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The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research to conduct a thorough, independent study of the workers' disability 
prevention and compensation system in Victoria. The methodology of this study is derived 
from a decade-long series of over 20 studies published in the United States by the Workers 
Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) of Cambridge, Massachusetts. The overall series is 
designed to assist public policy makers and other interested participants in making informed 
comparisons across jurisdictions. For that reason, the studies of individual systems use a 
common outline and, to the extent possible, address the same basic issues of workers' 
compensation system structure and function.
The Upjohn Institute, in partnership with the Workers' Compensation Board of British 
Columbia, Canada, expanded the methodology over the past 5 years to encompass the 
Canadian workers' compensation environment, and also broadened it to include issues of 
funding, health care, rehabilitation, and occupational safety and health. Now we have adapted 
this model to accommodate the unique features of the Victoria, Australia, workers' 
compensation system. This report focuses the model for the first time outside North America 
and also broadens the scope over any single previous study.
The research and analysis team included six workers' compensation experts; one 
Australian, two Canadians, and three from the United States. The authors drew on their 
experience with numerous similar studies and brought a collective total of well over 100 years 
of experience with workers' compensation and prevention issues to this task. During the winter 
of 1996, we conducted over 300 interviews with some 260 individuals who had substantial 
experience hi and around the Victorian workers' compensation and occupational safety and 
health systems.
The goal is to describe the operation of the system in such a way that the intelligent
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layperson can understand what it does and how it operates. We also endeavour to provide some 
comparative perspective with other jurisdictions where that is relevant or necessary. The 
descriptive material is for the Victorian system as it existed in July 1996, but historical data are 
generally presented for the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Because of the extensive changes in 
structure in 1992, this study offers an opportunity to review the operation of a workers' 
compensation system under two distinct regimes, as well as across varied economic and 
political climates. In the final chapter we also provide our perspective on areas that might need 
additional attention.
n. Structure
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) was created by the Accident Compensation 
(WorkCover) Act of 1992, which completely restructured the workers' compensation system in 
Victoria. The functions of the Authority are very comprehensive, ranging from administering 
the WorkCover Authority Fund and licensing and regulating authorised insurers to fostering a 
co-operative consultative relationship between management and labour in relation to the health, 
safety, and welfare of persons at work.
The Act also establishes the WorkCover Authority Fund. It receives premium income, 
investment income, penalties, and other income and is responsible for payment of 
compensation and other payments, such as the costs of the Health and Safety Division (and the 
predecessor Health and Safety Organisation), the costs of administration of the VWA, the costs 
of the Medical Panels, and the costs of the County Court, Magistrates' Court, and the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal arising from the operation of the Act.
The WorkCover Authority Fund operates as a re-insurer bearing the full underwriting 
risk of the scheme. The day-to-day collection of premiums and payment of compensation 
benefits under the Act are conducted by "authorised insurers." The Authority has the power to 
appoint and terminate such agents. In July 1996, there were 14 authorised insurers operating in 
Victoria. Their performance is monitored and regulated by the Scheme Regulation Division of 
the VWA.
The Health and Safety Division (HSD) is responsible for administering health and
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safety legislation in Victoria, primarily the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994. HSD undertakes 
activities aimed at improving health and safety in workplaces, strives to improve health and 
safety in the agricultural and farming sector, and facilitates public safety. A significant focus of 
HSD is regulating the transport, handling, and storage of dangerous goods and hazardous 
substances, including the notification and registration of premises and the licensing of drivers 
carrying dangerous goods.
The VWA has a comprehensive communications strategy which is designed to acquire 
and convey information to all major stakeholders. The stated purposes of this strategy are to 
create and maintain stakeholder support; minimise the frequency, severity and cost of 
workplace injuries; increase the rate at which injured employees return to work and improve 
their maintenance at work; and encourage quality service by insurers and providers. The 
VWA's Corporate Affairs Division has run a series of high-profile advertising campaigns 
aimed at establishing a sustained culture of safety within Victorian workplaces. The campaigns 
are grounded in comprehensive research and market testing. Their effectiveness is tested by 
market awareness surveys and changes in the number of recorded claims. Market awareness 
recently was found to be 80 percent, and a continued decrease in claims reported is attributed 
partly to the communication effort.
HI. Insurance Regulation
The underlying philosophy of the WorkCover scheme is important to understanding its 
regulatory institutions and evaluating their performance. The premise is that the state needs to 
bear the underwriting risk and closely manage the provision of workers' compensation 
insurance to ensure that coverage is readily available to all employers at the lowest possible 
cost while serving the overall social goals of the system. The shortcomings of the private 
system before 1985 are a legacy that helps to explain the perspective that the government needs 
to take a close hand in guiding the system. At the same time, the serious problems encountered 
with the public WorkCare system from 1985 through 1992 and the government's stated desire
xv
to return more autonomy to the private sector have resulted in the current mixed public-private 
WorkCover system.
In addition to administering the WorkCover scheme, the VWA performs some of the 
functions that might otherwise be performed by private insurers. These functions include 
bearing risk through reinsurance, pricing, funding claims, reserve analysis, investment 
management, and compilation and analysis of claims data. Insurers perform essentially all of 
the client service functions that would be performed in a traditional private insurance market 
environment. These functions include marketing, sales, underwriting, premium collection, loss 
prevention, claims adjustment and payments, litigation, case management, setting reserves, and 
data analysis and statistical reporting.
The VWA confronts a significant "principal-agent" problem in inducing authorised 
insurers to promote scheme objectives. In some respects, the VWA and insurers operate as 
partners in working together to provide workers' compensation insurance to employers and 
their workers. In other respects, the VWA acts like a traditional regulator in ensuring that 
insurers' actions comply with scheme requirements and serve the goals of the scheme. This 
gives rise to some regulatory issues for the VWA that are not present with pure private or pure 
government workers' compensation insurance systems.
The challenge for the VWA is to implement a cost-effective set of conduct and 
performance measures, regulations, agreements, standards, penalties, and rewards that will 
induce insurers and employers to maximise scheme objectives. The VWA's primary tools to 
influence insurer behaviour are (1) the licence agreement; (2) audits; (3) licence actions and 
penalties; and (4) the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme. With the exception of BPI, these 
mechanisms are more oriented towards conduct than outcomes.
The authority sets aside a certain amount of funds in a service fee pool which is 
allocated to insurers according to their market share for each quarter. For the 1995/96 financial 
year, the VWA allocated $72.3 million in service fees. The market share formula credits an 
insurer $115 for every policy it writes, plus 5.3 percent of the premiums derived from the 
policies. This effectively sets an average payment which each insurer receives for servicing a 
given policy or portfolio of policies.
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The Best Practice Incentive scheme sets performance standards and provides financial 
rewards to insurers for meeting these standards and/or improving their performance. For 1995- 
96 the measures were (1) the cost of claims as a percentage of industry premiums; (2) 
premiums collected as a percentage of the premiums to be collected; (3) the percentage of 
reported claims referred to conciliation; and (4) claims duration. Insurers receive points for 
meeting or exceeding performance benchmarks set by the VWA in monitored areas and 
financial rewards are paid according to the number of points an insurer receives. For the 
1995/96 financial year, the total BPI pool was $6 million although payments were reportedly 
less.
Employers are required to carry workers' compensation coverage, which they can 
purchase through an authorised insurer, or they can receive approval from the VWA to self- 
insure. Employers must take responsibility for compliance with statutory requirements, employ 
safety measures to reduce losses, and assist in returning injured employees to work. Producers, 
i.e., agents and brokers, serve as intermediaries between some employers and insurers and 
facilitate insurance transactions. Vendors of risk management, health care, and rehabilitation 
services function and compete much as they do in other systems.
The VWA determines the price or rate charged for workers' compensation insurance. 
This effectively eliminates direct price competition as a determinant of market performance. 
The rate to be charged is promulgated by the VWA in a "premiums order" every year. 
Victoria's pricing formula has been characterised as the purest experience rating system 
utilised in Australia. It uses an unweighted three-year average that balances sensitivity to 
changing experience against stability. The experience component is weighted by employer size 
(payroll), so that small employers' rates are based less on their own experience and more on 
the industry and class experience. With the exception of a $50 minimum premium, there are no 
size- or risk-related adjustments such as policy or loss constants, premium discounts, or 
schedule rating.
The overall cost of the WorkCover scheme is a principal concern of most stakeholders. 
Even workers and non-insurance providers have a stake in this, as rising costs will increase 
pressure to lower benefits and services. To the extent that costs can be minimised by effective
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loss prevention and return-to-work strategies, more resources are available to pay benefits and 
provide additional services to injured workers.
The decrease in the published rate from 2.4 percent of payroll in 1987 to 1.80 percent 
in 1997 combined with the elimination of a massive unfunded liability is a remarkable 
accomplishment; the latter is the lowest rate among Australian states. Over the period 1994- 
1996, the average annual ratio of claims payments to premiums was 81.1 percent. This ratio 
suggests a relatively efficient level of performance that is commensurate with the experience in 
competitive workers' compensation insurance markets hi North America.
Several factors have contributed to this improvement. One is system reforms under 
WorkCover supported by the public communication strategy mentioned earlier. Another is 
refinement of the pricing formula and experience rating system to increase employers' 
incentives to reduce losses. A third factor is VWA and insurer efforts to encourage loss 
prevention and improve case management. Public dissatisfaction with the abuses under 
WorkCare and the change in the culture pervading workers' compensation insurance have also 
helped to discourage "rorting" of the system.
IV. Weekly Benefits
A worker is entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act if there is 
an injury arising out of or in the course of employment and if the worker's employment was a 
significant contributing factor. A worker's dependents are entitled to compensation if an injury 
arising out of or in the course of employment was a significant contributing factor in, results 
in, or materially contributes to the death of the worker.
There is a requirement that notice of injury be given to the employer. A claim for 
compensation for weekly benefits must be served as soon as practicable, for death benefits 
within 2 years after the date of death, and for medical and like services within 6 months after 
the date of the service. A claim for weekly benefits must be accompanied by a certificate 
issued by a medical practitioner.
In a claim for weekly payments, the employer must accept or reject the claim within 10 
days of its receipt. The employer must forward to the insurer any claim for benefits for death,
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maims, or for medical and like services within 10 days of receipt of the claim. Claims for 
weekly benefits need to be forwarded to the insurer where either the employer rejects the claim 
or the claim is likely to exceed the employer's responsibility of $416 in 1996-97 (indexed 
annually).
An employer's decision to accept or reject a claim does not prejudice the insurer's 
decision as to liability. The insurer has 28 days from the date of receipt of the claim to accept 
or reject the claim and to give the worker written notice of the decision. If no written notice is 
given within that time, the claim is deemed to be accepted. Reasons for a decision to reject the 
claim must be given.
An injured worker entitled to weekly compensation under WorkCover will receive a 
benefit that is tied to his/her pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). The PIAWE is the 
worker's average weekly earnings for the previous 12 months, if employed continuously by 
that employer. It is calculated at the worker's ordinary time rate of pay for the worker's 
normal number of hours per week. Allowances such as overtime payments, shift differentials, 
hazard duty allowances or dirt money are not included in considering the injured worker's 
PIAWE. All weekly benefit payments are treated as ordinary taxable income.
Weekly benefits are paid according to three distinct phases, i.e., the first 26 weeks of 
incapacity, after 26 weeks of incapacity, and after 104 weeks in which a weekly benefit has 
been paid or is payable to the worker. During the first 26 weeks of incapacity, the worker is 
entitled to the lesser of 95 percent of his/her PIAWE or the weekly maximum benefit ($664 per 
week as of 1 July 1996). Cash benefits for the first 10 days of incapacity are the responsibility 
of the employer, not of the insurer, and are referred to as the "employer excess." Though 
employers may select a "buy-out" option that will insure them for the first 10 days of benefits, 
few employers choose to purchase it. It is the practice in many industries for employers to 
"top-up" the benefit to 100 percent of pre-injury earnings, at least for the first 26 weeks. If the 
worker is partially incapacitated, the worker is entitled either to the difference between $664 
and the worker's earnings, or to the difference between 95 percent of the PIAWE and 
earnings, whichever is lesser.
The most significant feature of Victoria's benefit scheme, and unique in Australia (or
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elsewhere so far as we know), is an adjustment of the benefit at 26 weeks according to whether 
or not the worker has a "serious injury." Workers with a "serious injury" qualify for a weekly 
benefit of 90 percent of PIAWE, subject to the weekly maximum. Workers with a partial 
disability that is not deemed "serious" receive only 60 percent of PIAWE. Workers who are 
deemed "totally incapacitated" qualify for a weekly benefit of 70 percent of PIAWE. This 
means that a judgment needs to be made at this stage regarding the degree of the worker's 
impairment. This provision is designed to foster a significant incentive to return to work for 
those who might be able to do so after 26 weeks, without placing that pressure on persons with 
more significant impairments.
The "serious injury" threshold for purposes of the 26-week rate adjustment is an 
impairment that is rated at 30 percent or more by the standard of the American Medical 
Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (2nd edition). The presence 
of a "serious injury" is also a necessary condition for a worker to have access to the common 
law remedy. The 1992 law also provided that weekly benefits would be terminated after 104 
weeks of incapacity, unless either of two situations existed at that point. Weekly benefits would 
not be terminated at 104 weeks if the worker was either "seriously injured" or totally and 
permanently incapacitated. Thus, only workers with 30 percent impairment or greater receive 
benefits beyond 2 years.
Since enactment of the 1992 legislation, aggregate payments for weekly benefits have 
fallen sharply. First, the number of new claims for benefits declined significantly in the period 
after 1 December 1992 to less than half the previous level by 1995-96. Second, the number of 
long-term recipients has been reduced by 40 percent, a major goal of the 1992 change. 
Additionally, WorkCover has been able to shorten the average length of time that persons stay 
on weekly benefits. Weekly benefit payments constituted 36 percent of claim costs in 1995-96 
totalling $259 million.
The success in curbing long-term claims (claims with over 260 days of compensation) is 
quite remarkable. Long-term claims were developing at a rate of 5,000-6,000 per year in the 
decade before WorkCover's enactment. By 1993-94, the rate had fallen below 2,000 per year,
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and it has continued to drop since. In December 1992, there were 16,600 long-term claims 
open in Victoria. By 30 June 1996, the number of open long-term claims was 9,997.
V. Maims
The Table of Maims lists 46 impairments ranging in severity from quadriplegia or the 
total loss of two limbs or both eyes, to the loss of a joint of a lesser toe. The maximum benefit 
payable for a maim, as of 1 July 1996 is $102,460. For each impairment, a percentage or 
range of percentages is listed. For example, the total loss of the right arm is listed as 80 
percent. Thus, a worker who lost the right arm would be entitled to a lump sum benefit of 
$81,968 (0.8 x $102,460). If the worker lost a fraction of the arm, that fraction, applied to 
$81,968 would be the maims benefit paid as a lump sum. This would be in addition to any 
weekly benefits that the worker received, and the worker also might seek further compensation 
under common law.
In Victoria, no-fault pain and suffering benefits were expressly included in the 1992 
legislation. Benefits under this section are available only to workers with injuries listed in the 
Table of Maims. In keeping with several significant features of the WorkCover law, a benefit 
for pain and suffering is available only to workers whose maun has been a significant one. As 
of 1 July 1996, the threshold for access to a benefit for pain and suffering is a maims award of 
$11,000 or higher. Thus, a worker with a non-back impairment rated at below 11 percent, or 
an 18 percent back impairment (yielding less than an 11 percent whole person rating) is not 
entitled to an award.
Lump sum maims benefits have grown substantially over time. One simple measure of 
this is the changing value of total maims payments per year from $5.2 million in 1986-87 to 
$104.1 million hi 1995-96. In recent years, a significant portion of the increase has been 
associated with benefits for pain and suffering. However, it is also due simply to the growth in 
maims payment claims. Maims payments constituted 14 percent of claim payments in 1995-96.
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VI. Medical and Like Benefits
Workers in Victoria who sustain a work injury have free choice of their medical 
provider. The injured worker is entitled to have the reasonable costs of medical and like 
services paid fully. Medical services are defined in the law and include the attendance, 
examination or treatment of any kind of medical practitioner, or a (registered) dentist, 
optometrist, physiotherapist, chiropractor, osteopath or chiropodist. In addition, medicines, 
appliances, and prostheses are covered, as are other services that are not defined but are 
available if they have been requested by a medical practitioner. For a worker who receives 
compensation only for medical and like services (i.e., no weekly benefits), benefits cease 52 
weeks after the date of injury.
There was rapid growth hi medical and like services costs from 1986-87 to 1992-93, 
with much of the growth occurring early in that period. In the past 3 years, under WorkCover, 
health care costs have fallen substantially. Much of the decline is associated with the reduction 
in claims for compensation that occurred in the wake of the 1992 legislation. Some of the 
decline reflects the increased employer deductible for medical and like services, which has 
been increased annually since 1986 through indexation. As of 1 July 1996, it stood at $416. 
Though aggregate expenditures paid for medical and like services have declined, they have not 
declined as rapidly as claims have. Medical and rehabilitation costs constituted 18 percent of 
system claim costs in 1995-96.
VII. Dispute Resolution
The agency does not adjudicate disputes. Instead, the WorkCover Authority seeks to 
minimise the incidence of disputes and, when they arise, to have them settled rapidly by the 
parties with a minimum of transaction costs. Where that does not succeed, as must occur on 
occasion, the dispute is resolved in the courts.
To assist the parties and achieve their goals, the VWA depends heavily on a system of 
Medical Panels, in order to bring to bear some objectivity and professional expertise on 
disputes arising over medical matters. A quasi-independent Conciliation Service is empowered 
to assist the parties in finding common ground. Disputes that are not resolved at that stage, and
xxi i
those emanating from common law actions enter the court process. A small number of disputes 
over some specialized issues can be resolved, if not at the Conciliation Service, at the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The purpose of the Conciliation Service is to help the parties resolve their disputes, 
thereby eliminating the need to litigate the matter at court. It functions by involving workers, 
employers, and insurers hi an informal and non-adversarial process that aims to lead to a 
mutually acceptable agreement.
Most requests for conciliation are initiated by workers who have been advised by the 
insurer of a decision that is regarded as adverse to them. However, any party to a dispute, i.e., 
the insurer, the employer, the worker, or the Authority, may refer a matter to conciliation. A 
party has 60 days from notice by the insurer of its decision to lodge a request for conciliation. 
When a "Request for Conciliation" form is submitted, a referral certificate is issued within 7 
days, putting all parties on notice. On occasion, this will be sufficient to cause the disputing 
parties to agree to settle, particularly where such cases may involve not a dispute so much as 
the need for clarification or a better explanation of a decision. After the initial 7 days have 
passed, a date is set for a conciliation conference.
The Conciliation Conference will bring together the insurer, the worker, and frequently 
the employer. The worker and the employer are entitled to be accompanied by a friend or 
relative or some other person to assist them at the conference. Union representatives, for 
example, often serve as an assistant for the worker. Significantly, neither a worker nor an 
employer is entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor. If a party wishes to have their solicitor 
present, approval must be given by both the contending party and the Conciliation Officer. 
Such requests can and have been granted, particularly where it seems clear that the opportunity 
to reach a settlement is greater where the worker has ready access to counsel.
If a solicitor does join the worker at a Conciliation Conference, his/her fee cannot be 
paid by the contending party. Since costs are not allowed as part of the conciliation process, 
either the worker must pay the solicitor or the solicitor must offer to serve without pay. Some 
solicitors say that they charge no fee for conciliation work where the client is a member of 
certain labour unions.
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The Conciliation Conference may enable the parties to move to an agreement. In some 
cases, the agreement is shaped at the conference. In other instances, negotiations between the 
parties may occur after the conference has occurred, possibly prior to a scheduled subsequent 
conference. If the dispute involves a medical question, the Conciliation Officer may refer it to 
a Medical Panel.
It is quite remarkable that this agency operates with virtually no backlog and that it can 
generally accommodate the rigorous requirement that applications be conferenced within 28 
days of their receipt. In its first 2 years, between 80 and 85 percent of its cases (excluding 
applications where conciliation did not proceed or there was no jurisdiction) were resolved, 
dropping to 65 percent in 1994-95 and 67 percent in 1995-96. This is an impressive 
performance.
Medical Panels are independent of the VWA, though their budget flows from it. The 
primary responsibility of a medical panel is to give its opinion on any medical question. The 
definition of "medical question" consists of 9 items identified in the statute. A Conciliation 
Officer, the County Court, the VWA, or an authorised insurer or self-insurer may require a 
worker seeking or receiving compensation to submit themselves for examination by a Medical 
Panel. If the worker unreasonably refuses to meet the Panel and answer its questions, to supply 
relevant documents to the Panel, or to submit to a medical examination by a member of the 
Panel, the worker may lose the right to payments or have them suspended.
The Panel can consist of one to three members. Each Panel member examines the 
patient, usually separately. After examination of the claimant and an evaluation of any relevant 
material supplied, each Panel member prepares a preliminary report. These reports are 
exchanged, and based upon subsequent communication between or among the panelists, a 
consensus is reached, which serves as the basis for the Panel's findings.
The opinion of the Medical Panel is binding on the insurer. Once the Panel's certificate 
is issued, the insurer must make an offer within 14 days that is consistent with (or better than) 
the Panel's findings. However, the Panel's opinion is not binding on the claimant. If the 
dispute remains, i.e., the insurer's offer is not acceptable to the claimant, the Conciliation 
Service may become involved.
XXIV
One goal of the Medical Panels has been to expedite the resolution of disputes. The 
statute provides some tight time lines for this process. A Medical Panel must form its opinion, 
in the form of a certificate, within 21 days after the referral is made. Further, the Panel has 
7 days after forming its opinion to provide it to the relevant persons. This has proven to be 
infeasible, and sizable delays exist in the process. In 1995-96, the median delay had grown to 
160 days. There are several reasons for this, but a key has been that the system has been vastly 
overburdened since 1994 by a requirement (introduced in 1994) that maims disputes be 
referred to a Medical Panel before proceeding to court.
In 1996, the Act was amended to refer claims for maims to the Conciliation Service 
rather than Medical Panels. Though the Conciliation Officer may refer disputes over "medical 
questions " to a Medical Panel and the opinion of the Panel is binding on the parties, 
detennining the extent of disability under Section 98 or of pain and suffering under Section 
98A are not "medical questions." Also, the courts have not been completely supportive 
regarding the binding nature of the findings on the parties.
VIII. Common Law
Though access to the common law on behalf of employees against their employers is 
absolutely barred in many jurisdictions, the Australian experience is more of a continuum; 
such actions are barred completely in South Australia and the Northern Territory; with limited 
access or benefits hi Victoria, the Commonwealth (Comcare, SeaCare), New South Wales, and 
Western Australia; and unlimited access or benefits in Queensland, Tasmania, and the 
Australian Capitol Territory.
Access to common law was generally narrowed by the WorkCover legislation, though 
elements of the law did broaden some parts of it. The law was enlarged to give workers access 
to common law for damages to their loss of earning capacity. However, damages can be 
awarded against an employer in such cases only where they exceed $32,860; a cap on such 
damages is set at $739,690 for 1996-97. Common law damages for pain and suffering also are 
not to be awarded if damages are assessed at less than $32,860. The ceiling on common law 
awards for pain and suffering is $333,420 as of 1 July 1996.
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The most significant change with WorkCover was the requirement that the injury be 
found to be a "serious injury" in order for the worker to have access to damages under 
common law. A huge inflow of claims for damages in late 1992 and early 1993 primarily were 
from those who believed that they would not be found to have a serious injury, thereby 
becoming ineligible for common law recovery for injuries after the effective date of 
WorkCover. Of course, the question of "serious injury" simply deals with the issue of access, 
and not with the need to prove negligence, the amount of damages, or the need to prove that 
the employment was a "substantial contributing factor."
With WorkCover, the expectation was that the number of common law cases would 
drop off precipitously. Although a substantial reduction has occurred over what would have 
been the expected volume in the absence of the 1992 legislation, workers' solicitors have 
learned how to widen access to the common law. This, in combination with certain judicial 
determinations, has meant that common law still represents an important component of work 
injury compensation in Victoria. Common law damage payments and associated legal costs 
constituted about 19 percent of claim costs in 1995-96.
IX. Courts
With only a few exceptions, the Courts (Magistrates' and County) of Victoria are 
empowered to determine any matter or question under the Workers' Compensation Act 1958 or 
the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (as amended). The Magistrates' Court cannot hear death 
claims, and it is limited to matters and directions concerning sums not to exceed $40,000 or 
104 weeks of weekly benefits. Except for claims for death benefits, proceedings must not 
commence in Magistrates' or County Courts unless the matter has been referred to conciliation 
and either 28 days have expired since the date of referral or a Conciliation Officer has issued a 
certificate indicating that all action in respect of conciliation has been taken.
A party to proceedings before the County Court may appeal a decision to the Court of 
Appeal/Supreme Court on a question of law. That party has 21 days from the date of the 
determination to serve notice of their intent to appeal. The appeal application must be lodged 
within 6 months of either the determination being appealed or the leave obtained to appeal by
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the Supreme Court. The County Court's determination is not stayed by the filing of a notice of 
an intent to appeal or the lodging of the appeal. However, if a County Court's determination to 
pay compensation benefits (other than weekly benefits) is appealed, it will allow payment to be 
postponed, depending upon the progress of and the outcome of the appeal.
In proceedings regarding maims and pain and suffering, where the judgment for 
payment of compensation by the Court is equal to or less that the final offer made by the 
insurer, the Court must order that the worker pay the insurer's costs, and it must not order that 
the insurer pay the worker's costs. Where the insurer's final offer is less than the amount 
ordered by the Court, the County Court must order that the insurer pay the worker's costs.
X. Occupational Rehabilitation
Physical, psychological, and occupational rehabilitation are provided for within the 
legislation; hi the Victorian context "occupational rehabilitation" refers to specific, defined 
services within the general rubric of rehabilitation. The current status of occupational 
rehabilitation services in Victoria also must be read in light of the evolution from its 
predecessor, the WorkCare organisation. Many of the features, processes, and outcomes are a 
direct response to the perceived shortcomings of earlier systems.
Return to work with the accident employer is the over-riding goal, and this message is 
reflected hi legislation, publications, and policies. As a regulator rather than a provider of 
rehabilitation services, the VWA's imperative is to set standards of service, monitor 
compliance, and ensure equitable outcomes. As the manager of the central fund, the scheme 
must also pay for the services (through the insurers), maintain adequate reserves for current 
and future rehabilitation costs, and monitor both utilisation and outcomes.
Financial benefits for workers engaged in rehabilitation activities are identical to the 
benefits prescribed for all workers under the Act. Benefits continue for a period of up to 1 
year, while engaged in authorised occupational rehabilitation activities. The cooperation of the 
worker is mandated by the Act, which requires a worker to make every "reasonable effort" to 
return to work a in suitable employment" and to participate in occupational rehabilitation 
service or a return-to-work plan. "Suitable employment" is defined as work for which the
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worker is suited having regard to the nature of the worker's incapacity and pre-injury 
employment, age, education, skills, work experience, place of residence, medical condition, 
return-to-work plan, and occupational rehabilitation services being provided. The definition 
specifically adds "whether or not that work is available."
One of the most notable aspects of the system is the high level of responsibility that the 
scheme places on employers. Where the Disability Management movement internationally and 
the Total Injury Management concept defined by the Heads of Workers Compensation 
Authorities' National Consistency Programme (HWCA, 1996) encourage return-to-work and 
occupational rehabilitation, the legislation and policies of the VWA mandate these as employer 
responsibilities. The insurer's role is supportive and facilitative to the employer's 
responsibility. With few exceptions, employers are required to make all initial payments for 
medical and like costs, including rehabilitation costs. These expenditures count towards the 
employer's "deductible" of $416 in 1996-97.
By 20 calendar days following an injury, an employer must prepare a return-to-work 
plan and nominate a return-to-work coordinator. Within a 90-day period after that, an 
employer must establish a written occupational rehabilitation plan in consultation with the 
worker. It includes a statement of the employer's return-to-work policy, the name of the 
return-to-work coordinator, and at least one provider of occupational rehabilitation services. 
The plan must include an estimated return-to-work date, an offer of suitable employment, and 
the steps to be taken to facilitate the worker's return, including any occupational rehabilitation 
services that are reasonably necessary to assist the worker in returning to and remaining at 
work.
Workers are entitled to return to work within 12 months with the accident employer in 
suitable employment. The employer, however, can be relieved of this responsibility if it can 
satisfy the Authority that it is "not possible for the employer to provide suitable employment." 
Failure to re-employ a worker may result in penalties of up to $25,000.
In Victoria, there is also a significant number of workers whose injury is profound, 
resulting in total permanent impairment. Many of these cases have been inherited from 
previous incarnations of the workers' compensation system in Victoria. In many cases, the
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employer is no longer active. The direction, management, and administration of the worker's 
ongoing needs is a shared responsibility between the authorised insurer and the VWA. Either 
may contract for occupational rehabilitation or other rehabilitation services for these workers.
Cases that have needs beyond the defined occupational rehabilitation services may be 
referred to community-based programmes and services, some of which are funded by the 
VWA. These agencies may offer support and services to the injured worker, family members, 
and others who may be affected by the injury but who are beyond the scope of the Act.
The overall "return to work rate" (RTW) for the VWA is reported at 86 percent for 
1995-96 a figure that compares well with other jurisdictions (including South Australia and 
New South Wales) and is a startling improvement over the 54 percent RTW rate reported 
under the WorkCare system in 1992. The quality of these RTW rates are also relatively high, 
with same employer/same duties placement at 66 percent.
XI. Prevention
The Health and Safety Division of the VWA (HSD), formerly the independent Health 
and Safety Organization, derives its authority from several pieces of legislation, including the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994, Dangerous 
Goods Act 1985, and Road Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1994, Collectively, these acts 
impose duties on employers, manufacturers and suppliers of plant and chemicals, and 
occupiers of premises to achieve and maintain general health and safety standards. The acts 
provide a broad framework for the imposition of specific regulatory controls.
The participation of workers in decisions concerning their own health and safety at 
work is central to the strategy for prevention. This is achieved through the election of health 
and safety representatives (HSRs) and the establishment of health and safety committees in 
individual workplaces. Through negotiation between employers and their workers, designated 
work groups (DWGs) may be established in workplaces from which health and safety 
representatives are elected by the workers. The Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 
provides such representatives the right to inspect any part of the workplace at which members 
of the relevant DWG work, receive relevant information, and be consulted on proposed
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changes to the workplace that may affect health and safety. HSRs may even issue a provisional 
improvement notice to the employer if they believe that the Act or regulations are being 
contravened. This requires the employer to rectify the breach within a specified time frame. 
The employer has the right of appeal to an HSD inspector.
The Act also provides for HSRs to be involved in the resolution of health and safety 
issues in the workplace. It envisages employers and workers agreeing on procedures for the 
resolution of issues; if there are no agreed procedures, the OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations 
1989 provide a procedure. Where there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of any 
person, the HSR may stop the work following consultation with the employer's representative. 
Health and safety committees may also be established at the request of the HSR. The 
composition, role, and function of these committees is flexible in the Act, which sets out only 
minimum requirements. It is for the parties in the workplace to agree on what is most 
appropriate for their circumstances.
The law provides for penalties for contravention of the Act or regulations. These 
penalties are currently set at a maximum of $40,000 for bodies corporate and $10,000 for 
individuals. For certain serious breaches the maximum is set at $250,000 for bodies corporate 
and $50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 5 years for individuals. Additional summary 
penalties may be imposed for repeat offenders. There is also a provision for infringement 
notices (on-the-spot fines), but regulations to give effect to this provision have not been 
promulgated.
A separate Dangerous Goods Act covers the special nature of risks arising from 
dangerous goods (e.g., explosives, flammable materials, and corrosive substances). It applies 
generally both to workplace and non-workplace situations. The Equipment (Public Safety) Act 
mirrors the provisions of the OHS Act in relation to prescribed equipment operated in non- 
workplace situations. It places duties on proprietors, manufacturers, designers, importers, 
suppliers, and persons in charge of prescribed equipment.
The VWA's decisions about the suitability of health and safety issues for regulation are 
primarily guided by decisions taken by the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC). NOHSC develops National Standards which are then implemented by
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the various jurisdictions in the way that is most appropriate within their own legislative 
frameworks.
WorkCover inspectors have the power to visit any place in Victoria covered by the 
health and safety Acts. The legislation provides inspectors with broad and far-reaching powers. 
They have the right of entry, without the need for a search warrant, to workplaces and to sites 
where there is high-risk equipment or dangerous goods. They can exercise this right at all 
reasonable times, both day and night. It is a violation for anyone to refuse access to an 
inspector, or to obstruct, hinder, or oppose an inspector. In conducting a visit, an inspector can 
be assisted by other people, including technical or scientific experts, interpreters, or police 
officers.
The VWA has an extensive database which it uses to target its prevention activities. 
HSD uses the data to develop a list of the top 20 injury-producing industries each year, to 
assist in targeting both high-risk industries and specific high-incidence injuries within these. 
The Division recognises that this system is not capable of providing targeting data by 
enterprise or workplace, however. To correct this shortcoming, a new system called SATS 
(Site Assessment Targeting System) has been developed to record inspector assessments of a 
workplace's risk elements (hygiene, plant, manual handling, dangerous goods, location), health 
and safety management system, compliance performance, and risk control measures. The 
objective is to develop a profile or scorecard for each site and to use this as a guide to target 
future interventions.
HSD provides a full range of services including inspection, investigation, information, 
advisory, licensing, and training. They are resourced with 304 people, of which 170 are field 
inspectors and 15 are information officers. These 185 positions deliver the front-line service. 
In the period March 1995 through February 1996, inspections totalled 46,141.
XE. Attention Points
These attention points are identified as such because they represent special strengths of 
the system or because they warrant, at least in our opinion, additional attention by those who 
seek to improve the system. We hope that the issues we identify for attention here will resonate
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with decision makers in Victoria. However, we purposely do not prescribe cures for problems 
identified; we believe this is the responsibility of the stakeholders in the system.
For purposes of exposition, we have grouped our observations into the broad categories 
of (1) general issues; (2) insurer regulation issues; (3) compensation issues; (4) rehabilitation 
issues; and (5) prevention issues. Within each of these categories, the attention points are 
numbered for convenient reference. However, the points are not presented in priority order.
General (G)
We begin with a set of observations that relate to the general approach and the 
accomplishments of the VWA over the period from late 1992 to the present.
G-l. Amazing Transformation
In just a few short years, the VWA has transformed a workers' compensation system 
characterised by a "compo" philosophy, uncontrolled claims incidence, excessive durations of 
disability, and runaway costs to one that appears to be sustaining a level of performance that 
would have been unimaginable 5 years ago. The leadership of the VWA and the Ministry 
deserve much of the credit for this turnaround. Their vision and consistency of purpose have 
been remarkable.
G-2. Historical Opportunity
While much has been accomplished, this is not the time for the VWA to rest on its 
laurels. The merger of the former Health and Safety Organisation and the VWA in 1996 
creates a historical opportunity for a thorough and careful rethinking of system parameters. 
Bringing the mission and operations of HSD into the VWA will prove challenging, but if it can 
be done with the kind of creative thinking that has characterised the past 5 years, it can move 
the entire organisation to new heights of achievement.
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G-3. Cultural Change through Media
We are not aware of any other workers' compensation system in the world that has used 
media more aggressively or more effectively than has the VWA. Their use of the power of the 
media to effect a reversal in the "compo" culture that characterised Victoria's workers' 
compensation system previously is unprecedented, and a valuable model for other systems 
around the world.
G-4. Stakeholder Input
Our interviews revealed that labour and management, as well as other stakeholders, 
have perceived a problem over consultation with the VWA and policy makers. We believe the 
system hi Victoria has matured sufficiently that further improvements will depend upon 
participation and ownership by stakeholders. Thus, it seems that it is time to move to a more 
open, consultative policy development process.
Insurer Regulation (I)
There are a number of issues which emerged from our review of the insurer regulation 
procedures at the VWA. It is difficult to forecast how future policy changes may impact the 
role of the VWA, given the uncertainties about possible changes in regulatory policies and 
mechanisms and the possibility of further privatisation of the provision of insurance services. 
We have tried to formulate attention points that address these uncertainties, as well as the 
eventual operational issues that will emerge from the political decisions about the relative roles 
of the insurers and the VWA.
1-1. Improvements in Scheme Performance
The success of the WorkCover scheme is partly attributable to more sophisticated 
regulatory mechanisms, as well as the development of insurers' capabilities. But Victoria may 
be approaching the limits of what can be achieved from the current principle-agent framework. 
In looking towards the future, policy makers will need to carefully assess the potential further
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gains from this arrangement against those offered by alternative models, including those that 
return greater responsibility and choice to the private sector.
1-2. Role and Expectations for Authorised Insurers
A certain degree of ambiguity is inherent in a system where the government and 
insurers share responsibility for providing workers' compensation insurance. However, this 
ambiguity has been exacerbated by communication problems, political uncertainty about the 
future role of insurers, and economic incentives that are sometimes inconsistent with the 
expressed goals of the system. It would be very helpful if these uncertainties could be resolved 
and all insurers understood the shape of the future in Victoria's workers' compensation market.
1-3. Relations Between the VWA and Insurers
We believe the relationship between the VWA and insurers is more adversarial than is 
appropriate for their shared responsibilities. The development of institutional practices that 
would facilitate better communication and joint problem resolution could improve VWA- 
insurer relations and contribute significantly to improved scheme performance.
1-4. Economic Incentives
The combination of experience rating and competition among insurers for employers' 
business is intended to encourage insurers to provide high-quality service, and to work with 
employers to contain costs. However, it is not clear that the incentives contained in VWA's 
pricing, remuneration, and regulatory schemes always encourage the return-to-work goal. The 
management of long-term claims and severely injured workers also will continue to be a 
problem without incentives specifically focused to address these objectives.
1-5. Insurer Quality of Service and Performance
VWA statistics indicate significant variation among insurers in several important 
service measures. If better service performance (considering an insurer's specific risk and 
claim portfolio) can be adequately compensated, insurers would have a greater incentive to
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pursue the performance goals of the system. We would urge the adoption of a continuous 
improvement model for all insurers, in addition to the implicit bench marking and relatively 
crude financial incentives currently underlying the regulatory regime.
1-6. Insurer Audits
Fully engaging insurers in a collective evaluation of the programme could help to ease 
their concerns and further support partnering with VWA. Of course, the VWA and insurers 
also need to be willing to pay to recruit and retain better qualified auditors, and to commit to 
longer-term contracts which would support additional capacity development by vendors of 
auditing services.
1-7. Pricing and System Costs
We fear that the promotion of a low workers' compensation insurance rate increases the 
pressure on the government to sacrifice other objectives to maintain that rate. Efforts to keep 
rates low should not be allowed to mask trends with respect to system costs or other emerging 
problems, which might delay recognition and implementation of remedial measures. While the 
goal of maintaining a low premium rate is laudable, it needs to be balanced against other 
scheme goals and the costs which may be externalised to employers, workers, or others in the 
community.
1-8. Scheme Information
Insurers' ability to compete and provide high-quality service is heavily dependent on 
their access to information. It is not clear to us that a summary database would provide 
sufficient detail to enable insurers to supplement their own data to develop a proper rate 
structure, nor allow the VWA sufficient insight into insurer performance to support their 
regulatory functions. The opportunities for "database synergy" with HSD should also not be 
overlooked. The potential contribution of analysing claims information jointly with 
occupational health and safety information would seem to argue for retaining an establishment
xxxv
level database under VWA control. Thus, we urge the VWA to carefully consider the strategic 
and tactical implications of the regulatory database proposals.
1-9. Consumer Information
Buyers need reliable, user-friendly information on the performance dimensions within 
which insurers compete. Lack of access to this information in the past has probably contributed 
to the inertia in employers' movement to better performing insurers. The VWA's plan to 
publicize insurer performance data should help to address this deficiency and, thereby, enhance 
competition and scheme performance.
I-10. Self-Insurance and Self-Administration
It is reasonable to consider ways to enhance employers' incentives to contain costs by 
allowing them to bear greater risk and/or be more actively involved in managing their claims. 
Of course there must be safeguards to ensure that only economically-viable employers are 
allowed to self-insure and to avoid unfunded obligations for the scheme. The expansion of self- 
insurance will also exacerbate the "missing data" problem. Self-insured employer's 
experiences should be part of the system database for analytical and comparative purposes.
1-11. Coordination of Federal and State Regulatory Responsibilities
If changes are made that would permit authorised insurers to bear more risk, the VWA 
and the ISC will need to reconcile their respective oversight functions to ensure that solvency 
issues would not slip between jurisdictions and place the VWA or policyholders at risk.
1-12. Other Issues With Respect to Privatisation
The prospects for privatisation initiatives are uncertain, but the VWA will likely 
implement several measures to improve economic incentives and increase insurers' 
responsibilities even if full privatisation is not achieved. Uncertainty about the future may be 
the most significant challenge facing insurers. Resolving this issue and developing a shared
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vision of the future structure of the scheme among all the stakeholders would facilitate better 
planning, investment, and other changes necessary to achieve scheme goals.
Compensation Issues (C)
We take the basic structure of compensation as "given"; that is, we assume that the 
political leaders in Victoria have structured the benefits to accord with current Australian 
realities. However, there are still a multitude of issues which arise, and we have a number of 
observations in the area of compensation.
C-l. WorkCover Goals Have Been Met
The legislation that created this new scheme sought to remedy certain perceived 
problems. Among the objectives were to reduce the number of claims for compensation, to 
shorten the average period of time for which workers would collect weekly benefits and, 
especially, to decrease the number of long-term beneficiaries. The WorkCover system has 
accomplished each of these goals.
C-2. The Erosion of the "Serious Injury" Threshold
The potential expansion of the concept of serious injury is a considerable threat to the 
current cost levels of the system. Leaving this decision in the hands of the court system also 
may not be the most effective way of dealing with the social equity and efficiency issues 
involved.
C-3. Consistency and Comprehensiveness of the Table of Maims
There are a number of inconsistencies in the treatment of maims in Victoria. There are 
also some surprising omissions from the Table of Maims. Combined with an update to a later 
edition of the AMA Guides, it would be appropriate to reexamine the equity aspects of the 
current benefit structure for maims.
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C-4. Terminating Weekly Benefits
Terminating weekly benefits is a difficult problem for most workers' compensation 
systems because of the difficulty of balancing the needs of workers and employers. The 
Conciliation Service in Victoria has managed to arrange and conduct conferences very 
promptly, thereby minimising the difficulties that either side might have to endure from the 
termination process. The significance of maintaining this access should not be minimised.
C-5. The Injured Workers' Wage Level May Need Consideration
A feature of Victoria's law is that the calculation of the weekly benefit takes no account 
of an employee's pay for overtime, shift differential, hazard duty allowance or dirt money. For 
workers that are accustomed to such payments, their true wage replacement rate is lower than 
that of a fellow employee who does not regularly receive such earnings. It seems difficult to 
justify this disparate treatment.
C-6. Payments for Maims Have Been Growing
The WorkCover law has been able to reduce the availability of lump sum payments. 
However, it has not been able entirely to eliminate lump sum settlements. Other jurisdictions 
have found that where the practice of lump sum settlements has existed, it becomes a familiar 
and convenient tool for the parties to use, and is extremely difficult to eradicate. Clearly these 
issues need to be reexamined in the current, successful workers' compensation environment.
C-7. Problems in the Setting of Reasonable Medical and Like Fees
Negotiations over fee schedules have been contentious. The process of rationalizing and 
negotiating these fees needs attention. All parties will benefit if these changes materialized as 
part of a carefully considered package, with extensive public consultation, rather than 
emerging on a piecemeal ad-hoc basis.
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C-8. The Medical Panels Have Been Overburdened
The medical panel scheme has been well designed and could be a highly useful source 
of dispute resolution. However, the extraordinary bulge in the workload of panels because of 
their use in maims disputes has exacted a severe price. It would seem more appropriate to 
confine the Medical Panels to areas where their expertise could really make a difference.
Rehabilitation Issues (R)
Occupational rehabilitation in Victoria has a narrower and more constrained focus than 
in some other jurisdictions. This results in large part from the perceived excesses under the 
WorkCare regime from 1985-92. Accepting this reality, we find there are also a number of 
issues hi the occupational rehabilitation area that need scrutiny.
R-l. Focus on Return to Work
The VWA's success in changing expectations of both workers and employers towards 
early return to work is remarkable. The VWA has been highly effective in getting this key 
message across in its policies, its media campaigns, and in its dealings with stakeholders. They 
have achieved a return-to-work focus second to none.
R-2. Rehabilitation as an Employer Responsibility
In many ways, the policies of the VWA have operationalised the ideals of the disability 
management movement. Employers in Victoria generally accept that they are responsible for 
returning workers to their employment. However, the size of an enterprise will inherently limit 
its flexibility to accommodate workers with disabilities. Additional assistance will be needed if 
smaller employers are to attain the return-to-work goal as well.
R-3. Return-to-work Coordinator
This innovation has been successful with large employers where the investment is 
justified. But the lack of a sufficiently skilled RTW coordinator can adversely affect 
rehabilitation outcomes either through delay in recovery or through an inappropriate early
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return to work. Wherever there is an infrequent need for such specialised skills, as with small 
employers, it may be more effective to encourage access to a rehabilitation professional.
R-4. Hard Costs and Soft Benefits
From the firm perspective, "hard cost" expenditures on RTW coordinator training or 
other occupational rehabilitation activities are real and immediate. The "soft benefit" of 
savings in terms of reduced injury severity and lower human suffering are distant and abstract 
benefits that do not easily translate to the bottom line. The VWA has taken the first step in 
overcoming this problem by returning to the injured worker limited rights of self-referral to 
occupational rehabilitation assistance. This area needs additional work if the VWA is to 
achieve the disability management ideal.
R-5. Case Management for the Severely Disabled
For the long-term severely disabled workers, improvements in independence, 
avocational rehabilitation, and quality of life issues are important and continuing needs. Many 
such workers face mobility challenges and systemic barriers to achieving their highest 
potential. Case management techniques offer the greatest opportunity to serve this client group 
effectively. Existing social and community health centres may also provide an effective 
delivery mechanism for some of these services.
R-6. Measured Outcomes and Research
In many cases, rehabilitation success must be measured hi increments far removed from 
the ultimate return-to-work goal. The record of the VWA in funding research on rehabilitation 
demonstrates a long-term commitment to improving measurement and outcomes. However, the 
VWA still has a unique unexploited opportunity to utilise its rich source of data and other 
resources to contribute to both prevention and rehabilitation goals.
xl
R-7. Rehabilitation Provider Issues
The VWA has a vested interest in fostering the professional development of the medical 
and rehabilitation community. The hybrid public-private system that exists in Victoria poses 
particular policy and monitoring problems in medical and occupational rehabilitation. The 
practice of service-provider substitution was widely reported. The vertical integration of some 
insurance carriers with wholly-owned rehabilitation subsidiaries and the ownership of 
rehabilitation facilities by medical practitioners may also represent emerging problems.
Prevention (P)
Many of these attention points are targeted towards improving the utilisation of Health 
and Safety Division (HSD) resources, dealing particularly with the efficiency and effectiveness 
of providing field services. The logic is that the organisation must be able to demonstrate 
maximum effect from the existing resource and strategies before it can be determined whether 
the resource level is appropriate.
P-l. Potential Synergies
We commend the HSD on its programmes, several of which represent cutting-edge 
strategies in this field. The management of the division is visionary, energetic, highly 
educated, experienced, and firmly committed to the challenge of reducing workplace injury and 
disease in Victoria. The merger of HSD with VWA provides a historical opportunity for the 
division to develop new synergies within the organisation and leverage the resource potential.
P-2. Management Structure
The Divisional management count is over 40, or about 10 percent of the total staff. Any 
future reorganisation should seek to reduce the number of managers and re-deploy resources at 
the field inspection or service delivery level.
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P-3. Human Resource Skill Adjustments
The division needs to evaluate whether each individual inspector's skills match a 
performance-based regulatory approach that promotes the use of best practices and a systems 
approach to managing safety. Retraining or replacement may be necessary to effect a change in 
service delivery that matches the requirements of the legislation.
P-4. Resource Allocation
The Division might benefit from reevaluating the need for the significant resources 
invested in the development of the various procedure manuals. The volume and detail of these 
appear excessive and incompatible with a performance-based regulatory approach.
P-5. Community Collaboration
The Development Taskforce has an opportunity to drive significant and durable 
improvement in the prevention of injury and disease in both the workplace and communities. 
Victoria is developing a wealth of private and public resources that can be enlisted to assist 
with the prevention mission on a cost-effective basis.
P-6. Service Quality Assurance
Service quality needs to be monitored regularly through surveys of employer and 
worker communities. It is particularly important in a regulatory environment that customers 
feel free to give their unfettered opinion. Thus, a random, anonymous survey conducted by an 
independent entity is the most reliable way of gathering information on service quality.
P-7. Specialist Skill Deployment
We believe that more specialist skills are needed in the field. HSD should consider the 
field deployment of hygienists as inspectors, and as vacancies arise in the field increase the 
number of hygienists. HSD should also find ways to enhance and deploy ergonomic consulting 




Each inspector needs a dedicated vehicle. This could provide up to a 64 percent 
increase in field active time over current practice An added bonus will be the ability of 
inspectors to carry brochures, pamphlets, posters, and other information they now advise 
employers to obtain by calling the information officers. Each inspector might also be provided 
with a laptop computer and portable printer. When combined with a dedicated vehicle and 
cellular phone, the inspector essentially has a fully mobile office. This makes the inspector 
contact with workplaces more effective and significantly extends the inspector resource in the 
field.
P-9. Other Resource Allocation Issues
In the dangerous goods arena VWA may want to consider moving ahead with policy 
revisions to achieve performance-based regulation on its own, with a view to regularise with 
the national model when it becomes available. VWA should also review the significant 
resource deployed in prosecutions, particularly in light of the generally held view in the 
community that the deterrent effect is minimal.
P-10. Information Sources
A toll free OHS information call centre could be developed which would provide timely 
advice and answers to questions from the public. The division would also benefit from 
developing a series of industry specific, user-friendly guides to the regulations and codes that 
are written in plain language and offer practical solutions specifically aimed at small business.
Conclusion
The VWA with its new responsibilities for occupational safety and health has 
outstanding potential to exploit the synergies between prevention, compensation, and 
rehabilitation. Further, the well-established VWA communication resource has the 
demonstrated capability to bring this vital message to the general public. As champion of both
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prevention and rehabilitation, the VWA now directs the two programmes with the largest 
potential to leverage financial and human cost savings in workers' disability. We look forward 






Improving the effectiveness of workers' compensation programmes is an urgent theme 
in legislative debates across the entire developed world, and developing countries are becoming 
increasingly concerned as well. Workers in every country with a compensation programme for 
workers disabled by their employment are concerned that benefits be adequate, prompt and 
delivered hi an equitable manner. Increasingly, employers also are paying attention to these 
programmes, especially as international competitiveness issues have driven them to examine 
every source of cost variation across jurisdictions. Thus, employers are concerned that 
workers' compensation systems are affordable. In addition, hi some states of Australia, the 
past decade has seen workers' compensation insurance go through a wrenching series of 
changes from private dominance to public monopoly to the current compromise between 
privatisation and public insurance. These issues have concerned policy makers and 
stakeholders in Victoria, as elsewhere, and the search for the "holy grail" of equitable and 
economical methods of managing this universal social problem continues.
The statutory changes in Victoria hi the last decade constitute a grand policy experiment 
that should enlighten and inform other countries of the world about the effectiveness of 
different workers' compensation strategies. Victoria operated a privately underwritten system 
(up to 1985), a public monopoly system (from 1985 to 1992), and a mixed model (since 1992) 
in organising the administrative and insurance requirements for compensating workers disabled 
in the course of their employment.
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) contracted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research (Upjohn Institute) to conduct a thorough, independent study of the 
workers' disability prevention, compensation and rehabilitation system in Victoria. The 
Authority had the vision and the courage to open itself to scrutiny from the outside, in the 
expectation that such an examination would lead to policy improvements in Victoria. Our hope
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is that this examination also has policy implications for other jurisdictions, in Australia and 
elsewhere.
The methodology of this study is derived from a decade-long series of such studies 
published in the United States by the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Such studies have been completed by WCRI on some 18 U.S. 
states to date. 1 In addition, the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) of British Columbia 
initiated a series of closely related studies of the British Columbia, Canada system in 1991. 
Separate studies were completed on the compensation and claims administration system, 
including vocational rehabilitation and dispute resolution (1991), the occupational safety and 
health system (1992), the assessment and premium setting system (1992) and the medical and 
physical rehabilitation system (1993).2 Further, some of these studies have been repeated after 
5 years in order to provide a "second look" at the progress made in British Columbia. 3
The overall series was designed to assist public policy makers and other interested 
participants in making informed comparisons across jurisdictions. For that reason, the studies 
of individual systems use a common outline, and to the extent possible, address the same basic 
issues of workers' compensation system structure and function. We have adapted this model to 
accommodate the unique features of the Victorian workers' compensation system. Thus, this 
report focuses the model for the first time outside North America and also broadens the scope 
significantly over any single previous study.
We pay special attention to the unique regulatory regime hi Victoria where private 
insurers perform claims administration and policy administration duties under the supervision
'Connecticut (1987), Texas (1989, 1995), Washington (1989), Michigan (1990), Maine (1990), 
Minnesota (1991), Pennsylvania (1991), Georgia (1992), New York (1992), Wisconsin (1992), California (1992), 
Missouri (1993), North Carolina (1993), New Jersey (1994), Virginia (1994), Oregon (1995), Colorado (1996), 
and Illinois (1996).
2Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1991), Rest and Ashford (1992), Hunt (1992), Fulton and Atkinson (1993).
3See Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1996) and Rest and Ashford (1997), for the second round of studies in 
British Columbia.
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of the VWA as public regulator. In addition to regulating private insurers, in a way that would 
be familiar to U.S. readers, although a good deal more invasive, the VWA operates a 
public reinsurance fund, bearing all the insurance underwriting risk of the scheme, while the 
private insurers bear no underwriting risk. Essentially, the private insurers operate as sales and 
servicing agents of the VWA, who actually carries the risk. This method of insurance 
organisation is unique in the world, to the best of our knowledge.
We also focus on the prevention of worker injuries and illnesses through inclusion of 
the former Health and Safety Organisation (HSO), now the Health and Safety Division (HSD) 
of the VWA, hi our study. This was somewhat difficult, since the merger of the two formerly 
independent organisations was occurring hi the whiter of 1996, just as we were observing 
them.
Because of the wide variety of institutional arrangements in Victoria in the past decade, 
we also include outlines of the policy history of workers' compensation (Chapter 2), 
rehabilitation (Chapter 7), and prevention (Chapter 8) efforts in the state. These histories will 
be particularly useful to non-Victorian readers, who may need the broader perspective that they 
can provide for understanding the Victorian story and, perhaps, to applying the lessons in their 
own jurisdictions.
This study originated because of the interest of Andrew Lindberg, Chief Executive 
Officer of the VWA. Andrew's determination to improve the workers' compensation system in 
Victoria has led him around the world in search of "best practice." He saw the potential gain 
from an independent evaluation of VWA operations, one that would measure Victorian 
performance against an international standard. He requested that the Upjohn Institute assemble 
an international team of experts to perform this study of the Victorian system, using the basic 
format established in North America, but adapting it to the Australian environment as 
necessary.
This volume represents our response to that challenge. Our research and analysis team 
included six workers' compensation experts; one Australian, two Canadians, and three from 
the United States. The authors drew on their experience with numerous similar studies, 
including eight such studies in five North American jurisdictions which were authored by one
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or another member of the team, about a dozen other U.S. studies where one or more of the 
authors served as technical reviewer or in some other consultative capacity, and scores of 
research efforts in the general field of disability prevention and compensation. The six authors 
brought a collective total of well over 100 years experience with workers' compensation and 
prevention issues to this task.
The report summarizes the insights the six authors gained over a six-month study 
period, including eight separate visits to Victoria of at least two weeks each by the North 
American authors. The VWA supported our efforts by arranging most of our interviews and by 
supplying requested documentation and data. In addition, they helped to focus the efforts of the 
team through suggesting interview targets and unexplored avenues of which we were not 
aware. They also respected our independence by resisting the temptation to "look over our 
shoulders" as we conducted the study. We are indebted to all the informed observers and 
participants in the Victorian scheme for sharing their observations and confidential judgments 
with us. They enabled us to multiply our efforts severalfold, by incorporating the "redigested" 
thoughts of local experts. We sincerely hope our efforts are worthy of their contributions.
The Scope of the Study
The objective of this volume is to describe, with supporting evidence, how the workers' 
compensation system in Victoria actually functions, and to do so in a way which maximises the 
comparability with the previous studies in North America. The intent is to provide an 
accessible description of the major features of the Victorian system. Our goal is to describe the 
operation of the system in such a way that the intelligent layperson can understand what it does 
and how it does it. We also endeavour to provide some comparative perspective with other 
jurisdictions, where that is relevant or necessary.
This study addresses nine core issues in the Victorian workers' compensation system:
  What is the history of the present scheme?
  How is the system organised and administered?
  How is the insurance function structured and regulated?
  What benefits are paid to injured workers?
  What dispute resolution procedures are used, and to what effect?
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  How are vocational rehabilitation services provided?
  How is prevention achieved?
  What are the actual costs of administration, benefits, claims processing, and 
appeal?
  What aspects of the system deserve further attention?
These questions are addressed for the Victorian system as it existed in July 1996, but 
historical data are generally presented for the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Because of the 
extensive changes in structure in 1992, this study offers a unique opportunity to review the 
operation of a workers' compensation system under two distinct regimes, as well as over 
varied economic and political circumstances. Because of the desire to facilitate comparisons 
across regimes, some analyses will use explicit comparisons between the 1986-1992 WorkCare 
and 1993-96 WorkCover periods.
Research Approach
We conducted this study using a 4-step approach. The elements are (1) an examination 
of the relevant legislative Acts and the policies, regulations and guidelines developed for their 
implementation, (2) data gathering and analysis, (3) interviews with individuals knowledgeable 
about the system and its operation, and (4) reconciliation of the observations we have made 
about the system with the viewpoints of others.
The Act and Its Implementation
We began the study with an examination of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 and amendments thereto. Because of the broad 
mandate of the Health and Safety Division of the VWA, it was also necessary to review the 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, the Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994, and related legislation. 
We also had access to various policy manuals and training materials including the VWA 
Claims Manual, OHSA Manual, OHSA Operations Manual, HSO Branch Manuals, HSO 
Orientation Workbook, HSD Regulations, and Codes of Practice. We benefited greatly from 
the work that has been done by the Boston Consulting Group for the VWA over the past 
several years. They clearly marked out the trail of what has been accomplished in Victoria.
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We also reviewed the Australian Industry Commission studies of Workers' 
Compensation (1994) and Occupational Health and Safety (1995). The very interesting and 
thorough reports of the Australian Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities (HWCA) 
provided invaluable context for our predominantly North American team. We reviewed VWA 
and predecessor Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) Annual Reports from 1985-86 
through 1994-95, as well as other published and unpublished literature on the Victorian 
workers' compensation programme. The bulk of these were provided by VWA staff, but a 
great deal was also provided to us by the individuals we interviewed during the course of the 
project. We are deeply indebted to all of these sources.
Data Collection
The VWA provided us with the data we requested covering the past 10 years of system 
performance. These data are designed to provide a clear perspective on the present status of the 
system, but also to assist with an understanding of the antecedents of today's system; in other 
words, to provide some historical perspective. However, gathering consistent and comparable 
data for the last decade in Victoria proved to be significantly more difficult than anticipated. 
Because of the dramatic changes in system structure and performance, and organisational 
changes, many time series are not available on a truly consistent basis. The report gathers the 
data that are available, but less reliance should be placed on the numbers in this study than in 
others the authors have been involved with. The workers' compensation system in Victoria has 
been a rapidly evolving one. Most of these data are displayed in Appendix Table A-l.
Interviews
The interviews were designed to probe beyond the statutory language and policy 
manuals, to discover how the statutes actually are implemented in practice and how 
stakeholders experience the system. We conducted over 300 interviews with some 260 separate 
individuals who had substantial experience in and around the Victorian workers' compensation 
system. They represent a wide variety of interests: from managers and staff of private 
insurance companies to the VWA regulators they report to, from medical practitioners and
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physiotherapists to private workers' compensation consultants, from HSD inspectors and 
information officers to community-based worker advocacy groups, from VWA conciliators to 
solicitors representing injured workers in common law proceedings, from occupational 
rehabilitation practitioners to the consulting actuaries for the VWA, as well as virtually the 
entire management of the VWA.
Labour stakeholders interviewed included representatives of the Australian Workers' 
Union, the Telecommunications Workers, the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers, 
the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union, the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union, 
the Transport Workers Union, the Construction, Forestry and Mining Union, The National 
Union of Workers, the Health Services Union, the Australian Education Union, the 
Independent Education Union, the State Public Services Federation/Community and Public 
Sector Union, the Finance Sector Union and the Victorian Trades Hall Council (the peak 
Federation) of trade unions. We also met with representatives of Community Skill Share, the 
Maroondah Social and Community Health Centre, the Italian Community Assistance 
Organisation and members of the Australian Nursing Federation Injured Nurses Support 
Group.
Employer stakeholders interviewed included representatives of the Australian Chamber 
of Manufactures, the Victorian Employers' Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI), the 
Metal Trades Industry Association, and the Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association. In 
addition, we spoke with a number of individual employers, including Coles-Myer, Thiess 
Contractors, Qantas, Greer Industries, Royal Children's Hospital, Amcor, DuPont, University 
of Melbourne, Mayne Nickless, Holeproof, Unilever, Shell, ICI, Nippondenso, National 
Australia Bank, Philip Morris, Kemcor, and Transfield Tunnelling. We also met with the 
Northern Employers Forum and the Southeast WorkCover User Group in Victoria.
We talked with administrators of two other state workers' compensation schemes in 
Australia, three federal agencies, and six other State of Victoria agencies. All the individuals 
we interviewed are listed in Appendix Table A-2. Of course, none of them are responsible for 
our conclusions, no matter how much influence they may have had on our opinions.
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Reconciliation
Finally, we submitted the descriptions and analysis that resulted from this process to 
many of the people we interviewed, the people who know the system best. The Draft Final 
Report was circulated to about 50 persons for their review and comment in June of 1997. Their 
cooperation made the study possible in the first instance, as they freely and openly shared their 
perspectives with us. Their willingness to assist further by checking our interpretations was 
invaluable to completion of the study. The authors, however, remain responsible for any errors 
of fact or interpretation.
One limitation of the research approach is that we did not have the opportunity to 
survey or to interview a large number of individual injured workers. Since injured workers are 
the major beneficiaries of the workers' compensation system, that could be a serious 
shortcoming. However, our extensive contacts with organised labour and worker advocacy 
groups served the same purpose, with obvious gains in efficiency. In addition, the VWA is 
already collecting feedback from external stakeholder communities, and we were allowed to 
share this information. Thus, this report relies on the representatives of organised labour, 
injured-worker advocacy groups, the formal client surveys sponsored by the VWA, the staff of 
the VWA and its authorised insurers, and our own instincts to represent the views of injured 
workers in Victoria.
Organisation of the Report
The report follows the list of basic questions given above. This chapter concludes with 
a brief overview of Victoria's industrial environment. Chapter 2 presents the recent history of 
the scheme, including an analysis of the perceived failures of WorkCare between 1985 and 
1992, which shaped the new WorkCover scheme so decisively. The third chapter provides an 
overview of workers' compensation governance and organisation in Victoria; it describes the 
structure and function of the VWA and other organisations that play a significant role in the 
workers' compensation system. It also contains a brief overview of the claims process, 
including the rate at which claims flow through the entire workers' compensation system.
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The fourth chapter contains a description and analysis of the unique workers' 
compensation insurance scheme in Victoria. It employs a principal/agent model and uses 
techniques of analysis from industrial organisation economics to explore the structure and 
performance of the scheme. Chapter 5 describes the extensive array of benefits available to 
workers' compensation claimants in Victoria. Chapter 6 reviews the dispute resolution 
mechanisms in Victoria, including Conciliation Services, Medical Panels, the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal, and the courts. The seventh chapter is concerned with the occupational 
rehabilitation function in Victoria, including the historical antecedents of the current system.
Chapter 8 examines the structure and operation of the Health and Safety Division of the 
VWA as it pursues its critical mission of preventing injuries and illnesses. A brief history of 
health and safety regulation in Victoria helps to illuminate the important determinants of these 
policies and approaches. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the study's Attention Points, the 
professional judgments of the authors about those areas that might need additional examination 
by policy makers, in Victoria and elsewhere. Attention Points were formulated after the Draft 
Final Report had been reviewed by interviewees, i.e., those who were capable of correcting 
our interpretation of the facts.
Victoria's Industrial and Employment Profile
For the benefit of readers outside of Australia, this section gives a very brief 
description of Victoria's industrial makeup and employment profile. This is important 
background to understanding some of the policy issues which will follow.
Victoria is the second largest state in Australia in terms of population, with about 4.5 
million residents, or 25 percent of the Australian total. Victoria's employed workforce consists 
of just over 2.0 million persons working in approximately 221,000 enterprises. The average 
unemployment rate during 1995-96 was about 8.4 percent. Small employers (under $800,000 
payroll) represent 88 percent of the enterprises but employ only 26 percent of the workforce. 
On the other hand, large enterprises (over $800,000 payroll) represent just 12 percent of the 
total but they employ 74 percent of the workforce.
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Both the enterprises and the employees are heavily concentrated in the urban areas of 
the state. Greater Melbourne contains 81 percent of the workforce and 71 percent of the 
enterprises. Regional cities account for about 6 percent of the enterprises and the workforce. 
The remaining 13 percent of the workforce is employed in the 23 percent of the enterprises that 
are located in the rural areas of the State.
Table 1.1 shows the industrial distribution of employment and enterprises in Victoria. 
Manufacturing is the largest sector at 17 percent of employment and 9 percent of enterprises. 
Retail trade has nearly 15 percent of employment and 17 percent of establishments. The third 
largest sector is Property and Business Services, at 10 percent of employment and 13 percent 
of establishments. Other moderately large sectors include Construction, at about 6 percent of 
employment and 11 percent of establishments, Wholesale Trade, at about 6 percent of 
employment and 8 percent of establishments, Education, at about 6 percent of both 
employment and establishments, and Health and Community Service, with 9 percent of 
employment and 8 percent of establishments.
Approximately 33 percent of all workers in Victoria are unionised. The system of 
industrial relations is founded on an "Award" from either the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission or the state Industrial Relations Commission. Formerly, these were basically 
industry agreements over the terms and conditions of employment. With deregulation of 
industrial relations in Australia, they have become more a statement of the basic recognition of 
the union and its areas of authority, including dispute resolution procedures, etc. Built upon 
the Award is the "Enterprise Agreement," which is a collectively bargained agreement for a 
specific term between the union and the employer. It adds to and amends the basic terms of the 
award to accommodate the requirements of the individual enterprise. The Enterprise 
Agreement also sets out the collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment.
Australia is being swept by the "privatisation" movement. In everything from 
telecommunications to prisons, the trend is toward the private sector initiative and away from 
government production. The Liberal Party has been riding this movement and using it against 
the Australian Labour Party in the political realm. This has been successful in several states 
and ultimately, in 1996, at the national level. As will be discussed below, this wave has
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notably included the state of Victoria, where the Liberal coalition won political dominance in 
November 1992. Changing the "inflexibility" of Australian industrial relations based upon the 
award system has been very much a part of this change.4 One of the first actions the Liberal- 
National Coalition took in Victoria was to "reform" the workers' compensation system. Thus, 
the issues discussed in this report are at the core of the intense political competition over 
"privatisation" in Australia during the past several years.
With this background in place, let us proceed to review the current workers' 
compensation system in Victoria and how it operates. As indicated earlier, we begin with an 
overview of the history of workers' compensation in Victoria.
Note: All uses of "$" and "dollars" in this report refer to Australian dollars, unless 
specifically stated otherwise.
4John Mathews. 1994. Catching the Wave: Workplace Reform in Australia, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
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Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND TO THE VICTORIAN WORKCOVER SYSTEM
Chapter 2 BACKGROUND TO THE VICTORIAN WORKCOVER SYSTEM
Introduction
The history of social systems always affect their current structure and performance, 
sometimes in obvious and sometimes in subtle ways. This is most particularly true of workers' 
compensation systems, which are the oldest government-organised social insurance systems in 
many countries around the world, dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Our 
review of the structure and performance of the workers' compensation system in Victoria 
would not be complete without an explanation of its historical antecedents.
The current WorkCover system, dating from December 1992, is both an heir to the 
predecessor WorkCare system and a reaction to it. WorkCare, dating from September 1985, in 
turn was the product of the perceived inadequacies of the earlier private workers' 
compensation insurance system. As such, this chapter can be regarded as an exercise in 
contextualising the historical, political, and environmental background of the present workers' 
compensation system in Victoria.
In this report, such contextual material will be presented in three different sections, 
corresponding to the three broad missions of workers' compensation systems; prevention, 
compensation, and rehabilitation. In the present chapter, the history of compensation will be 
laid out in considerable detail. Chapter 7 uses the recent history of occupational rehabilitation 
in Victoria to explain the policy environment in which occupational rehabilitation is practiced 
today. Chapter 8 contains a brief history of the origins of injury and illness prevention 
legislation in Victoria. In each instance, the historical material helps to illuminate the "policy 
setting" which shapes current practice. We expect this material will be particularly useful to 
non-Australian readers, for whom this information is much less familiar.
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Australian Workers' Compensation in Context
Australia is a nation of 18 million people occupying an island continent. In terms of 
workers' compensation arrangements, it shares with the United States and Canada the 
distinction of having the major occupational disabilities programme operating at the state rather 
than the national level. As a result there are ten distinct workers' compensation systems in 
effect, one for each of the six states and two territories plus two federal schemes (one for 
public employment at the federal level and the other for the merchant marine engaged in 
interstate and overseas trade and commerce). This compares with the 12 provincial and 
territory systems plus 2 federal schemes in Canada, and the 50 state systems plus that for the 
District of Columbia and four federal schemes in the United States.
While there are substantial similarities between the Australian workers' compensation 
arrangements and those operative in the United States and Canada, there are also salient 
differences. For instance, whereas workers' compensation has long constituted the exclusive 
remedy in North America, until relatively recently all Australian schemes allowed unfettered 
access to the common law action for negligence for workplace injuries and illness. In the past 
several years this has changed, with some jurisdictions abrogating the common law remedy 
entirely and others subjecting it to threshold entitlement criteria and/or caps upon settlements 
and awards.
Similarly, all the Australian schemes operate upon wage loss principles for the 
calculation of loss of earnings entitlement, although there are significant variants between them 
in respect to duration of such entitlement and the capacity for it to be capitalised hi the form of 
lump sum redemption payments. However, unlike the United States, scheduled disability 
principles have not taken hold hi respect of payment of wage loss, although such principles do 
operate in relation to lump sum impairment payments under what is variously called the "Table 
of Maims" or "Table of Injuries." Many of the similarities and differences between Australia 




Like so much of the early legislation of the Australian states, workers' compensation 
statutes were based very much on the handiwork of the English legislature. The first Australian 
workers' compensation statute, the South Australian Act of 1900, was essentially a copy of the 
original English measure, the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (Imp). Victoria was the last 
Australian state to enact workers' compensation legislation, and this measure, the Workers' 
Compensation Act 1914, again largely replicated the consolidating English Act of 1906 with 
the addition of the "Table of Maims." This latter feature was derived from the 1908 New 
Zealand statute and was reputedly the brainchild of the New Zealand judge and jurist Sir John 
Salmond.
Over time, the various schemes have evolved in separate directions, such that now the 
Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities (HWCA), a body comprising the chief 
executives of the ten Australian schemes, is involved in a process of trying to achieve greater 
national consistency. 1 However, until the mid 1980s, workers' compensation in Australia was, 
overall, characterised by a surprising degree of structural uniformity. Where changes occurred 
(such as the adoption of the disjunctive "or" in place of the conjunctive "and" in the primary 
entitlement provision of an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment;" or the 
extension of coverage to injuries sustained while travelling between a worker's place of 
residence and place of employment, so-called journey injuries), such changes tended to be 
picked up relatively quickly by most if not all jurisdictions in a process of legislative 
uosmosis."
In terms of financing arrangements, the schemes adopted the English system of private 
insurer underwriting with the ability of enterprises to contract out as self-insurers according to 
certain criteria. Unlike the English system, the requirement to insure was generally made 
mandatory and most jurisdictions, often at the time of enacting their workers' compensation 
legislation, also created a state-owned insurer which competed in the market with private
'Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities, Promoting Excellence: National Consistency in Australian 
Workers' Compensation: Final and Interim Reports to Labour Ministers' Council, May 1997.
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insurers. The state-owned insurer also tended to have the functional role of an insurer of last 
resort and thus served a role which in the United States is most often performed by the residual 
market. In United States terms, the typical Australian scheme was a three-way system of 
private insurers, a competitive state insurer, and self-insurance option for certain employers. 
The significant exception was the state of Queensland which, in 1916, under the radical TJ. 
Ryan Government, moved to oust private insurers from workers' compensation and established 
a monopoly state scheme, with no provision for self-insurance.
The Queensland experience was the nearest that Australia came to the debates on 
alternative approaches to workers' compensation which characterised the Progressive era in the 
United States. There were no organisations hi Australia such as the American Association for 
Labor Legislation, the National Civic Federation and the National Association of 
Manufacturers in the United States making a critical evaluation of various reform options.2 Nor 
was there a figure such as Sir William Meredith, the Chief Justice of Ontario, whose 
investigations and reports to the Ontario legislature laid the basis for the distinctive workers' 
compensation arrangements adopted by the Canadian provinces and territories from 1914. The 
nearest Australian analogue did not occur until 1970, with the trailblazing report on 
rehabilitation by the then chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission of New South 
Wales, Judge A.T. Conybeare QC.
Stability and Change
Change tended to be somewhat slow and piecemeal. In Victoria, the 1914 legislation 
operated without amendment until 1922 and then remained unchanged until 1928.3 These 
changes were often directed to refining and widening the qualifications and restrictions on 
coverage inherited from the English model; for instance, the income threshold on coverage
2See Robert Asher, Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 1880-1935. University of Minnesota, 
Ph.D., 1971, Ch. VI.
3Orwell De R. Foenander, Developments in the Law Governing Workers' Compensation in Victoria. 
Melbourne: Law Book Company, 1956, p. 1.
2-4
(apart from manual labour) was progressively diluted and finally removed in 1972. Other 
restrictions, such as the exclusion of outworkers, survived until the 1985 WorkCare reforms.
More significant changes occurred with the 1937 legislation which established the 
Workers' Compensation Board as the body for the determination of contested claims of 
compensation instead of the general court system, and with the moves in the 1940s, noted 
above, to include journey injuries and the adoption of the "arising out of or in the course of 
employment" wording for the primary entitlement provision. This history stamped a particular 
functional style and approach upon the operations of Australian workers' compensation 
schemes. As the 1984 Victorian Cooney Report noted:
English workers' compensation legislation and the Australian statutes based 
upon them reflected [the] perspective of an amelioratory measure the provision 
of income support to compensate for wage loss as a result of industrial injury. 
There was never a hint by the legislature that workers' compensation could 
encompass any wider role in terms of accident prevention or the vocational and 
social rehabilitation of injured workers. The enforcement of industrial safety 
was seen to be the preserve of the inspectorate established to police the 
provision of the Factories and Shops Act while, apart from some provision for 
injured war veterans, rehabilitation was not a concept which entered the 
consciousness of officialdom, being left to private charitable organisations. By 
contrast, in Canada and in a number of American States influenced by the 
German model, the provision of rehabilitation services was a prominent feature 
of workers' compensation administration from the beginning.4
During the 1970s, the essentially tranquil nature of workers' compensation in Australia 
began to change. One of the first markers of this change was the 1970 Conybeare report, 
mentioned above. Judge Conybeare had long taken an interest hi North American 
developments, and while his report was focused on rehabilitation it was characterised by an 
expansionist perspective which, for instance, seriously questioned the role of common law in 
the workers' compensation system.
On the national political stage, 23 years of conservative rule were brought to an end 
with the election of the reforming Whitlam government. One of the first acts of this new
4 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Victorian Workers' Compensation in Victoria. Melbourne: 
Government Printer, 1984, para. 2.5.5.
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federal Government was to invite Sir Owen Woodhouse, architect of New Zealand's 
revolutionary comprehensive national accident compensation system, to investigate the basis 
upon which a similar scheme could be introduced into Australia. The proposals outlined in the 
1974 Woodhouse report would have totally transformed personal injury compensation in 
Australia and spelt the end of state workers' compensation schemes. However, they fell into 
the dustbin of history with the fall of the Whitlam government in 1975. Nevertheless, these 
proposals generated ripples which would contribute to the changes in Australian workers' 
compensation in the 1980s and beyond.
These changes were most dramatically expressed in the Victorian WorkCare reforms 
which took effect from September 1985 and which are examined in further detail below. 
However, the Victorian move to oust private insurers from an underwriting role was followed 
in South Australia and New South Wales in their WorkCover reforms hi 1986 and 1987, 
respectively. The recent process of change in Australian workers' compensation is reflected in 
the fact that, over the last 2 decades, there have been at least 16 official inquiries into the 
reform of workers' compensation schemes and that, since 1985, there have been nine new 
legislative schemes introduced.
This situation of review and legislative change continues apace, with major scheme 
reviews occurring in late 1996 in both Queensland and Tasmania and significant legislative 
amendments enacted in a number of Australian jurisdictions, including Victoria during 1996. 
The drivers of this recent volatility can be better understood by looking at the background to, 
and evolution of, the 1985 WorkCare changes in Victoria.
The Crisis of Workers' Compensation in Victoria
The changes to workers' compensation arrangements which occurred in Victoria in 
1985 represented a fundamental rupture with the general trend of workers' compensation 
development noted above. The causes for the Victorian changes were primarily financial in 
nature, although there were contributory factors in terms of the inefficiency of some the 
system's delivery mechanisms. These financial features can be viewed at a number of levels, 
involving both short-term and medium-term factors. The medium-term factors involved the
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volatility of the workers' compensation market between 1974 and 1981, while the short-term 
factors related to the disappointing experience between 1981 and 1983, following which the 
Government appointed the Committee of Enquiry into the Victorian Workers' Compensation 
System (the Cooney Committee) to examine and report upon the problems of the Victorian 
system.
Medium-Term Factors
In a medium-term perspective, the WorkCare changes were largely a response to the 
erratic behaviour of the general insurance market, and particularly the workers' compensation 
segment of that market, which was exhibited from the mid 1970s. This experience appears to 
have resulted from the conjunction of a number of factors. First, there was the influence of the 
federal Insurance Act 1973 which regulated the prudential operations of insurers. A number of 
insurers were faced with problems in regard to financing the solvency requirements laid down 
under the Act within their existing capital structure. The result was a "flight of premium" 
when companies rejected workers' compensation business in an attempt to meet the solvency 
margins. Most of these companies managed to secure the requisite prudential buffers and 
margins after a couple of years, and were ready to buy back a market share in the workers' 
compensation market through heavy discounting.
In addition, the federal Trade Practices Act 1974 began to change the very restrictive 
environment that insurers were operating in. This enactment introduced a more competitive 
commercial environment that required some years of adjustment, and was certainly a factor in 
the premium volatility throughout the middle and late 1970s in all classes of insurance in 
Australia.
Second was the fallout from the Australian Woodhouse inquiry and report. Had the 
Whitlam government remained in office and the proposals of the Woodhouse report been 
implemented, the insurance industry would have faced the prospect of losing all personal injury 
business. This would have included not only workers' compensation, but compulsory third- 
party motor vehicle injury insurance and some other areas of liability insurance which involved 
a personal injury component as well. Given that coverage would have been extended to the
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self-employed as well, there may also have been a significant loss of private disability 
insurance business. Faced with the prospect of being ousted from personal injury lines 
completely and the running out of the claims tail from existing reserves, the industry regarded 
itself as significantly underfunded. Consequently, premiums were raised in the prospect of 
meeting the run off involved. The quarantining of the Woodhouse legislation in the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Committee and the subsequent fall of the Whitlam government 
removed this threat and contributed to the vigorous price-cutting war which followed.
Third, according to evidence given by insurance brokers to the Cooney Committee, the 
mid 1970s coincided with an unusual over-capacity in the international re-insurance market. 
One of the results was fierce competition for the premium dollar, and this was reflected in 
heavy discounting in Australia. Thus, these three features combined to produce, from around 
1975, a severe price-cutting war in the workers' compensation market, particularly in respect 
of larger accounts. As interest rates were at historically high levels, part of this fight for 
market share and premium income also represented the practice of cash flow underwriting to 
secure funds which could be invested to take advantage of the prevailing high interest rates.
An additional element contributing to this volatility was the role of insurance brokers. 
Around three-quarters of the market engaged a broker or used the services of an insurance 
agent in obtaining employers' liability coverage. As a result, brokers had a central role in the 
placement of insurance coverage and this choice was crucially influenced by the existence and 
size of commission. When the State Insurance Office (SIO), after receiving a strong influx of 
business in 1975, decided in 1976 not to pay brokerage fees for the securing of business, it lost 
half of its workers' compensation portfolio within 18 months. In contrast, generous brokerage 
fees led to brokers, in the period 1977 to 1979, placing a large volume of business with 
Palmdale Insurance Company Limited. This insurer went into liquidation in February 1980 
and, in Victoria, the payment of claims became the responsibility of the Insurers Guarantee and 
Compensation Supplementation Fund.
This situation was exacerbated by the entry into the market of some relatively 
aggressive new underwriters such as C.E. Heath and the American International Group (AIG) 
who didn't face the claims tail of the established market players. These new entrants were
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aggressively targeting the larger employer accounts and the competition in this sector was 
particularly intense.
The rate cutting peaked in 1978/79 and 1979/80, with an attempt to regain financial 
rectitude beginning in 1979/80. Thus, surveying the period 1975/76 to 1981/82, premiums 
increased by only 1 percent while general costs, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, 
had doubled over this period, and claims costs had increased by some 120 percent.
Immediate Impetus
The immediate impetus which largely led to the demise of private underwriting in 
Victoria was the dramatic attempt by insurers to suddenly regain much of the ground lost 
during the period of ferocious rate-cutting. The huge increase in premium rates which occurred 
in 1981/82 and 1982/83 had the effect of alienating the business community and making that 
community amenable to other solutions. While Australia-wide the period between 1981 and 
1983 showed an average annual rate of growth in workers' compensation premiums of some 
49.3 percent, the premium spiral appears to have been even more severe in Victoria. The 
various employer bodies provided extensive documentation of this dramatic increase to the 
Cooney Committee.
A membership survey by the Victorian Employers' Federation hi November 1982 
revealed that a majority of respondents had experienced premium increases in excess of 50 
percent in the previous 12 months and some reported increases of 200 percent and 300 percent 
between 1981 and 1982 despite declining or static claims rates. The Metal Trades Industry 
Association of Australia reported on the experience of its membership, which showed 
dramatically escalating premiums, unrelated to claims experience, of up to 500 percent. One 
company had its premium increased by 184 percent between 1980/81 and 1981/82 even though 
employment in this company had decreased by almost 17 percent and it had experienced no 
claims for many years. The Victorian Small Business Development Corporation reported that 
premium increases for small business in the previous 2 years had ranged from 80 percent to 
400 percent with individual instances of more than 700 percent.
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The reason underlying this energetic attempt by the insurance industry to restore its 
funding levels in this sector can be glimpsed through the actuarial report commissioned by the 
Workers' Compensation Premiums Advisory Committee in 1983 and prepared by Richard 
Cumpston, then a partner at E.S. Knight and Company, an actuary active in the general 
insurance field. This involved an examination of the Form 11 returns by insurers to the federal 
Insurance Commissioner, detailing the run off patterns for the 50 private insurers engaged in 
the Victorian market, and an attempt to ascertain what the insurers' outstanding claims reserves 
should be compared with what reserve provisions they had actually made. The conclusion 
reached by Richard Cumpston was that while, collectively, these insurers had made provisions 
of $501 million for outstanding claims, the required figure was some $723 million; that is, as a 
group, they were under-reserved by some 31 percent.
The Problem of Contested Claims
While this roller coaster behaviour of the premium system over the period between 
1975 and 1983 shook the confidence of the business community in the insurance industry's 
handling of workers' compensation financing, there were also profound problems with the 
existing system from the perspective of injured workers and the labour movement. At the 
forefront of these complaints was the issue of delays in the handling of contested claims.
There was a steady and inexorable increase hi the backlog of claims before the 
Workers' Compensation Board and in the time between lodgment of a claim before the Board 
and its disposal, notwithstanding the expansion of the Board. By October 1983, there was a 
backlog in excess of 14,000 cases, and the average time between lodgment of a contested claim 
before the Board and the claim being brought for hearing was 24 months. A year later, by 
October 1984, the backlog had further increased to some 17,000 cases.
Apart from the issue of delay, the operation of the system was itself flawed. The 
chairman of the Cooney Committee, himself a barrister, was moved to describe it, in the 
foreword to his report, as having "many of the features of a street bazaar."5 In particular, only
5 Ibid., p. 2.
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1.6 percent of cases following this average 2-year wait were actually heard to judgment, while 
some 62 percent of cases were being settled at the door of the court.
The Road to WorkCare
Following almost 3 decades in opposition, the Labor Party achieved political office in 
Victoria hi April 1982. By the end of 1982, both the Treasurer, Rob Jolly, and the Minister for 
Labour and Industry, Bill Landeryou, were the subject of a "deluge of complaints" from 
employers concerning spiralling workers' compensation premiums as well as representations 
from the labour movement about the delays at the Workers' Compensation Board. The 
Government introduced interim legislation hi December 1982 and announced that it was 
considering a thorough review of the system.
The Cooney Committee
In July 1983 the Government announced the appointment of the Committee of Enquiry 
into the Victorian Workers' Compensation System, generally known as the Cooney Committee 
after its chairman, Barney Cooney, a barrister and prominent member of the independent 
faction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The other four members reflected major 
stakeholder interests. They were Jack Wood, a long tune former lay member of the Workers' 
Compensation Board, who was nominated by the Trades Hall Council; J.C. Rademaker, a 
senior business executive with extensive manufacturing experience as the employer 
representative; Peter Jackson, deputy general manager of the State Insurance Office known for 
his knowledge and expertise in workers' compensation insurance; and Bruce Lilley, then a 
partner hi Coltmans, a legal firm which represented the interests of a number of the major 
private workers' compensation insurers. 6
The Committee received some 117 submissions and followed up with oral evidence 
from 36 bodies and individuals who either represented key stakeholders in the system or had
6Ian Baker, then one of Bill Landeryou's ministerial advisers and later to achieve ministerial office 
himself in a later Labor government, and a ministry research officer, Alan Clayton, headed the Committee's 
secretariat as Executive Officer and Secretary/Research Officer, respectively.
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specialist knowledge and expertise. The stakeholder representation included injured workers 7 
employer and trade bodies,8 trade unions,9 insurers and brokers, 10 doctors, 11 lawyers, 12 
rehabilitation providers, 13 and risk managers. 14
In addition, a number of bodies with particular concerns about the operation of 
workers' compensation were given representation, with evidence being taken from 
representatives of the Equal Opportunity Board, the Ethnic Affairs Commission and the Small 
Business Development Corporation. Individuals with specialist knowledge and expertise who 
gave evidence before the Committee included Brendan Hammond, the Registrar of the 
Workers' Compensation Board; Professor Harold Luntz of the University of Melbourne Law 
School and one of the leading Australian authorities on accident compensation systems; Don 
Rennie, a New Zealander who previously headed the research department of that country's 
Accident Compensation Corporation; and Ted Hill, the legendary "king of compo," the 
leading workers' compensation barrister and co-author of a book on this area. The Committee 
also met informally with Judge Harris, who had conducted a review of Victorian workers' 
compensation 7 years previously.
7North Richmond Workers' Compensation Support Group.
8Metal Trades Industry Association, Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, Victorian Employers 
Federation and the Housing Industry Association.
'Australian Railways Union, Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia, Federated Liquor 
Industries Union and the Victorian Trades Hall Council.
IOC.E. Heath Underwriting and Insurance, National Employers Mutual Insurance Company, and the 
National Insurance Brokers Association.
"Australian Medical Association.
12Victorian Bar Council representing barristers. The Law Institute of Victoria, the professional 
association for Victorian solicitors was scheduled to give oral evidence but at the eleventh hour withdrew due to a 
sharp schism between the plaintiff and defendant wings of that body's workers' compensation section.
"Industrial Rehabilitation Service and Vocational Rehabilitation Service. 
MAssociation of Risk and Insurance Managers of Australia.
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While the clear intention of some within Government was that the Committee would 
simply "dust off the Harris recommendations and add some refinements,"15 the Committee in 
fact undertook a comprehensive investigation of almost all aspects of the Victorian workers' 
compensation system. This was sometimes a tortuous process, 16 but the Committee completed 
its report in early June 1984.
While the Cooney Committee report proved to be a very useful source document in 
terms of detailing the ills of the system, as a vehicle for change it was hampered by the fact 
that the Committee membership reflected the interests of the existing system and, 
consequently, on many important issues these members voted to support the interests of the 
constituency from which they were drawn. The analysis within the report provided a damning 
indictment of the operation of the current system, and of its failures hi both economic and 
social terms; however, when it came to recommendations and solutions the Committee largely 
divided upon interest group lines.
One of the most hard-fought battles within the Committee revolved around how to 
present (or perhaps disguise) the issue that "[cjontrol of the workers' compensation system has 
through evolution been wrested from the institutional mechanism established to deliver benefits 
to the injured and given over to captured by exogenous parties, namely insurers and the 
medical and legal professions.*' 17 This was finally illustrated in Table 1.16 from the report, 
which showed how the premium dollar in Victoria was distributed, (see Table 2.1)
On a number of important issues the Committee divided 3-2 in its decisions. The 
recommendation that lump sum redemptions should be removed from the compensation system 
on the grounds of being destructive of the successful operation of a rehabilitation-oriented 
compensation system was adopted by this margin. Similarly, the recommendations that there 
should be a continuance of private underwriting and not a move to a central fund, and limiting
15 A ministerial adviser quoted in Mark Considine, The Politics of Reform: Workers' Compensation from 
Woodhouse to WorkCare. Centre for Applied Social Research, Deakin University, 1991 (Deakin Series in Public 
Policy and Administration, No. 1) at p. 63.
I6lbid., pp. 62-81 for a good account of some of the workings of the Cooney Committee. 
l7Report of the Committee, op. cit., p. 2.
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lump sums (apart from Table of Maims payments) to highly circumscribed situations were 
adopted by this same majority. The recommendation that the common law action be abrogated 
was taken on a 3-2 split, although the impact of this particular recommendation was essentially 
negated by the rider to it that the appropriate forum for such action should be the future 
implementation of a national accident compensation scheme.
The DMB Blueprint
The Cooney report represented a comprehensive review of a system in crisis, but little 
unanimity in terms of solutions. However, during the period of the Committee's operation, Bill 
Landeryou had resigned as Minister for Labour and Industry and, in a reallocation of 
departmental functions, the administration of workers' compensation was transferred to the 
Department of Management and Budget (DMB). Consequently, ministerial responsibility 
rested with the Treasurer. This proved to be a crucial development.
One of the things which marked out the Cooney report from earlier Australian reviews 
was the strong economic perspective which underlay much of its analysis. It included 
indicative results of the impact of the recent shock increases in workers' compensation 
insurance costs upon Victorian business as measured by the University of Melbourne's impact 
model (ORANI). It was an approach that meshed with the agenda of DMB, which was quick to 
see the importance of workers' compensation as an economic development issue, particularly 
in terms of the effect of the financing crisis of workers' compensation insurance upon the trade 
exposed sectors of the Victorian economy.
The new Department of Management and Budget, under Dr. Peter Sheehan as 
Director-General, took an interventionist approach to transforming the Victorian economy. As 
a vehicle for technocratic revolution it resembled some of the initiatives of Massachusetts 
Governor Michael Dukakis in the days of the "Massachusetts miracle." The Department was 
the major architect of the Government's economic strategy for Victoria, which was released in 
April 1984. A document entitled "The Next Step Forward" outlined issues concerning the 
development of the Victorian economy over the next decade. It was followed by a series of 
economic strategy statements giving a detailed outline of proposed initiatives in individual
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sectors. It is significant that the outline of the new WorkCare scheme was detailed in one of 
these economic strategy statements, 18 the fifth publication in this series, following detailed 
statements on state and regional industry policies, the Government's energy policy, the 
Portland aluminium smelter, and the tourism strategy.
The workers' compensation statement saw "the current system of workers' 
compensation [as] unsatisfactory both in respect of its effectiveness and efficiency [and having] 
considerable scope to reduce the level of labour costs to Victorian producers, without reducing 
the level of benefit to employees." 19 It was perceived as a win-win situation. The Cooney 
analysis had shown the degree of inefficiency and transaction costs within the old system. A 
more modem and rational problem-solving approach could address these issues and share the 
benefits between employers and workers, while the net result would be to advance the 
economic development of the Victorian economy.
The contours of the new scheme were the result of the work of a high-level taskforce 
within DMB which took the Cooney analysis and crafted a new framework for the funding and 
organisation of workers' compensation in Victoria. While negotiations with the union 
movement to secure their support for the new scheme produced a number of concessions in 
respect of the benefit proposals,20 the major difference from the scheme originally conceived 
by the DMB taskforce lay in the manner in which the new scheme was to be administered.
Initially it had been proposed that the new Accident Compensation Commission would 
operate as a single fund, on the Queensland Workers' Compensation Board and New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Corporation model. The fund would discharge the claims handling, 
premium collection and other functions involved in the running of a workers' compensation 
system. It was envisaged that, at least for an interim period, some or all of the claims functions 
would be handled by the State Insurance Office, and that premium collection would be
"Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform: Government Statement. Economic Strategy for Victoria 
Statement No. 5. Melbourne: Government Printer (December 1984).
"Ibid., pp. 129-130.
20See Considine, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
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undertaken by the State Taxation Office, which was the vehicle for the collection of payroll 
tax. Again, there were New Zealand analogues for such interim action.
The decision to move to a system of claims administration "agents" resulted from 
pressure from significant areas of the business community, who were concerned that a 
government monopoly would become overly bureaucratic and inefficient, and also from the 
Insurance Employees Union, which was alarmed at the prospect of significant redundancies 
among its members as a result of the move to a monopoly state fund. This change was made 
relatively early in the planning process and was incorporated in the Government statement 
where it was advanced as a basis to "ensure minimum insurance industry disruption, increased 
business opportunities and maximum efficiency.**21
WorkCare in Operation
WorkCare is a term which has both an extended meaning and a more circumscribed 
signification. In its extended sense it refers to the triad of agencies, the Accident Compensation 
Commission (ACC), the Occupational Health and Safety Commission (OHSC), and the 
Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC), as well as the schemes administered by 
them. The objectives of the ACC, expressed in its legislative charter, included one to "ensure a 
coordinated approach in the implementation of the accident compensation scheme in liaison 
with the [Victorian Accident Rehabilitation] Council and the Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission that emphasizes accident prevention, rehabilitation and operational efficiency." 22
However, the degree of coordination in practice fell well short of the rhetoric accorded 
to this goal. It is true that there was cross representation on the Boards of these three agencies 
and even a WorkCare Co-ordination Committee, comprising the chief executive officers of 
ACC and VARC and the Chairperson of OHSC, together with a senior representative from the 
Department of Labour to provide coordinated executive policy and strategic management 
decisions. Nevertheless, to the extent that coordination existed, it was in a formal sense rather
21 Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform, op. cit., p. 15; also Ch. 9, "The Role of Existing Insurers.' 
^Accident Compensation Act 1985, Section 19(c).
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than one which involved significant functional integration of approach and activities. To a very 
considerable degree the agencies were separate trains going in a similar direction rather than 
carriages of a single train.
In its more circumscribed sense, and the one which would be recognised by the 
Victorian public, the term WorkCare refers to the system of reformed workers' compensation 
arrangements which operated from the inauguration of the new system on 1 September 1985 
until the beginnings of what is generally called WorkCover, from 1 December 1992. It is this 
concept of WorkCare which is addressed in the following sections of this chapter.
Components of Scheme Operation
Far and away the most fundamental problem that WorkCare experienced was the 
number and duration of long-term claimants hi the system. This was particularly pronounced in 
the early years of the scheme's operations; at the tune of the DMB review in 1987 it was found 
that around 18 percent of claimants with a standard claim (that is one involving weekly benefits 
for more than 5 days) were still in receipt of these benefits after 12 months. While 
this rate improved over the later years of the scheme (by 30 June 1988, the scheme's actuaries 
were reporting a fall to around 12.5 percent), the level and duration of long-term claims in 
Victoria remained comparatively high over the entire WorkCare period.
The duration issue had a dramatic effect on the scheme's funding ratio which, as can be 
seen from Table 2.2, had fallen sharply during the first 4 years of scheme operation to a level 
in 1988/89 of only 14 percent. This was almost entirely due to lengthening durations and the 
resulting rise in claim liabilities. Table 2.2 shows that the number of new claims incurred was 
actually falling through this period. The funding ratio improved following the 1989 reform 
initiatives to around 48 percent in WorkCare's last year of operation. However, by then the 
effects of these reforms had been exhausted, and the ACC was reporting that unless further 
changes were made, the scheme's funding level would remain below 60 percent for the rest of 
the decade.
Workers' compensation systems are extremely complex entities, in terms of both their 
own dynamics and their interaction with external systems; as such, assigning rough measures
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of cause and effect and relative contribution of specific scheme features to particular system 
outcomes is fraught with difficulty. Such an exercise is likely to overlook important exogenous 
variables such as the state of the economy and the labour market or demographics, which have 
profound effects and consequences, for instance, on return to work possibilities. However, a 
thematic approach to aspects of the WorkCare system in terms of scheme administration, the 
pricing system, the benefits structure, rehabilitation, and dispute resolution may assist in 
illuminating some of the problems of system performance.
Administration of the WorkCare Scheme
At the heart of the administrative arrangements of the WorkCare scheme was the 
system of agency relationships for the discharge of scheme functions. The collection of the 
levy was undertaken by the Levy Collection Agency, which was an entity within the State 
Taxation Office. The investment of the collected levy that was surplus to immediate scheme 
needs was undertaken initially by three fund management agents selected on the basis of 
tender; all were bodies associated with major banks. The major function of claims 
administration was the responsibility of nine claims administration agents. These had all been 
private insurers in the previous system who had successfully tendered for this role.
This element of delegated responsibility for claims functions was, as noted above, a 
political compromise and a change from the original WorkCare blueprint. This compromise 
had the effect of creating an arrangement unique in workers' compensation practice. No other 
state workers' compensation fund hi the world operated in this manner. It was an arrangement 
which was always going to be fraught with tension. Although it was essentially a relationship 
between principal and agent (see Chapter 4), it suffered from the fact that the agent often had 
an interest different (indeed sometimes fundamentally opposed) to that of the principal. The 
most important of these differences were to emerge strongly in relation to the costs of claims 
which straddled the operation of the previous private insurance system and WorkCover.
The claims administration agents were entities who had recently been engaged hi a 
highly acrimonious fight with the Government over their removal from workers' compensation 
insurance underwriting and thus had no reason to feel a special commitment to the success of
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the new system. 23 The difficulty in achieving scheme goals through this arrangement was 
compounded by the initial basis of claims administration agent remuneration. This mainly 
consisted of a uniform fee for each claim registered, with an additional rollover fee for any 
claim which extended into a second year's duration. As the WorkCare fund rather than the 
agent bore the economic burden of the cost of claims, the profit-maximising strategy for an 
agent would be to accept every claim and do nothing and hope that the claim would continue 
into a second year.
In order to simplify the logistics of establishing the scheme during the 12-week (!) 
implementation phase, employers were generally allocated to the insurer who had provided 
cover immediately before WorkCare, where that insurer was a claims administration agent 
under the new scheme. Not only did this arrangement result in disincentives for the claims 
administration agent to undertake any recovery action against itself (as the former insurer on 
risk) in respect of liabilities which straddled the two schemes, it also created an opportunity for 
the transfer of some old system costs onto WorkCare.
The 1987 review of WorkCare conducted by the Department of Management and 
Budget found evidence of old system claims being passed onto WorkCare and noted the 
phenomenon of some 1,033 claims with 1 September 1985 (the date of commencement of 
WorkCare) as the date of injury, notwithstanding that this day was a Sunday and that this 
figure was without precedent for any other Sunday over the life of the scheme.24 The DMB 
review also found widespread employer dissatisfaction with the performance of claims 
administration agents, with employers complaining of delays in reimbursement, poor claims 
review, irregularity in ordering medical examinations, lack of follow-up action in relation to
23It should be noted that the Insurance Council of Australia specifically denies this. They assert that the 
nine agents went to considerable length to work through operational problems, including frequent meetings with 
the Accident Compensation Commission.
24The insurance industry maintains that claims agents were instructed by the ACC to file claims on 1 
September if there was any doubt about which Act pertained to the claim.
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return to work or referral to the Tribunal [and failing] to respond to employer's inquiries, 
complaints and requests for information.25
These failures had generated a high number of representations to Members of 
Parliament, Ministers, and the Ombudsman. In particular, the performance of two agents 
(Accident Compensation Settling Agency and Manufacturers Mutual Insurance), was regarded 
as sufficiently poor for their contracts to be terminated. C.E. Heath Underwriting and 
Insurance was also cancelled at that time for other reasons. Yet another agent (Royal 
Insurance) decided to withdraw from its contract following the announcement of a new system 
of claims administration agent remuneration which was brought into effect from 1 October 
1987.
The new remuneration system, while recognising prompt registration of claims, placed 
the emphasis upon file closure with a weekly management component which decreased as the 
number of weeks of compensation on the claim increased. As well, a bonus scheme was 
introduced from 1 January 1988 which provided a performance bonus to claims administration 
agents with increased return to work rates and more effective claims management. In its 
1988-1989 annual report, the Accident Compensation Commission stated:
The critical administrative issue faced by the Commission remains the need to 
enhance the performance of claims agents whose principal motivation and 
objectives need not necessarily be compatible with those of the Commission. 
The appropriate balance of economic incentives and sanctions, and mixture of 
regulation and competition has proven to be difficult to find. 26
The Grafting of a package of remuneration provisions which more appropriately met 
that balance proved to be a continuing challenge for the Accident Compensation Commission 
over the entire WorkCare period and remains so today for the Victorian WorkCover Authority 
(see Chapter 4). From the time of the introduction of the October 1987 remuneration 
arrangements and the January 1988 bonus pool, refinement and enhancement of performance 
measures have become almost an annual event.
"WorkCare: Government Statement, 31 July 1987, para. 4.10. 
26Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 23.
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The composition of the claims administration agents was subject to frequent change as 
well. Following the termination of agents' contracts in 1987, mentioned above, a new agent, 
FAI Workers' Compensation, was added to the group and the ACC created its own agent, 
WorkCare Compensation Services, partly to test new computer and administrative systems, but 
also to assist with handling some of the open claims left after agent termination and 
withdrawal. Following the termination of Mercantile Mutual's contract in 1989 and the 
withdrawal by Compensation Business Services in 1990, there remained five claims 
administration agents. This number rose to six with the admission of QBE Insurance in 
February 1992.
One of the early problems of the claims administration agent operations, noted in the 
1987 DMB report, was the lack of responsiveness to employer concerns. Beginning with the 
new October 1987 contractual arrangements, the ability of employers to change agents was 
enhanced and the process of introducing market competition into the agency operations was 
progressively fostered by the ACC. This process reached its furthest extension under 
WorkCare with the new agent contracts which took effect from 1 July 1992, which actively 
promoted competition among agents to gain employer clients. The clear evidence is that agents 
did become increasingly responsive to employer concerns and began to develop special 
products and cultivate niche markets. This attentiveness to employer concerns appeared 
motivated by gaining and maintaining desired market share and position and by offering a 
wider range of insurance products to targeted employers. However, while the final phase of the 
WorkCare period saw a much greater level and quality of service from the authorised claims 
agents to employers than at the beginning of the scheme, there is little evidence that these 
agents ever saw the injured worker as a client in the same manner that they belatedly came to 
regard the employer.
Pricing System
The basis of the financing arrangements for the new scheme was the employer levy. 
Since this amounted to a percentage of employee compensation, the ACC utilised the State 
Taxation Office as its agent for levy collection since that body was already collecting payroll
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tax. The levy system operated with levy being paid annually (in arrears) by around 36,000 
employers with an estimated liability of $650 or less and monthly (in arrears) by approximately 
90,000 other employers.
Whereas the premium arrangements under the previous privately underwritten system 
had been based upon occupational classification, the WorkCare levy system utilised an industry 
rating based on a WorkCare Industry Classification (WIC) code derived from the Australian 
Standard Industry Classification (ASIC). Under these arrangements all establishments of 
employers were categorised according to 466 industry types and allocated to one of the seven 
levy rates, which ranged from 0.57 percent to 3.8 percent of total employee remuneration.
The process of determining industry levy rates was done on the basis that the average 
rate paid by employers on a state-wide basis would not exceed 2.4 percent of employee 
remuneration over the first 5 years of the scheme. The result would be that the cost of the new 
scheme to Victorian employers would be some 48 percent less than the indicative premium 
rates operative under the old system. The Government costings for the new scheme predicted 
that it could be fully funded over a period of 10 years at this average premium rate of 2.4 
percent of remuneration. These costings were undertaken by Richard Cumpston (then at E.S. 
Knight and Co.) and David Orford and Bill Szuch of Financial Synergy Pty Ltd and were set 
out in a three-volume publication, Costing WorkCare. The target of 10-year full funding was 
based on a number of assumptions, including:
  a reduction in the claims rate (i.e., claims per 100 workers) of 15 percent;
  a reduction in the cost per claim (as measured as a proportion of average 
earnings) by 10 percent;
  a rate of return on funds invested of 14 percent hi 1985/86 declining to a long- 
term level of 9.5 percent by 1990/91 compared with an assumed long-term rate 
of growth of Victorian average weekly earnings of 7.5 percent; and
  significant savings in the areas of legal, medical and administrative costs.
^ While the great majority of employers secured substantial reductions in workers' 
compensation costs as a result of the new levy system, it was recognised that some employers 
would pay more under the new system. Accordingly the Government agreed to a system of 
interim levies under which employers whose levy rate would have been significantly higher
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than their fully funded insurance premium under the old system could receive a levy rate which 
was equivalent to this former premium amount. By mid 1987, around 1,400 employers had 
been granted interim levies upon this basis at an estimated system cost of around $6 million 
annually.
^ It was intended that the interim levy arrangements would cease on 30 June 1986 when it 
was anticipated that a bonus and penalty system would be introduced. However, this 
introduction date was deferred and the interim levy system was progressively extended to 30 
June 1987, then 30 August 1987 and finally 30 June 1988, with the introduction of the bonus 
and penalty system from 1 July 1988. The experience of the scheme in its first 2 years of 
operation showed it falling behind the required performance necessary to track the 10-year full 
funding curve. In these years the average levy rate was 2.2 percent rather than 2.4 percent of 
remuneration, which equated to an income shortfall from target over this period of more than 
$100 million.
This shortfall was contributed to by a number of factors. First, the data deficiencies of 
the previous system created great problems in estimating the true industry claims experience, 
and thus the determination of proper levy rates for particular industries was prone to 
considerable error. Secondly, following the commencement of the new scheme a number of 
industries successfully challenged their designated rates and were reassigned to a lower levy 
band. Thirdly, the pattern of employment growth was more varied than predicted and the 
highest growth proved to occur in low levy rate industries. Fourthly, the under-registration of 
employers was skewed towards high levy rate industries.
A reallocation of industries and levy rates on the basis of actual claims experience over 
the first 2 years of the scheme resulted in an average levy rate of 2.4 percent in 1987/88, but it 
fell to 2.3 percent in 1988/89, largely as a result of economic restructuring and industry 
reclassifications. As a result of the legislative reforms following the Rowe Committee review, 
the average levy rate was sharply increased to 3.3 percent of remuneration (comprised of an 
average prescribed industry rate of 3 percent and a 10 percent surcharge) as from 1 October 
1989. The band of levy rates was considerably widened from 0.4 percent to 7.0 percent of
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remuneration (effectively 0.44 percent to 7.7 percent through the operation of the surcharge). 
As well, the industry classification system was expanded to cover 516 industries.
An attempt to provide a financial incentive for employers to improve their WorkCare 
claims record was made with the introduction of a bonus and penalties scheme from 1 July 
1988. This scheme covered all employers with 1986/87 remuneration of $450,000 or more and 
extended to some 7,000 employers with around 29,000 establishments. The scheme was 
revenue neutral and underwent a series of revisions to increase the rate of contribution to the 
Bonus Fund from which bonuses were paid (progressively from 25 percent to 50 percent to 75 
percent) and to extend its operation to small employers hi 1989/90. In the final year of 
WorkCare's operations, around 85 percent of workplaces earned a bonus and about 13 percent 
incurred a penalty under this system.
The ACC, in early 1992, began a major review of the total design of the pricing 
system, considering both Australian and overseas models. Much of this work would bear fruit 
in the early WorkCover period in the implementation of an experience rating system which has 
underpinned the financing of this successor scheme.
Dispute Resolution
With the inception of WorkCare, the Workers' Compensation Board, the body which 
determined disputed claims under the previous workers' compensation system, was replaced by 
the Accident Compensation Tribunal. The Tribunal was structured into three separate 
divisions. First, a Conciliation Division provided a sifting role. It heard all genuine disputes 
and was the body which initially considered all other new system disputes and convened 
Preliminary Conferences to facilitate the settlement of old system claims. Secondly, a Board 
Division was constituted to run off the backlog of old system matters which had previously 
been dealt with by the former Workers' Compensation Board. Finally, a Tribunal Division was 
to resolve disputes about new system cases which had not been resolved at the Conciliation 
Division.
The overwhelming majority of claims were heard by the Conciliation Division and most 
related to genuine disputes, a term which referred to the measure in the Accident
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Compensation Act which provided that claims for weekly payments had to be accepted or 
disputed within 21 days of the receipt of the claim by the employer. A claim which was not 
disputed within this period was deemed to be accepted. In the first 2 years of WorkCare's 
operations, the percentage of total claims which were disputed in this manner was 5.2 percent 
(1985/86) and 5.7 percent (1986/87). Following the 1987 review and changes to the claims 
administration agents remuneration, under which a proportion of such remuneration related to 
the disputation of claims, the percentage of total claims disputed as to initial entitlement rose to 
15.1 percent in 1987/88.
One aspect of this dramatically increased rate of agent disputation was the similarly 
dramatic level of withdrawal of disputes in relation to initial entitlement. In 1987/88 of the 
12,445 disputes lodged by claims agents under Section 109, 5,420 (43.5 percent) were 
withdrawn by the agent and, hi the following year, 6,779 (46.9 percent) of the 14,449 disputes 
lodged were similarly withdrawn. In large part this phenomenon reflected the difficulty 
experienced by agents hi assembling the necessary information in order to make a 
determination of liability within the statutory 21-day period. As a result, this period was 
increased to 28 days under 1989 legislative changes.
The initial institutional structure relating to contested claims resolution underwent a 
number of changes over the life of the WorkCare scheme. The 1987 legislative amendments 
restructured the Tribunal into an Accident Compensation Division, a Workers' Compensation 
Division, and a Contribution Assessment Division. The latter division was created and granted 
wide powers to resolve issues relating to contributions between the ACC and insurers 
operating under the previous workers' compensation system. It was composed of one 
Presidential (i.e., judicial) member. Members of the previous Conciliation Division were 
metamorphosed into Arbitrators and essentially performed their former duties as members of 
either the Accident Compensation Division or the Workers' Compensation Division.
More significant was the change brought about by the 1989 legislative reform package 
which saw an administrative review body, the WorkCare Appeals Board (WAB), interposed as 
an independent body between the ACC and the Accident Compensation Tribunal. The WAB 
commenced operations in March 1990 and was empowered to review any decision (or any
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failure to make a decision) by the ACC. The claimant had a period of 60 days following 
notification of a decision to apply for a review before the WAB. However, if a claimant, in 
cases involving termination or alteration of benefits, lodged an application for review within 21 
days of notice of the decision, then such claimant would continue to receive their weekly 
benefits until the WAB made its decision. This created an understandable incentive to appeal 
all such cases within the 21-day period of benefit preservation.
The operation of the WAB was governed by a further set of stipulated times hi which 
various material had to be submitted. While neither the ACC nor the employer was granted a 
right to appear before the WAB, the ACC was required and an employer was able to make a 
written submission to the WAB within 14 days of an application being lodged. The claimant 
could also make a statement, but had 21 days to do so and had access to both the ACC and 
employer's statements. As well, a set fee was provided for the cost of case preparation and for 
medical examinations organised by the claimant or the claimant's representative, including 
travel costs relating to a claimant's attendance at the WAB. In 1990/91 these costs amounted to 
some $6.1 million, of which 57 percent related to case preparation, 42 percent to medical 
examination costs and 0.7 percent to claimant attendance costs. With the number of 
applications to the WAB doubling in the following year, these costs also more than doubled to 
$14 million in 1991/92.
The Road to WorkCover
WorkCare a System under Review
During the 7 years of its operation, WorkCare was the subject of ongoing examination 
and scrutiny. Mention has been made of these reviews hi the previous section, as they were 
often the trigger to elements of scheme modification and change. The Government WorkCare 
Statement which was released at the end of July 1987 was the end product of a 9-month review 
by the Department of Management and Budget of the scheme. While the Statement touched on 
a range of issues, these were essentially subsidiary to the problems of return-to-work 
performance. It stated:
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The most important deficiency of WorkCare to date has been in the area of
return to work. Thus, while the number of standard WorkCare claims has been
higher than anticipated and measures are necessary to tighten access to
WorkCare benefits, the major area of concern is the number and duration of long-term
claimants in the WorkCare system. 27
The Government Statement announced a 10-point reform programme, the major 
elements of which became part of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1987 which 
came into force on 1 December 1987 and which were supplemented by the Accident 
Compensation Regulations promulgated on 4 January 1988. These measures included 
provisions for a tightening of access to benefits, standardised medical certificates, a widening 
of the grounds upon which benefits could be suspended or terminated, the appointment of a 
complaints investigator, capping of common law damages, and increased penalties for 
fraudulent activities. They were complemented by administrative changes within the ACC such 
as the establishment of the Employment Monitoring Unit and new procedures on claims 
monitoring and the new performance-based claims agents contracts.
Following the DMB review, the attention surrounding WorkCare, particularly as a 
result of the parliamentary debates upon the 1987 legislation, led to the Government 
establishing, in November 1987, a Joint Select Committee of the Victorian Parliament to 
further examine the system. The Committee had both a specific and a broad mandate. The 
former was to investigate the question of contribution to the ACC from pre-WorkCare insurers 
hi relation to injuries whose origins partly lay prior to the establishment of WorkCare. The 
latter was an open-ended investigation into all aspects of WorkCare.
The Committee, under the chairmanship of Barry Rowe, tabled its first report, into the 
question of pre-WorkCare insurer contribution, in late March 1988. This report (by a majority) 
endorsed the Government's view that contribution should exist in respect of all claims which 
had a part pre-WorkCare origin and not, as the insurers had claimed, that such contribution 
only applied to injuries of gradual process. The Government then legislated to insert an
"WorkCare: Government Statement, 31 July 1987, para 1.6.
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extensive legislative regime into the Act to govern the contribution issue. This legislation was 
proclaimed on 11 May 1988.
The Final Report of the Rowe Committee was delayed by parliamentary elections in 
October 1988 and was finally tabled in November 1988. The two-volume report made some 
124 recommendations for change. Apart from its recommendations in respect of a changed 
system of contested claims resolution, most of the recommendations contained hi the Rowe 
Report were process and procedure oriented, concentrating on matters such as information 
dissemination (including the production of quarterly reports from the various WorkCare 
agencies), redesigned claim forms and medical certificates and changes to the operating 
procedures, policy guidelines, and remuneration arrangements hi respect of claims 
administration agents.
The Government, however, moved to introduce a more extensive package of changes to 
the WorkCare system with the Accident Compensation (General Amendment) Act 1989 which 
was assented to at the end of September 1989. This was the second significant reform package 
following the 1985 legislation. It was a comprehensive set of measures which included
  raising the average levy rate from 2.4 percent to 3.3 percent (including the 10 
percent surcharge;
  the reduction of the rate of weekly payments from 80 percent to 60 percent
PIAWE for workers on benefits for more than 12 months with a work capacity 
or level of impairment below 15 percent;
  replacement of the previous minimum-floor arrangements with a compensation 
supplement for lower-paid workers;
  increasing the period that an employer had to keep a job open for an injured 
worker from 6 months to 12 months; and
  introduction of the WorkCare Appeals Board as the body responsible for the 
initial stage of contested claims resolution.
WorkCare the Internal Repositioning Process
The 1989 legislative reforms provided a breathing space for the WorkCare system, 
especially in respect of the former downward financial spiral. This can be seen from Table 2.2. 
The WorkCare fund in 1989/90 reported an operating surplus of some $373.7 million 
compared to a deficit of $12.3 million the year before; this was due mostly to increased
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revenues as claim payments only declined slightly. Even more strikingly, the unfunded 
liabilities of the scheme fell by more than 40 percent, from $4.182 billion to $2.476 billion, 
between 1988/89 and 1989/90, and the funding ratio more than doubled, from 14 percent to 30 
percent, over this period. This obviously reflected the actuarial impact of the system changes.
These gains continued to consolidate during 1990/91 and 1991/92, with the unfunded 
liabilities of the scheme being estimated at $1.819 billion and $1.862 billion, respectively, and 
the funding ratio rising to 46 percent in 1990/91 and 48 percent in 1991/92. However, during 
these years the Victorian economy had moved firmly into recession and it was becoming clear 
that this, particularly as it was reflected in labour shedding, was beginning to have a significant 
impact upon the scheme, both hi respect of levy income and difficulties hi returning injured 
workers to the workforce.
The 1991/92 ACC annual report represented a clarion call to action to address these 
issues. The new managing director, Andrew Lindberg, bluntly declared that
Once again the WorkCare scheme is at the cross-roads. By year end, the 
1989 reform measures had run their course and there is no doubt that further 
substantial legislative reform is necessary to significantly reduce the financial 
and social costs of workplace injury in Victoria. 28
The ACC managing director stated that the ACC stood "ready to provide every assistance to 
the Government to implement change during 1992/93. "29 The organisation had already 
embarked upon a process of analysis and preparation of alternative approaches.
The centrality of the link between claims duration, particularly the number of long-term 
claimants, and the attainment and maintenance of a fully-funded scheme at a levy rate 
comparable to that of surrounding schemes was brought to the fore through research 
commissioned by the ACC. This research, conducted by the Boston Consulting Group, 
estimated that around 70 percent of the cost differential between the Victorian system (with an 
average levy rate of 3 percent of remuneration) and that across the border in New South Wales
28Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 6. 
29Ibid.,p. 7.
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(then operating on an average levy rate of 1.8 percent of remuneration) could be accounted for 
by the different duration experience of the two systems.30
Further, a visit to the United States by the ACC managing director had reinforced the 
view that, on the basis of Australian and overseas experience, the "compensation cycle" could 
only be broken by
  a workplace centred system of rehabilitation and return to work, supported by 
strong financial incentives and obligations for employers to get injured workers 
quickly and safely back to work and for employees to rehabilitate, retrain and 
find suitable employment;
  a more direct and less litigious approach to reviewing benefits with minimal 
involvement of lawyers;
  reduced benefits for those claimants capable of work with increased support for 
the seriously injured;
  restricted access to common law in favour of more efficient forms of 
compensation; and
  integrated administrative and service delivery systems.31
The Move to WorkCover
Given these antecedents, it was highly likely that 1992/93 would see further significant 
changes to the WorkCare system. When and by whom such change would be implemented 
would depend upon the election cycle. The Labor Government that had been in power since 
1982 was internally divided and weakened by financial management questions, particularly in 
relation to the sale of the State Bank and the failure of the Pyramid Building Society. As 
predicted, a Liberal-National Party coalition scored a landslide victory in the October 1992 
elections. The new Government moved to completely overhaul the WorkCare system through 
the introduction of a new WorkCover scheme as one of its first legislative initiatives. While in 
Opposition, the new Government had commissioned the Tasman Institute, a conservative think 
tank, to provide the blueprint for a new system of workers' compensation arrangements. This 
report, with accompanying actuarial costings, provided the basis for dramatically overhauling
 ^Boston Consulting Group, Benchmarking Best Practice: Cost Drivers in Australian Workers' 
Compensation Systems (July 1992).
''Accident Compensation Commission, Annual Report, 1991/92, p. 7.
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the WorkCare system. This was augmented by input from other sources and a new set of 
proposals was rendered into legislative form and introduced into Parliament on 30 October 
1992. With a majority in both Houses of Parliament, the new measure, the Accident 
Compensation (WorkCover) Act 1992, quickly completed its parliamentary stages and received 
Royal Assent on 19 November 1992. Workers' compensation in Victoria moved from 
WorkCare to WorkCover on 1 December 1992. The new WorkCover system and its 
performance are the subjects of the remaining chapters of this review.
Concluding Observations
The WorkCare changes involved a significant break with the past tradition of workers' 
compensation development. There were no Australian models to hand. Queensland had 
legislated to establish a state monopoly scheme hi 1916, but the Queensland system (even at the 
time of the introduction of WorkCare) maintained limitations on the duration of weekly 
payments of compensation which were much more stringent than those in Victoria. Indeed, in a 
functional sense, the more radical step was not the change from private insurance to a state 
fund, but the move to operate an extended wage loss system. This broke the general mould, 
which had existed from the origins of workers' compensation in Australia, of such schemes 
only providing circumscribed coverage (usually through prescribed monetary limits) of income 
loss, with more income protection for more extended periods being primarily the responsibility 
of the federal social security system. In addition, the traditional arrangements in workers' 
compensation schemes for dealing with extended duration claims through lump sum 
redemptions was proscribed except in very limited situations.
The move to an extended wage loss system placed enormous responsibility upon the 
institutional mechanisms and processes in charge of injury prevention, rehabilitation, and 
return to work. As became clearly evident very early in the WorkCare scheme's operation, the 
issue of extended duration and long-term claims would be the major threat to its continued 
economic viability. If the system was to operate under its original legislative mandate, it would 
require a sophisticated and proactive system of claims administration. The breadth of the
2-31
managerialist vision had to be matched with the strength and depth of the operations administration
But the operation of the system of claims administration agents was plainly disastrous 
at least in the early days of the set fee per claim remuneration arrangements. This system, born 
of political compromise, introduced a unique variant to workers' compensation administration 
Questions persist as to whether a different set of remuneration arrangements could have 
provided the necessary basis for administrative excellence and whether the initially preferred 
arrangements with respect to a state fund operation would have fared better. The first of these 
questions is still being played out; the issue of how to align in the optimal manner the actions 
and behaviour of a third party with scheme goals through economic and other incentives 
remains a challenge for WorkCover in its present form. The second is somewhat moot. 
Overseas experience can point to a number of state funds which are a bureaucratic and 
financial mess. Yet, it can also illuminate occasional systems of this type which are essentially 
fully funded and rank among the world's best; British Columbia and Washington are two such 
examples.
The establishment of an extended wage loss system also brought into sharp focus the 
issue of the relationship between workers' compensation and the labour market, and in 
particular the vexed question of the treatment of permanent partial incapacity. Conceptual and 
legal difficulties had always existed in this regard previously, but their practical (and 
particularly their financial) effect had been muted by the general limits upon the duration of 
weekly benefits.
The issue is central to the issue of scheme boundary differentiation; that is, what is the 
basis upon which workers' compensation schemes delimit their proper area of responsibility 
and avoid become de facto unemployment insurance schemes. In other words, for what period 
and at what level should workers' compensation support continue for persons whose recovery 
from injury leaves them with a work capacity, but whose inability to secure employment 
results primarily from the state of the labour market. This issue had been largely left open in 
the original WorkCare scheme arrangements, and attempts to provide answers were important 
components of the 1987 and 1989 amending legislation.
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The influence of labour market conditions and their effect upon scheme operations was 
heightened when the Victorian economy moved into recession. As the economic downturn 
increasingly affected employment levels in the economy, there was a direct impact on both 
return-to-work opportunities and upon scheme financing in a system where income is 
determined by a levy upon employee remuneration.
The lack of coordinated action between the WorkCare agencies also meant a dissipation 
of effort and almost certainly a degrading of ultimate results. The potential of using a single 
fund and its comprehensive data base for sophisticated, targeted injury prevention initiatives 
was never realised. Similarly, the largely arm's-length arrangement between the agencies 
responsible for claims and rehabilitation/return to work, undermined the basis for an integrated 
problem solving approach and created confusion for employers in having to deal with different 
agencies over a single workers' compensation claim. Employers and injured workers were 
passive participants rather than having a controlling involvement in the workers' compensation 
process. A strong workplace focus was a comparatively late development under WorkCare, but 
when it came (such as in VARC's Injury Management Program) it yielded superior results and 
provided indicators for future scheme redesign.
While WorkCare is acknowledged to have been a failure, its problems informed the 
design of WorkCover and are reflected in many of the features of the present scheme. In 
particular, the strong focus on the return-to-work goal under WorkCover directly reflects the 
failure of WorkCare to achieve return to work for so many claimants. Concentration on 
incentive effects for authorised insurers results from the failure to adequately consider such 
issues under WorkCare. Dissatisfaction with both the private approach to workers' 
compensation (pre-1985) and the WorkCare approach (1985-1992) led Victoria to develop the 
mixed approach that we find today under WorkCover. It is to that system that we now turn our 
attention.
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Source: Cooney Report, Table 1-16.
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Source: Accident Compensation Commission Annual Reports 
'10 months only; from 1 September 1985
2Figures include actual claims for the period, together with an estimate of the number of incurred but not yet 
reported claims (IBNRs) estimated at 30 June 1992.
'income from levy, investments and other sources. 
4Excluding movement in outstanding claims liability. 
5Net assets excluding recoveries.
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This chapter will provide a brief introduction to the structure and functions of the VWA 
as of July 1996. While many of these topics will be explored in more detail later, it is useful to 
provide an overview, particularly for the reader who is not already familiar with the Victorian 
workers' compensation scheme. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the volume of 
claims hi Victoria.
The Legislative Mandate
The Victorian WorkCover Authority (VWA) was created by the Accident Compensation 
(WorkCover) Act of 1992, which completely restructured the workers' compensation system in 
Victoria, as recounted in the previous chapter. According to the Accident Compensation Act 
1985, as amended (the Act), the objectives of the Authority are to
(a) manage the accident compensation scheme as effectively and efficiently and 
economically as is possible;
(b) administer . . . [the Act] . . . and any other relevant Act;
(c) assist employers and workers hi achieving healthy and safe working environments;
(d) promote the effective occupational rehabilitation of injured workers and their early 
return to work;
(e) encourage the provision of suitable employment opportunities to workers who have 
been injured;
(f) ensure that appropriate compensation is paid to injured workers in the most 
socially and economically appropriate manner and as expeditiously as possible;
(g) develop such internal management structures and procedures as will enable the 
Authority to perform its functions and exercise its powers effectively, efficiently 
and economically. (Section 19)
The functions of the Victorian WorkCover Authority are very comprehensive. It 
oversees the workers' compensation insurance system, including regulating authorised insurers 
and superintending the operation of the WorkCover Authority Fund, which acts as a 100 
percent re-insurance fund, and thus bears the actuarial risk of the Victorian scheme. As part of
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its workers' compensation responsibilities, the VWA also regulates the public and private 
system that accomplishes the medical, physical, and occupational rehabilitation of injured 
workers. It is largely responsible for maintaining the focus of this system on the effective, 
economical, and durable return-to-work objective.
It manages (effective 2 July 1996) the occupational health and safety system in Victoria, 
including standards setting, inspection, enforcement, education, and prosecution activities. It is 
responsible for public safety under the Dangerous Goods Act, the Road Transport (Dangerous 
Goods) Act, and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. The VWA also acts as the main policy 
development and evaluation body for the areas of workers' compensation and occupational 
safety and health in Victoria. As such, it works closely with the Ministry for Finance in 
formulating public policy in these critical areas. It also has general responsibility for fostering 
a co-operative consultative relationship between management and labour in relation to the 
health, safety and welfare of persons at work (Section 20). According to the Victorian 
WorkCover Authority, 1995-96 Annual Report, "WorkCover exists to prevent work injuries, 
achieve return to work after injury, provide fair compensation and deliver quality service to 
both workers and employers at a competitive cost to business." (p. 7)
VWA Governance
The VWA is headed by a Board of Management, which includes a full-time Director, 
who acts as Chief Executive of the Authority, and not more than six part-tune Directors, 
appointed by the Governor in Council (Sections 24-26). Directors serve at the pleasure of the 
Governor in Council for terms not exceeding 5 years and are eligible for re-appointment. It is 
also provided that the Governor in Council may appoint one of the Directors to be Chairperson 
(Section 27). The Board of Management meets at least 10 times in each calendar year at the 
call of the Chairperson, and a majority of Directors in office constitute a quorum. Questions 
are decided by a majority of votes of the Directors present and voting on the question. The 
Chairperson, or other person presiding, has a second, or casting, vote in the event of a tie vote 
(Section 28).
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The Director of the Board and Chief Executive of the VWA is appointed by the 
Governor in Council and "... any act, matter or thing done in the name of, or on behalf of, 
the Authority, by the Chief Executive is to be taken to have been done by the Authority." 
(Section 25) The remuneration and terms and condition of appointment of the Chief Executive 
of the VWA are not set by statute, but are determined by the Governor in Council.
The Act also establishes the WorkCover Authority Fund. It receives premium income, 
investment income, penalties, and other income and is responsible for payment of 
compensation, rehabilitation, and any other payments required under this or any other Act. 
This specifically includes the costs of the Health and Safety Division (and the predecessor 
Health and Safety Organisation as described in Chapter 8). In addition, the Fund is responsible 
for the payment of the costs of administration of the VWA (including the Board of Directors 
and the WorkCover Advisory Committee), the costs of the Medical Panels, the County Court, 
Magistrates' Court and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal arising from the operation of the 
Act. (Section 32(4)) In addition, "the Authority may obtain financial accommodation subject to 
and in accordance with the powers conferred on it under the Borrowing and Investment Powers 
Act 1987." (Section 33)
The statute also calls for a WorkCover Advisory Committee, appointed by the Minister, 
to advise the Board in relation to its objectives:
(a) to promote a healthy and safe work environment; and
(b) to ensure that appropriate compensation is paid to injured workers in the most 
socially and economically appropriate manner and as expeditiously as possible; and
(c) to promote the occupational rehabilitation and early return to work of injured 
workers. (Section 31A(1))
The Advisory Committee is to include persons with a sound knowledge of the law relating to 
accident compensation, persons with experience in hospital services or medical services, 
occupational health and safety, occupational rehabilitation, and persons with experience in 
accident compensation who are nominated by Victorian employer and employee groups. 
(Section 31A(2))
In its insurance role, the VWA operates, in essence, as a re-insurer that bears the full 
underwriting risk of the scheme. The day-to-day collection of premiums and payment of
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compensation benefits under the Act are conducted by authorised agents, generally referred to 
as "authorised insurers." See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of this relationship, perhaps the 
most unique feature of workers' compensation in Victoria. The Authority has the power to 
appoint and terminate such authorised insurers. In July 1996, there were 14 authorised insurers 
operating in Victoria. Authorised agents must keep appropriate accounting records relating to 
transactions under the Act, and the Authority may compel the production of such accounting 
records for audit and inspection as necessary. (Section 23 (6) and (7)) In fact, the VWA has 
exercised considerable oversight and control over the authorised insurers (see Chapter 4).
Other Major Players in the Victorian Workers' Compensation System
The Governor in Council, the Parliament, and the Minister are the ultimate sources of 
authority in the Victorian workers' compensation system. The VWA is the major 
administrative agent, but not the only major player. The County Courts and the Magistrates' 
Courts review decisions of the VWA and its authorised insurers. The Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal also hears certain disputes about workers' compensation matters. The Conciliation 
Service attempts to prevent disputes in workers' compensation cases from spreading to the 
courts. Medical Panels are constituted for individual disputes and hold sway over the decisions 
that will ultimately determine compensability of individual conditions. The function of all these 
entities is described in full in Chapter 6, Disputes and Their Resolution. They will only be 
briefly highlighted here.
Conciliation Service
The Act specifies that "... the Authority must engage persons nominated by the 
Minister as Conciliation Officers." (Section 54) However, the VWA appoints "... such other 
officers and employees as are necessary ..." (Section 54) Thus, the Conciliation Service has a 
unique status and reporting relationship as they are employees of the VWA, but answering 
directly to the Minister for their performance. According to the Act, "... the Senior 
Conciliation Officer . . . must observe any guidelines issued by the Minister." The 
Conciliation Service had a staff of 81 at 19 March 1996 and a 1995-96 administrative budget of
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Conciliation Service had a staff of 81 at 19 March 1996 and a 1995-96 administrative budget of 
$4.1 million.
Medical Panels
Medical Panels are nominated by the Convenor, who is appointed by the Minister. The 
Panels are drawn from a list of medical practitioners appointed by the Governor in Council and 
may consist of one, two or three members as determined by the Convenor of the Medical 
Panels. As discussed in Chapter 6, a Medical Panel is charged with giving its opinion on any 
medical question in respect of injuries arising out of, or in the course of or due to the nature of 
employment. . . (Section 67) Cases may be referred to a Medical Panel by a Conciliation 
Officer, the County Court, an authorised insurer or self-insurer, or the VWA. Medical Panels 
had a 1995-96 administrative budget of $485,000.
The Courts
The courts in Victoria have broad jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters. 
Since workers' compensation in Victoria is not an exclusive remedy for the worker against 
his/her employer, there is a considerable amount of court activity. However, a matter may not 
be taken to court in Victoria unless it has first been through Conciliation Services. This is an 
attempt to prevent expensive litigation over matters that could be resolved more directly 
between the parties. The Magistrates' Court may not hear matters involving death claims and is 
limited to matters involving less than $40,000 or 104 weeks of weekly benefits. (Section 43) 
County Court is somewhat more formal than Magistrates' Court, but still not bound by rules of 
evidence. (Section 44) Either Magistrates' Court or County Court may refer a matter in dispute 
to a Medical Panel, and is bound by the determination of such a panel. Decisions of the Court 
can be appealed to the Supreme Court, but only on questions of law. (Section 52)
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal also adjudicates disputes emanating from the 
workers' compensation system. The Tribunal's jurisdiction extends to the following range of 
matters:
(a) various disputes about medical and like services under Sections 99, 99A or 99B 
(bearing in mind that Section 99B is now repealed) after the Conciliation 
requirement has been observed;
(b) contribution matters under Sections 129A- 129M.
There are other disputes over the funding of claims and other various issues that will be 
discussed later in Chapter 6. The VWA transferred some $4.6 million to the Department of 
Justice in 1995-96 to support the operation of the Courts and the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal with respect to workers' compensation matters.
Structure of the VWA
The VWA was reorganised in July of 1996 when it absorbed the former Health and 
Safety Organisation (HSO) as the new Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the VWA. (see 
Chapter 8) This consolidation represented an attempt by the government to provide closer 
coordination between prevention efforts and monetary incentives. Figure 3.1 shows the 
organisation of the VWA as of July 1996. The major operating arms of the VWA are the 
Health and Safety Division, the Scheme Regulation Division, and the Scheme Development 
Division. In addition, there are a number of important corporate service groups that are part of 
the central administration of the VWA. These include Corporate Affairs, Information Services, 
and Finance and Corporate Services. There are also the normal corporate functions of Human 
Resources and Legal Services, attached directly to the office of the Chief Executive. Figure 3.1 
depicts the broad structure of the VWA as of July 1996 (i.e., right after the reorganisation).
Health and Safety Division
The Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the Victorian WorkCover Authority is 
responsible for administering health and safety legislation in Victoria, primarily the
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Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Equipment 
(Public Safety) Act 1994. HSD undertakes activities aimed at improving health and safety in 
workplaces, strives to improve health and safety in the agricultural and farming sector, and 
facilitates public safety. A major focus of HSD is regulating the transport, handling, and 
storage of dangerous goods and hazardous substances, including the notification and 
registration of premises and the licensing of drivers carrying dangerous goods. Licensing of 
fireworks displays and the manufacture, use, importation, storage, transport, and sale of 
explosives are also the responsibility of HSD. The structure and function of HSD will be dealt 
with in detail in Chapter 8.
There are three Operations Sections organised geographically as Eastern, Central and 
Western, with each headed by a Director. In addition to the Melbourne headquarters 
operations, there are a total of 11 offices around the state, with each staffed by Inspectors and 
(generally) an Information Officer and headed by a Manager. In addition, each of the Directors 
has state-wide responsibility for a particular type of hazard. The Director of Eastern 
Operations has state-wide responsibility for Work Environment Hazards; the Director of 
Central Operations has state-wide responsibility for Plant Hazards; and the Director of 
Western Operations has state-wide responsibility for Dangerous Goods. This matrix 
management structure resulted from a 1994 independent consultant review of the organisation 
and its mission.
In addition to the Operations Sections, there are three specialist sections that primarily 
serve internal HSD needs. The Technology Section provides scientific, engineering and other 
technical advice and support for the other sections. It also provides technical research and 
analysis to identify and provide advice on current and emerging technical issues with potential 
to impact on health and safety. It is composed of the Hygiene Unit, Mechanical Engineering 
Unit, Occupational Medicine Unit, Chemical Technology Unit, and Ergonomics Unit.
The Strategy Section manages key policy, standards and strategy processes to achieve 
HSD objectives. In association with other divisions it undertakes policy development, research 
and review, standards development and coordination, strategic planning, management 
information systems, marketing and awareness, corporate performance support, and
3-7
investigations and prosecution. It is composed of a Legislation Policy Unit, Planning and 
Review Unit, Standards Development Co-ordination Unit, Central Investigation Unit, 
Organisational Development Unit, and Marketing Unit.
The third specialist section is called the Development Taskforce. It undertakes 
initiatives aimed at identifying and developing creative approaches to the establishment and 
marketing of HSD services. It manages projects to leverage HSD's impact externally with 
business sectors, including employer and employee associations, educational institutions and 
the general community. The key objective is the use of private sector and community sector 
infrastructure to improve health and safety outcomes. This section was initiated as an 
experiment in leveraging the expertise of the HSD through external organisations and 
processes. It will be evaluated at the end of the experimental period for its overall impact on 
HSD mission achievement.
Scheme Regulation Division
The Scheme Regulation Division has responsibility for the regulation of scheme 
participants, including authorised insurers, self-insurers, medical and like providers, 
occupational rehabilitation providers, and others. The Insurance Section deals with the 
traditional regulatory issues that would be familiar in most workers' compensation systems in 
North America, including the regulation of self-insurers. The relationship between the VWA 
and authorised insurers is especially complex. The participation and oversight responsibilities 
of the VWA in the insurance functions are greater than in a typical private workers' 
compensation insurance system (as hi most U.S. states). Moreover, they are more complex 
than those of a typical exclusive public workers' compensation fund (as in Canada and several 
U.S. states), because private organisations are performing the basic client service functions. 
This relationship and the general performance of the insurance system will be examined in 
detail in Chapter 4.
Scheme Regulation's basic mandate is to regulate the performance of the authorised 
insurers. It does this through its Insurance Section, which licenses insurers, audits their 
performance, and monitors their outcomes with the Authorised Insurer Quarterly Performance
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Table. They also manage the Best Practice Incentive scheme which provided some $6 million 
(about 10 percent supplement to base fees) in performance-based compensation for authorised 
insurers in 1995-96. Scheme Regulation negotiates annually with the authorised insurers over 
the terms of their compensation (both base and incentive-based).
The approval of self-insurers is also the responsibility of the VWA. Self-insurance is 
treated as a privilege in Victoria and the VWA is mandated to determine whether an applicant 
for self-insurance is fit and proper to be self-insured. (Section 142) The Self-Insurer Regulation 
Unit of the Insurance Section does the staff work for the approval of self-insurers under the 
Act. This does not just involve the question of whether the body corporate is able to meet its 
workers' compensation liabilities and has the resources to administer claims on its own, but 
also questions of the level of incidence and the aggregate cost of injuries, and the safety of the 
working conditions maintained by the self-insurer. Only 23 self-insurers were authorised as of 
July 1996.
The Investigations & Compliance Section is in charge of conducting such investigations 
into questions of fraud and abuse as might be necessary. In addition, this unit conducted the 
massive run-down of some 22,000 pre-WorkCover common law cases. The Investigations & 
Compliance section also conducts the VWA payroll audits (or Wage Audits). The authority for 
collecting the employer payment for workers' compensation insurance coverage was 
transferred from the State Taxation Office to the VWA in 1993. As a result, the VWA had to 
inaugurate a system of payroll audits, to insure that employers give accurate reports of their 
employment and payroll levels. This has been done through a contracted external audit system 
with a performance-based fee for the auditors, based on the amount of payroll they discover 
that was not covered by VWA premium. In the first year of this program (for 1993-94 
payrolls, completed during calendar year 1996), the VWA paid out $4.6 million in audit fees 
for the recovery of $15 million in unreported premium and some $5 million in penalties.
The Health and Rehabilitation Branch reviews and implements policy on rehabilitation 
providers (which, in Victoria, includes a wide variety of professionals, from physiotherapists 
and chiropractors to naturopaths and massage therapists in addition to vocational or 
occupational rehabilitation practitioners). The Health & Rehabilitation Branch also regulates
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the prices of medical and like services, conducts utilisation reviews, and promulgates practice 
guidelines. These issues are reviewed in Chapter 5 below. Some of the functions have been 
transferred to Provider Services section in the Insurance Branch, effective March 1996. 
Chapter 7 examines the working of the occupational rehabilitation system.
The utilisation review consists primarily of a review of the frequency of treatment by 
individual practitioners (medical, physiotherapy, chiropractic, psychological and others). "Bad 
players" are identified internally by the VWA and resolution is sought in cooperation with the 
relevant professional licensure group. In the past, one practitioner has had a licence to practice 
suspended for a year and several have been fined and directed to conduct specific remedial 
efforts.
Scheme Development Division
The Scheme Development Division is responsible for research and development, 
business planning, legislation and policy issues, and the actuarial functions of the VWA. The 
Legislation unit is responsible for drafting and interpretation of legislation; essentially it is the 
legal eyes and ears of the VWA. The Policy unit provides support for policy development, 
including intelligence on scheme practices in other states and other countries. This unit has 
also been supporting VWA participation in the national Heads of Workers' Compensation 
Authorities (HWCA) organisation and their drive toward greater standardisation of workers' 
compensation law and practice among Australian states. The Business Planning unit produces 
special reports and analyses for senior management at the VWA. It also calculates the key 
performance indicators for the VWA and measures that performance against the annual 
corporate plan.
The Research & Development unit supports external research designed to improve the 
overall efficacy of the scheme in reducing injuries, or mitigating their effects. It had an 
external grant budget of $700,000 in 1995-96. There have been some stimulating research 
results generated, including the Ballarat Project, which sought to test the impact of general 
awareness media ads on specific injuries in particular industries. It appears that significant 
reductions in injury incidence and severity were obtained in a media campaign aimed at back
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strain in the hospital and trucking sectors in Ballarat. This unit also administers grants to 
community-based organisations seeking to assist disabled workers with recovery and return to 
work. This aspect is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
The Actuarial & Statistical Services unit is responsible for the actuarial assessment of 
the Fund and the adequacy of the premium level to support the scheme. They use two outside 
actuarial consultants with contrasting methodologies to inform these issues. In addition, this 
unit is involved in developing the F factors for individual insurers. These F factors are used to 
adjust individual authorised insurer claim reserve estimates to offset the historical tendency to 
underestimate future costs. In essence, this prevents the scheme from tending to under-funding 
by virtue of underestimation of future commitments emanating from current claims. This issue 
is discussed in Chapter 4 below.
Information Services Division
Information Services had a 1995-96 budget of $21.2 million; but only about 20 percent 
of this was spent on internal systems, as the rest was contracted out to Continuum, Australia. 
Continuum administers the ACCtion main frame transaction processing system and a related 
management reporting database that the VWA and the authorised insurers use for claims and 
premium processing. Development and operation of ACCtion by VWA began in 1987, and it 
was outsourced to Continuum in 1993. There has been a great deal of controversy about the 
future of the ACCtion system, interlinked with the issue of further privatisation of the 
Victorian scheme. Plans have been under development, and redevelopment, since 1992 for 
replacing the aging ACCtion database. However, there has been no agreement to date within 
the VWA, or between the VWA and the authorised insurers, as to the optimum strategy to 
follow. The Authority also maintains PC and UNIX applications supporting internal operation 
of the organisation. The VWA uses package-based payroll, financial, and records management 
systems and has built Oracle-based systems in house to support specialised functions such as 
audit management and conciliation.
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Corporate Affairs Division
Corporate Affairs does the public relations and public information work of the VWA. It 
had a 1995-96 budget of $9.9 million, most of which was for media purchase. The Division 
has maintained a very high profile in recent years with a series of public awareness campaigns 
stressing the themes of return-to-work and prevention of workplace accidents. These 
advertising efforts are given much of the credit for the turnaround in system performance and 
the fundamental change in the workers' compensation culture in Victoria since 1992.
Finance and Corporate Services Division
The Finance and Corporate Services Division does the accounting, budgeting and 
financial performance monitoring for the VWA. The Division had oversight responsibility for 
claims payments of $670.4 million, payments to insurers and agents of $80.4 million, a total 
VWA administrative budget of $69.4 million, and payments to other agencies of $24.5 million 
in 1995-96. The management of the VWA fund reserves was transferred from this Division to 
the Victorian Funds Management Corporation in late 1995, in an attempt to obtain greater 
economies of scale in investment management. This agency manages about 3 billion in VWA 
reserves, which generated net investment income for the VWA during 1995-96 of $286 
million.
Claim Flow Analysis
There are three very different ways of looking at the dynamic population of claims in 
any workers' compensation system. One can take a common point of origin approach, 
grouping together all claims that originate in the same period. For the most part, such claims 
will have common injury dates as well, but that is not always true since some claims may take 
considerable time to be reported, for a wide variety of reasons. It is also possible to take a 
common closing date approach, looking backward from the time that the claim is "resolved" 
and developing aggregate measures over the duration of the claim. We put resolved in quotes 
because the degree of finality of closure depends ultimately on the legal system, and because of 
the potential for claims that seem resolved to resurface or reopen as conditions change. Third,
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it is possible to take a stock approach and just count the number of claims active at any point in 
time. We will employ both the first and last of these methods to examine the flow of claims in 
the workers' compensation system of Victoria.
Claims Lodged
Figure 3.2 shows the number of claims lodged with the VWA and its authorised 
insurers during fiscal year 1995-96 (1 July 1995 through 30 June 1996) and their outcomes, at 
least so far as these are known at this point. Of a total of 33,291 claims lodged, some 29,261 
(or 88 percent) were paid by the authorised insurers and a total of 4,030 (or 12 percent) were 
rejected. Of those rejected during 1995-96, only 374 (or 9 percent) had appealed that decision 
as of 30 June 1996. This should not be regarded as the final appeal rate, however, as some 
additional appeals can be expected after the end of the fiscal year on claims arising during 
1995-96. As shown in the figure, very few of these disputes had yet settled by 30 June 1996; 
with only nine resolved by that date, five successful and four unsuccessful from the claimant's 
perspective.
Among the paid claims, disputes developed among 1,587 (or 5.4 percent) on some 
matter subsequent to basic compensability. This could be over the level of the benefit, the 
degree of impairment, the point of recovery, suitable work, rehabilitation issues, etc. The 
29,261 paid claims included 7,491 (or 35 percent) "Medical Only" claims. These claims did 
not involve loss of more than 10 days of work time (the "employer excess" or retained risk), 
but did involve more than $407 in medical costs. Disputes developed among 108 (or 1.4 
percent) of these claims.
There were 21,770 claims lodged in 1995-96 that received weekly payments, i.e., 
disability exceeded the employer excess of 10 days. This represented 65 percent of the paid 
claims during the period. Among these, disputes developed between the worker and the insurer 
in 994 cases (4.6 percent). As in the case of the other dispute rates, this should be regarded as 
a minimal estimate, since some disputes are likely to be filed after the end of the fiscal year.
Victoria had 2,099 cases that received some occupational rehabilitation services during 
the year (or 7.2 percent of paid claims). There were no disputes recorded among these claims,
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but again it is necessary to remember that insufficient time has passed for these claims to have 
finally resolved, so it can be expected that additional disputes will be recorded in the future 
against the 1995-96 cohort of claims. See Chapter 7 for a full description of occupational 
rehabilitation in Victoria.
There were 3,143 cases that received compensation for maims under Section 98 of the 
Act during the year (see Chapter 5). This represented 10.7 percent of the paid claims in 
1995-96. Among those receiving payment, 583 (or 18.5 percent) showed a dispute sometime 
during the life of the claim. Finally, 179 proceedings were commenced under common law for 
damages. This is very preliminary, given the usual time delays with such claims, and can be 
expected to expand severalfold before the ledger is closed on 1995-96 injuries.
Active Claims
Figure 3.3 gives a very different idea of the number of injuries that flow through the 
Victorian workers' compensation system. It shows all "active" claims during 1995-96, or the 
claims where some payment occurred during the fiscal year. The long duration of many 
workers' compensation claims is readily apparent in the fact that there were over 100,000 
active claims in 1995-96, as against only about 33,000 lodged during the year (from Figure 
3.2).
Of the 100,124 active claims in 1995-96, 74,530 (or 74 percent) received weekly 
payments during the year. Collectively, they received $258.4 million in weekly benefits, or 
about $3,467 per claim. The figure shows that these cases received about 36 percent of all 
VWA payments during the year. Further, it is shown that 9,780 (or 13 percent) of these claims 
had conciliation services at some time and 42 involved Medical Panel referrals. In addition, 
there were a total of 1,738 appeals to County Court and 558 to Magistrates' Court during the 
year. Most of these appeals were not resolved by the end of the period, but among those that 
had resolved during the year, 62 percent of Magistrates' Court and 60 percent of County Court 
appeals had been accepted in favour of the worker.
Among the 25,594 medical only claims that were active during fiscal 1995-96, a much 
lower rate of disputation was evident. Only 704 of these claims involved Conciliation Services
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and 16 were referred to Medical Panels. Further, there were 136 appeals to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal during the year with a success rate of 57 percent for the worker. These 
relatively simple claims (less than 10 days lost from work) were paid a total of $64.0 million, 
or about 8.8 percent of total payments during 1995-96.
Figure 3.3 indicates that there were 8,077 Section 98 (table of maims) claims active 
during 1995-96 (or 8.1 percent of all active claims). However, these claims involved much 
more than a proportionate amount of litigation, as the figure indicates that 4,856 of these (or 
60.1 percent) involved Conciliation Services, and 3,343 (or 41.4 percent) involved Medical 
Panel referrals. They also accounted for 385 appeals to Magistrates' Court and 633 appeals to 
County Court. About 85 percent of both Magistrates' Court and County Court appeals were 
accepted in favour of the worker. Total payments for maims hi 1995-96 amounted to $116.6 
million, or about 15.7 percent of all system payments. Of this amount, about $12.6 million (or 
10.8 percent) was for pain and suffering under Section 98A.
Last, Figure 3.3 shows that there were 727 common law actions "active" during 
1995-96. While the number of these cases is not great, they are very expensive, with an 
average payment of $137,689. In aggregate, payments to such cases involved $100.1 million 
during the year, or about 13.8 percent of total payments. It is important to note that this 
number includes some of the "run-off of pre-WorkCover common law claims, which were 
being settled in bulk during the period. Furthermore, it could be expected that since these were 
among the last "old" cases to settle, that they involved the most intractable issues. In fact, the 
figure shows that $82.2 million went to these old cases. Of course, 100 percent of such cases 
involve litigation; a total of 667 common law actions were filed in County Court and 60 with 
the Supreme Court. As indicated in the figure, a small minority of these cases had resolved by 
the end of the year.
With these preliminary elements in place, let us proceed to examine the specific 
performance areas of the workers' compensation system in Victoria, beginning with the 
insurance regulatory mechanisms in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.1 























































































CLAIMS LODGED IN 1995/96
Claims Lodged 33,291
Claims Rejected 4,030 (12%)
Dispute 374
• Successful 5
• Not Successful 4
Paid Claims 29,261 (88%) Dispute 1,587 (5.4%)
Weekly Payments 21,770 (65%)
Medical Only 7,491 (35%)
* All Common Law commenced as 
a result of Writ Lodgement
Dispute 994 (4.6%)
Dispute 108 (1.4%)
Occupational Rehabilitation 2,099 (7%) Dispute -Nil (Nil%)
Maims S.98 3,143 (10.7%)


















































































* Refers to all referrals to Medical Panels including 
Conciliation Referrals. Total Medical Panels=3,401 
(98% are S98/104 plus S98A) 
(1% S99) 
(1%S93A,S93C)
Accept means accepted in favour of the worker Matters going to "Appeal" in 95/96 may not be included 
as they are unresolved at 30/6/96.
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Chapter 4 REGULATORY ASPECTS OF THE VICTORIAN WORKCOVER SYSTEM
Chapter Objectives
The regulatory system plays a very important and interesting role in the Victorian 
WorkCover scheme. Victoria relies on a combination of private insurers and a state authority 
to manage the provision of workers, compensation insurance. Most systems hi Australia and 
elsewhere tend to rely more heavily on the private sector to perform insurance functions. Other 
systems utilise a state agency to provide workers' compensation insurance. Victoria is 
somewhat unusual in that it delegates some insurance functions to the private sector while 
others are retained by the Victorian WorkCover Authority. Similar arrangements exist in New 
South Wales and South Australia.
The underlying premise or philosophy of the WorkCover scheme is important to 
understanding the structure of its regulatory institutions and evaluating their performance. The 
premise is that the state needs to bear the underwriting risk and closely manage the provision 
of workers' compensation insurance to ensure that coverage is readily available to all 
employers at the lowest possible cost while serving the overall social goals of the system. The 
widely perceived shortcomings of the private system before 1985 are a legacy that helps to 
explain the perspective that the government needs to take a close hand in guiding the system. 
At the same time, the problems encountered with the public WorkCare system and the 
government's desire to return more autonomy to the private sector have resulted hi the mixed 
public-private system under the current WorkCover system.
Structuring a mixed system that provides the right controls and incentives and delegates 
decisions to the most appropriate entity is a challenge given the many options available and the 
complex interactions between government mandates and private choice. The government has 
elected to maintain direct control over those parameters that it believes are essential to scheme 
objectives and that are not likely to be achieved if left simply to market forces. At the same
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time, the government has delegated certain functions to insurers, with regulatory controls and 
incentives, where it believes that private incentives and private choice can promote efficiency 
and scheme objectives. Refining the mix of public and private functions and regulatory 
controls and incentives is a task that will continue to challenge the VWA as it moves forward 
into the 21st Century.
This mixed approach increases the responsibilities of the state in terms of providing 
certain insurance services as well as closely overseeing the activities of private insurers. As 
discussed below, the VWA confronts a significant principal-agent problem in inducing 
authorised insurers to promote scheme objectives. The VWA must coordinate its functions 
with those of private insurers to achieve the objectives of the system. In some respects, the 
VWA and insurers operate as partners in working together to provide workers' compensation 
insurance to employers and their workers. In other respects, the VWA acts like a traditional 
regulator in ensuring that insurers' actions comply with scheme requirements and serve the 
goals of the scheme. This gives rise to some unique issues for the VWA that are not present 
with pure private or pure government workers' compensation insurance systems.
This chapter describes the relative roles of the regulatory authority (VWA) and the 
insurance industry in achieving the goals of the Victorian workers' compensation scheme, and 
it assesses their performance. Along the way, we will explore the limits of regulation and the 
role of market forces hi such a mixed system.
Relative Roles of Market and Regulatory Mechanisms
Understanding the roles of government and private decision mechanisms is key to 
understanding the management of the WorkCover scheme. Public and private entities share the 
responsibility of providing workers' compensation insurance in Victoria but the nature of their 
responsibilities differ and create relationships that are somewhat unique.
Figure 4.1 provides a schematic diagram of the delegation of insurance and regulatory 
responsibilities among the different entities. The VWA administers the WorkCover scheme, 
bears the risk through reinsurance, and regulates insurers and other providers. Insurers service 
insurance policies, adjust claims, and assist employers with risk management. Employers are
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responsible for complying with statutory requirements for workers' compensation coverage, 
selecting their insurer, and risk management. Other service providers and intermediaries 
perform functions similar to their activities in other systems.
This section provides an overview of the relative roles and responsibilities of these 
different entities in performing workers' compensation functions in Victoria. The basic 
decisions made by regulators or through public choice mechanisms are identified, as well as 
those decisions made by "the market" or private choice mechanisms. First, the nature of the 
principal-agent problem is outlined to provide a frame of reference for the evaluation of the 
regulatory structure.
Managing the Principal-Agent Relationship
The economic theory of the "principal-agent problem" is particularly relevant to the 
structure of the Victorian WorkCover scheme. The problem arises when one entity, the 
principal, wants to induce another entity, the agent, to take some action that is costly to the 
agent (Varian 1992). It may be costly or difficult for the principal to directly observe the 
behaviour of the agent, but the principal may be able to observe the outcome of the actions of 
the agent. In the standard theoretical treatment, the principal's problem is to design an 
incentive payment, s(x), which induces the agent to produce the desired output, x. However, in 
some real-world situations, principals also may face constraints in observing the output 
produced by the agent. This is more likely to be the case in complex systems like workers' 
compensation, where the "product" has multiple dimensions which are difficult to measure and 
involve a considerable tune lag between action and result. In this instance, a principal may 
utilise an array of conduct and output measures, controls, and incentives to influence agent's 
behaviour.
There are several principal-agent relationships nested in the structure of the WorkCover 
scheme. Principal-agent relationships exist between (1) workers and employers; (2) employers 
and insurers; and (3) the VWA and insurers. It is the relationship between the VWA and 
authorised insurers that is of primary interest here, but it is important to understand that 
scheme outcomes are not solely controlled by insurers. The VWA uses mechanisms that rely
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on insurers and employers to promote the objectives of the system and the interests of workers. 
It is costly for insurers and employers to perform such actions and it is costly for the VWA to 
monitor and control insurers' and employers' behaviour.
Agents typically face two types of constraints which influence their actions. One is a 
participation constraint, which is the potential gain to the agent from engaging in other 
activities. The principal must ensure that the agent receives at least this level of utility (or 
profit in the case of a firm), i.e., the agent's opportunity cost, to enlist the agent's 
participation. The second constraint involves incentive compatibility. This means that the agent 
will choose that action which maximises his utility based on the incentive schedule offered by 
the principal. In the standard theoretical model, the principal cannot control the agent's action 
directly, but can only influence the agent's actions by the choice of incentive payments.
The solution of the principal-agent problem is relatively simple when the principal is a 
monopolist with full information. The more interesting case is when the agent's actions are 
hidden so that incentive payments can only be based on output. Assuming that output is not 
fully controlled by the agent, then output-based payments to the agent will necessarily have a 
random component and the optimal incentive scheme will involve some degree of risk sharing 
between the principal and the agent. If the principal imposes too much risk on the agent, the 
principal has to raise the average payment to compensate. On the other hand, if the principal 
assumes too much risk, the agent has little incentive to perform well. The general solution to 
this problem implies that greater uncertainty and/or greater risk aversion on the part of the 
agent will force the principal to bear more risk. Moreover, if the principal faces both high-cost 
and low-cost agents but is unable to accurately distinguish between the two, the principal will 
choose a payment scheme that effectively yields the low-cost agent a surplus and the high-cost 
agent just enough to make him indifferent between participating and not participating.
Arguably, the VWA faces a more complex problem in that it must achieve multiple 
outcomes which are somewhat difficult to measure objectively. At the same time, the VWA 
can monitor and regulate insurer conduct which may be precluded in other principal-agent 
relationships. Hence, the optimal strategy for the VWA is determined by the relative cost and 
effectiveness of controlling insurer conduct directly versus influencing insurers' output or
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performance through incentives. The challenge for the VWA is to implement a cost-effective 
set of conduct and performance measures, regulations, agreements, standards, penalties and 
rewards that will induce insurers and employers to maximise scheme objectives. The VWA's 
primary tools to influence insurer behaviour are (1) the licence agreement; (2) audits; (3) 
licence actions and penalties; and (4) the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme. With the 
exception of BPI, these mechanisms appear to be more oriented towards conduct than 
outcomes. This system needs to be carefully evaluated hi light of the interests of the 
government and the other stakeholders that affect WorkCover outcomes and the constraints 
they face.
Role of the Victorian WorkCover Authority
The VWA wears several different hats under the current WorkCover scheme. One is 
that of a government administrator responsible for the overall performance of the scheme and 
ensuring that employers comply with scheme requirements. This role is akin to that played by 
workers' compensation administrators in Australia and the U.S.A. under private systems. The 
VWA's second hat is that of insurer. Some of the functions performed by insurers in private 
systems are performed directly by the VWA. The VWA's third hat is that of regulator in the 
traditional and non-traditional senses of the term. In this role, the VWA oversees insurers' 
performance of the functions which they have been delegated as well as ensuring that insurers 
meet the financial standards necessary to perform these functions.
Administrative Role
There are certain generic administrative functions inherent in any workers' 
compensation scheme that are typically performed by a government authority, including the 
VWA. These functions stem from the state's responsibility for the overall management of a 
government-mandated social insurance scheme with statutorily prescribed coverage, benefits, 
and eligibility requirements. For the VWA, these functions include system monitoring and 




In addition to administering the WorkCover scheme, the VWA performs some of the 
functions that might otherwise be performed by private insurers. The insurance functions 
performed by the VWA include bearing risk through reinsurance, pricing, funding claims, 
reserve analysis, investment management, and compilation and analysis of claims data. These 
activities were retained by the VWA when Victoria implemented the WorkCover scheme. The 
VWA has sought to minimise the principal-agent control problem by undertaking these 
activities directly, although the reinsurance function gives rise to a related moral hazard 
problem. Without other controls and incentives, insurers would have no incentive to minimise 
claim costs, as the VWA reinsures 100 percent of all claims payments. Such arrangements are 
unusual in private reinsurance contracts (except for fronting arrangements), which involve 
some risk sharing between the reinsurer and the ceding company.
Regulatory Role
Other insurance functions have been delegated to insurers. In one sense, VWA 
functions as a contractor of services performed by insurers acting as vendors. In another sense, 
VWA is a regulator, controlling insurers' entry into and exit from the market for private 
workers' compensation services, as well as enforcing requirements and restrictions on insurers. 
The blend of contractual, regulatory and incentive mechanisms reflects the VWA's strategy hi 
managing the principal-agent relationship it has with authorised insurers in providing insurance 
services to employers and workers.
The distinction may be more than semantic in terms of how the VWA exercises control 
over insurers in various situations. The process for becoming an authorised insurer has many 
characteristics of a contractual relationship between the insurer and the VWA. In effect, VWA 
is a selective gatekeeper to the market for private insurance services purchased by employers. 
Insurers agree, in writing, to a detailed set of requirements to gain admission to this market. 
The VWA is able to exercise leverage over insurers by denying, revoking or degrading an 
insurer's authorisation to serve the market. This is very much like the process for designating 
servicing carriers for residual markets in the U.S. except that VWA-authorised insurers go on
4-6
to compete for accounts, whereas in the U.S.A., employers are assigned to residual market 
servicing carriers.
In a more traditional regulatory environment, the regulatory authority would not 
typically enter into such detailed written agreements with regulated entities. The requirements 
for admission to a market would be set by law and regulation and regulators would essentially 
be compelled to admit any entity meeting the requirements. The VWA does act more like a 
traditional regulator in overseeing certain aspects of insurers* market activities and services to 
insureds that are governed by competition. The VWA's ability to direct insurers' behaviour at 
this level is more limited, however.
The dual nature of this regulatory role allows the VWA to exercise considerably more 
leverage in influencing the behaviour of its agents, i.e., insurers, in fulfilling scheme 
objectives than other workers' compensation authorities. This is consistent with the philosophy 
underlying Victoria's mixed public-private system, with its roots hi the previous WorkCare 
system. The mixed approach places considerable responsibility on the VWA for scheme 
outcomes which it seeks to fulfill through extensive market intervention. It also gives rise to 
some tension and confusion about the relationship between VWA and insurers and the degree 
of autonomy that insurers have. This dual nature of VWA's regulatory role will need to be 
reconciled with any efforts by Victoria to enhance insurers' discretion within the WorkCover 
system.
Insurers' Role
The insurers' role under WorkCover is more substantial than it was under WorkCare 
but less substantial than it was under the private system previous to WorkCare. Under the 
current system, insurers perform essentially all of the client service functions that would be 
performed in a traditional private insurance market environment. These functions include 
marketing, sales, underwriting, premium collection, loss prevention, claims adjustment and 
payments, litigation, case management, setting reserves, and data analysis and statistical 
reporting. These are the actions that the VWA seeks to influence through its system of controls 
and incentives. Insurers do not perform insurance functions retained by the VWA, which are
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primarily risk bearing, pricing, and investment of policyholder ftinds. Insurers receive fees for 
their services which are set by the VWA.
Insurers compete for accounts in order to increase the amount of service fees they 
receive. Assuming there are some economies of scale in servicing workers' compensation 
accounts and that service fees cover the marginal cost of servicing an additional account, 
insurers can increase their profits by servicing more accounts and increasing their service fee 
revenues. With the base price determined by the VWA, insurers compete on quality of service, 
with particular emphasis on risk management services, and other in-kind services to 
employers. 1 This is the way in which the VWA attempts to harness market forces and private 
incentives to encourage insurers to provide high quality service and contain costs.
Role of Other Market Participants
The functions performed by other market participants under WorkCover—employers, 
workers, producers, and vendors—are very much the same as in private workers' 
compensation systems. Employers are required to carry workers' compensation coverage, 
which they can purchase through an authorised insurer or they can receive approval from the 
VWA to self-insure. Employers must take responsibility for compliance with statutory 
requirements, employ safety measures to reduce losses, and assist in case management and 
returning injured employees to work. Producers, i.e., agents and brokers, serve as 
intermediaries between some employers and insurers and facilitate insurance transactions. 
Vendors of risk management, claims administration, health care, and rehabilitation services 
function and compete much as they do in other systems.
Description of Victorian Workers' Compensation Regulatory Scheme
This section provides a detailed description of the ways hi which the activities of 
insurers are regulated by the state and how decisions are made by the VWA with respect to
By law, insurers are prohibited from making monetary kickbacks to employers to get their 
business. However, it is commonly known that insurers do provide additional in-kind services and 
equipment to employers, which effectively increase the value of services employers receive in relation to 
the premiums they pay.
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workers' compensation services. The contractual as well as the traditional regulatory functions 
of the VWA are outlined. Emphasis is placed on the most important aspects of the regulatory 
scheme and other areas where regulators or insurers perceive that changes need to be made. 
Outlining the regulatory structure is essential to assessing the structure and performance of the 
market for insurers' services as well as the performance of the overall scheme. The federal 
solvency regulatory system for Australian insurers, including WorkCover insurers, is also 
described under Market Structure.
The VWA's regulatory functions are performed by the Scheme Regulation Division 
which is headed by a director who reports to the Chief Executive (see Figure 2.1). There are 4 
units within the Regulation Division, each supervised by a senior manager: (1) Health and 
Rehabilitation; (2) Investigation and Compliance; (3) Insurance; and (4) Transitional Projects. 
The principal regulatory functions are the responsibility of the Insurance Unit, which has 
several sub-units, each supervised by a manager: (1) Business Systems; (2) Self-Insurers; (3) 
Licence Management and Insurer Review; (4) Provider Services; (5) Regulatory Monitoring 
and Planning; and (6) Executive Support.
The Regulation Division has the primary interface with the authorised insurers. The 
Division is responsible for writing the licence document, the re-insurance agreement, 
supporting manuals, and policy documents that outline what is required of insurers. The 
Division also implements the Best Practice Incentive (BPI) scheme and prepares the Authorised 
Insurer Quarterly Performance Table.
The Licence Management and Insurer Review unit is responsible for monitoring 
insurers' compliance with the licence agreement, developing the framework for regulation, 
remuneration, audits, performance visits, information, and technical interpretations of the act. 
This unit also is involved hi helping to design and modify BPI provisions which are ultimately 
determined by the Board.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics on the premiums collected and costs incurred by 
the VWA under the WorkCare and WorkCover schemes over the financial years 1986/87 
through 1995/96.2 As can be seen from this table, premiums, claims costs, and operating costs
2Unless indicated otherwise, references to specific years or periods are based on VWA "financial years" 
which run from July 1 to June 30 of the following year. For example, a reference to 1996 will imply the 1995/96 
financial year as defined by the VWA.
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increased considerably over the period 1987 to 1993. Total costs increased from $412.5 
million in 1987 to $1,223.3 million in 1993. Some of this increase is presumably attributable 
to growth in the Victorian economy but it is recognised that costs also increased for various 
reasons related to the WorkCare scheme (see Chapter 2). This trend was reversed with the 
implementation of WorkCover. Premiums fell to $883.4 million in 1996. Claims and operating 
costs also dropped significantly to $763.9 million in 1995 but increased to $897.6 million in 
1996. Managing these costs while achieving the objectives of the scheme in serving injured 
workers is the principal focus of the VWA's regulatory system.
Authorisation of Insurers
The authorisation of insurers to provide workers' compensation services in Victoria is 
the principal foundation for the VWA's array of regulatory activities. The requirements for 
authorisation, and the agreements which insurers must sign to become authorised, bind 
insurers to a detailed set of obligations in performing workers' compensation services. 
Regulators use this mechanism to supervise insurers' activities and compel good performance 
with respect to scheme objectives. Regulators can restrict or withdraw this authorisation as a 
way to sanction insurers if they fail to perform their obligations satisfactorily.
The Accident Compensation (WorkCover Insurance) Act of 1993 provides strong and 
comprehensive authority to the VWA to regulate WorkCover insurers. The Act only allows 
"authorised insurers" to issue or renew a WorkCover insurance policy. The Act requires 
authorised insurers to be separate companies that only write Victorian WorkCover insurance. 
All authorised insurers are subsidiaries of parent companies but must maintain certain firewalls 
between them and their parents and affiliates. The secrecy provisions of the Act are also 
significant and help to maintain this separation. An authorised insurer is not allowed to share 
any individual employer or claimant information with its parent or affiliates. Insurers may 
make payments to their parents for certain services. The VWA does not appear to be in a 
position to closely evaluate or restrict these payments unless they are clearly excessive or 
threaten an insurer's financial condition. Presumably, the requirement for separate Victoria 
workers' compensation insurers is intended to increase the control of the VWA and help to 
ensure that the insurer is focused principally on the WorkCover scheme.
An insurer incorporated in Victoria must apply for a licence to become an authorised 
insurer. The VWA develops the form for application and the requirements for any supporting
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documentation. The Act prescribes fairly comprehensive criteria which the Authority may use 
to consider licence applications, including:
the suitability of the applicant;
• its financial viability;
the provisions of the memorandum and articles of association of the applicant;
the applicant's history of claims management;
the efficiency and effectiveness of the WorkCover scheme; and
any other matters the Authority considers appropriate.
The VWA may refuse an application if the applicant is authorised to carry on business 
other than WorkCover or the applicant is not a wholly owned subsidiary licenced by the 
federal regulator. WorkCover licences are granted for 12 to 24 months and can be renewed. 
The VWA can deny renewal applications based on the above criteria, failure to comply with 
the Act and conditions of the licence, and any other reasons deemed appropriate by the 
Authority.
The VWA has broad authority with respect to additional conditions it may impose on an 
insurer's licence. The VWA can require or prevent an insurer's undertaking of a specified 
amount or class of WorkCover insurance. Insurers may not refuse to offer insurance to 
employers unless mandated or approved by the VWA or the employer is not in compliance 
with the Act. The VWA also can require an insurer to earmark certain assets to cover 
WorkCover obligations. Insurers also may be prohibited from delegating claims management 
to an intermediary.
The licence and supporting documents developed by the VWA set very detailed 
conditions and standards for authorised insurers, which gives the VWA considerable ability to 
control insurers' activities. These documents include a comprehensive checklist of items which 
the insurer is expected to address in indicating its interest in becoming an authorised insurer. A 
detailed description of these documents is beyond the scope of this report but it is helpful to 
summarise their major components. The conditions of the licence cover such areas as
• corporate requirements and arrangements;
• responsibilities of the insurer;
• audit requirements;
administration of the statutory fund;
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the insurer's market share;
the remuneration received by the insurer;
computer systems;
• security;
• warranties and covenants; and
• suspension, cancellation and surrender of the licence.
Supporting schedules outline a code of conduct; insurers' quality control and audit program; 
remuneration; computer systems; licence actions; and additional functions.
Insurers must have paid-up capital of not less than $2 million, which is equivalent to the 
federal regulatory requirement. The VWA requires insurers to maintain and supply accounting 
records which accurately record its transactions and financial position. In practice, the VWA 
relies principally on the accounting statements required by the federal regulator. Insurers are 
not allowed to attain a market share in excess of 49 percent. Detailed service standards pertain 
to employer service requirements; processing insurance policies; charging premiums and 
managing receivables; managing claims; managing long-term and severe injury cases; 
resolution of complaints; and assuming policies from other insurers.
WorkCover licences may be degraded, suspended or cancelled for any reasons deemed 
appropriate by the VWA. Insurers incur a financial penalty in direct proportion to the 
percentage difference between the Minimum Success Rate (MSR) and the Sample Success Rate 
(SSR), based on an audit of their compliance with the service standards, which is applied to 
their quarterly service fee. The VWA may impose additional penalties for other breaches of the 
reinsurance agreement and associated conduct and service standards. Financial penalties are 
capped at 8.5 percent of an insurer's quarterly service fee.
If an insurer is penalised more than 5 percent of its service fee in any one quarter, its 
licence will be qualified. Licences also may be cancelled or qualified for harassment of 
claimants, fraud, incompetency or inefficiency, and breach of confidentiality. There are four 
tiers of qualification or degradation depending on the length of time penalties exceed 5 percent. 
These tiers ultimately lead to the cancellation of an insurer's licence if the situation is not 
corrected.
Authorised insurers are required to enter into a reinsurance arrangement with the VWA
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in which insurers ftilly cede all premiums and losses to the Authority. This agreement 
effectively transfers all underwriting risk to the Authority. The reinsurance agreement is very 
detailed and covers a number of areas, including employer and worker services; premiums; 
and claims and case estimates. The VWA also has the right to assign the policies, claims and 
obligations of an insurer whose licence is cancelled to other authorised insurers. Policy forms 
and related notices must be sent directly to the employer and not an intermediary. Employers 
must pay premiums directly to their insurer and not an intermediary.
Reserving and Pricing
The VWA determines the price or rate charged for workers' compensation insurance. 
This effectively eliminates direct price competition as a determinant of market performance. 
The rate to be charged is promulgated by the VWA hi a premium order every year (signed by 
the Governor-in-Council), as provided hi the Act. Victoria's pricing formula, detailed in 
Figure 4.2, has been characterised as the purest experience rating system utilised in Australia. 
It uses an unweighted 3-year average that balances sensitivity to changing experience with 
stability. The premium calculation starts with the employer's prior rate and then adjusts this 
rate based on experience.
The experience component is weighted by employer size (payroll) so that small 
employers' rates are based less on their own experience and more on their industry and class 
experience. With the exception of a $50 minimum premium, there are no size or risk-related 
adjustments such as policy or loss constants, premium discounts, and schedule rating. As an 
employer becomes smaller, the formula effectively lengthens the time span that occurs before 
an employer is fully experience-rated. This contributes to the continuity of the formula. 
Consequently, there are fewer abrupt changes in an employer's rate because of changes in 
experience or other factors.
As noted in a VWA 1995 working paper, WorkCover Premium System, premiums are 
designed to meet five principles:
1. the system must be fully funded, i.e., premiums must cover all expected claims 
payments;
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2. premiums must match claims risk and minimise cross subsidies;
3. the system must be statistically valid; and
4. the system must be based on sound insurance principles; and
5. the system must promote prevention and return to work.
Premiums must cover the estimated total liability for a particular policy year (as calculated by 
two independent actuaries) plus the administrative costs of the scheme, including insurer 
service fees. The total claims liability for a given policy year comprise actual payments made 
in that year, claims incurred but not reported, and case reserves.
The general premium formula for an employer is based on the prior estimate or rate and 
recent claims experience of the employer (calculated as an employer experience factor) as 
follows:
premium rate = (Z) employer experience factor + (1-Z) prior rate;
where Z is the sizing and experience factor (ranges between 0 and 1) based on the employer's 
total payroll weighted by industry risk, (see Figure 4.2) Because the prior estimate starts with 
the industry rate for a new employer, the formula effectively increases the degree of 
experience rating as the size and the length of experience of an employer increase. The 
experience factor is based on the ratio of fully developed claim costs of the employer's 
workplace as a proportion of the workplace remuneration over a 3-year period.
The experience factor also is adjusted by individual insurer F factors which are 
designed to correct insurers' tendency to underestimate reserves.3 This is also intended to 
prevent insurers and employers from gaming the system by underestimating incurred losses to 
improve their experience adjustment. In theory, F factors are based on insurers' initial 
estimates of reserves compared to their actual claims payments for a given policy year. The F 
factors also adjust premiums for costs that are not reflected in the basic pricing formula, such 
as VWA administrative costs and dispute resolution costs.
The Actuarial and Statistical Analysis Unit in the Scheme Development Division is 
responsible for premium calculations as well as other statistical research required for scheme
The VWA indicates that, historically, reserves have been underestimated by 30 percent.
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administration and policy analysis. This unit provides the data and reports used by the 
independent actuarial firms (Tillinghast and Trowbridge) to perform valuations of reserves at 
the end of the financial year and for semi-annual updates. Starting in December 1996, the 
actuarial unit began utilising its own models and performing its own actuarial valuations of and 
projections for the scheme and compares its results against the analyses of the actuarial firms.
VWA staff cite evidence indicating their analyses and projections to be more accurate than
i
those of the actuarial firms. The VWA actuarial unit also found inconsistencies in the 
assumptions used by the actuarial firms.
The actuarial firms also perform special analyses of the pricing formula and related 
issues on request of the VWA. The VWA Unit employs analysts with a financial and statistical 
background but does not have any staff actuaries of its own.
Service Standards and Enforcement
Insurers' performance requirements are outlined in the licence and reinsurance 
agreement which include schedules outlining detailed and comprehensive standards of quality 
of service and a code of conduct. The areas covered by these documents were listed above. 
Generally, they require insurers to be diligent, responsive, timely and efficient in carrying out 
their service functions. Their provisions establish specific minimum service requirements (e.g., 
the maximum number of days for processing policies, premium calculation and claims) as well 
as general principles that support the objectives of the scheme in serving injured workers.
Arguably, these standards govern both conduct and performance. The ambiguity lies in 
whether one regards "service" as an outcome or product. For example, there is a general 
service standard requiring insurers to provide necessary information to employers which 
includes a specific standard (among others) that insurers respond to employers' written 
requests within 10 working days. Is the desired outcome (1) a well-informed employer? (2) the 
provision of adequate and timely information by insurers? or (3) insurer responses to written 
requests within 10 working days? The difficulty in measuring (1) and (2) may incline the VWA 
to set a more specific, objective and measurable test as reflected hi (3). Regardless of how they 
are viewed, the failure to meet these service standards triggers a regulatory response in terms
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of financial penalties and licence actions rather than an adjustment of incentive payments.
Enforcement of the standards is an important activity of the VWA. The licence 
agreement includes a schedule outlining an insurer quality control and audit program. The 
Insurer Audit Program (LAP) tests audit standards and insurers' compliance with the service 
standards. Insurers must submit a self-audit program for approval to the VWA and are 
required to implement that program. A director of the insurer must personally certify the 
accuracy and regulatory compliance of its audits.
The Authority also retains the right to perform and does perform its own review of an 
insurer's self-audit or conducts more detailed audits of its own. In practice, the VWA has 
contracted with accounting firms to perform its audits. Financial penalties for identified 
performance failures are exacted as a percentage of an insurer's service fee based on the 
"success rate" of the transactions sampled compared with a minimum success rate. The 
maximum penalty is 8.5 percent of the service fee for a given quarter.
The VWA is revamping its audit program to respond to recognised deficiencies in the 
old program. The intent of the new program is to focus on broader measures of performance 
and decrease the emphasis on penalizing minor errors. The new program outlines insurer 
business functions, their components, and key objectives which are intended to help insurers 
focus on the most important areas for testing and compliance. Sampling procedures are 
carefully specified. Tested claims are required to satisfy all aspects of compliance but minor 
failures will not constitute a failure of the test.
Remuneration
The remuneration system, outlined in a supporting schedule for the licence, determines 
the service fee that an insurer will receive. The authority sets aside a certain amount of funds 
in a service fee pool which is allocated to insurers according to their market share for each 
quarter. For example, for the 1995/96 financial year, the VWA allocated $72.3 million in 
service fees, or $18.075 million per quarter. Service fees are initially calculated at the 
beginning of the quarter and recalculated at the end of the quarter to account for transfers in 
business among insurers. The market share formula credits an insurer $115 for every policy it
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writes, plus 5.3 percent of the premiums derived from the policies it writes. This effectively 
sets an average payment which each insurer receives for servicing a given policy or portfolio 
of policies which is not based on performance. There also is a levy fee on debts incurred prior 
to WorkCover that is assessed according to the time when the debt was incurred (3 percent for 
post 30 June 1993 debts and 25 percent for pre 30 June 1993 debts). In addition, insurers can 
receive a discretionary costs fee for non-common law related legal costs, medical costs, 
investigation costs and other extraordinary costs as determined by the Authority. These 
additional fees transfer some further risk from insurers to the VWA.
Best Practice Incentive Scheme
The Best Practice incentive scheme sets performance standards and provides financial 
rewards to insurers for meeting these standards and/or improving their performance. In the 
past, the measures have been (1) the cost of claims as a percentage of industry premiums; (2) 
premiums collected as a percentage of the premiums to be collected; (3) the percentage of 
reported claims referred to conciliation; and (4) claims duration. Insurers receive points for 
meeting or exceeding performance benchmarks set by the VWA in monitored areas and 
financial rewards are paid according to the number of points an insurer receives. For the 
1995/96 financial year, the BPI payment was $6 million.
The VWA moved to a broader measure of performance for the 1996/97 BPI program. 
Insurers will be rewarded on a sliding scale up to 5 percent depending on their relative 
performance in bringing in actual costs below expected costs. The premium collection measure 
also will be retained but the other measures will be dropped.
Monitoring and Statistical Reporting
Three units perform statistical analysis used by the VWA for management and public 
information. The Regulation, Monitoring and Planning unit, in the Scheme Regulation 
Division, is responsible for statistical information and reports, Best Practice Incentive scheme 
calculations, market share calculations, remuneration fee calculations, and special requests. 
The Actuarial and Statistical Services unit, in the Scheme Development Division, also prepares
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statistical analyses used for management information and planning, as well as premium and 
reserve calculations. The Business Analysis unit in the Scheme Development Division is 
responsible for preparing special reports and analyses for senior management and the Board. 
This unit also has prepared the VWA's annual report for the last 2 years, but this function may 
revert to the Scheme Development Division in the future. These 3 units are the principal users 
of the VWA database.
The general database used for the various statistical analyses is extracted (weekly) from 
the ACCtion system transactions information. Insurers are mandated to use this system 
according to the licence document. This enables the construction of databases at a unit 
transaction level which the VWA staff believes is essential for the type of analyses that are 
performed. The database is divided into 200 tables, which facilitates analysis within a table but 
which requires more effort to join data across tables. Almost all data from ACCtion is 
captured. Historical data are not available for some elements. Anyone at the VWA can access 
the data and data users have sought to agree on some standardisation of definitions (e.g., long- 
term claims) to ensure more consistent analyses across users.
The Regulation, Monitoring and Planning unit also is responsible for administering the 
Legal Information Management System (LIMS) which requires insurers to record and report 
legal actions. This helps the VWA keep track of legal actions and the impact of litigation on 
costs. Data quality has been a problem with this system and VWA reconciles LIMS data with 
other data to identify anomalies. Poor performance is communicated to regulate compliance.
Communications with Stakeholders
The VWA has a comprehensive communications strategy which is designed to acquire 
and convey information to all major stakeholders. The stated purposes of this strategy are to 
create and maintain stakeholder support; to minimise the frequency, severity and cost of 
workplace injuries; to increase the rate at which injured employees return to work and improve 
their maintenance at work; and to encourage quality service by insurers and providers. The 
Authority conducts a number of programs using various media to implement this strategy. 
Among its programs, as of July 1996, were publication of informational brochures;
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management of insurers' printing; translation of employers' brochures into different languages; 
ethnic print and radio advertising; video production; promotion of new initiatives; displays at 
trade conferences; press releases, media response and editorials; sponsorships; and stakeholder 
liaison and networking. Insurers are responsible for printing their own insurance contracts.
While all of these activities are valuable in helping stakeholders and the general public 
understand WorkCover, stakeholder communication is the most critical to the VWA regulatory 
function. The VWA utilises a special insurer advisory committee to discuss regulatory issues 
and communicate VWA policy. This and other forms of VWA communication with insurers 
are important and deserve further scrutiny. This is especially true in Victoria's mixed system 
where regulators apply a much closer hand hi managing insurers' service functions.
Self-Insurance Regulation
Self-insurers are regulated within the Insurance Unit of the Scheme Regulation 
Division. Self-insureds have an advantage under the law, relative to other employers, in that 
self-insureds can make immediate decisions as to whether a claim is compensable. Self- 
insureds also avoid the cross-subsidy paid by other large employers who pay more than their 
share of costs. Self-administration also is an option although it has been rarely used to date; 
discussions are underway with two employers who seek self-administered status. Under the 
act, self-administrators make their own claims decisions but the VWA carries the risk. Self- 
administrators' premiums are reduced by the amount loaded for administration (i.e., the 
servicing fee). Self-administration can serve as an interim step to full self-insurance, or as an 
end in itself.
The VWA characterises its self-insurance requirements as the toughest among the 
Australian states, except for Queensland. Self-insureds must have $200 million in net assets, 
500 full-time employees, and be a corporate body. There are no group self-insureds. Self- 
insureds also must demonstrate that they meet a "fit and proper" test, which involves 
determining that they are financially viable and that they can serve scheme objectives. As of 
December 1996, the VWA was authorised to approve self-insurance applications (previously 
they had to be approved by the Minister of Finance). The fit and proper test has four elements:
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(1) financial viability; (2) claims performance; (3) workplace safety; and (4) the infrastructure 
for administering claims. With respect to claims performance, the employer must be above 
average for measures such as cost of claims, duration, and frequency. Workplace safety is 
evaluated using HSD audit results.
Self-insurance authorisation is granted for an initial 3-year period, and every 4 years 
thereafter. Self-insureds must obtain a bank guarantee for one-half of their liabilities as 
certified by an approved actuary. Self-insureds must purchase unlimited excess coverage for 
catastrophes. They also must implement a self-audit program and contribute to the WorkCover 
fund, except for administrative costs. The self-audit program focuses on claims administration, 
rehabilitation and loss prevention. Within the last year, the self-insureds have begun reporting 
data which the VWA uses to monitor and benchmark their performance. Self-insureds are not 
allowed to use captives nor third-party administrators. This is consistent with the intent of 
using self-insurance to promote greater employer control of their own risk and claims.
There are currently 23 self-insured employers, accounting for 9 percent of scheme 
remuneration. At the time of this study, the VWA had nine self-insureds under assessment and 
was reviewing two new applications. Processing self-insurance applications also involves 
negotiating the self-insured's assumption of the tail of its outstanding claims. The self-insured 
receives any related premiums collected less any benefits paid.
There are barriers to self-insurance, in addition to regulatory requirements, which help 
to explain why it is not more predominant. These barriers include employer apathy (which may 
be encouraged by the decrease in premium costs under WorkCover and the strong experience 
rating component of the pricing formula), the fact that workers' compensation is not viewed as 
a core competency of employers, and the rigorous assessment process.
Investment Management
The Victorian Funds Management Corporation (VFMC) manages the funds 
accumulated by Victorian government agencies, the bulk of which are owned by the 
Transportation Accident Commission and the VWA. For the VWA, these funds cover the 
Authority's future obligations to claimants as well as any surplus it maintains. Participation in
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VFMC is voluntary for government agencies. VFMC currently manages $7 billion, of which 
about $3 billion is owned by the VWA.
The VFMC investment strategy emphasises growth and income within certain 
prescribed constraints. The VFMC's inflation-adjusted return is between 4 and 5 percent. 
VFMC management believes that its performance is quite comparable to that of insurers and 
other conservative portfolio managers. The VFMC would like to match the liability profile of 
each fund with its asset duration and return. The funds have to be 95 percent invested. Average 
asset duration is 2 to 3 years. The VFMC can invest in derivatives for hedging purposes.
The mix of VWA assets are 35 percent domestic equities; 20 percent foreign equities; 
10 percent domestic interest income investments; 10 percent foreign interest income 
investments; 10 percent inflation-indexed investments; 10 percent real estate; and 5 percent 
short-term investments. Interest income earned on VWA assets allows the VWA to collect less 
in premiums than would otherwise be needed to cover its future obligations. Thus, the earnings 
of the funds are an important influence on the price of insurance.
Market Structure
Some elements of the structure-conduct-performance framework used by industrial 
organisation economists are employed in this section and the next to analyse the market for 
private insurance services under WorkCover. Figure 4.3 outlines this framework. The 
principal-agent problem also is important to understanding the behaviour and performance of 
insurers. This section focuses on those structural aspects of the market for the services 
provided by insurers that are critical to the system's performance. The key factors that 
influence market structure are regulation, insurer cost functions and market strategies, and 
employers' ability and inclination to shop for insurers' services. To the extent there is a market 
for certain services performed by insurers, parameters such as the number and size of insurers, 
entry and exit, and how insurers differentiate their services are important to understanding how 
this market functions. This discussion is relevant because changes in the structure of the 
market would affect scheme performance.
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Federal Regulation
In addition to regulation by the VWA, Victoria's workers' compensation insurers also 
are subject to supervision by the federal regulator, the Insurance and Superannuation 
Commission (ISC). The exercise of ISC's jurisdiction over WorkCover insurers is unclear, but 
it could effectively limit the insurers eligible to apply for authorisation to become a 
WorkCover insurer. The ISC also regulates the holding companies for WorkCover insurers 
which could indirectly affect the structure and performance of the market for insurer services 
under WorkCover.
The ISC focuses primarily on solvency, with an emphasis on "supervision" rather than 
"regulation." This means that ISC tends to monitor and consult with insurers frequently and 
persuade them to rectify problems, rather than enforcing detailed regulations specify ing what 
insurers can and cannot do. There only have been a handful of insurer failures since the ISC's 
inception in 1973. Its objective is to limit the cost of insolvencies, not totally eliminate them. 
The primary responsibilities of the ISC are to establish limited restrictions on insurers; 
supervise specific aspects of insurers' financial structure and operations; monitor prudence; 
enforce minimum standards; and maintain close contact and consultation with insurers. The 
ISC must approve the independent auditors used by insurers. An Australian Valuation Office is 
used to confirm real estate values.
The ISC system establishes three progressive layers of financial tests: (1) a solvency 
margin; (2) a capacity margin; and (3) a prudential margin. Regulatory attention and 
intervention intensifies as an insurer falls below these tiers. The solvency margin is the lowest 
tier ($2 million in surplus) and could trigger regulatory takeover of a company, if necessary. 
The ISC works with a company to try to avoid insolvency, if possible. The ISC is now 
considering establishing risk-based capital standards as have been implemented in other 
countries.
Insurers are required to file quarterly and annual financial reports. The ISC sets 
accounting standards for insurers who are required to report investments at their market value. 
Financial reports must be certified by independent actuaries and accountants. The ISC does not 
emphasise comprehensive regulatory exams but does perform targeted exams which focus on
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particular areas of concern. Much of the ISC's interaction with insurers is confidential. The 
ISC communicates regularly with the states on matters of mutual concern. Of course, the states 
can also revoke an insurer's authorisation for state-controlled business which can create a 
solvency problem.
Historically, the ISC has exercised limited regulation of insurer market practices and 
relied on the common law to protect consumer rights. The ISC authority in this area is 
provided by the Insurance Contracts Act of 1973 which defines the regulatory relationship 
between insured and insurer and codifies the aspects of common law which govern this area. 
The Act was expanded in 1994 to give more power to ISC to enforce codes of practice. The 
industry also operates a consumer complaint tribunal which seeks to resolve insured-insurer 
disputes.
There are 169 authorised insurers in Australia representing 18 groups. There are 25 
authorised reinsurers and a handful of captives. The ISC prefers that international insurers 
establish Australian subsidiaries as opposed to branches. The ISC does not regulate alien 
insurers but regulates the intermediaries that broker international transactions. There are no 
restrictions on consumers' purchase of insurance from alien insurers. Domestic groups hold the 
predominant share of the Australian market.
The ISC does not regulate state-owned and state-controlled insurers. Victorian 
WorkCover falls into a gray area in that insurers write the business but cede all of it to the 
VWA. Technically, this requires the ISC to regulate authorised WorkCover insurers in 
Victoria, but, in practice, the ISC appears to pay little attention to these insurers. Yet, the 
VWA relies on ISC financial requirements and financial reports to evaluate and monitor 
authorised WorkCover insurers. The regulatory responsibilities of the ISC and the VWA with 
respect to Victorian workers' compensation insurers will need to be clarified and coordinated if 
Victoria delegates more insurance functions and decision making to authorised insurers.
Number and Size of Insurers
As noted above, there are currently 14 authorised insurers providing WorkCover 
services. This number may be somewhat less than the number of insurers that might typically
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write workers' compensation insurance in a private market system in a state of comparable size 
to Victoria. However, it should be pointed out that the relevant market in which insurers 
compete does not cover the full scope of workers' compensation insurance. Rather, it is the 
market for the set of services delegated to insurers. This effectively limits the size of the 
market to competition for the services and service fees allocated to insurers, i.e., only 5 to 6 
percent of the total premiums collected. Moreover, entry is closely regulated, services are 
highly prescribed, and potential profits are constrained. For these reasons, we would not 
expect a large number of insurers to service the WorkCover market. With these considerations, 
14 insurers appears to be a reasonable number of companies to serve the market and should 
provide an adequate number of choices to employers and adequate competition for employers' 
business.
The market also is relatively concentrated, with a few insurers holding a dominant 
share of the market. Table 4.2 tracks the concentration of the Victorian workers' compensation 
insurance market since 1993. The top four insurers held 73.6 percent of the market in 1993 
and 67.3 percent of the market in 1996. The Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index was 1,618 for 1993 
and 1,374 for 1996.4 The 1993 levels of concentration would be considered relatively high by 
conventional standards, but the decrease in concentration over the last 4 years is significant and 
suggests a fairly competitive and dynamic market environment. Concentration increased in 
1996 with the merger of CIC and Heath and the exit of AIG, but the resulting increase in the 
HHI was only 50 points. Moreover, the current levels of concentration are reasonable given 
the relatively small size of the market for insurer services. Smaller markets would be expected
4The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of market concentration that 
measures the relative size distribution of all firms in the market. It is calculated by summing the squared market 
shares of all firms. This gives disproportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger insurers which 
is consistent with economic theory about the relationship between firm size and market power. The U.S. 
Department of Justice anti-trust guidelines define HHI's between 1,000 and 2,000 as constituting moderate market 
concentration and HHI's in excess of 2,000 as constituting high market concentration. Note that these benchmarks 
have been established for national markets that are larger and more difficult to enter than smaller state markets. 
Most state workers' compensation markets in the U.S.A. have HHI's between 1,000 and 2,000 but are viewed as 
highly competitive.
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to be more concentrated, all else equal (Klein, Nordman, and Fritz, 1993). It is not uncommon 
for larger state workers' compensation markets in the U.S. to have comparable levels of 
concentration.
Table 4.3 tracks insurer market shares over the last 4 years. Several large insurers have 
lost market share and some smaller insurers have gained market share over this period. If this 
is the result of effective competition by more efficient insurers, it bodes well for the 
performance of the market. On the other hand, if this trend reflects unfair competition or 
attempts to secure business with excessive extra services or manipulation of premium 
classifications, then it should be a matter of concern.
Entry and Exit
The level of entry and exit has been somewhat limited under WorkCover, but given the 
size of the market and the tight licencing requirements, it appears reasonable. Table 4.4 
summarises this activity from a statistical perspective. Nine insurers were initially authorised 
as servicing agents under WorkCare. In 1987/88, four of these agents dropped out and two 
more insurers became agents, resulting in a net decrease of two agents. In 1989/90, two more 
agents dropped out, leaving five authorised agents in the system. Through the end of 
WorkCare, two new insurers entered the market, one insurer resumed operations, and one 
insurer dropped out. Exits were prompted either by termination by the VWA or voluntary 
withdrawal.
The demands upon and incentives for servicing agents under WorkCare encouraged 
fewer insurers to be in the market than the more promising business opportunities opened 
under WorkCover. It is apparent that some companies were induced to become authorised 
insurers because of expectations about growth and profit opportunities resulting from greater 
privatisation. If these expectations are not realised, there may be some retrenchment and exits 
by currently authorised insurers. Exits could be even more numerous if insurers are required to 
establish their own information and transaction systems. Although WorkCover entry 
requirements and barriers are relatively high, they do not seem excessive considering the
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orientation of Victoria's mixed system and do not appear to have seriously compromised 
competition.
However, the issue of entry barriers and market concentration requires continued 
attention by the VWA. Some insurers may exit if it becomes too costly for them to operate in 
this market and/or if Victoria does not privatise the market. This could dampen competition 
and reduce incentives for the remaining authorised insurers to be innovative and improve their 
quality of service. It also could reduce the VWA's leverage in influencing insurers' conduct. 
Additionally, if Victoria moves to greater privatisation, entry requirements would have to be 
reassessed to ensure they are commensurate with the requirements for a system that places 
more emphasis on private choice and competition. It would be desirable to have additional, 
financially strong insurers enter the market if it was privatised.
Insurer Differentiation
Insurer differentiation of their services is the principal mechanism for competition in 
the Victoria WorkCover market. Historically, there has been a perception that insurer 
differentiation has been limited but this may be changing. All the insurers interviewed 
contended that their service strategy is different than their competitors and essential to 
increasing their market share. It is difficult to evaluate the validity of this contention without 
more extensive examination and comparison of insurers' services. Some insurers may be 
enhancing their services and targeting niche markets in anticipation of greater privatisation. 
Indeed, many insurers cited efforts to improve their facilities to analyse employers' experience 
and help them contain costs. Delegation of information system responsibilities to insurers and 
publication of insurer performance statistics could also encourage insurer service 
differentiation. Future adjustments in the regulatory scheme will likely have a significant 
impact on this dimension of market structure.
Market Performance
This section evaluates how well the scheme performs in areas that are affected by 
regulation and insurers' activities. Because of the unique nature of the Victorian scheme in its
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reliance on a combination of public and private choice, the framework of this analysis differs 
somewhat from the conventional market structure-conduct-performance analysis. The primary 
question is how well the mixed system of public-private provision of workers' compensation 
insurance has achieved the objectives of the WorkCover scheme. This is a difficult question to 
answer because of the close integration of VWA administrative and regulatory responsibilities 
and insurer activities. The performance measures available reflect the impact of all of these 
institutions and it is difficult to isolate the effects of regulation and market structure per se. 
Hence, this performance analysis is somewhat general and its reflection on insurer efficiency 
must be qualified.
It helps to have a historical perspective in evaluating insurers' performance under the 
current WorkCover scheme.5 Most observers agreed that the system was in bad shape prior to 
WorkCare. Pricing was extremely cyclical and coverage was difficult to purchase and very 
expensive when the market hardened. Small employers were most vulnerable to this market 
volatility. Large employers had more leverage to make deals with insurers.6 Under the 
WorkCare scheme, the system was plagued by runaway costs, excessive durations, and a 
growing class of dependent injured workers. As discussed below, under WorkCover, prices 
have been stabilized, costs have decreased, and the availability of coverage is not an issue.7
Underwriting and Availability of Coverage
Insurers' underwriting responsibilities are considerably different under Victoria's mixed 
system than under a private system. In a fully private system where insurers bear the risk, 
underwriting is key to the insurers' risk management and avoidance of adverse selection. In 
this environment, an insurer will reject employers who are perceived to be too risky hi relation 
to the insurer's price structure, causing claim costs to exceed the premiums collected and
5See Chapter 2 for a more thorough account of the history of workers' compensation in Victoria.
6 Tasmania's private workers' compensation market is often cited as an example where cyclical pricing 
occurs when there is minimal regulation.
7At the same time, recent developments in New South Wales indicate that this mixed public/private model 
is not immune to these problems.
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attracting more high-risk employers. However, under WorkCover, insurers do not face this 
problem. For this reason, insurers' underwriting function is confined to proper classification of 
risk and determination of the correct premium, which they perform on behalf of the VWA. 
Insurers interviewed, for the most part, confirmed that they are not selective in terms of the 
types of risks they seek to write.
To a limited extent, some insurers may use underwriting to tailor their business towards 
employers for whom the standard service fee is perceived to yield a larger profit margin given 
the level of service that the employers will require and the potential for audit exceptions and 
penalties on the handling of their claims. This strategy has to be implemented through selective 
marketing and service perquisites. Some insurers, anticipating privatisation, also may be 
seeking to write employers that they perceive will be more profitable in a private system under 
which they would bear the risk.
Because insurers have little incentive or ability to reject high-risk insureds, the 
availability of workers' compensation coverage is not an issue per se in Victoria, in contrast to 
private systems. Under Section 11 of the WorkCover Act, an authorised insurer may not, 
without the consent of the VWA, refuse to issue or renew an insurance policy to an employer. 
This provision does not apply if the employer has not complied with the law or regulations 
governing WorkCover. Hence, there is no need for a residual market mechanism as in private 
systems where insurers can refuse to write an employer for a number of reasons. Only the 
supply of special additional services are subject to insurer discretion and may be less available 
to small and high-risk employers.
However, other performance issues do arise in this area. Insurers' diminished 
incentives for accurate underwriting can result in instances of incorrect classification and 
pricing. Indeed, some insurers take pride in their ability to lower employers' premiums by 
reclassifying their workforce. This is appropriate if an employer has been misclassified but 
there also is the potential for manipulation of classification for competitive purposes. We do 
not know whether this is a serious problem or not. The audit process is intended to prevent 
classification and pricing errors but it is an imperfect substitute for stronger insurer incentives 
to get it right.
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Marketing
VWA officials observe that competition among insurers to attract employers does not 
appear to have had a significant effect on employers' selection of insurers or insurers' 
performance. The VWA indicates that turnover of employers is limited, less than 1 percent 
annually. 8 Insurers tend to market their services in a traditional "promotional" sense but, 
historically, do not appear to have focused on their relative performance in terms of outcomes. 
Employers lack the information to effectively identify the better performers. There are other 
reasons why employers may rarely move their business, including other insurance coverages 
they may purchase from an insurer and the relationship they have established with an insurer.
Reserving
It is possible that some insurers would have difficulty hi estimating losses and pricing 
coverage for workers' compensation without the Authority's assistance. VWA staff noted that 
insurers typically do not have the analytical resources to determine adequate reserves and 
evaluate their risk. This is significant given the long tail of workers' compensation insurance 
claims. According to the VWA, insurers consistently underestimate the development of case 
reserves and EBNR. Studies indicate that a significant portion (60 percent) of losses are not 
paid until 5 years after the injury year, so it is easy to see how insurers might underestimate 
needed reserved.
The VWA acknowledges that some insurers are getting better at analysing their losses 
and their risk at a technical level, but senior company managers sometimes do not use this 
analysis to make good business decisions. It also was observed that insurers in Victoria had to 
climb a big learning curve, and that approximately 50 to 60 percent of insurers have made 
considerable progress, but 20 percent are doing a poor job. The F factors are intended to adjust 
for the reserving accuracy of each insurer, but this objective may be obscured if F factors are
8 This contrasts with a Boston Consulting Group survey of 300 Victorian employers, among which 14 
percent had changed insurers within the last year (Boston Consulting Group, 1995).
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also used to adjust for scheme costs not reflected in the base rate. At the same tune, it is fair to 
point out that the ACCtion system is not designed to make it easy for insurers to extract this 
information and perform this kind of analysis.
Premium Collection
Employer reporting of remuneration and the collection of the proper premium has been 
an issue in Victoria, as elsewhere. In the 1993/94 financial year, the function of premium 
collection was transferred from the government to insurers. VWA audits of selected employers 
have identified $15 million in unpaid premiums, plus $5 million in penalties. The VWA will 
audit a random sample of employers this year to estimate the magnitude of under reporting. 
The VWA believes that this is a function which should be delegated to insurers. Competition 
among insurers for accounts and employers' desire to lower their premiums create 
disincentives for proper reporting of remuneration. The fact the premiums are fully ceded to 
the VWA reduces insurers' incentive to collect the full amount due the VWA. However, VWA 
staff do not perceive this to be a significant problem in relative terms as they indicate that 99 
percent of premiums are collected properly.
Premium and Claim Costs
The overall cost of the WorkCover scheme is a principal concern of most stakeholders. 
Even workers and non-insurance providers have a stake hi this, as increasing costs will 
increase pressure to lower benefits and medical and rehabilitation services. To the extent that 
costs can be minimised by effective loss prevention and return to work strategies, more 
resources are available to pay benefits and provide additional services to injured workers. As 
noted above, the overall cost of the system is affected by all the institutions Involved in 
regulating and providing WorkCover services. Hence, while it is instructive to examine cost 
trends, it is problematic to attribute these trends among the different institutions affecting 
them.
Table 4.5 shows figures for the basic premium rate (premiums divided by leviable 
remuneration), the published rate, and the ratio of claims payments to premiums for the 1986-
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1996 period. The decrease in the published rate from 3.3 percent in 1992 to 1.98 percent in 
1996 is a remarkable accomplishment, and is currently the lowest rate among Australian states 
at 1.8 percent for 1996-97. The ratio of claims payments to premiums on a fiscal year basis is 
an imperfect performance measure because the premiums are associated with a different set of 
policies than the claims payments. Over the period 1994-1996, the average annual ratio of 
claims payments to premiums was 81.1 percent. To the extent this fiscal year ratio reveals 
anything about the policy year experience, it suggests a relatively efficient level of 
performance, in terms of the relation of benefits received to benefits paid, that is 
commensurate with the experience in competitive workers' compensation insurance markets.
Several factors have contributed to this improvement. One is system reforms under 
WorkCover. Another is refinement of the pricing formula and restoration of full funding to 
increase employers' incentives to reduce losses. A third factor is VWA and insurer efforts to 
encourage loss prevention and improve case management. Public dissatisfaction with the 
abuses under WorkCare and a change in the culture pervading workers' compensation 
insurance also may have helped to discourage workers "rorting" the system.
The ability of Victoria to sustain this low cost is a subject of considerable discussion. 
Many observers point to underlying cost drivers that will ultimately force premiums up. It is 
typical for costs to rebound in systems that have undertaken significant reforms as different 
interest groups whittle away at the reforms and search for new ways to stretch the system. 
Victorian officials are aware of this tendency and are seeking to further increase efficiency and 
forestall erosion of previous reforms.
Profitability
The profitability of WorkCover insurers is particularly difficult to measure and a source 
of considerable disagreement. Insurers contend that the service fee is inadequate and that 
selling WorkCover services is not profitable enough to sustain their long-term operations under 
the current system. The question then is why insurers stay in the market. One possible 
explanation is that profits are higher than they are alleged to be, particularly considering that 
risk is low. Another reason is that some insurers expect to increase their profits by increasing
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their market share and benefiting from privatisation. A third possible explanation is that there 
are economies of scope in marketing WorkCover insurance with other coverages supplied by 
affiliates and that the overall profits from selling a package of coverages makes WorkCover 
business more viable.
Table 4.6 presents aggregate figures on scheme financial performance. While year to 
year financial results are somewhat volatile, it is apparent that there has been significant 
improvement over this period. The scheme sustained a net loss every year during the 1986- 
1989 period. Since then, income has exceeded expenditures in all but 2 years.
While the scheme's financial performance appears to be much improved, what do the 
data indicate with respect to insurers' financial performance? Table 4.7 presents income figures 
by insurer for the 1995 report year based on ISC statistical reports. These figures do not 
appear to be very meaningful given the peculiarities of the WorkCover mixed system.
Because insurers cede all premiums and losses to the VWA, their income is a product 
of their expenses from providing insurance services and the revenues they derive from service 
fees and any investment income from assets they hold. There is a wide variation among 
insurers in terms of expenses and income which may be partly due to differences in results 
reported on a calendar year basis for ISC versus results that would be measured on a policy- 
year basis. Also, income and expense figures are subject to considerable manipulation from an 
accounting perspective, particularly with respect to reporting payments to parents and affiliates 
for the services they render. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate insurers' claims of inadequate 
profits.
In 1995, insurers' profits after income taxes varied from a negative 34.2 percent of 
premium revenue to a positive 20 percent. Many insurers reported zero or negative profits and 
the median profit rate for all insurers was zero. Closer analysis of more consistent financial 
data will be necessary to develop meaningful profit estimates. Still, it is unlikely that such an 
analysis will find that insurers are making excessive profits from WorkCover or one would see 
much greater interest from other insurers to get into the market. The question of what insurers 
require in terms of a fair rate of return on investment will depend heavily on the changes that 
Victoria will make in increasing private choice under WorkCover.
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Products and Quality of Service
There is not true competition among WorkCover insurers in terms of products offered, 
as the basic WorkCover policy and coverages are prescribed by law and cannot be modified. 
However, if we adopt a broader concept of product that encompasses the full set of services 
offered by insurers then there is some opportunity for service differentiation and the question 
of service performance becomes relevant. Clearly, insurers can affect scheme performance by 
offering more innovative and better services that help lower costs and promote other employer 
and worker interests. However, a principal challenge that is present with any workers' 
compensation system with private providers is the fact that it relies on first and second parties 
to deliver services to a third party, workers, who do not control the other parties. Also, under 
the current system, insurers and employers do not reap the full financial benefits from better 
services (at least without a fairly long time lag) which diminishes the incentives for good 
performance.
The VWA identifies service delivery as the greatest problem under the current system. 
Insurers are not perceived as being innovative with respect to identifying problem areas and 
developing solutions. Insurers do not have their money at stake and are alleged to view 
problems to be WorkCover's concern. Insurers' efforts to help employers improve workplace 
safety is one area of concern. VWA officials believe that insurers do not tend to provide 
comprehensive loss prevention services as part of their normal package of services. In their 
view, insurers' standard approach to risk management services is not geared towards 
employment-related coverages that involve human resource considerations. They feel that 
insurers fail to actively analyse their data to identify cost drivers or problem areas and 
implement or recommend effective cost containment strategies to employers and public 
officials. Insurers also are thought not be sufficiently responsive to small employers. The 
VWA indicated that the loss prevention advice that is provided tends to follow the occurrence 
of an injury. Insurers may negotiate separately with employers to provide more extensive loss 
prevention services. As noted above, there are other risk management providers (sometimes 
affiliated with insurers) who also provide loss prevention services in Victoria.
The VWA's view of the extent of loss prevention services provided by insurers
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contrasts somewhat with insurers' characterisation of what they do. All of the insurers 
interviewed indicated that they perceive loss prevention and risk management to be an 
important part of their services and one of the principal ways they differentiate themselves to 
employers. At the same tune, insurers acknowledge they could do more in this area and some 
are seeking to expand these services within the constraints they face. Lack of innovation by 
insurers is attributed to inadequate remuneration.
Long-term case management also has been identified as a problem area (see Chapter 7). 
From the perspective of the VWA, insurers are good at processing claims but not as good at 
managing cases involving long-term and severe injuries. VWA staff indicate that insurers seek 
to close claims as quickly as possible by paying lump sum settlements and through other 
means. There is a concern that there still is an excessive number of long-term claims that could 
be resolved. Of the approximately 4,500 serious injury claims (as of 30 June 1996), one senior 
VWA manager "guesstimated" that only 900 would be completely unable to do any work. 
Another 900 are probably drug dependent and would need to be detoxified before returning to 
the labour market. Many remaining long-term claimants have had no recent medical treatment 
and their current disability status is unknown. The VWA will investigate these cases for 
potential long-term return to work as well as consider some claimants for psychological testing 
and rehabilitation.
Several factors are identified as contributors to insurers' performance at service 
delivery. One is the historical legacy of insurer practices with respect to claims management 
which remains from prior systems. In this view, the insurance "culture" is not geared towards 
conserving human capital; but rather in terms of "doing deals" to get workers to sell their 
rights to further compensation. It is alleged that insurer personnel receive insufficient training 
on effective claim management practices. It also is observed that employers do not seem to 
discriminate among insurers very well. They do not know what to look for in terms of 
selecting a good service provider. It also should be noted that, historically, the Authority has 
not published performance statistics for individual insurers that would help employers select 
insurers.
VWA officials indicate that insurers' service performance has improved since the
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implementation of WorkCover but that it still falls considerably short with respect to achieving 
system objectives. At the same time, the authorised insurers tend to be more advanced than 
other insurers in handling workers' compensation claims. Some of the improvements 
developed under WorkCover have been extended to other areas of the insurers' business. The 
question is whether insurers can make the leap to effectively manage the difficult, long-term 
cases (roughly 20 percent of the total cases).
Table 4.8 summarises service performance statistics by insurer for the first quarter of 
1996. The data indicate considerable variation in insurer service performance, particularly for 
categories such as timeliness, case reserve accuracy, and medical panel delays. At first glance, 
the performance of some insurers in the areas of timeliness and medical panel delays appears to 
be quite poor. It is difficult to determine simply by looking at these data the extent to which 
these statistical differences are attributable to true differences in performances and to what 
extent they are attributable to differences in insurers' portfolios of risks. However, at first 
blush, they do give credence to the view that some insurers are considerably better than others 
in performing their service functions and promoting scheme objectives. If good controls for 
differences in portfolios could be employed, it would enable analysts to target poor performers 
and perhaps work with them to upgrade their performance. Significant differences in service 
performance raise questions about the efficacy of the current incentives in encouraging all 
insurers to provide good service. This issue will become more relevant when the VWA 
publishes these performance statistics to allow employers to use this information in comparing 
carriers.
Solvency
Insurer solvency and solidity is an important issue under WorkCover, although not as 
significant as in systems where insurers bear underwriting risk. Under WorkCover, the VWA 
assumes claims obligations, so an insurer's failure would not create problems in meeting these 
obligations or create a deficit that would have to be covered by other stakeholders. On the 
other hand, the failure of a WorkCover insurer, at the very least, would require the VWA to 
transfer its policies, which would create some disruption and impose some transactions costs.
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Also, an insurer in financial trouble might lower its quality of service in an effort to reduce 
costs, which would negatively affect scheme objectives and constituencies. Insurer solvency 
and financial solidity may become more important if privatisation measures delegate more 
responsibility to insurers and increase their level of financial risk.
Table 4.9 presents figures on assets and liabilities by insurer for 1995 as reported by 
the ISC. Most insurers have net assets close to the $2 million capital requirement mandated by 
the ISC and the VWA. Consequently, their ratios of assets to net assets and liabilities to net 
assets (conventional measures of capital adequacy) tend to be much higher than the ratios that 
insurers would normally maintain. Presumably, the parent companies of these insurers have 
decided that it is not efficient to maintain higher levels of capital hi Victoria workers' 
compensation insurers. Given that these insurers do not bear underwriting risk and their 
parents are in a position to infuse more capital if needed, this does not raise a concern about 
the financial solidity of these insurers that would be present if the circumstances were 
different. Of course, if these insurers accept more risk in the future as the result of 
privatisation measures, it is clear that they would need to be capitalized at a higher level to 
satisfy safety objectives. They also would need to generate sufficient profits to provide 
company owners with an adequate rate of return on this additional capital.
Regulatory Program Assessment
This section evaluates the performance of regulatory functions and issues raised with 
respect to these functions. This analysis is based on interviews of regulators and insurers as 
well as on quantitative or other objective measures of regulatory performance that are 
available. We cite comments from the different stakeholders that were interviewed and reflect 
on those comments. In many of these cases, we were not in a position to validate the comments 
that we received. However, there are a few instances where data are available to add some 
perspective on these issues.
While regulators and insurers are proud of their significant accomplishments under 
WorkCover, both sides perceive the need to significantly improve certain aspects of the 
regulatory program. Insurers, in particular, indicate considerable dissatisfaction with a number
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of things that regulators do and have called for substantial reforms. A strong theme in their 
criticisms is their perception that regulators are too heavy handed and treat insurers in a 
demeaning manner. Insurers do not believe that the VWA acts as a true partner with an 
appropriate level of mutual respect and trust with insurers. Comments by some VWA staff 
about insurers tend to confirm insurers' view of regulatory attitudes, although senior VWA 
management is seeking to improve the relationship between regulators and the regulated.
Management of the Principal-Agent Relationship
The way in which the VWA manages its principal-agent relationship is key to the 
performance of the regulatory program. Is the VWA using an optimal mix of conduct and 
outcome measures, controls, and incentives to induce insurers to maximise scheme objectives? 
Determining whether the VWA is using the best possible regulatory strategy is beyond the 
scope of this report, but it is reasonable to make some observations on the cost-effectiveness of 
some of its regulatory mechanisms. Mechanisms that are difficult and costly to administer and, 
at best, have only a marginal positive effect on insurer performance should be reconsidered. 
There may be other measures that could be initiated or strengthened that would accomplish the 
job at a lower cost and/or with greater benefits.
Specifically, the VWA's relatively heavy reliance on conduct monitoring and control 
versus outcome-based incentive payments should be assessed. Both regulators and insurers are 
buried in the minutia of enforcing and complying with numerous detailed conduct-oriented 
standards rather than focusing on and rewarding overall performance. This system is costly for 
all parties, gives rise to significant tensions between regulators and insurers, may present 
conflicting objectives, and may induce insurers to expend an excessive amount of effort on 
nominal compliance with an arbitrary set of conduct standards at the expense of service 
outcomes.
This approach also may be somewhat unusual relative to the ways in which most 
principal-agent relationships are managed. Moreover, the vision for insurers' role under 
WorkCover may be somewhat different now than what was envisioned when the current 
regulatory system was implemented. Is the regulatory system still optimally designed given the
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present direction of the WorkCover scheme? This question is nested within the broader 
question of the delegation of insurance functions between the government and insurers. If 
insurance functions are reassigned or other changes made to enhance the role of the private 
sector, how should regulatory policies be modified?
Some aspects of the principal-agent problem faced by Victoria might be obviated by 
delegating more responsibilities to and increasing reliance on market forces and private choice. 
This section considers the cost-effectiveness of current regulatory mechanisms as well as more 
fundamental changes to the regulatory structure that would significantly alter the principal- 
agent relationship between the VWA and insurers.
Authorisation of Insurers
The authorisation process appears to be fairly rigorous although not necessarily 
inappropriate given the responsibilities shared between the VWA and insurers and the conduct- 
oriented nature of the regulatory system. Interviewed insurers did not complain about the 
authorisation process but they may see an advantage to it to the extent that it discourages entry 
by other insurers. Moreover, the requirements for authorisation do not appear to be so steep as 
to prevent an adequate number of insurers from serving the market hi its current form. The 
detailed and well-documented standards promote a mutual understanding of what is expected 
from insurers and a clear basis on which to judge their compliance.
On the other hand, greater reliance on outcome as opposed to conduct standards might 
be easier to administer and achieve greater success in promoting scheme objectives. This 
would require the VWA to design a more limited set of performance standards that would 
focus on insurers' results rather than how they achieved those results. Performance standards 
could encompass any outcomes with appropriate weights that the government determined to be 
desirable, including minimising claim, legal and administrative costs, timeliness hi processing 
claims and paying benefits, conformance with the statutory requirements of workers' 
compensation, and success in returning injured workers to productive employment. The VWA 
could set minimum performance standards in these areas and a system of rewards and penalties 
based on insurers' performance relative to the standards. While there are already some
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elements of this approach in the current regulatory system, the emphasis on outcome-based 
incentive payments could be significantly enhanced.
Victoria might also revisit its requirement that authorised insurers be separate 
companies that only provide WorkCover coverage. The rationale for this requirement is still 
somewhat unclear to an external evaluator. It is not obvious that requiring separate WorkCover 
insurers improves performance in serving WorkCover objectives. While this has not 
necessarily proven to be an excessive entry barrier, removing this requirement could reduce 
administrative costs for insurers and possibly attract more efficient companies. The VWA 
could still enforce conduct and performance standards on authorised insurers, regardless of 
whether WorkCover was their sole business.
If Victoria moves to a more private system, it will have to reexamine its licencing 
process and determine what is appropriate under a different regulatory scheme. In such an 
environment, more consideration would need to be given to financial evaluation and 
monitoring as well as rate and market conduct regulation. Intensive monitoring and regulation 
of insurers' conduct and performance may be less feasible and necessary if private incentives 
replace the VWA as the principal regulator of insurers' activities. In addition, it would be 
preferable to have a larger number of insurers compete in an insurance market where the 
product includes risk bearing.
Service Standards and Enforcement
The audit program is cited frequently by insurers as a problem area. They express the 
concern that auditors lack sufficient expertise to understand what they are auditing, and that 
audits are too focused on identifying minor exceptions to arbitrary performance standards and 
miss the "big picture" in terms of insurers' overall performance. Consequently, insurers are 
induced to focus on activities aimed at avoiding audit exceptions rather than overall 
performance and scheme objectives. Insurers also complain that the audits are aimed at finding 
and penalizing errors rather than giving insurers an opportunity to cure problems identified and 
sanctioning the failure to cure identified problems.
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However, it should be pointed out that one of the objectives of an audit program is to 
encourage insurers to comply with service standards before they are audited. If insurers are 
only penalized after they have had an opportunity to cure problems found by external auditors 
insurers' incentives to comply with standards proactively are diminished. The solution may be 
a combination of better standards and the selective use of retrospective as well as prospective 
penalties to induce optimal conduct. Some errors may be obvious failures to comply with 
established standards that insurers should have corrected or avoided on their own, while others 
may reflect legitimate ambiguities or situations which insurers clearly could not have avoided. 
Auditors also should be properly trained and not solely junior staff with little or no insurance 
experience. Insurers could be encouraged to establish more rigorous self-audit programs.
The new audit program may effectively address many of these concerns. Insurers 
indicate that they believe that the new audit program is a substantial improvement over the 
previous one. At the same time, some insurers expressed surprise and frustration that certain 
provisions of the new program still contain unfairly punitive aspects that they did not expect. 
Not all insurers, however, share the view that the new audit program departs from what was 
discussed.
A more radical idea would be to do away with the audit program altogether. This would 
not be feasible if the VWA retains a heavy emphasis on enforcing conduct requirements but it 
might be reasonable if it shifted its focus to performance standards and incentives. 
Performance measurements and incentive payments would need to be strengthened to offset 
decreased emphasis on conduct regulation. The advantages of eliminating the regular audit 
program would be reducing the costs of conducting and complying with the audits and 
refocusing insurers' efforts towards achieving the best results in the way most efficient for 
each insurer. This would not preclude the VWA from performing limited market conduct 
exams on a random basis or specialised targeted exams in response to employer and worker 
complaints of poor performance.9
9 Market conduct examinations, in the traditional sense, would be more limited in scope than the current 
service audits. Market conduct examinations would assess whether insurers were complying with statutory 
requirements and the terms of their contracts with insureds.
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Pricing and Reserving
Opinions differ on the desirability of the scheme's current pricing formula. It is the 
primary mechanism which the VWA uses to influence employer behaviour. The VWA believes 
that the formula has performed relatively well hi helping to restore the scheme to full funding, 
establishing more accurate, risk-based premiums for employers, diminishing cross-subsidies, 
and enhancing employers' incentives to improve their experience. At the same time, the VWA 
recognises that the formula is not perfect and that there may be ways to improve it.
One of the significant issues is the cross-subsidies that still exist within the current 
formula. These cross-subsidies primarily benefit small employers. They stem from (1) the 
$15,500 remuneration deductible; (2) the $7,500 exemption limit below which employers do 
not have to pay any premium; (3) the small sizing and experience (Z) factor for small 
employers; and (4) the maximum industry rate of 7 percent. The VWA estimates that the cross- 
subsidy to small employers from the first three factors amounts to approximately $20 million. 
A 1995 VWA working paper (WorkCover Premium System) discusses these and a number of 
other issues and options.
Among the many options that have been identified for discussion purposes are: placing 
a floor on the Z factor and adjusting the Z factor for an employer's industry's performance in 
broad bands to help small employers; including dispute resolution administrative costs hi claim 
costs; increasing variable excess options available to employers; and refining classifications to 
the three- or four-digit industry level. The VWA points out that changes to the premium 
system should not be considered in isolation but evaluated as a set in terms of their impact on 
employers and scheme objectives.
Among the goals of the options identified above are to make an employer's rate more 
responsive to its experience and to help small insurers who are not large enough to benefit 
significantly from individual experience rating. This would increase the interest in industry 
wide cost containment and best practice initiatives. However, while these are laudable
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objectives, individual employers still could pursue a "free rider" strategy by benefiting from 
the safety investments of their competitors without making commensurate investments of their 
own.
There also are questions with respect to the simplicity and transparency of the pricing 
formula. There appears to be different opinions among VWA staff on this issue. The Authority 
does receive a number of complaints from employers, particularly small ones, that the formula 
is too complex and difficult to understand. However, one advantage of the formula cited is that 
there is no formal mechanism for insurers to cut "side deals" with employers which would 
further complicate employers' understanding of the basis of their premium calculation. This 
presumably focuses employers' attention and incentives to improve their experience.
Other experts outside the VWA criticise certain aspects of the pricing formula. They 
note that the prior rate component of the formula dampens large swings in the premium. At the 
same time, it serves to perpetuate the cross subsidy built into the formula. The prior rate 
approach differs from the more common method of blending the industry rate with the 
experience of an employer, as is done in New South Wales. An alternative would be to employ 
a more traditional experience rating formula which would adjust an employer's rate more 
quickly based on its relative experience. While this would diminish the degree of continuity hi 
the current formula, it would reward and penalize employers more promptly according to their 
experience and enhance their incentives to prevent and contain loss costs.
VWA staff respond that the current formula's greater reliance on an employer's 
previous experience provides a better prediction of the employer's future experience, based on 
statistical theory. They also point out that greater reliance on industry experience would 
provide a greater cross subsidy to poor performing employers. Credibility theory suggests that 
placing excessive reliance on a small employers' prior experience would lead to inaccurate 
pricing with respect to a small employers' future experience. Indeed, VWA staff note that 
when the scheme employed lower sizing constants then it tended to "bleed premium'' and, 
hence, it was raised to $360,000 in 1995-96 which it believes to be the right level. In sum, 
they conclude that recent changes will result in a reasonably balanced price structure, with the 
exception of the cross subsidy still provided by the $15,500 remuneration deductible.
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It is reasonable to surmise that the VWA's F factors have contributed to the 
improvement in reserve estimates over time and have helped to expedite the transition to full 
funding. However, the F-factors still receive considerable external criticism from outside 
experts, as well as insurers. It is alleged that the F factors are a catchall that picks up any 
errors hi previous premium calculations, as well as under-reserving. This is perceived as 
inequitable in that it has a disproportionate impact on large employers who, in effect, pay for 
the prior miscalculations of the scheme. VWA staff disagree that F factors are employed as a 
catchall for previous errors, noting that the factors only relate to the previous year.
It also is asserted that the $15,500 statutory deduction has a large impact on F factors. 
If this criticism of the F factors is correct, they should not be manipulated simply to maintain 
the appearance of a low base rate. It should be noted, however, that regardless of the accuracy 
of this criticism, the F factors are intended to adjust premiums for costs that are not reflected 
in the individual employer pricing formula. It would be more straight-forward to incorporate 
these costs directly into the base rate. At the same time, some type of mechanism like F factors 
is needed to correct the incentives of insurers and employers to underestimate reserves when 
then* own funds are not at risk.
Remuneration
A significant limitation of the current remuneration formula is that it fails to 
discriminate among the levels of service that insurers are required to provide for their 
respective portfolios of risk. It also does not discriminate among insurers in terms of their 
performance or quality of service to employers and claimants. For example, an insurer does 
not receive a greater amount of fees if it manages a disproportionately higher number of long- 
term and difficult cases, which require more intensive management. Similarly, the 
remuneration formula does not reward insurers for doing a better job at loss prevention and 
case management, resulting hi lower claim costs and higher success in returning injured 
employees to work. Insurers bear the additional cost of these efforts but the financial benefits 
accrue to the VWA, injured workers, and employers. The Best Practice Incentive scheme is 
intended to provide financial payments to insurers for better service but its performance
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measures are imprecise and the total amount of the rewards is small. Some complain that 
insurers with a disproportionate share of employers with short-term and less difficult cases are 
unfairly advantaged under the current remuneration scheme.
The VWA is aware of these concerns and is considering changes to address them. It has 
discussed negotiating customised contracts with each insurer, rather than one generic contract 
with each insurer. This would allow the VWA to recognise the type of portfolio held by an 
insurer in determining its remuneration. The VWA also has discussed inducing insurers to 
lower costs by sharing a portion of the savings with them. This kind of approach may have 
considerable merit and should receive serious consideration.
Best Practice Incentive Scheme
The total amount of BPI payments that can be made, $6 million, is relatively small 
compared to the remuneration provided through the service fee, approximately $70 million. 
Consequently, the impact of the program on insurer behaviour is limited. However, the 
program also may influence behaviour through the signal it provides which could provide a 
psychological motivation to some insurers' management. VWA staff expressed the view that 
the financial impact of the program is more significant than any signalling aspect. This 
perception may change if employer performance statistics are published. Still, as long as the 
VWA bears the burden of claim costs, the needs to find ways to increase the financial 
incentives for good performance. This could be accomplished through increasing BPI payments 
and/or revamping the remuneration scheme.
This area, along with service standards and enforcement, deserves serious 
reassessment. Could the VWA achieve greater success in promoting scheme objectives at a 
lower regulatory cost by increasing performance-based incentive payments? This would be 
another way to enhance insurers' gains and incentives from better performance. Similar to the 
current system, insurers could receive a minimum service fee for meeting minimum 
performance standards and additional payments for exceeding these standards. The difference 
would be that performance payments would comprise a greater portion of insurers' total 
remuneration. Scheme cost savings could help to fund incentive payments. Economic analysis
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could be employed to determine the optimal incentive payment system. Such a system would 
require close attention to refined outcome measures to minimise biases and incentive 
incompatibility.
The outcomes that could be measured and rewarded could include (1) minimising 
claims, legal and administrative costs; (2) paying the benefits required by statute on a timely 
basis; (3) timely remission of funds to the VWA; (4) returning injured workers to productive 
employment; and (5) any other outcome that the government seeks that is not encompassed in 
the first four. These outcomes are subject to objective if not perfect measurement. While any 
performance measurement and reward system will necessarily be imprecise, the VWA could 
redirect its regulatory resources to developing and monitoring cost-effective measures and 
incentive payments. To optimise performance, the outcome measures would need to encompass 
any objective that the government perceives to be important and that insurers would be inclined 
to ignore or diminish if not rewarded. Hence, the system would have to establish an 
appropriate balance between incentives to contain costs and pay benefits so that workers would 
get no more or no less than what they were entitled to.
Monitoring and Statistical Reporting
The Authority's database gives it a distinct advantage in performing various analyses 
necessary for proper pricing and analysing cost drivers. The VWA can conduct statistical 
analyses using unit transaction data for the entire system. Hence, the database provides 
maximum credibility and flexibility that considerably exceeds what any insurer can perform 
with its own data. This includes valuation of individual case reserves that can be estimated with 
a high degree of accuracy. On the whole, it appears that VWA prospective loss cost estimates 
have proven to be relatively accurate relative to actual experience (aside from the criticisms 
about the need to manipulate F factors). The VWA also has been able to set adequate rates 
which have quickly restored it to full funding since the implementation of WorkCover.
The tie between the detailed transaction information extracted from the ACCtion system 
and the VWA's database significantly contributes to the flexibility, content, accuracy and 
timeliness of the VWA analysis. VWA can turn around loss cost estimates and premium
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calculation within weeks after the end of injury year. This far exceeds the capabilities of 
workers' compensation authorities in most other states in Australia or in the U.S.A. However 
the VWA believes that the ACCtion system is becoming outdated and needs to be replaced or 
turned over to insurers to develop their own systems. The high cost of replacing the ACCtion 
system is obviously a significant motivation to delegate this function back to insurers.
Some insurers also express a preference to use their own systems which are tailored to 
their specific needs and other information systems. Understandably, these tend to be larger 
insurers with stronger information systems departments within their company structure. They 
do not hide the fact that they perceive requiring insurers to develop their own systems will 
serve as an entry barrier that will help to cull the market of marginal players. Other insurers 
express concerns about the cost and their ability to develop their own systems.
Most insurers, regardless of their views on whether there should be a common system, 
indicate that the current system is not well suited to their needs to extract information to serve 
their clients. Indeed, some insurers' disproportionate demands on the ACCtion database has 
been a source of contention and compelled the VWA to attempt to restrict excessive use of the 
database. This further frustrates insurers, who believe they are unfairly criticised for not doing 
more analysis to help their clients better manage risk and claims. Developing a cost-effective 
solution to this dilemma which will serve both regulators and insurers is one of the biggest 
challenges facing Victoria.
Self-Insurance
As noted above, Victoria's requirements for self-insurance are relatively stringent and 
few employers are self-insured. There is considerable interest in easing restrictions on self- 
insurance and self-administration. Self-insureds tend to improve their experience although this, 
in part, may reflect a selection bias. Other perceived advantages are self-insureds' increased 
control over claims management, ability to consider other human resource issues involved with 
claims, and the involvement of various levels of management in cost containment efforts. The 
VWA is interested in opening the process to encourage the 250 largest employers to move 
towards self-insurance. It is envisioned that self-insureds would still need to satisfy stringent
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but more flexible capital requirements and demonstrate that they have achieved an initial level 
of performance based on health and safety measurements.
There are several ways to make self-insurance easier. The Boston Consulting Group has 
recommended liberalising the capital requirement using some form of a point scoring model. 
Allowing insurers to increase their deductible or level of retention could be another approach 
to increasing self-insurance. The Boston Consulting Group also has suggested raising the 
variable excess limit from 10 days to 26 weeks as another way to allow employers to retain 
more risk. Victoria already has the highest limit in Australia, as the other states typically have 
5-day limits. The current 10-day variable excess provision could be adjusted to anywhere from 
1 month to 1 year, depending on the size of the employer and other considerations. Self- 
administration also could be expanded by easing its requirements. The VWA believes that it 
will be necessary to perform an actuarial analysis of expanding self-administration to establish 
the correct incentives. Self-administrators will have to demonstrate that they are financially 
viable and employ a full-time WorkCover administrator.
There are some concerns with respect to increased use of self-insurance, such as 
employers suppressing claims and adverse selection. The cross-subsidy to small employers 
would have to be resolved to avoid excessive adverse selection. In the U.S.A., cross-subsidies 
and other factors have helped to push approximately 30 to 40 percent of the workers' 
compensation insurance market into self-insurance. But it is very important that an employer 
choose self-insurance because of its underlying efficiency, not as a way to avoid the payment 
of cross subsidies or administrative cost levies.
The VWA might consider allowing group self-insurance. Self-insurance is not viable 
for small employers unless they participate hi a group plan. The VWA has not favored group 
self-insurance because risk is shared among group members and, hence, diminishes a 
participating employer's incentive to reduce risk. However, requirements for group self- 
insurance can be structured in such a way that participants can still gain some efficiencies 
without abusing the system to avoid paying their fair share of costs. Group self-insurance can 
be limited to employers in a common industry or trade association, where members of the 
group can combine efforts to address similar safety and claims management problems. A group
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also can exercise peer pressure on its members to contain costs, particularly if it can charge 
risk-based premiums and exclude employers that fail to meet the group's standards. Group 
self-insurance would expand options for small- and medium-sized employers and increase their 
bargaining power with insurers.
The prohibition against the use of third-party administrators by self-insureds also might 
be reconsidered. The VWA has noted that one of the barriers to self-insurance is that 
employers do not view this as one of their core competencies. However, access to a third-party 
administrator would allow a self-insured employer to outsource claim administration if that is 
more efficient while maintaining a strong incentive to prevent losses and return injured 
workers to productive employment.
Communications with Insurers
Poor communications with regulators ranks near the top of insurers' concerns with the 
current regulatory scheme. Insurers loudly complain that regulators do not communicate with 
them openly and respectfully as equal partners in the WorkCover scheme. Insurers contend 
that the VWA's communication structure fails to support the close working relationship that it 
purports to. Many VWA staff appear to have a different perception and do not believe 
insurers' criticisms are justified. These different perspectives must be reconciled if the VWA is 
to forge a more constructive and positive relationship with insurers.
This problem might be addressed through facilitated sessions in which both sides can 
freely express their views. Understanding the other person's side is the first step to agreeing on 
measures that will address the problem. The current advisory committee structure also might 
be strengthened to increase the VWA's accountability to insurers. The advisory committee 
could receive periodic reports and briefings and be notified of any significant developments or 
issues that the VWA was considering. The VWA could establish a policy of formally 
responding to questions, complaints and recommendations of the advisory committee and 
providing support for any response.
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Employer Information
The WorkCover regulatory scheme relies on employer choice to induce insurers to 
control claim costs and provide good service. Competition among insurers to secure 
employers' business is intended to counteract some of the perverse incentives implicit in the 
principal-agent relationship between the VWA and insurers. If employer choice is to play this 
role, employers must have the incentive and the necessary information to purchase services 
from better performing insurers. It is intended that the experience rating aspect of the pricing 
formula provide the proper employer incentives. Yet, it has been observed that employer 
movement among insurers is limited, and insurers that score relatively low on the VWA's 
performance benchmarks still write a significant amount of business. Some of this may be due 
to imperfections hi performance measurement, but a lack of information on the part of 
employers with respect to insurers' performance and its impact on their costs also could be a 
contributing factor.
Providing information to employers is a critical component of the WorkCover 
regulatory scheme. This information can take two forms. One is general education on how to 
shop for an insurer and lower workers' compensation costs. This approach focuses on key 
areas and disseminates high-level information to all employers, as well as more detailed 
information on request. The other type of information is the publication of performance 
statistics for individual insurers. The VWA is working on a prototype report for this purpose. 
The objective is to help employers identify insurers who offer better service, and it could 
ultimately help to lower employers' premiums by improving their experience.
Insurers are understandably concerned about the accuracy of such a report, but it has 
the potential to attract employers to insurers with good performance records and increase 
competition. The key is whether the report helps to better inform employers about insurers' 
performance, or provides misinformation or is misunderstood by employers and encourages 
movement to insurers who are not good performers in reality. The development of accurate 
performance measures and useful explanatory materials will be essential to the success of this 
effort. The VWA should be prepared to enhance the service performance data available to 
employers and take other steps to improve employers' information and understanding of the
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implications of their choices. The VWA's communications strategy includes a number of 
promising initiatives, particularly the Best Practices program which is targeted at industries 
with notoriously poor safety records, such as road transport.
There is an issue with respect to the relative roles of the VWA and insurers for 
informing employers. In theory, the public sector has an interest in disseminating information 
that promotes public goals, that it can provide most efficiently, and/or that would not be 
adequately supplied by private entities. Generally, the VWA's information products seem to 
meet at least one of these criteria. One service that might fall into a gray area is the 
development of individual employers' claims experience reports for feedback and peer 
comparisons. Ideally, this is something that insurers would prepare as part of their services and 
promotion to employers. However, many insurers appear to lack the ability to prepare such 
reports and since the VWA is the ultimate risk bearer, it has an interest in encouraging 
employers to reduce losses. Improvements in insurers' access to employers' claims data and 
greater competition for employers' business could facilitate shifting this task to insurers.
Other Regulatory Tools
The VWA has employed other administrative and regulatory devices to promote scheme 
objectives. For example, under the Work Incentive Scheme for Employers (WISE) program, 
the VWA agrees to pay half the salary of long-term claimants for 6 months to employers who 
hire them. So far the program has had 172 placements. The VWA is developing a register of 
interested employers to expand the program. Senior management would like to use WISE to 
target the 3,000 "direct payees," claimants whose employers are no longer in business. There 
is a proposal to pay insurers an incentive of $1,000 if they are able to return the claimants to 
work.
Innovative programs like this can be valuable in a mixed system where private financial 
incentives may be insufficient to encourage insurers and employers to achieve scheme return- 
to-work objectives. Such programs may need to be reevaluated in the context of privatisation 
efforts which may or may not serve the same objectives.
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Private Choice and Regulation
Another option for Victoria is delegating more insurance functions to the private sector 
This has been a subject of considerable debate and great uncertainty. When WorkCover was 
first implemented, it was contemplated to be a transitional system that would eventually evolve 
into a largely privatised system. That plan is apparently being reconsidered in light of the 
concerns of employers and workers that such a change would not be in their best interests and 
might reverse some of the gains that have been made. This report is not intended to analyse or 
resolve the issues surrounding privatisation but it is useful to offer some observations on how 
some privatisation options might affect and possibly ease the principal-agent problem faced by 
theVWA.
Privatisation is not an either/or proposition hi the Victorian context, but rather a matter 
of degree. Although full-scale privatisation is one of the options that have been proposed, less 
comprehensive measures also have received considerable discussion. Victoria is evaluating the 
degree of private choice and the significance of private incentives in promoting scheme 
performance. Many believe that the VWA has obtained the most it can get from an agency 
arrangement. Insurers do not have their money at risk, which diminishes their incentives to 
contain costs and serve the global objectives of the scheme. Modifying incentives and 
balancing regulatory mandates and private choice in a mixed system to achieve optimal 
performance raises a number of difficult issues that will have to be resolved. For example, if 
insurers bear more risk, then their ability to exercise underwriting judgment and pricing 
flexibility and the resulting implications for the availability of insurance coverage would have 
to be addressed.
Full Privatisation
The most radical proposal that has been put on the table is to return Victoria to a 
private market system with limited regulatory oversight. This would entail having insurers 
assume underwriting risk as well as the responsibility for setting prices and managing 
investments. Prices could be regulated in some fashion, but privatisation proponents express 
different opinions on how this should be handled. One approach would be to enforce, at least
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initially, uniform rates established by the VWA and/or a rating organisation with limited 
opportunities for deviations. Constraints on insurers' pricing discretion could be eased over 
time as insurers gain experience with the new system and its performance can be evaluated.
Insurers' rates could be subject to prior regulatory approval before they go into effect 
or some form of file and write or write and file system, which would rely more heavily on 
market forces to regulate rates. These approaches are often characterised as "competitive 
rating" systems but this term is used differently by different people. In reality, the type of 
approval process has less to do with competition than the extent to which regulators rely on 
market forces. 10 In this discussion, the term competitive rating is used to characterise systems 
where regulators essentially let the market set prices and only intervene if they perceive that 
competition is lacking. Under a competitive rating system, advisory organisations might still 
develop "advisory" rates or loss costs which insurers might reference in determining their 
specific price structures.
Depending on one's perspective, full privatisation and competition could effectively 
eliminate much of the principal-agent problem faced by the VWA. In theory, with full pricing 
flexibility, employer choice and competition should regulate insurers' performance in 
controlling costs. More efficient insurers could offer lower prices to employers who 
demonstrated a commitment to loss prevention and effective claims management. The 
regulatory function could be limited to policing insurers' financial soundness and compliance 
with the requirements of the workers' compensation law and insurance contracts. The VWA 
also could increase the information provided to stakeholders to enhance the effectiveness of 
private choice.
However, the experience with the private system in place prior to WorkCare has 
produced a healthy skepticism among many employers, workers and regulators with respect to
10 To illustrate, prior approval does not necessarily mean that regulators disapprove or require 
modifications to rates. This policy effectively lets the market set prices. Conversely, under file and write or write 
and file systems, regulators may frequently disapprove rates retroactively or threaten to do so if filed rates do not 
conform to certain parameters. Under this policy, regulators effectively interfere with market forces and do not 
rely solely on competition to govern prices.
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whether such a system would follow the theoretical model. Cyclical movements in the supply 
of workers' compensation insurance are common in private markets, as is price discrimination 
between small and large employers. Regulatory measures can be employed to mitigate these 
problems but to some extent they are unavoidable aspects of private markets where information 
is constrained and buyers differ in their bargaining power. While full privatisation would 
reduce the costs of regulation and compliance, it is unclear whether it would improve scheme 
performance in terms of cost containment and assisting injured workers.
Altering the Reinsurance Arrangement
An alternative or complement to full privatisation would be to modify the reinsurance 
arrangement between the VWA and authorised insurers to reduce the moral hazard problem 
that arises with full reinsurance. The reinsurance arrangement could be structured more like 
typical private reinsurance arrangements with retention levels, limits and pro-rata loss sharing 
so that ceding insurers bear some risk and have an increased incentive to control loss costs. If 
the VWA continues to set the premium rate, it would need to determine the amount of 
premiums that an insurer would be allowed to retain to cover their increased risk and share of 
losses. If insurers were to set prices, then the VWA would need to determine the price of the 
reinsurance that it would provide to insurers. This would allow insurers to earn greater profits 
in return for accepting more risk.
This approach would raise issues with respect to insurer solvency and their ability to 
meet obligations to claimants and the VWA that would have to be addressed. If the government 
were to continue to guaranty the payment of an insurer's loss obligations in the event of its 
insolvency, the reduction of the moral hazard problem and the enhancement of private 
incentives would be diminished. It would be better to require an insurer to maintain adequate 
reserves to cover its net claims obligations and possibly require it to bolster its liquidity 
through devices such as surplus notes to cushion unexpected increases in claims obligations.
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Capitated Payments to Insurers
A third option would be to borrow the concept of capitated payments from health 
insurance managed care and apply it to workers' compensation. Under a capitated payment 
system, insurers would retain the obligation to pay benefits to injured workers and would 
receive a pre-determined payment to cover a given risk based on the risk's characteristics and 
expected losses. If actual claims payments are less than the capitated payment, then the insurer 
would pocket the difference as profit. If actual claims payments exceed the capitated payment, 
then the insurer would bear the loss.
The primary advantage of this system is that it would maximise an insurer's incentive to 
control costs through loss prevention and effective case management. At the same time, it 
would impose all of the risk on insurers and increase their incentive to avoid paying benefits to 
injured workers. This tendency would have to be controlled through monitoring and regulation 
of insurers' compliance with statutory requirements and possibly additional incentive payments 
to promote scheme outcomes other than cost containment. This might or might not be more 
cost-effective than the current regulatory system. In addition, insurers would find this less 
desirable than setting their own premiums.
Increasing Pricing Flexibility
The current system requires insurers to charge a uniform rate to force competition on 
service. In practice, insurers have circumvented this restriction, to some extent, through "in- 
kind" services to employers. Many regulators hold the view that unfettered price competition 
would result in excessive price cutting to secure employers' business at the expense of quality 
of service. However, it also is recognised that employers' incentives to switch to more efficient 
insurers are diminished because employers do not gain a greater immediate reduction hi their 
premium costs. Another approach would be to allow insurers to negotiate premium reductions 
with employers subject to employers' commitments to take steps to reduce their risks. 
Experience-based dividends to insureds or alternative forms of employer risk sharing (e.g., 
large deductibles, retrospective rating plans, and other discounts) also might be permitted, as 
in the U.S.A.
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These devices could enhance insurers' and employers' incentives to control costs, but 
they also would impose greater downward pressure on the payment of statutory benefits to 
injured workers. Any change such as this might be implemented slowly over time to help 
ensure that insurers' analytical capabilities are commensurate with the pricing flexibility that 
they would be allowed and that adverse effects on workers would be prevented through other 
performance controls and incentives.
Unbundling and Opening the Market for Insurance Services
Under the present system, a select group of insurers are authorised and required to 
provide a full set of insurance services to employers and workers. An alternative approach 
would be to allow different providers (including insurers) to offer various packages of 
insurance services. For example, an employer could elect to purchase basic workers' 
compensation insurance services from an insurer for short-term injuries and claims but 
purchase management of long-term cases and rehabilitation services from another provider. 
Self-insureds might purchase certain claims administration services from insurers or other 
third-party administrators. This would allow providers to specialise in what they do best, with 
resulting improvements in service efficiency and effectiveness.
Competitive State Fund
The public sector relinquished the role of being a direct provider of workers' 
compensation insurance services which it performed for a time under WorkCare. However, 
Victoria could explore the possibility of establishing a separate state workers' compensation 
fund that would compete with private insurers. In the U.S.A., where about one-third of the 
states maintain such funds, some have been very successful, while others have performed 
badly. The primary reason for establishing a state fund is to provide a source of insurance to 
employers rejected by the voluntary market, e.g., small employers. A second objective has 
been to increase competitive pressure on private insurers. State funds have performed best 
when their pricing and underwriting is not subject to political manipulation and they specialise
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in serving market niches, such as small retail establishments, that have been eschewed by the 
voluntary market.
The current WorkCover regulatory scheme does not require a residual market function 
but there may still be advantages to a properly-structured competitive state fund. Such an entity 
could be chartered to prioritise the objectives of WorkCover and demonstrate the best practices 
in loss prevention, claims management and rehabilitation. It could test the view held by some 
that it is economically feasible to improve upon insurers' current service performance. Its 
mission also could include serving any group of employers that is not well served by private 
insurers. To avoid political manipulation, a state fund should be separate from the government 
and managed according to sound business principles by a board of directors representing 
employers, labour and the general public. To maintain a level playing field, it should be 
subject to the same level of taxes and assessments as would any mutual insurance company.
Concluding Observations
Victoria's workers' compensation scheme has come a long way in improving the 
efficiency and quality of the insurance services provided to employers and workers. At issue, 
is whether it can achieve further significant improvement, either by refining its current 
regulatory tools or making more fundamental structural changes. It is possible, but perhaps 
unlikely, that fine-tuning the VWA's regulatory tools will make much of a difference. If 
insurers' incentives and constraints stay essentially unchanged, one would expect their 
performance to remain the same. Some insurers may continue to learn how to serve their 
clients better, but they are unlikely to make considerable investments in innovation and 
improving service with the limited profits offered by WorkCover under the present system. 
Indeed, performance may deteriorate if insurers have been basing business decisions on 
expectations about the future that will not be realised.
The expected outcomes of more fundamental changes to WorkCover regulation or 
increasing the role of the private sector are uncertain but at least deserve exploration. It is 
possible that the VWA could achieve equivalent if not better performance, at a lower 
regulatory cost, by increasing its emphasis on performance- or outcome-based incentive
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payments rather than strengthening its enforcement of conduct standards. Additionally, there 
are a number of ways to enable private choice to play a greater role in increasing the efficiency 
and equity of system outcomes, when the costs and benefits of market decisions can be 
properly aligned. Of course, policy makers will need to consider the effect of alternative 
market and regulatory arrangements on the tradeoffs between cost containment and other 
scheme objectives. Victoria should explore these options with an open mind and clear eye in 
determining the future course of workers' compensation.
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* Claims expenses minus claims recoveries. 
Source: VWA
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* Combined market share of top four insurers.
** Sum of squared market shares of all insurers.
Source: VWA
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Note: These performance measures are based on definitions used in VWA statistical reports.
* Cases not classified after 104 weeks plus cases classified after 520 days.
** Number of weekly payments in last 3 months. 
Source: VWA Authorised Insurer Performance Table





































































































































Workers' Compensation Premium Calculation 
[(1-Z) x R] + (ZxE) = PR
Z = sizing and experience adjustment factor 
R = prior rate for the workplace 
E = experience factor for the workplace 
PR = premium rate
r t _
Wt + WM + W,
t = insurer's F factor for year t
= claims paid plus case reserves for year t 
Wt = remuneration for workplace for year t 
E = experience factor for the workplace
PR x w = Employer 
1 l Premium t
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Figure 4.3
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A worker is entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 if 
there is an injury arising out of or in the course of employment and if the worker's 
employment was a significant contributing factor. A worker's dependents are entitled to 
compensation if an injury arising out of or in the course of employment was a significant 
contributing factor, results in, or materially contributes to the death of the worker.
The language in this statute parallels that found in many other jurisdictions, in so far as 
aarising out of and " in the course of employment" are utilised. Some jurisdictions connect 
these phrases with "and" rather than "or," but the treatment of the terms in practice suggests 
that this difference is somewhat academic. The requirement that the worker's employment was 
aa significant contributing factor" is not commonly attached to entitlement language hi 
workers' compensation statutes. Still, the compensation agencies and courts that apply such 
laws may often interpret the law as if such a clause was present. However, hi jurisdictions that 
have tended to be somewhat restrictive in their legislation regarding eligibility for benefits, the 
courts have tended to widen it. The phenomenon has been observed in Australia: "The 
Commission found that there has been a tendency for legislators to limit what qualifies as a 
compensable injury or illness, while judicial interpretation has tended to expand coverage." 1
Benefits hi Victoria are similar to those found hi most industrialised jurisdictions. 
Injured workers may be entitled to medical and like benefits as well as cash benefits paid in 
weekly or lump sum form for temporary or permanent disabilities. An entitlement exists also 
for occupational rehabilitation benefits, a subject reserved for discussion in Chapter 7.
'Industry Commission, Workers' Compensation in Australia, Report No. 36, 4 February 1994, p. 99.
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Medical Benefits
As in most jurisdictions, medical and like benefits (these include the various health care 
providers as well as hospitalization, pharmaceutical, and prosthetic appliances) are provided 
under the workers' compensation program. There can be an advantage to a worker to have 
medical benefits provided under this program, rather than by the Commonwealth health 
program. First, certain benefits are available to the worker at no charge only if it is a 
compensable work injury, e.g., physiotherapy. Second, under the workers' compensation 
program, and unlike the Commonwealth health plan, the law precludes action against a worker 
for the payment of balances charged by providers for medical services.
However, "agreements" between workers and providers for the payment of balances do 
occur. Employers have been known to pay balance bills as well.2 The medical provider may 
also prefer that the treatment or service is paid for under WorkCover as the insurance fee for 
the service is likely to be greater. All this suggests that some incentives exist for cost shifting 
to occur on the part of the worker or the provider. An employer on the other hand may have an 
incentive to shift the medical costs to the Commonwealth scheme so as to avoid having its 
experience affected for WorkCover insurance rating purposes.
Initiating Benefits
A worker may receive medical and like services from the provider of the worker's 
choice (this does not include occupational rehabilitation services). The employer is responsible 
to pay the first $416 of these services, with any costs above this the responsibility of the 
insurer. (This maximum, which is indexed, was applicable from 1 July 1996.)
An injured employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee must give notice of 
the injury to the employer as soon as practicable. Until proper notice has been given to the 
employer, there is not an entitlement to compensation. A claim for compensation for weekly 
benefits must be served as soon as practicable, for death benefits within 2 years after the date
2Balance billing occurs where the service provider bills the recipient of the service or the employer for 
any unpaid balance, should the insurer pay less than the amount invoiced.
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of death, and for medical and like services within 6 months after the date of the service. All of 
these time thresholds can be waived or extended for cause. A claim for weekly benefits must 
be accompanied by a certificate issued by a medical practitioner, though a worker without such 
a certificate may ask that the County Court consider his/her entitlement to compensation.
In a claim for weekly payments, the employer must accept or reject the claim within 10 
days of its receipt. The employer must forward to the insurer any claim for benefits for death, 
maims, or for medical and like services within 10 days of receipt of the claim. Claims for 
weekly benefits need to be forwarded to the insurer where either the employer rejects the claim 
or the claim is likely to exceed the employer's responsibility of $416.
The initial medical certificate which accompanies the claim is issued for up to 14 days. 
In exceptional cases where the injury is obviously very severe, e.g., spinal cord injuries, heart 
attacks, etc., the initial certificate can be applicable for more than 14 days. For weekly benefits 
beyond this initial 14-day period, a continuing certificate of capacity must be issued, for a 
period of up to 28 days. Unlike the initial certificate, which can be issued only by a medical 
doctor, the continuing certificate can also be issued by a registered physiotherapist, 
chiropractor or osteopath. A certificate of capacity can relate only to a period of time no more 
than 90 days from the date of the certificate.
An employer's decision to accept or reject a claim does not prejudice the insurer's 
decision as to liability. The insurer has 28 days from the date of receipt of the claim to accept 
or reject the claim and to give the worker written notice of the decision. If no written notice is 
given within that time the claim is deemed to be accepted. Reasons for a decision to reject the 
claim must be given. If the insurer accepts the claim, or if it is deemed accepted by the 
insurer's non-response within 28 days, the decision is binding upon the employer for purposes 
of its liability to pay medical and weekly benefits. No time limit is provided for the insurer to 
accept or reject medical benefits only claims. A rejection of such a claim (Section 99), if 
disputed by a claimant, must be taken to conciliation and if not resolved at that level, to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, (see Chapter 6)
The data in Table 5.1 are based on the number of claims reported hi each year for the 
past 10 years. These are so-called "Standard Claims," that is, they have been standardised to
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take account of changes that have occurred in the law. Standard claims exclude journey claims 
(no longer compensable for injuries after 1 December 1992), and non-fatal closed claims with 
up to 10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold (in July 1993 
the employer became liable for up to the first 10 days of weekly benefits; prior to that the 
employer was responsible to pay only up to the first 5 days of incapacity). Note that these 
claims are not as of the year of injury, but as of the date reported.
The data in Table 5.1 reflect the substantial decline in claims reported over the past 
decade. The drop is especially evident beginning in 1992/93. Several factors contributed to this 
decline. First, certain types of claims were no longer compensable for injuries after 1 
December 1992. (Of course, this includes journey claims, but the data in the table have 
standardised for this.) Certain claims for stress-induced injuries related to personnel activities, 
for example, ceased to be compensable. Additionally, the threshold for compensability was 
raised by requiring that employment be a "significant contributing factor" to the injury. A 
more intangible factor was the widely held perception that workers' compensation claims 
would be harder to obtain under the new regime. To the degree that this attitude caused some 
marginal claims not to be made, the new law was a factor in the decline, regardless of whether 
the entitlement was actually changed.
Weekly Benefits
An injured worker entitled to weekly compensation under WorkCover will receive a 
benefit that is tied to his/her pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). The PIAWE is the 
worker's average weekly earnings for the previous 12 months if employed continuously by that 
employer. It is calculated at the worker's ordinary time rate of pay for the worker's normal 
number of hours per week. Organised labour representatives object to the fact that allowances 
such as overtime payments, shift differentials, hazard duty allowances or dirt money are not 
included in considering the injured worker's PIAWE. Workers employed less than 12 months 
with the injury employer have their PIAWE calculated based on the lesser period, while 
workers with less than 4 weeks in the job have their PIAWE calculated based on deemed 
earnings. All weekly benefit payments are treated as ordinary taxable income.
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Weekly benefits are paid according to three distinct phases, i.e., the first 26 weeks of 
incapacity, after 26 weeks of incapacity, and after 104 weeks in which a weekly benefit has 
been paid or is payable to the worker. During the first 26 weeks of incapacity, the worker is 
entitled to the lesser of 95 percent of his/her PIAWE or the weekly maximum benefit ($664 per 
week as of 1/7/96). Cash benefits for the first 10 days of incapacity are the responsibility of 
the employer, and not of the insurer. Though employers may select a "buy-out" option that 
will insure them for the first 10 days of benefits, few employers choose to purchase it. It is the 
practice in many industries for employers to "top-up" the benefit to 100 percent of pre-injury 
earnings, at least for the first 26 weeks.
If the worker is partially incapacitated, s/he is entitled either to the difference between 
$664 and the worker's earnings, or to the difference between 95 percent of the PIAWE and 
earnings, whichever hi lesser. Earnings refer to current weekly earnings of the worker either 
as a worker or as a self-employed individual. The concept legally also refers to what the 
worker could earn in employment in his/her previous employment or in suitable employment 
(notional earnings), but this basis for compensation is not currently being used.
After 26 weeks of incapacity, the wage replacement rate is lowered. This is in line with 
the practice hi New South Wales, Queensland, the Northern Territory, and A.C.T. In 
Tasmania, the initial compensation rate is lowered after 6 weeks and again at 25 weeks. The 
Commonwealth and South Australia have rate reductions that occur at 45 weeks and 52 weeks 
respectively. Though these rate drop-offs after specified periods are widespread across 
Australia, they are not typical hi North America.
After 26 weeks of incapacity, a worker entitled to weekly benefits is likely to have a 
reduction in those benefits. Essentially, the worker's benefits will be set according to one of 
four possibilities:
(a) If the worker is found to have a "serious injury" (defined below), and the worker 
has no current weekly earnings, the worker is entitled to $664/week or 90 percent 
of the PIAWE, whichever is lower.
(b) If the worker is found to have a "serious injury" and the worker has some current 
weekly earnings, the worker will receive the difference between 90 percent of the
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PIAWE and current weekly earnings or, if lower, the difference between $664 and 
current weekly earnings.
(c) If the worker has no "serious injury" but is totally incapacitated, the worker 
receives the lesser of $664 or 70 percent of the PIAWE.
(d) If the worker has no "serious injury" and is not totally incapacitated, the worker is 
entitled either to the difference between 60 percent of the PIAWE and 60 percent 
of current weekly earnings or the difference between $399 and 60 percent of 
current weekly earnings, whichever is lower.
The cut in the wage replacement rate may have no effective impact on workers with a 
very high PIAWE. For a worker with PIAWE of $948 or more, even with a reduction at 26 
weeks from 95 percent to 70 percent, the worker's benefit would remain at the weekly 
maximum $664. However, this worker would have experienced a lower rate of wage 
replacement initially, since the maximum benefit of $664 is only 70 percent of his/her PIAWE.
The significant feature of Victoria's benefit scheme, and unique in Australia (or 
elsewhere so far as we know) is to adjust the 26 weeks benefit according to whether or not the 
worker is judged to have "serious injury." It means that a judgment needs to be made at this 
stage regarding the degree of the worker's impairment. Obviously it can precipitate a 
controversy between the insurer and the worker. This determination also will affect the 
opportunity that may exist for the worker to seek a common law remedy. (This is discussed in 
Chapter 6.) Though each of these considerations might discourage the use of the concept of 
"serious injury" at the 26-week mark, there is an important reason for its use. Clearly, it is 
meant to foster a significant incentive to return to work for those who might be able to do so 
after 26 weeks, without placing that pressure excessively on persons with more significant 
impairments.
The meaning of "serious injury" for purposes of adjusting the PIAWE replacement rate 
at 26 weeks is found in the statute (Section 93B(5)). The "serious injury" threshold for 
purposes of the 26-week rate adjustment is that the worker is judged to have an impairment 
that is rated at 30 percent or more by the standard of the American Medical Association's 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (second edition).
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The "serious injury" decision for the 26-week determination is based solely on 
impairment and not on any broader notion such as disability. The rating at 26 weeks is for 
purposes of knowing whether the worker is impaired above or below the 30 percent level only. 
It is not used, therefore, to determine the extent of the worker's permanent impairment or 
disability level for the purpose of awarding some benefit for permanent disability. It is also 
arguable whether the 26-week decision regarding "serious injury" was intended to be used for 
purposes of allowing the worker access to the common law for the work injury. However, the 
presence of a "serious injury" is a necessary condition for a worker to have access to the 
common law remedy.
To clarify this issue, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the law was amended 
hi 1996 so as to differentiate, explicitly, the 26-week determination of "serious injury," from 
the subsequent determination made for the purpose of deciding eligibility to use the common 
law remedy. The "serious injury" determination is also utilised for the purpose of deciding 
whether or not weekly benefits can be paid beyond some maximum period established hi the 
law for the receipt of such benefits. Again, the 26-week determination of "serious injury" is 
not the basis, customarily, for that decision.
The weekly benefits rate determination at 26 weeks is the basis for any continuing 
weekly benefits paid. However, the 1992 law provided that for injuries occurring on or after 
1 December 1992, weekly benefits would be terminated after 104 weeks of incapacity, except 
if either of two situations existed at that point. Weekly benefits would not be terminated 
automatically at 104 weeks if the worker was either "seriously injured" or totally and 
permanently incapacitated. The 104-week determination represents a very large target, that is, 
a threshold with several very important implications for the parties. First, it may or may not 
rule out the possibility of the worker being paid very long term benefits. Further, as observed 
above, it determines whether or not the worker has access to the County Court for a common 
law remedy.
Some persons have argued that the 104 weeks of incapacity created an unfair situation 
for certain workers who had sought to return to work, possibly for modified duty or for limited 
hours only. Where a worker had engaged in such activity, considered to be laudable and
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consistent with the spirit of the 1992 law, this time was considered to be within the period of 
incapacity. As such, 104 weeks of incapacity might provide the diligent employee less than 104 
weeks of compensation, since benefits would terminate according to the law. In 1996, this 
concern was eliminated. As a result of the amendments enacted, weekly benefits are terminated 
(save for the two exceptions noted above) after 104 weeks of compensation benefits have been 
paid or an entitlement existed, and not based on 104 weeks of incapacity.
The 1992 legislation also provided limits on compensation for workers already 
receiving weekly benefits on its effective date. For a worker who had received weekly benefits 
for less than 52 weeks, the weekly benefit would be terminated after 104 weeks of incapacity, 
including any period prior to the effective date of the law, unless found to be "seriously 
injured" or totally and permanently incapacitated. For a worker who had received 52 weeks or 
more of weekly benefits, the worker's entitlement would cease after 52 additional weeks of 
incapacity, except if the worker had a "serious injury" or was totally and permanently 
incapacitated. Needless to say, this guaranteed that there would be numerous disputes over 
"serious injury" and total and permanent incapacity determinations, as the Authority sought to 
resolve the claims of many long-term recipients that had been added to the rolls under 
WorkCare.
A worker is not entitled to weekly benefits when the person attains retirement age. 
Retirement age means either age 65 or the normal retirement age in that occupation, whichever 
is earlier. For example if commercial airline pilots routinely retire at age 60 in Victoria, 
weekly benefits would be terminated at that age. However, if a worker is injured on the job 
after reaching retirement age, that person is entitled to receive weekly payments, but only for 
the first 52 weeks of incapacity.
Another measure to tighten up eligibility for purposes of curbing certain perceived 
system abuses involved claims for benefits after the worker ceased to be employed by an 
employer wherein the injury was said to occur. No longer will such a claim be accepted unless 
the worker can satisfy the insurer that the claim reasonably could not have been made while 
employed with that employer.
Table 5.2 shows the level of payments for weekly benefits for the past decade. With the
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enactment of the 1992 legislation and the subsequent amendments, aggregate payments for 
weekly benefits fell sharply. First, the number of new claims for benefits fell in the period 
after 1 December 1992 for the reasons given earlier. Second, the number of long-term 
recipients fell sharply, a major goal of the 1992 change. Additionally, WorkCover was able to 
shorten the average length of time that persons stayed on weekly benefits, another central focus 
of the 1992 law. Also, hi mid-1993 the employer became responsible for the first 10 days of 
weekly benefit payments, up from the previous level of 5 days.
Terminating Weekly Benefits
A sticking point in every workers' compensation system occurs where the insurer seeks 
to alter (reduce) weekly compensation payments or terminate paying them altogether. Systems 
that have become especially sensitive to matters of cost recognise that prompt alteration or 
termination of payments where circumstances call for this can represent a significant source of 
potential cost reductions. Balancing this concern is the need to treat the injured worker fairly. 
Thus, if the insurer has no restraint on its ability to change benefits, it can place the injured 
worker in a very difficult position, especially if any appeal process is slow or back-logged.
There are numerous provisions of the law, some of which have been noted above, 
which provide reasons to terminate benefits. These include:
• The expiration of a fixed period of benefits, e.g., at 52 or 104 weeks;
• The attaining of retirement age;
• The worker has left Australia (unless "seriously injured" or totally and 
permanently incapacitated);
• The recipient serves a prison sentence;
• The worker has received a lump sum on termination of employment for
redundancy or severance, or for certain superannuation or retirement lump sums;
• The worker has returned to any work;
• The worker's notional earnings have increased;
• The worker's benefits were obtained fraudulently.
In most cases, the worker must be provided with written notice of the decision to 
terminate or alter weekly benefits, and in some instances, there are fixed periods for which 
benefits must be continued, subsequent to the provision of notice.
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If a worker has received weekly payments of compensation for at least 12 weeks, and 
has provided the insurer with a certificate of capacity, the benefit cannot be terminated or 
lowered for the period covered by the certificate without giving proper notice. For a worker 
who had been receiving weekly benefits for a continuous period of at least 12 weeks, but less 
than 1 year, the period of notice is 14 days. For a worker who has received weekly payments 
for a continuous period of 1 year or more, the period of notice is 28 days.
Disputes regarding termination of benefits tend to be commonplace in workers' 
compensation systems. The insurer, for example, may believe that the worker's condition is 
such that return to work is possible. In Victoria, in such instances, the insurer has the worker 
examined by either the treating medical provider or one that the insurer selects. These disputes 
are moved quickly into the Conciliation Service where the Conciliation Officer may direct that 
benefits be continued (discussed in some detail in Chapter 6). Presently, a worker can obtain a 
Conciliation Conference quickly, i.e., under 28 days, but if the parties cannot settle 
voluntarily, lengthy delays can ensue either at the Medical Panel stage or as the dispute is 
litigated in the Courts.
However, the relatively rapid access to Conciliation, the requirement that some notice 
be given the worker of the intent to terminate (at least where benefits have been paid for some 
time), and the ability of the Conciliator to direct that payment be made for some previous or 
prospective time periods, under certain circumstances, appears to serve the needs of both sides. 
By contrast, some other jurisdictions require that payments continue until an adjudicator has 
made a determination (which may mean that many months pass with benefits being paid) or 
permit insurer termination at will with no weekly benefits until the adjudicator, perhaps many 
months later, orders resumption.
The extraordinary success in curbing long-term claims (claims with over 260 days of 
compensation) is evident in Table 5.3. Long-term claims were developing at a rate of 5000- 
6,000 per year in the years before WorkCover's enactment. By 1993/94, the number had fallen 
below 2,000, and it continued to drop in 1994/95. Because of the limited time involved, one 
cannot yet make any judgement about the number of new long-term cases for claims reported 
in 1995/96. In December 1992, there were 16,600 long-term claims open. As of 30 June 1993,
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this had fallen to 13,300 claimants, and by 30 June 1996, the number of open long-term claims 
was 10,013. That represented about 50 percent of the number that existed in 1991.
In addition to issues relating to the termination of weekly benefits, parallel ones arise 
regarding their alteration. It has been noted that weekly benefits may be altered due to changes 
in the worker's notional earnings or any current weekly earnings, and the 26-week threshold. 
Payments will be adjusted, also, to reflect any payments that a worker might have received 
from the Department of Social Security. These social security benefits paid will also serve as 
the basis for offsets against any lump sum benefits with a pecuniary loss component (Section 
135A, Section 115, and certain claims under Section 135(1)).
Death Benefits
Where an injury that arises out of or hi the course of employment materially contributes 
to or results in death, the worker's dependents are entitled to compensation. From 1 December 
1992 to 30 June 1994 death claims were processed by the insurer, and any disputes were 
referred to the County Court. Since 1 July 1994, death claims have been determined by the 
County Court.
Eligible dependents must meet one of three conditions:
• The person, at the time of the worker's death, was partly, mainly or wholly 
dependent on the earnings of the worker.
• The person would have been partly, mainly or wholly dependent on the worker's 
earnings, but for the incapacity due to the work injury.
• The person is the worker's spouse (common law or actual) and lived with the 
worker on a permanent and bonafide domestic basis. No account is to be taken of 
a spouse's earned income or to any savings from such earnings.
If there are no dependents wholly or mainly dependent on the worker's earnings, the 
County Court may award benefits, which it considers to be reasonable, to partial dependents. 
Where the worker has left both total and partial dependents, the County Court will allot 
compensation as it sees fit. The possibility that a spouse could be denied compensation because 
of the spouse's financial independence due to non-earned income is unusual. It introduces a
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means test of sorts into workers' compensation for a spousal benefit, a rarity in workers' 
compensation programs.
The death benefit that the County Court can award is a fixed amount set by statute (and 
then indexed). As of 1 July 1996, the death benefit was $131,190. Beyond that amount, each 
dependant child is entitled also to compensation, with the sum based on the child's age. As of 
1 July 1996, a child below the age of 1 year could receive $25,000, while any children age 16 
up to age 21 (and a full-time student) would receive $5,650, if they were wholly or mainly 
dependents of the worker. In addition to workers' compensation benefits, a dependant of a 
worker may recover damages under the Wrongs Act (1958) in respect of the death of a worker. 
The Court must not award in excess of $500,000 in respect to the work fatality.
Data on fatal claims for the past 10 years are shown in Table 5.4. The number of 
workers' compensation claims for fatality have fallen in recent years. Overall, they represent a 
rather small proportion of system payments. Over the past 10 years there has been an average 
of 186 claims per year, though for the past 3 years ending in 1995/96, there have been only an 
average of 127 claims. (Both averages are by report year. The numbers have been standardised 
by excluding journey claims.) In 1995/96 payments of compensation for death claims 
(excluding any damages awarded) were less than 2 percent of all benefits and lump sum 
payments that year (including damages). Though average lump sum payments per death claim 
were well above the averages found earlier hi the decade, the smaller number of claims has 
meant that total expenditures were considerably below earlier levels.
Benefits for Maims and Permanent Disabilities
It is only the rarest jurisdiction that finds that it can operate a workers' compensation 
scheme with little or no difficulty in respect to permanent disabilities compensation. All 
systems use one of three bases for making permanent disability awards, or they apply some 
combination of them. In some jurisdictions, the permanent disability award is based, 
exclusively or nearly so, on the degree of medical impairment that the worker is found to have 
sustained. Thus, workers with equal degrees of impairment are entitled to equal or parallel 
levels of benefits. The same principle is utilised where a particular injury is found on a
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schedule or a list. Most commonly, such scheduled losses apply only to body extremities and 
to eyes. In either case, some jurisdictions use this basis but may adjust the benefit levels, 
automatically, in line with the worker's age. In some, an adjustment is made, also by formula, 
for the worker's occupation. Some jurisdictions will take this impairment-based determination 
and translate it to a benefit amount, while other jurisdictions will adjust it further by the 
worker's pre-injury average weekly earnings.
A very different basis for determining the level of permanent disability benefits is to 
base it on the anticipated loss of earnings due to the worker's injury. Since projecting what 
future earnings losses will be is highly subjective, a variety of methods is employed to gauge 
those losses. Commonly, consideration is given to the degree of medical impairment, the 
worker's age, education, work experience and language limitations, with different weights 
(informally) applied to each.
A third basis for setting compensation benefits for permanent disability is one identified 
as wage loss. Unlike the previous approach that forecasts what the loss of wage earning 
capacity might be, the wage loss approach compensates on the basis of actual incurred losses. 
Consequently, there would be no benefits paid under wage loss for permanent disability even 
where the worker sustained a considerable impairment, if that employee had returned to work 
at the pre-injury average weekly earnings level, or higher.
Each method has certain drawbacks. To some extent, the shortcomings have caused 
some jurisdictions to mix their approaches, so as to avoid the worst features of each and to 
utilise the strengths of each approach. In Victoria, benefits for permanent disabilities that are 
not totally incapacitating are compensated in one of four ways according to the specific nature 
of the injury.
Section 98 Losses
The Table of Maims lists 46 impairments ranging in severity from quadriplegia or the 
total loss of two limbs or both eyes, to the loss of a joint of a lesser toe. The maximum benefit 
payable for a maim, as of 1/7/96 is $102,460. For each impairment, a percentage or range of 
percentages is listed. For example, the total loss of the right arm is listed as 80 percent. Thus,
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a worker who lost the right arm, totally, would be entitled to a lump sum benefit under Section 
98 of $81,968 (0.8 x $102,460). If the worker lost a fraction of the arm, that fraction, applied 
to $81,968 would be the maims benefit paid as a lump sum. This would be in addition to any 
weekly benefits that the worker received, and the worker might seek further compensation 
under common law. The award would likely be an offset against certain damages under 
common law, discussed later in this chapter.
This basic benefit under the Table creates areas for dispute, especially on medical 
matters. The loss of a member or extremity includes the (permanent) loss of its use. Thus, for 
example, a dispute can arise both over the issue of whether there has been any loss of use of a 
leg, as well as the quantitative assessment of that loss. There can be a dispute over whether or 
not the loss entails an "industrial loss," that is, the ability to use the member for industrial 
purposes.
Medical differences that generate disputes may also emanate from a preexisting 
condition. Any permanent loss that existed prior to the work injury would not be compensated. 
Thus, an injury that is rated at 10 percent to a leg with a 40 percent preexisting impairment 
would be rated at .10 divided by .60 (the preexisting level of non-impairment) or 17 percent. 
This is in contrast to some jurisdictions that might rate the same worker as 50 percent impaired 
(.10 + .40).
Several things should be noted about the Table of Maims. First, the rating of an 
impairment need not be done through the use of any specific guide or criteria. (An exception is 
noted below.) Various bases can be found for determining the degree of loss of use of a 
member. Concepts such as "industrial use" only provide more latitude for assessing the degree 
of impairment. Second, the degree of impairment, for purposes of setting the maim benefit 
under Section 98, is not likely to be the same as the estimate of impairment for purposes of 
determining whether or not the worker is "seriously injured." A judgment regarding 
impairment for purposes of determining whether "serious injury" has occurred can affect the 
size of the weekly benefit after 26 weeks, the possible continuation of benefits after 104 weeks, 
and the accessibility to the common law remedy.
The Table of Maims provides benefits that are based almost purely on impairment. The
5-14
injured worker's age, occupation, and subjective factors have virtually no bearing on the 
worker's benefit. Moreover, if two workers sustain the same injury, their lump sum benefit 
will be the same, despite any difference in their pre-injury average weekly earnings. And if 
one worker has returned to work and the other has not, it is likely to be immaterial for 
purposes of setting the maims benefit. Of further note, in addition to the list of 46 
impairments, disfigurement of the face and of the body are listed on the table. While many 
jurisdictions use schedules that are in form similar to the Table of Maims, few of them 
explicitly list disfigurements.
Back Cases
In the 1985 WorkCare legislation, impairments to the back, neck, and pelvis were 
incorporated into the Table with special treatment hi such cases for evaluating and 
compensating any permanent disability. (For brevity, these will be called "back cases"). The 
special treatment for back cases begins with the requirement that they be rated in accordance 
with the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
(2nd edition). Note, that this is the same source to be used in determining whether or not a 
worker has a 30 percent impairment or more, thus qualifying the worker as being "seriously 
injured."
Because back cases must be rated according to the Guides, and the Guides are based on 
a whole person basis, not consistent with the 46 impairments found hi the same schedule, an 
adjustment is made. Impairments of the back, neck, or pelvis are listed hi the Table as being 
within a range, respectively of 0 - 60 percent, 0-40 percent and 0-15 percent. Consequently, 
the maximum benefit for a back, neck, or pelvis impairment as of 1/7/96 would be $61,476, 
(60% x $102,460), $40,984 (40% x $102,460), or $15,369 (15% x $102,460), respectively.
The back, neck, and pelvis cannot be rated as more than 60%, 60%, and 50% of the 
whole person according to the AMA Guides (2nd edition). The Authority has interpreted the 
application of Section 98 as it pertains to back cases to mean that the specific rating is not the 
percentage of the maximum dollar benefit specified in the Table. Instead, it is the rating 
divided by the maximum whole body percentage suggested in the Guides. For, example, a
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pelvis impairment rated as 10 percent loss of the whole person would entitle the worker to 
10%/50% (the pelvis' whole body maximum), meaning a 20 percent loss of the pelvis with 100 
percent of the pelvis valued at $15,369. Thus, a benefit would be paid of
10% / 50% x (15% x $102,460) = $3,074.
Similarly, a 30% whole person rating of a neck injury would yield a maims benefit of
30% / 60% x (40% x $102,460) = $20,492.
That back cases are evaluated differently than extremities for disability compensation is 
not altogether surprising. Many jurisdictions have traditionally had scheduled benefits for 
injuries to extremities and other bases for determining benefits to backs, including necks, and 
to internal organs. Yet it must also be pointed out that some other jurisdictions do not employ 
this distinction, relying instead on some scheme that is consistent for all injuries. Certainly the 
AMA Guides could be employed to evaluate body member or eye injuries as they are now used 
in the cases of back, neck and pelvis injuries.
A second noteworthy characteristic of this Table is its exclusions. There are no maims 
benefits for injuries to most internal organs, including—strikingly—those of the respiratory 
system. Thus, workers with any of the pneumoconioses are not entitled to a lump sum maims 
benefit, nor are persons with comparable claims for cancer and other occupational diseases, 
though weekly benefits can be paid for such conditions. At best, if workers with such 
conditions successfully pursue a common law remedy, there is no offset for a previously paid 
maims benefit. While few jurisdiction would place such conditions on a benefits schedule, they 
generally would compensate such conditions as an unscheduled loss, essentially parallelling the 
manner in which back cases are compensated.
It must also be noted that there is no maims benefit for mental injuries, except where 
they may involve permanent brain damage. Thus, while a worker may be able to claim weekly 
benefits, common law damages, or be rated as "seriously injured" due to the result of some 
mental stress, there is no maims benefit under the existing Table. However, prior to the 




Claims for loss of hearing have been frequent and have represented a significant share 
of the benefits paid for maims. As such, hearing loss claims are treated somewhat differently 
from other permanent disabilities due to injuries that arise out of or in the course of 
employment, with the employment being a significant contributing factor. The benefit rate 
associated with total loss of hearing is 65 percent in the Table. Any compensable partial loss of 
hearing is set as that percentage loss times 65 percent times the maims maximum at the time 
($102,460 as of 1/7/96). However, there is no benefit if the degree of hearing loss that is 
attributed to the employment is rated below 7 percent.
Hearing loss must be rated by one of the 56 or so specialists approved by the Minister 
on the recommendation of the Convenor of the Medical Panels. The rating of hearing loss must 
be done in accordance with Improved Procedure for Determination of Percentage Loss of 
Hearing by the National Acoustic Laboratory. A determination made by an approved person in 
accordance with the procedures set out in the legislation and the regulations is conclusive 
evidence of hearing loss.
In hearing loss claims, the date of injury is the date of the claim, if the worker is still 
employed in the employment out of which the claim arose. However, if the claimant is no 
longer working in the employment out of which the claim arose, the injury date is the last day 
of employment at that establishment. The implication of that difference is that the aggregate 
sum available for an injury from the Table is adjusted (upwards) annually. A difference in 
injury date can result in a higher or lower maims benefit being awarded.
Compensation for Pain and Suffering
Most jurisdictions do not provide compensation, expressly, for pain and suffering. 
Indeed, losses for pain and suffering are often considered inapplicable in workers' 
compensation claims, at odds with one of the bases for damages in tort or common law 
proceedings. This fine line is at best academic. The existence of and the degree of pain, at 
least, must have some effect in many instances where awards are made for permanent 
disabilities. In a jurisdiction that awards such benefits on the basis of either the projected loss
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of earning capacity or the actual loss of earnings, pain can serve to limit a worker's range of 
employment options or the quantity of employment that can be obtained. For jurisdictions that 
award permanent disability benefits strictly on an impairment basis, pain is often the factor that 
can limit a person's range of motion, their ability to undertake lifting or bending and so on. 
Hence, it is somewhat unrealistic to argue that pain and suffering are not a part of a permanent 
disability benefit, even where the law would seem to rule that out.
In Victoria, pain and suffering under Section 98A were expressly included in the 1992 
legislation. Benefits under this section are available only to workers with injuries listed in the 
Table of Maims. In keeping with several significant features of the WorkCover law, a benefit 
for pain and suffering is available only to workers whose maim has been a significant one. As 
of 1/7/96, the threshold for access to a benefit for pain and suffering is a maims award of 
$11,000 or higher. Thus, a worker with a non-back impairment rated at below 11 percent, or 
an 18 percent back impairment (yielding less than an 11 percent whole person rating) is not 
entitled to an award under Section 98A. A pain and suffering award is not available to a person 
with diseases or injuries affecting internal organs, since such conditions, as noted, are not 
listed on the table.
Awards under Section 98 are designed to be determined in an objective manner. In 
large part, one should expect that, aside from any vested interest that a rater might have, 
ratings done by different raters would cluster closely around some central tendency. This quest 
for consistency, be it for back cases or any other maim, is one justification for employing an 
impairment-based approach to permanent disability compensation. That issue stands out when 
considering the benefits available under Section 98A. There is almost no guidance in the Act as 
to how to determine the size of such an award. As of 1/7/96, the maximum benefit that can be 
paid for pain and suffering is $55,040. The law states that this maximum amount is to be 
payable "only in a most extreme case and the amount payable in any other case shall be 
reasonably proportionate to that maximum amount having regard to the degree and duration of 
pain and suffering and the severity of the injury or injuries." (Section 98A(3))
It seems clear that there is considerable room for negotiation (subjectivity) in setting the 
award for Section 98A. In some instances, the parties appear to have settled on an award under
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Section 98A based on a rule of thumb of 50 percent of the settlement value for the Section 98 
benefit. In some instances, the flexibility that exists in setting the benefit amount under Section 
98A is utilised to bring over-all resolution to a claim where a dispute exists over some other 
issue(s).
Lump sum maims benefits have grown substantially over time. One simple measure of 
this is the changing value of total maims payments per year from 1986/87 till 1995/96, as seen 
in Table 5.5. The growth of maims lump sum payments is also evident in the second column, 
which shows the ratio of maims payments, including pain and suffering payments since 
1993/94, to the total of weekly benefit payments. Part of the very rapid growth of this ratio is 
due to the decline since 1991/92 hi the value of weekly benefits payments, associated with the 
enactment of WorkCover. In recent years a portion of the increase has been associated with 
benefits for pain and suffering under Section 98A of the law, introduced after 30 November 
1992. However, it is also due simply to the growth in maims payments claims.
The data in Table 5.6 reflect the types of injuries for which maims payments have been 
paid over the past 10 years. As noted in the text, hearing disorders have been a major source 
of maims claims, particularly before the latest 2 years. Indeed, over the 10-year period, fully 
51 percent of all compensated maims claims were for hearing disorders, though these claims 
accounted for only 28 percent of aggregate payments. Part of this disparity reflects the 
relatively low cost per claim for hearing loss, compared to other maims, and because so many 
of the hearing loss claims occurred in earlier years when benefits payment tended to be lower.
Of special note is the rapid growth over the past 3 years in the payments for the loss of 
mental powers. This reflects payments made for work injuries that occurred prior to 
1 December 1992, at which time the loss of mental powers was removed from the Table of 
Maims. Curiously, prior to 1992/93 maims benefits for the loss of mental powers were so 
small that any such maims were simply included in the category "other.** One well publicized 
case involving a police officer's injury served to open the flood gates for maims for the loss of 
mental powers.
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Medical Examinations - Section 112
There are a variety of matters that may cause an insurer to seek to have a worker 
examined by a medical person that it selects. Such matters could include for example, whether 
or not a compensable injury or illness has occurred, the continuing incapacity of the worker, 
and the existence of and degree of any permanent impairment. Any claim or proceeding 
commenced by or for the worker and the worker's entitlement to benefits can be suspended if 
the worker unreasonably refuses to have or obstructs an examination.
Medical examiners under Section 112 are asked by an insurer to conduct their 
examination, typically, at 1 of 3 times in the life of the claim. If the examination occurs within 
the first 2 weeks of the claim, typically the insurer is inquiring into the matter of 
compensability. If an examiner is asked to see a worker in the period 4 to 5 weeks into the 
claim, the insurer is seeking some information about the prognosis for the condition and the 
claim. Many of the examinations are conducted at about 20 weeks after the claim has begun, to 
determine the issue of "serious injury" at the 26-week threshold. This will be a point where the 
insurer has the medical practitioner rate the degree of impairment of the worker.
Medical examiners are selected by insurers from a list of persons who have been 
approved by the Authority. Examiners must be drawn from the ranks of the medical 
practitioners, or registered physiotherapists, chiropractors, osteopaths or psychologists. Some 
treating medical persons who were not medical practitioners disapproved of having medical 
examinations conducted only by practitioners. In their view medical practitioners were not the 
best persons to examine workers being treated by other types of professionals. Hence, the set 
of medical examiners has been expanded to enable, in most cases, these examinations to be 
conducted by persons with training that is similar to that of the treating persons. However, 
only medical practitioners are approved to conduct examinations for purposes of rating the 
degree of impairment.
Similar to the situation in most jurisdictions, these medical examiners are viewed with 
suspicion by many of the workers that they see, and by worker representatives. Perceived as 
"insurance doctors," these examiners can make findings that will lead to the reduction or 
termination of weekly benefits and affect the possibility of receiving any lump sum payments.
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When insurers continue to use the same individuals again and again to conduct these medical 
examinations, and their opinions appear consistently to be injurious to the (financial) well- 
being of the worker, the process, inevitably, will draw some criticism.
From the perspective of the Authority, the ideal would be for all medical examiners to 
be widely regarded as objective and professionally respected. No doubt this is the case for 
some significant proportion of the medical examiners. Difficulties arise, however, for several 
reasons. First, where a medical examiner no longer treats patients and limits his or her practice 
to conducting insurance examinations, questions arise over both competence and objectivity. 
The latter issue will arise where a significant portion of a medical examiner's income depends 
upon being called upon by insurance companies for these purposes. Practically, it has been 
difficult for the Authority to remove such examiners from the approved list of examiners.
Additionally, the Authority and insurers recognise that it is difficult to attract the 
quantity of service needed from some medical persons, that is, those who are regularly heavily 
demanded. The time lines in the law do not permit insurers to have the luxury of scheduling a 
needed medical examination far into the future when that is the first available open date. 
Further, some medical persons prefer not to do such medical examinations because they wish 
to eschew potentially confrontational situations.
Other medical persons limit or avoid doing Section 112 medical examinations on the 
grounds that they view the fees as inadequate. The fee paid to examiners depends upon the 
person's credentials. As of June 1996, the fee paid to a specialist medical practitioner was 
$289 with an added $82.45 if an impairment assessment was prepared. The fee covers both the 
examination and the preparation of the report for the insurer.
Some criticism has surfaced regarding the rapidity with which some persons conduct 
their Section 112 medical examinations. Some persons schedule these examination at 15-minute 
intervals while others may give considerably more time to the worker examination. Some 
medical examiners believe that they can be helpful to the treating medical person in either of 
two ways. First, they may observe something in their examination that was not observed 
initially by the treater. Second, the treating person may find it difficult to tell the worker 
something that the worker does not wish to be told. Presumably, this is less difficult for the
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medical examiner to do, or for the treating person to do upon the recommendation of the 
Section 112 examiner.
Lump Sum Settlements
Workers with compensable injuries or illnesses may be able to receive certain benefits 
in the form of lump sum payment. (This does not consider a lump sum paid for any weekly 
benefits to which the worker had been entitled but that had not been paid previously.) Lump 
sum payments are paid for Section 98 and Section 98A benefits (maims and pain and 
suffering), Section 92 payments (death cases), and for any damages won at common law. 
Additionally, the law permits lump sum settlements to be made in a very limited set of other 
claims. (Section 115)
If a worker is over the age of 55, and has been receiving weekly benefits for 104 weeks 
or more, and is totally and permanently incapacitated, the worker can receive a lump sum 
settlement if the total amount is $10,000 or less. (The $10,000 figure is set by regulation, not 
by statute.) A worker that has received 104 weeks of benefits and is found to be "seriously 
injured" may also be paid in a lump sum settlement, for purposes of using that sum for some 
income-producing project. If the Authority is not persuaded that the funds will be used for such 
a project, or if it appears that the project has a high risk of failure, the Authority is not likely 
to approve the settlement. In practice, such settlements are granted only in exceptional 
circumstances.
Lump sum settlements are calculated based on several factors. First, any future medical 
payments for the compensable injury are calculated, taking account of the worker's condition, 
age and life expectancy (according to Australian mortality rates by gender). For purposes of 
appropriately discounting future expenditures, the Authority uses a discount rate of 3 percent. 
Future weekly benefits, net of income taxes that are estimated to be payable, are also 
discounted at 3 percent. (Recall that future weekly benefits would be terminated at age 65 or 
the regular age of retirement in that occupation). Thus, the lump sum payment is the present 
(discounted) value of any future medical and weekly benefits to which the worker is projected
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to be entitled plus, where appropriate, any lump sum benefits under Section 98 and Section 
98A.
Typically, if the worker believes that there may be some potential damages to be 
awarded, no Section 115 lump sum settlement is sought. The reason for this is that acceptance 
of the lump sum settlement extinguishes the worker's right to any future compensation or 
damages for the injury in question. Nothing prevents a worker from first settling under 
common law and then applying for a lump sum settlement under Section 115.
Table 5.7 indicates the value of all the lump sum payments paid under Workers' 
compensation over the past decade. Column 1 is the aggregate amount paid per year, and it 
reflects an extremely rapid rate of growth hi such payments. From 1986/87 to 1991/92, the last 
full year under WorkCare, aggregate lump sum payments grew from $11.5 million to over 
$221 million. In 1992/93, payments exploded to over $378 million, substantially due to 
common law damages payments associated with the large run-off of claims brought about by 
the 1992 legislation.
One way to gauge the growth of lump sum payments is to compare them to weekly 
benefit payments, which also grew substantially after 1987/88 (see Table 5.2). Column 2 of 
Table 5.7 traces the ratio of lump sum payments to aggregate weekly benefit payments over the 
decade. Lump sum payments increased from about 5 percent of the level of all weekly benefits 
in 1986/87 to 52.2 percent hi 1991/92, and then jumped to equality in 1992/93. As the run-off 
of common law cases results in fewer settlements, the percentage has begun to fall back.
The allocation of payments as lump sums are shown in Table 5.7. Column 3 is death 
benefit payments as a percentage of lump sum payments showing that death benefits have 
become an even smaller proportion of total lump sum payments. Column 4 is the percentage of 
total lump sum payments that were paid for maims. (Included hi the maims payments are 
benefits for pain and suffering under Section 98A. Such benefits were paid only hi the past 3 
years and represented a negligible sum in 1993/94.) Maims benefits declined, proportionately, 
after 1987/88 until 1992/93 due to the growth in importance of common law payments.
After 1992/93 maims payments began to grow rapidly, due in part to the limited 
availability of other lump sum settlements (column 6). Common law benefits have grown
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dramatically over time, reaching a peak in 1992/93. Even over the past 3 years, the large bulk 
of lump sum payments under common law are based on claims for injuries under WorkCare 
By 1995/96, WorkCare claims still accounted for $79 million in lump sum benefits (about 35 
percent of the total), but this was well below the amounts paid in each of the 3 preceding 
years.
Medical Issues
The focus of this section is on a variety of issues relating to medical benefits that have 
not been addressed thus far. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the role of medical 
services for a workers' compensation system. Persons and businesses that provide injured 
workers with medical services play a pivotal role in the system, from the determination of 
elements of the compensability issue to factors that establish the size and duration of cash 
benefits. Some jurisdictions have observed with alarm their high rates of growth in the cost of 
medical services in workers' compensation. Some have also observed the growing share of 
litigation costs that are paid for med/legal services.
The worker is entitled to have the reasonable costs of medical and like services paid 
fully. Medical services are defined in the law (Section 5) and include the attendance, 
examination or treatment of any kind of medical practitioner, or a (registered) dentist, 
optometrist, physiotherapist, chiropractor, osteopath or chiropodist. In addition, medicines, 
appliances, and prostheses are covered, as are other services that are not defined but are 
available if they have been requested by a medical practitioner. Injured workers may also be 
entitled to occupational rehabilitation services, but these are covered hi Chapter 7.
In summary, the Authority recognises four categories of health care providers whose 
services are covered under the law. First, there are medical practitioners, who are the only 
ones who can issue initial certificates of capacity in claims for weekly benefits. Second, there 
are those registered professionals (dentists, optometrists, physiotherapists, chiropractors, 
osteopaths, and chiropodists) who may be accessed by the injured worker directly. Third, there 
are those that may provide a subsequent certificate. Such providers must be medical 
practitioners, physiotherapists, chiropractors, or osteopaths. Fourth, there are other providers,
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who have been approved by the Authority, whose services must be requested by a medical 
practitioner. These include persons providing services in acupuncture, dietary analysis, home 
help, massage, naturopathy, occupational therapy, pharmacy, psychology, remedial 
gymnasium, social work, and speech pathology. In the cases of all four sets of providers, they 
are approved by the Authority by dint of their membership in specific professional 
associations.
As of 1 July 1996, an employer's insurance required that it pay a deductible of $416 
before there is any liability for medical and like services by an authorised insurer. A worker's 
entitlement to medical and like services ceases 52 weeks after an entitlement to weekly benefits 
ceases, unless certain exceptions exist:
- The worker has returned to work but
- could not remain at work without medical and like services, or
- surgery is required, or
- the worker has a "serious injury" (a 30 percent or greater impairment); or
- The worker requires a modification of a prosthesis; or
- The service is essential to ensure that the worker's health or lifestyle does not 
significantly deteriorate.
In the event that none of these conditions is met, the worker may have resort to the 
general health insurance that exists outside of the workers' compensation system. However, 
that insurance may be less attractive to a worker because of the presence of a deductible, 
because certain medical services available under workers' compensation are not covered under 
the Commonwealth plan, e.g., physiotherapy, and because only in workers' compensation is 
an action against a worker for the payment of balances precluded.
Medical and Like Services Costs
Medical and like services costs have been the source of concern for some time in 
Victoria. Many jurisdictions, including Victoria, have sought to control the growth of these 
costs through fee schedules that limit the amount that service providers will be paid for their 
services. The process of setting "reasonable" fees, as called for by the law, has been highly 
contentious in recent years.
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In 1990, following some continuing dispute over medical fees between the WorkCare 
administration and medical groups including the Australian Medical Association, the Victorian 
government named a Compensable Patients Fees Review Committee chaired by Dr. lan 
Siggins. Following the report of the Committee, the government agreed to pay medical fees 
beginning 1 January 1991 based on the Commonwealth Medical Benefits Schedule (CMBS) 
rates plus a loading that ranged between +24 percent and +49 percent.
The loadings, reflecting Siggins, were based on two sets of factors. First, there were 
special circumstances in workers' compensation (and transport accident) cases that imposed 
costs on the treating providers. Specifically, the loading factor included a factor for bad debts 
(soon dropped), extra duration, extra service, practice disruption, slow payment, and list 
adjustment. Second, the CMBS fee schedule allows for balance billing. Balance billing refers 
to the practice of billing the injured worker directly for the "balance" of the bill after the 
primary payer has made payment. Thus, that fee schedule is different from the actual or market 
rate for medical services. The fee schedule under workers' compensation, where balance 
billing is less likely, was stepped up to reflect the market rates that doctors were receiving 
outside of workers' compensation.
Though a fee schedule increase had been negotiated immediately after the election of 
October 1992, the enactment of the WorkCover law and the changed circumstances 
surrounding that kept the newly agreed-upon schedule from going into effect. Since that time 
there have been off-again on-again negotiations between the Authority and the Australian 
Medical Association. In January 1995, the Authority announced an increase in the fee schedule 
in the range of 1-1.5 percent. On 1 July 1995, as a result of the VWA's agreement with the 
Australian Society of Orthopaedic Surgeons, a 5 percent increase was approved for orthopaedic 
surgery. However, no agreement was reached at the time with the Australian Medical 
Association.
Rates were revised as of 1 January 1996 based on the current CMBS fee schedule plus 
the two sets of loadings (market rates and Siggins factors). The change was not the product of 
any agreement reached with the Australian Medical Association. One set of fees that was not
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revised at the time was that for anaesthetists. A separate negotiation over their rates had broken 
down.
To the extent that rancour exists over the issue of the medical fee schedule, it stems 
primarily from two problems. First, the doctors (through their representatives) believe that 
their fees have been inadequate, with special concern over the lack of increases in the past 4 to 
5 years. In contrast, some in the Authority saw a need for little or no growth on the grounds 
that the fees had been set too high hi 1991-92. A second source of friction emanates from the 
process of setting these fees, with some of the doctors believing that bargaining power rests 
entirely with the Authority. From their perspective, the Authority has acted unilaterally.
Disputes over medical fees are increasingly common hi many jurisdictions. And in each 
of them other issues surround these controversies that tend to make their resolution more 
difficult to achieve. Some of the pressure from the medical providers emanates from their 
claim that medical bills are often paid only many months after their submission. The Authority 
acknowledges that late payment of medical bills did occur hi the past too frequently, but that 
the standard has been greatly improved in the last several years. As such, complaints about late 
payments and disputed bills are considered to be past history, and (some at the Authority 
believe) simply a handy argument to justify fee increases.
One group with a particularly strong criticism of the fee schedule is the anaesthetists. In 
their view, the role that they play has changed, becoming more sophisticated and more 
important. They contend that the fee schedule does not recognise the added complexity and 
responsibility of then" roles. At this writing, three individual cases are pending at the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and the VWA is expected to revise the schedule based on the 
findings in these cases.
There has developed a tripartite arrangement for the payment of hospital costs. Public 
hospitals operate in Victoria under a fee schedule set by the state. Several years ago a dispute 
between WorkCare and the public hospitals resulted hi an agreement whereby the Authority 
would pay those hospitals based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). State Government now 
pays also on the basis of DRGs, although the Transport Accident Commission does not. 
Private hospitals are still not paid based on DRGs. A third group of (eight) private hospitals
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was selected to participate in a short-term pilot program 6 years ago. Though the pilot project 
ended 5 years ago, that program continues. It involves providing financial incentives to each of 
these hospitals to have workers treated and released more promptly than had been the norm. 
Though only a small number of hospitals participate in this scheme, they have a 
disproportionately large share of the hospitalized patients under workers' compensation.
The experience in many jurisdictions has been that tight controls over fee schedules 
have been inadequate as a means to limit medical cost growth. Instead, control over utilisation, 
in conjunction with a fee schedule, may be more effective. In the United States at least, control 
over utilisation can come from several initiatives, primarily the adoption of managed care 
programs. 3 At this time managed care has not been developed in Victoria's workers' 
compensation system. However, it is certainly true that insurers can challenge whether the 
provision of certain medical services was necessary, and whether the service is required as a 
consequence of a compensable injury.
One step with some potential to control costs and to provide appropriate treatment has 
been the adoption recently of a protocol for use in back injury cases. Borrowing from an 
earlier effort in South Australia, a medical advisory committee to the Authority recommended 
this protocol. For other jurisdictions, medical protocols have been utilised in several different 
ways, including as a basis for insurers to determine whether inappropriate or superfluous 
services were being rendered. The protocol, in such instances can serve as a justification to 
deny medical payments, as well as to identify providers that may (frequently) deviate from 
accepted practices. The back protocol in Victoria has not been developed for these purposes. 
Instead, it is to be and already has been employed as an instructional or advisory tool for 
practitioners. Additionally, the protocol may aid the practitioner in persuading an injured 
worker that the services being provided are appropriate ones, and that other treatments or more 
frequent applications of services are not called for medically.
3See for example, P. Burstein. 1996. Benchmarks for Designing Workers Compensation Medical Fee 
Schedules, Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation Research Institute. See also S. Eccleston. 1995. Managed 
Care and Medical Cost Containment in Workers' Compensation: A National Inventory, 1995-96. Cambridge, MA: 
Workers Compensation Research Institute.
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Currently, there are no medical and like services for which a provider or an injured 
worker must seek pre-authorisation from an insurer (excluding occupational rehabilitation 
services). However, there are procedures to seek pre-authorisation from insurers and they are 
being utilised. Where a provider fears that it may not be paid by an insurer for a service 
requested by or for an injured worker, the pre-authorisation can assure it that it will be paid for 
the services.
The data in Table 5.8 provide an indication of Victoria's experience with medical and 
like services costs. Column 1 reveals the rapid growth in these costs from 1986/87 to 1991/92, 
with much of the growth occurring earlier hi that period. In the last 3 years, under 
WorkCover, health care costs have fallen substantially. Much of the decline is associated with 
the reduction in claims for compensation that occurred in the wake of the 1992 legislation. 
Some of the decline reflects the increased employer deductible for medical and like services 
that occurred after 30 June 1992, when it was raised from $360 to $378 for injuries after that 
date. (That deductible has been increased annually since 1 July 1986 through indexation. As of 
1 July 1996 it has reached $416.) Though aggregate expenditures paid for medical and like 
services have declined, they have not declined as rapidly as claims have. Consequently, the 
costs per claim for medical and like services have grown every year over the past 10 years 
(column 2).
How are medical and like services costs spent? The last five columns of Table 5.8 show 
the percentage of total costs, allocated across five major categories. Not surprisingly, the 
largest share of these costs are paid to medical practitioners. Over the past 5 years, this group 
accounted for 30-33 percent of the medical and like services expenditure. There has been a 
small steady growth of payments for physiotherapy services. By 1995/96 physiotherapists 
received about 14 percent of all medical and like services expenditures (or about 44 percent of 
the amount paid to medical practitioners). Expenditures for hospitals have ranged between 22 
and 29 percent over the 10-year period, and have been concentrated between 24 and 27 percent 
over the past 4 years.
The most significant changes in medical and like costs have been in the areas of 
rehabilitation and ancillary medical services. There has been consistent growth,
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proportionately, in ancillary medical services over the past decade. It represents an area that 
the Authority will want especially to monitor. Rehabilitation costs had fallen substantially after 
the enactment of the 1992 legislation, though they have increased again over the latest 2 years 
It should be noted that these figures include personal and household services ($6.1 million in 
1995-96) and the cost of the WISE re-employment program (about $1.0 million in 1995-96), in 
addition to the occupational rehabilitation services ($4.9 million in 1995-96) that will be 
described further in Chapter 7. The costs of personal and household services, including 
attendant care, counselling, household help, and modifications to home or car were included in 
medical costs rather than rehabilitation under the WorkCare system. Thus, the figures across 
the decade are not completely comparable.
Concluding Observations
There are a number of goals that the supporters of the 1992 legislation hoped to 
achieve. Certainly, a reduction in system costs was a motivation, but that was certainly not its 
only goal. Other concerns were that benefits were not adequate in certain, more serious injury 
cases, and that the system was forcing employers to pay for injuries over which they had no 
control. Another obvious concern was the length of time that people remained on benefits and 
the incentive structure that contributed to this. Some of these issues are discussed elsewhere in 
this report. However, certain observations regarding the changed approach to benefits since 1 
December 1992 are appropriate here.
First, it has become clear that the effort to limit access to the common law remedy 
through the use of the serious injury threshold has been weakened, both as a product of judicial 
interpretations and as the 30 percent impairment level has become more readily attainable. The 
use of psychological injury impairment as an add-on to the impairment level for a physical 
injury has been instrumental here.
Disputes over benefits for maims and pain suffering were not eliminated, even after 
Medical Panels became involved routinely. In fact, their frequency weakened the Medical 
Panels by utilising them so heavily as to backlog them completely. The incentive structure for 
workers, and for their solicitors, encouraged the issue of proceedings, primarily as a route to a
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settlement, with the worker's costs largely paid by the insurer. Settlements at the courthouse 
steps for maims and for pain and suffering could also be utilised in order to reach some 
understanding with regard to any continuing weekly benefits or damages that might otherwise 
be sought at common law. Thus, despite the aim of the supporters of the 1992 effort to limit 
the use of lump sum settlements, it seems apparent that this has not been fully successful. It is 
very difficult to seal off one area of benefits from another where the parties are able to arrive 
at a mutually agreed outcome in one of them. Compounding this is the incentive to move 
benefits from a taxable source (weekly benefits) to a tax-free source (lump sum).
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* All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
**Standard claims exclude journey claims and non-fatal closed claims with up to 
10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold.
Source: VWA
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10 days compensation and medical and like payments below the threshold.
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* Claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded.
** Standard claims exclude journey claims. 
Source: VWA
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•"Includes payments for Section 98A in the latest 3 years. Claims arising from self-insurers as of 30/6/96 are excluded. 
Source: VWA
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Severe injuries includ. 
Paraplegia, Quadriplegia


















































































































* Claims arising from self insurers as of 30/6/96 are excluded 
Source: VWA




























































































































































































* Total claims reported in that year. All claims arising from self-insured employers as of 30/6/96 are excluded. 
Source: VWA
Chapter 6 
DISPUTES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
Chapter 6 DISPUTES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
Disputes arise in all systems of insurance, be they social insurance or a purely private 
arrangement. Workers' compensation programs have developed a rich mixture of approaches 
to cope with disputes. In recent years an increasing number of jurisdictions have sought to 
minimise the incidence of these disputes, as awareness of their costliness has surfaced. 
Additionally, a common goal has been to seek to settle the disputes that do arise hi a prompt 
and, preferably, informal fashion. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods 
employed in Victoria to deal with disputes in workers' compensation. The approach that is 
taken is to focus on the various sub-systems that have been established to resolve and settle 
disputes as they develop.
The role that a workers' compensation agency takes in matters of disputes can be 
arrayed along a continuum. At one end are those public agencies that play a central and 
decisive role in the resolution of disputes. Such agencies make the initial determination of 
factual matters, and they may also be nearly the ultimate appellate body as well, if further 
review in the courts is rare and difficult to obtain. At the other edge of the continuum are those 
agencies that utilise direct and indirect measures to induce the parties to mutually resolve their 
differences. Further, the agency itself may not decide disputes at all but, instead, have the 
independent court system serve that function.
Since 1 December 1992, Victoria's approach to dispute resolution has placed it squarely 
in the latter camp. The agency does not adjudicate disputes; instead, the WorkCover Authority 
seeks to minimise the incidence of disputes, and when they arise, to have them settled rapidly 
by the parties with a minimum of transaction costs. Where that does not succeed, as must 
occur on occasion, the dispute is resolved in the courts. To assist the parties and achieve their 
goals, workers' compensation depends heavily on a system of Medical Panels, in order to 
bring to bear some objectivity and professional expertise on disputes arising over medical 
matters. An independent Conciliation Service is empowered to assist the parties in finding
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common ground. Disputes that are not resolved at that stage, and those emanating from 
common law actions, enter the court process. Even here, however, the WorkCover law seeks 
to drive some cases to the less formal (and less expensive) Magistrate's Court rather than the 
County Courts. A small number of disputes over some specialised issues can be resolved, if 
not at the Conciliation Service, at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
Medical Panels
An important element in the dispute resolution process in Victoria is the system of 
Medical Panels. In recent years an increasing number of jurisdictions have created and utilised 
such Panels, in one form or another, to assist in the resolution of disputes involving medical 
issues. 1 The goal of this approach, generally, is to have these issues decided by neutral persons 
with appropriate medical expertise, who have no financial or other interest associated with the 
outcome. Currently, such Panels are found in Victoria, New South Wales and Western 
Australia; and Queensland employs a Medical Assessment Tribunal.
The use of the Medical Panel approach can provide several outcomes that many parties 
would consider to be salutary. Aside from bringing some neutral professional expertise into the 
process, the very existence of such Panels may serve to discourage excessive amounts of 
litigation; as parties avoid disputing matters if they have little or no effective medical evidence 
to support them. Additionally, the parties may have more satisfaction with the entire process 
when the contending positions are evaluated by qualified neutrals.
Jurisdictions that have created Medical Panels have had to wrestle with many significant 
issues concerning the procedures that they employ. Specifically, interest groups may give 
support to, or oppose, such Panels depending upon the answers to a number of questions, 
including:
What issues are to be taken to a Panel? 
Who can serve on a Panel? 
Who selects the Panel members?
'For example see Earth. 1985. Resolving Occupational Disease Claims: The Use of Medical Panels. 
Cambridge, MA: Workers Compensation Research Institute.
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What is the size of a Panel?
How binding are the findings of the Panel?
In what form does the Panel report its findings?
On what basis does the Panel determine its findings?
To what extent does the Panel delay the dispute resolution process?
Medical Panels were established in December 1992 with the introduction of 
WorkCover. It is independent of the Authority though its budget flows from it. The primary 
responsibility of the scheme is spelled out in the statute Section 67(1): "The function of a 
medical panel is to give its opinion on any medical question in respect of injuries arising out 
of, or in the course of or due to the nature of employment before, on or after the 
commencement of section 10 of the Accident Compensation (WorkCover) Act 1992 ..." The 
definition of "medical question" consists of nine items identified in the statute (Section 5). In 
1994, the function of the Medical Panels was expanded under Section 104 (see below). That 
section does not refer explicitly to a "medical question." Consequently, the function of the 
Medical Panels extends beyond that which is found in Section 67.
Under Section 67, a Conciliation Officer, the County Court, the Authority or an 
authorised insurer or a self-insurer may require a worker—either one claiming compensation or 
one who is receiving weekly payments under the Act—to submit themselves for examination by 
a Medical Panel. If the worker unreasonably refuses to meet the Panel and answer its 
questions, to supply relevant documents to the Panel, or to submit to a medical examination by 
a member of the Panel, the worker may lose the right to payments or have them suspended.
The law provides that where the County Court exercises jurisdiction, the court may 
refer a medical question to a Medical Panel for an opinion, and it must refer a medical question 
if a party to the proceedings so requests (Section 45). In either case, the opinion of the Panel is 
binding, subject to the County Court's opinion that new information on the medical question 




One Panel member is appointed by the Minister as Convenor. The Convenor is 
appointed to oversee the business of the Panels and to give directions as to procedures of the 
Panels. Members of Medical Panels are appointed by the Governor in Council. They must be 
medical practitioners, i.e., a registered medical practitioner within the meaning of the Medical 
Practice Act of 1994. Currently, there are about 120 persons so designated in Victoria.
As noted above, the selection of Medical Panel members can be a source of 
dissatisfaction by parties, who may question their neutrality (fairness) or their quality. A 
number of issues have surfaced in this regard. First, it can be difficult to recruit certain 
medical practitioners to the Medical Panel. If potential members are already very heavily 
committed, if they perceive that Panel work may involve them in excessive contention or, if 
they believe that such work inadequately compensates them, it may be difficult to fill the Panel 
with highly regarded professionals. Further, some persons may be willing to serve on the 
Panel but substantially limit the degree of their involvement.
In actual practice, the Victoria Medical Panel has had several specific matters to deal 
with. First, the number of medical practitioners in some specialties is hardly adequate for the 
number of cases requiring those skills, while there exists an excess supply in other fields of 
specialisation. Second, while some Panel members allow themselves to serve only in a handful 
of Panels, others will serve in 30 or 40 a month. Critics of the Panel point to these Panel 
members who serve frequently as an indicator of a lack of quality, although no evidence has 
been produced to show that frequency of service bears any relation to quality. A third issue 
that has arisen has been the difficulty that might exist in removing any person previously 
selected to serve on the Panel. Specifically, even if the Convenor sought to have a Panel 
member removed, the Convenor was vulnerable to having a legal action brought against him. 
However, Section 65(10) of the Act, inserted by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 
1996 appears to provide the Convenor some protection hi this regard.
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Procedures
The party that refers the dispute to the Panel indicates the issue(s) that is (are) in 
dispute. The Convenor then puts this issue(s) to the Panel for its findings. The issues that can 
go to the Panel are either "medical questions" or other matters (see below) that the statute 
directs can or must go to a Medical Panel. When an issue is referred to a Medical Panel, the 
Convenor identifies the appropriate Panel member(s) on the basis of specialty, given the 
medical issue in dispute, and availability. If a member has treated or examined the worker 
previously, or is engaged to do so, they cannot be appointed to that Panel.
The Panel can consist of one to three members. In Victoria, each Panel member 
examines the patient, usually separately. One member of the Panel is designated as the 
Presiding member. After examination of the claimant, and an evaluation of any relevant 
material supplied by the Convenor, each Panel member prepares a preliminary report. These 
reports are exchanged and, based upon subsequent communication between or among the 
panellists, a consensus is reached, which serves as the basis for the Panel's findings. These are 
reported and certified by the Presiding member.
An issue has arisen over the preliminary reports of the Panels and their availability as 
evidence. The preliminary opinions need not be released, nor must members provide additional 
opinions. Ultimately, they must simply respond to the question(s) put to them. Moreover, the 
consensus reports are often quite brief, and provide little or no explanation for the Panel's 
findings. What is clear, however, is that it is the findings themselves that the parties need, if 
they are to reach some resolution. What the Panels seek to do is to provide these findings, 
while avoiding becoming involved hi the litigation themselves.
A goal of the Medical Panels has been to not delay the resolution of disputes. The 
statute provides some tight time lines for this process. A Medical Panel must form its opinion, 
in the form of a certificate, within 21 days after the reference is made. Further, the Panel has 7 
days after forming its opinion to provide it to the relevant persons. This has proven to be 
unworkable, and sizable delays exist in the process. There are several reasons for this, but a 
key has been that the system has been vastly overburdened since 1994.
In the 1994 law change, the role of the Medical Panels was modified and greatly
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expanded. Specifically, where a claimant disputes an insurer's offer for a claim under Section 
98 or 98A, the claimant must not commence proceedings until the claimant first refers the 
dispute to a Medical Panel for an opinion as to entitlement to compensation and the extent of 
any loss in terms of impairment, disfigurement or pain and suffering. Until 1996, claims made 
under Section 98 or 98A went to a Medical Panel if the insurer's offer was disputed. However, 
where the insurer did not respond with a determination regarding entitlement to the claim and 
its extent within 60 days of receipt of the claim, the claimant could proceed to court.
The opinion of the Medical Panel is binding, essentially, on the insurer. Once the 
Panel's certificate is issued, the insurer must make an offer under Section 98 within 14 days of 
receiving the opinion of the Panel that is consistent with (or better than) the Panel's findings. 
Similarly, it must do so with Section 98A claims, though this may involve some subjectivity. 
The Panel's opinion is not binding on the claimant. If the dispute remains, i.e., the offer is not 
acceptable, the Conciliation Service may become involved. Though the Conciliation Officer 
may refer disputes over "medical questions" to a Medical Panel, and the opinion of the Panel 
is binding on the parties, determining the extent of disability under Section 98 or of pain and 
suffering under Section 98A are not "medical questions." Further, the courts have not been 
completely supportive regarding the binding nature of the findings on the parties.
Medical Panels in Practice
The data in Table 6.1 show the number of referrals according to referring party over 
the past 3 years. The numbers could hardly be clearer in terms of the changed character of the 
Medical Panels. From 1993-94 to 1995-96, the number of referrals grew by almost 9 times. 
This reflects the impact of the 1994 amendments. Secondly, Table 6.1 reveals that the activity 
of Medical Panels is generated almost entirely by claimants, who must request a Medical Panel 
as a step on the path to the courts in disputes over maims. For practical purposes, the courts do 
not refer cases to the Medical Panel. That reflects the fact that very few disputes over maims 
actually get to trial. It likely reflects also the courts' belief that the Panel's opinions are not 
needed. Moreover, a court is bound, essentially, by the Panel's opinion when it has been
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referred by the court. The Conciliation Service's use of the Panel is mandatory in cases 
involving disputes over medical questions.
Table 6.2 is confirmation of the impact of the 1994 amendments. By 1995-96, 97 
percent of referrals to Medical Panels were made under Section 98/104, that is, disputes over 
maims. It seems fair to summarize that the use of Medical Panels for all issues other than 
maims benefits was negligible.
The data in Table 6.3 reveal the little that is known about the type of bodily injury 
involved in disputes that are referred to a Panel. In 1993/94, about 44 per cent of referrals 
involved "backs," and though the number of such cases grew, they were overtaken by the 
ballooning of hearing loss claims/disputes in the next 2 years. However, as maims cases 
swamped the Medical Panels in 1994/95 and 1995/96, increasingly the types of injuries were 
coded as "multiple." Of course, "multiple" injuries can be the source of problems hi 
constituting a single panel of medical specialists. However, the Panel may obtain consultation 
from other specialists, where needed, to assist it hi reaching an opinion.
In almost all cases in 1995/96, two-person Panels were employed. (Table 6.4) Over the 
past 2 years, not a single Panel was constituted on the basis of a single member. This reflects 
the preferences of both the Panel members and the Convenor for a Panel that permits some 
consultation within the Panel process. Table 6.5 reflects the professional specialisation of those 
appointed to a panel in 1995/96. Hardly surprisingly, the dominant specialty required is 
orthopaedics. Note the sizable number of specialists drawn from otolaryngology and 
psychiatry. The lack of availability of psychiatrists to serve on Medical Panels in Victoria was 
noted by a number of parties.
The explosion in Medical Panel activity has exacted a price. Delays and backlogs have 
grown from 1993/94 to 1995/96. In the most recent year the median delay for the return of an 
opinion reached 160 days. By July 1995, there was a backlog of 1,173 files; as the number of 
lodgements grew, the backlog in July 1996 had grown to 1,345 files. By 1996, it was apparent 
that disputes over maims were swamping the Medical Panel approach. Moreover, many of the 
disputes did not appear to resolve as a result of the opinions of a Medical Panel.
Consequently, the system has been modified. Specifically, the 1996 amendments of
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Section 104 mean that if a worker disputes an insurer decision with respect to a claim for a 
maims benefit, it no longer must be referred to a Medical Panel. Instead, it must be referred to 
Conciliation. The Conciliation Officer may then refer the matter to a Medical Panel. The 1996 
change does not require that the insurer make an offer consistent with the Panel opinion where 
the disputed issue is not a "medical question." However, it seems likely that the insurer will 
still be expected to make such an offer.
Medical Panels and the Future
The unknown is the extent to which Conciliation Officers will refer maims benefit 
disputes to a Medical Panel. The 1996 law changes are likely to lead to some reduction overall 
in claimant disputes over maims. That aside, Conciliators may or may not seek the intervention 
of a Medical Panel. One view is that the 1996 law will lead to some reduction in the proportion 
of claims resolved by the Conciliation Service. Indirectly, this may place some pressure on the 
Service to show a higher rate of resolutions, and referrals to Medical Panels may be utilised as 
a means to achieve a higher success rate. Early indications are that the use of Medical Panels 
will be very limited in maims disputes.
A reduction in the utilisation of the Medical Panels is seen as a highly desirable 
outcome. First, as the demand for Panels is reduced, it can lead to some reduction hi the delays 
that have resulted from excessive demands. Second, it would reduce the problem created by the 
inadequate number of practitioners available in certain specialties. Third, it would reduce the 
need to depend so heavily on some practitioners, which previously created perceptions that the 
quality of Panel members had slipped.
Relieving the pressure on the Medical Panels is regarded as vital. However, there still 
appears to be something of an artificial distinction that exists regarding "medical questions." It 
seems to stretch things to exclude disputes over the existence and extent of maims from the set 
of "medical questions." Few workers' compensation schemes have found a generally accepted 
method of resolving maims disputes. Many of the differences between claimant and insurer 
regarding maims do involve medical matters, if not "medical questions." A rational and 
objective method to resolve these matters must be found.
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A related question is the type of issue on which the Panel may report. Prior to 1996, 
the law required the Panel to provide "an opinion as to (a) the entitlement of the claimant to 
compensation," in Section 104 disputes. It requires little imagination to see that so broad a 
question could have medical specialists reporting on issues that were fundamentally beyond 
their domain. Some parties argued that this had occurred, and that particular language has been 
replaced in 1996. It remains to be seen if Panel members will be made sensitive to the 
somewhat less open-ended responsibilities that they will encounter in maims disputes.
The Common Law
In many jurisdictions, workers' compensation is the "exclusive remedy" that an injured 
worker or dependant has vis-a-vis the employer. In virtually all of the U.S.A. and Canada for 
example, the employer is shielded from common law actions by employees or dependents with 
rights to benefits under workers' compensation. Actions for damages due to negligence can be 
sought by workers not covered under a workers' compensation law, or from parties other than 
the employer. (However, actions against fellow employees, labour unions, insurance carriers, 
government inspectors and some others are also generally not permitted, leaving workers' 
compensation as the exclusive remedy.)
Though access to the common law on behalf of employees against their employers is 
absolutely barred hi many jurisdictions, the Australian experience is more of a continuum with 
such actions barred in South Australia and the Northern Territory; limited access or benefits in 
Victoria, the Commonwealth (Comcare, SeaCare), New South Wales, and Western Australia; 
and unlimited access or benefits in Queensland, Tasmania, and the Australian Capitol 
Territory.
The first worker's compensation law in Victoria (1914) preserved the common law 
rights of employees. An injured worker had the option to claim workers' compensation .or take 
proceedings for damages; the employer would not be liable under both remedies. Due to 
legislative changes and judicial decisions, by 1970 an injured worker was able to claim both 
workers' compensation and common law damages, although an offset of dual benefits was 
applied.
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In 1985, the passage of the Accident Compensation Act spelled out and set certain 
constraints on workers' access to dual benefits or compensation. Essentially, there was to be 
no recovery for damages for pecuniary losses, except in death cases and in certain third party 
proceedings where the employer was not a party. Workers were allowed to seek damages from 
their employer for their pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life due to negligence. In 
1987, the Accident Compensation Act was amended, to place limits on the damages for non- 
pecuniary loss. A ceiling of $140,000 was placed on these damages, and any amount paid for 
maims under worker's compensation was to be deducted from awarded damages.
Common Law Under Section 135B
The legislation creating the WorkCover scheme created a sharply bifurcated approach 
to the common law in the case of work injuries. The law sought to spell out common law 
entitlements for injuries occurring before (Section 135B) and after (Section 135A) 1 December 
1992. Though a grey area exists for some claims in terms of the applicable section of the law, 
there are very significant differences between Section 135A and Section 135B. Under Section 
135A, for injuries arising after 1 December 1992, access to the common law was substantially 
narrowed. Workers had a brief period of time to commence proceedings under the less 
restrictive Section 135B, with any subsequent suits to be covered, if applicable, under Section 
135A. A flood of proceedings was commenced under Section 135B to avoid the possibility of 
being unable to do so under Section 135A.
Initially, workers who wished to claim common law damages for injuries incurred 
before 1 December 1992 were required to file their claims by that date. A grace period of 3 
months was allowed for injuries that occurred in the 3 months prior to 1 December 1992. In 
the last 10 days of WorkCare, approximately 10,000 writs were issued. By February 1993, 
over 18,000 common law writs had been issued. A court decision in December 1993, followed 
by remedial legislation, moved the final date for filing claims for injuries prior to 1 December 
1992 to 30 June 1994.2 Ultimately the VWA was faced with having to run off 22,000 claims.
2See Robart v. Matchplan Pty Ltd., Supreme Court of Victoria - Full Court, 7267 of 1993.
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The Authority has had an enormous task in resolving more than 22,000 common law 
claims for these "old" cases. Yet by July 1996, over 97 percent had been settled. In the 3 
(fiscal) years beginning with 1992/93, WorkCover settled 9,690, 5,046 and 4,974 claims. The 
Authority utilised a number of techniques to resolve this monumental number of common law 
claims, including the use of alternative dispute resolution and the involvement of independent 
expert evaluators.
An interesting measure employed to resolve these claims was one that discouraged 
claimants from forcing some actual court involvement. The law required that common law 
claims under Section 135B (but not Section 135A) be brought to Conciliation, and that the 
court must not hear such proceedings unless the parties had attended a conference at which an 
offer was made, either within 3 months of December 1992 or the commencement of 
proceedings. If the Authority's final offer was not accepted by the worker at the conference, 
the Authority's settlement offer could not be increased. The worker would be required to pay 
both parties' costs unless the amount awarded by judgment exceeded 120 percent of the 
Authority's final offer.
Fewer than 1.5 percent of the writs lodged resulted in a formal court determination. 
The size of the settlements paid averaged $23,000. However, it is likely that the cases that 
remain unsettled may involve not only more intractable issues, they may also involve, on 
average, cases that will settle for amounts greater than that previously established.
Common Law Under Section 135A
Access to common law was generally narrowed by WorkCover legislation, though 
elements of the law did broaden some parts of it. The law was enlarged to give workers access 
to common law for damages to their loss of earning capacity. However, damages could be 
awarded against an employer in such cases only where they exceeded $29,860. Recall that 
proceedings for the loss of wage earning capacity had been permitted in Victoria prior to 1985.
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A cap on such damages was set at $671,960.3 Common law damages for pain and suffering 
also were not to be awarded if damages were assessed at less than $29,860. The ceiling on 
common law awards for pain and suffering remained at the existing level of $184,740, to be 
modified annually by indexation ($333,420 as of 1 July 1996).
The most significant change with WorkCover was the requirement that the injury be 
found to be a "serious injury" in order for the workers to have access to damages under 
common law. The inflow of claims for damages in 1992 and 1993 primarily were from those 
who believed that they would not be found to have a serious injury, thereby being ineligible for 
common law recovery. Under Section 135B, "old" cases had no such "serious injury" barrier.
The legislation, substantially modelled after the Transport Accident Act 1986, defined 
"serious injury" hi several ways. Most attention was focused on a requirement that the injured 
worker be found to be impaired by 30 percent or more, on the basis of an assessment made 
according to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, 2nd edition. Persons familiar with the Guides recognise that a 30 percent 
impairment level or higher represents a very significant impairment. Thus, despite reopening 
access to damages for the loss of earning capacity, it was anticipated that the volume of 
common law cases would drop off substantially from where it had previously been. The 
expectation was that the reduction would occur amongst the claims for relatively minor injuries 
and perhaps nuisance claims as well. Though such claims may not carry large awards or 
settlements, their volume combined with their transactions costs were seen as burdensome.
Essentially, there are four possible mechanisms that will allow a worker to successfully 
seek common law damages. First, if the insurer determines that the worker has sustained an 
impairment of 30 percent or more according to the AMA Guides, the worker has a "serious 
injury." However, the insurer may be satisfied that the worker has a "serious injury," even 
absent the 30 percent determination, under the "narrative" definition of disability. In that case 
the insurer is able to issue a certificate consenting to the bringing of proceedings. This might
^These dollar amounts are subject to annual indexing. As of 1 July 1996, these amounts were $32,860 for 
the threshold and $739,690 for the maximum allowed.
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occur where the insurer believes that the court is quite likely to find "serious injury" and 
chooses to avoid litigating the issue. A third mechanism is where a court gives leave to bring 
proceedings. A final mechanism that enables the worker to bring proceedings follows from 
Section 135A(19) and is described later. Of course, the question of "serious injury" simply 
deals with the issue of access, and not with the need to prove negligence, the amount of 
damages, or the need to prove that the employment was a "substantial contributing factor." 
With WorkCover, the expectation was that the number of common law cases would 
drop off precipitously. However, although a substantial reduction has occurred over what 
would have been the volume in the absence of the 1992 legislation, worker solicitors have 
learned how to widen access to the common law. This, in combination with certain judicial 
determinations, has meant that common law still represents an important component of work 
injury compensation in Victoria.
Procedures and the Expansion of Accessibility
The process that may lead to a common law determination begins, typically, with the 
rating of an injured worker's impairment. The insurer will have the worker sent to a medical 
examiner of its choosing, preferably a specialist in the field relating to the injury. The worker 
is rated based on the AMA Guides, 2nd Edition. As indicated above, the worker is classified as 
being "seriously injured" only if the rating is 30 percent or higher. If the worker is not found 
to be "seriously injured," and no certificate is issued by the insurer consenting to the bringing 
of proceedings, the worker still may apply to court for leave to bring proceedings.
It is important to note that a worker with no certificate consenting to his/her bringing 
proceedings for damages was thought to face two sets of proceedings. First, the worker would 
have to persuade a county court to give leave to bring proceedings for damages and then, if 
this hurdle was overcome, would have to win a separate damages action. This creates an added 
hurdle for the worker, a situation where winning at the initial level of dispute can leave the 
worker with some costs, and it extends the time that the entire process will take. However, it 
does parallel the process found in the Transport Accident Act.
Workers or dependents have 6 years in which to commence an action for personal
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injury or death. For an occupational disease, however, the worker has 6 years from the date 
that the worker becomes aware both of the existence of the disease and that another person is 
responsible for it. Similarly, where a worker dies without knowing they have a cause of action 
the dependant has 6 years from the date that they became aware of the condition and its source 
to commence an action. Courts are able to extend the statutory limits on the issuing of a writ.
Since 1993, the common law procedures have been defined by several important 
judicial determinations. We note here only three that are considered to have had, or will have, 
a major impact on common law cases. In Bowles v. Coles-Myer Ltd. (Bowles Case), J. Ashley 
found that a worker was free to bring proceedings for damages where the insurer had not made 
a determination on the matter of "serious injury" before the issuance of the writ.4 Though the 
defendant asserted that a determination had been made before the writ was issued, J. Ashley 
rejected that and ruled that absent such a determination, the worker was able to proceed to seek 
damages. The consequence of the Bowles Case is to reduce the burden on the plaintiff, by 
eliminating the need for the first trial, where the court finds that the insurer has not made a 
(proper) determination of the existence of "serious injury." The worker is still obliged to 
establish "serious injury" at trial.
Sections 135A(2A)-(2D), which were inserted by the Accident Compensation 
(Amendment) Act 1996, and which were made applicable to any proceedings brought on or 
after 25 June 1996, create a procedure to deal with certain issues raised by Bowles. Subject to 
one exception, a worker may not bring proceedings unless a determination has been made of 
the degree of impairment. If the written application by the worker is received within 104 weeks 
after the injury, the insurer may refuse to make a determination if the condition has not 
stabilized. If the condition is stable, or it is beyond 104 weeks, the insurer has 60 days from 
receipt of the application to make a determination of the degree of impairment. If the insurer 
does not advise the worker in writing of the determination within 60 days, or of its refusal to 
do so within the 104-week window, the worker is entitled to bring proceedings, and have the 
matter of "serious injury" determined in the proceedings.
4Bowles v. Coles-Myer Ltd. (1995) 1 VR 480.
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No doubt, some insurers will find this 60-day clock to be a difficult one to meet in all 
applications. As such, some workers will find themselves with access to the court to have both 
"serious injury" and damages decided in a single trial, due to an insurer's inability to act 
within the time limits imposed.
In the LJ. Hanrahan v. Terrence John Davis (Hanrahan Case), the Court of Appeal of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria found that a determination of "serious injury" under Section 
93B(5) by the insurer satisfied the requirements of Section 135A(3), thereby deeming the 
injury to be a "serious injury" for purposes of the common law action as well.5 Recall that a 
determination is made by the insurer regarding "serious injury" for purposes of setting the 
weekly benefits rate after 26 weeks of incapacity (Section 93B). In the Hanrahan Case, the 
court found that the post-26-week benefit determination which found that the employee had a 
"serious injury" enabled him to satisfy the test of serious injury, and to proceed to seek 
damages against his employer.
The significance of the Hanrahan Case was considerable, as it essentially opened access 
to common law relief for workers who were found to be "seriously injured" by the 26th week 
of incapacity, but whose incapacity would have fallen below the 30 percent threshold 
subsequently, as their healing continued and their condition improved. Section 135A(3A) of 
the Act, inserted by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, seeks to rectify this. It 
provides that a decision by the insurer that the worker has a serious injury for the purposes of 
Section 93B is not to be taken to be a determination for purposes of Section 135 A (common 
law), unless the decision specifically so states.
That change overturns the Hanrahan result, and is deemed to have commenced on 1 
December 1992; however it does not eliminate it for any proceedings commenced and 
determined before 16 May 1996. Much as the enactment of WorkCover triggered a flood of 
actions brought for damages, a smaller but considerable number of claims for damages have 
been initiated in cases where workers were determined to be "seriously injured" at 26 weeks,
5L.y. Hanrahan v. Terrence John Davis, Supreme Court of Victoria, No. 5312 of 1995.
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but did not or would not have been found to be "seriously injured" subsequently under Section 
135A.
It is too early to judge how effectively Section 135A(3A) will serve to limit common 
law actions. The response by injured workers and their solicitors suggests that Hanrahan is no 
longer of importance, at least once these new claims are run off. Yet it remains that a finding 
of "serious injury" at 26 weeks may serve to influence a court in deciding the presence or 
absence of "serious injury" for purposes of a Section 135A determination. Thus, a worker's 
solicitor can be expected to ask how a worker is not "seriously injured" currently when the 
insurer itself found the worker's injury to be "serious" previously.
The third case, actually a set of cases, stem from the discussion above regarding the 
mechanism that can be employed by an injured worker to seek damages. Specifically, Section 
135A(19) provides a definition whose impact is still not fully understood:
In this section, serious injury means
(a) serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function; or
(b) permanent serious disfigurement; or
(c) severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioural disturbance or disorder; 
or
(d) loss of a foetus.
This section of the law, combined with Section 135A(4)(b), which says "a court, on the 
application of the worker, gives leave to bring the proceedings," poses the greatest opportunity 
to expand access to the common law remedy for workers with less than a 30 percent level of 
impairment. A critical decision hi this regard is drawn from an attempt to seek damages under 
the Transport Accident Act 1986, whose wording and application very closely parallel the 
(amended) Accident Compensation Act of 1985. In that case, the court found that the plaintiff 
could bring proceedings without consideration of the 30 percent AMA Guides threshold.6
The court found that the preponderance of medical evidence established that there was 
an aggravation of a pre-existing back condition, which constituted "... a serious long-term 
impairment of a body function—the function of the spine." Practically, persons familiar with
'Petkovski v. Galetti, 1994 I VR 426.
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workers' compensation matters recognise the widespread, frequent character of claims for back 
injuries, with or without the complication of a pre-existing condition. In Petkovski v. Galetti, 
the court allowed the claimant to seek common law damages as it found:
The unassailed evidence established that before the accident the applicant 
was able to work full-time and effectively, albeit interrupted in occasions by 
back problems. While the evidence of economic loss is skimpy, to say the least, 
and the evidence is imprecise as to the normal working hours, it safely can be 
inferred that they must have totalled significantly more than 30 per week; the 
accident has effectively reduced them to 20. We accept as correct the submission 
... that such an interference with working capacity may fairly be regarded as a 
"serious consequence" for the applicant... (at 444)
In the Nichols Case, the plaintiff sought leave of the county court pursuant to Section 
135A(4)(b) to issue proceedings for recovery of damages in a workplace injury.7 Judge Ravech 
found in favour of the plaintiff, Nichols, allowing him to move to the next stage in his quest 
for damages. The judge did so for several reasons. One doctor reported that the plaintiff s 
injury and subsequent pain contributed to his depression. He accepted the doctor's explanation 
that a person with an injury who is also depressed is likely to have difficulty in obtaining 
employment. Judge Ravech noted other cases where "serious injury" was found based on 
disablement from work or interference with the enjoyment of life. Because the plaintiff 
appeared headed both for "difficulty" in obtaining future employment and to future periods of 
unemployment, and due to his loss of enjoyment of life "serious injury" was found.
What Petkovski, Nichols, and other comparable decisions have done is to find "serious 
injury" on the basis of disability and not impairment. As such, decisions of this sort create an 
enormous opportunity for injured workers to access the common law remedy, despite then* 
inability to meet the 30 percent impairment threshold in the statute. In fact, decisions of this 
kind could move access back to where it was before 1 December 1992. However, today there 
is also an entitlement to damages for pecuniary loss, which did not exist immediately prior to 
enactment of WorkCover.
Petkovski, Nichols, and related cases do not represent a matter that is unique to
1 Glen Alexander Nichols v. Victorian WorkCover Authority etal. No. MC 9409103.
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Victoria. In a number of jurisdictions in and outside of Australia, legislation has tended to 
move compensation of injured workers with permanent disabilities from one basis to another. 
Specifically, with a view toward eliminating subjective evaluations of present and future 
disability—primarily an assessment of the vague concept of the loss of future earning 
capacity— laws have been changed to shift to a more uniform basis (assessing the degree of 
medical impairment only). However, compensation agencies and/or courts have been difficult 
to wean from the disability standard. Victoria sought to move to the impairment basis in 1992, 
at least for purposes of limiting access to the common law. Clearly, if that was the intent, it 
has not been entirely successful.
Yet another assault on the "serious injury" standard found in Section 135A arises from 
the 30 percent threshold itself. A widely held perception is that the threshold is not as difficult 
to reach or overcome as was envisioned in 1992. Specifically, workers with injuries may be 
able to reach or surpass the 30 percent barrier because of the combined effects of the 
workplace injury and any psychological sequelae of the accident, the injury and/or the pain that 
results. This practice was legislatively prohibited in the December 1996 amendments to the 
Act. Unlike many injuries, considerable subjectivity is involved in assessing the degree of 
psychological impairment.
Damages
The damages under common law are described in Chapter 5 on benefits, and the floor 
and ceilings have been noted earlier. It needs to be observed that the potential damages are 
related to the probability of attempting to secure them. For example, any benefits paid to a 
worker under Section 98 or 98A (maims or for pain and suffering) are deducted from damages 
awarded, respectively, for pecuniary loss or for pain and suffering. As such, the greater the 
payment under either of these provisions, the lower the net expected value of an action for 
damages. It is alleged that the parties game the scheme accordingly. Insurers may pay higher 
levels of benefits under Section 98 and/or Section 98A to reduce the likelihood of common law 
actions. Workers and their solicitors will not turn down these higher payments, and they avoid
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the protracted and more challenging characteristics of a suit for damages. The Authority does 
not condone this practice.
Yet another practical consideration works precisely against such a practice. Insurers are 
under some pressure from employers to minimise the costs of any injuries their employees 
sustain, due to experience rating. Because expenditures not made within 3 years of the injury 
are not considered in setting the employer's experience modifier, the employer has a direct 
incentive to have the insurer delay payments until the three-year window has been closed. As 
such, were a Section 98 or Section 98A benefit to fall within the three-year period, and a 
common law action result in damages that fall outside the three-year period, an incentive exists 
not to bulk up the workers' compensation benefit so as to preclude having a subsequent action 
for damages.
Any contributory negligence by the worker can proportionately reduce the amount of 
damages paid. Because of the no-fault character of workers' compensation, contributory 
negligence plays no role in benefits awarded there. Contributory negligence is considered by 
the defence in proceedings, but it is said to be a difficult matter to win. Among other things the 
employer owes a duty to care to all its employees. It is the employer that has the duty both to 
instruct and to supervise the performance of the work. Consequently, contributory negligence 
need not be found, even where the worker's conduct has caused or aggravated the injury. 
Nevertheless, where contributory negligence may be a significant factor, it will reduce the 
probability of a suit.
The Future
A critical question for workers' compensation, in terms both of its recent experience 
and its future, relates to the future of common law actions. Clearly, a goal since 1992 has been 
to bring down the volume of such actions. Setting aside the run-off of the 20,000 claims for 
injuries under WorkCare, there has been a decline in such cases. However, there are mixed 
views as to the importance of that observation. Some solicitors appear to believe that it is not 
productive to rush to common law. Instead, they argue, the passage of time usually enriches a 
claim for damages. According to this, there are cases where, currently, writs could be issued
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or leave sought to proceed to doing so. Instead, the cases have not emerged and are being held 
back to maximise their value.
One basis for assessing the degree to which a potential exists for future actions for 
damages is the number of cases where "serious injury" has been found by the insurer. Of 
course, some of these will not result in proceedings since no basis for employer negligence 
may exist. More importantly, the erosion of the "serious injury" barrier has already been 
noted, and the potential number of damages actions may be much larger than the number of 
previously determined "serious injured" workers. However, as of 30 June 1996, the Authority 
reported that there were 3,277 claimants who had been found to be "seriously injured." As of 
August 1996, the Authority believes that 1,423 common law matters have been lodged under 
the WorkCover law. Some of these are obviously based on the legislative response to the 
Hanrahan decision, discussed above.
The Conciliation Service
In many jurisdictions outside of Australia, particularly in North America, there is a 
general pattern or approach to dispute resolution in workers' compensation cases. While 
specifics differ from one system to another, a common formula places decision making for 
dispute resolution in the hands of the workers' compensation agency. This is true even when 
there is no allowance of private insurance (or even self-insurance), and the government 
insurance fund may reside within the same agency that adjudicates disputes. Frequently, also, a 
more or less autonomous appeals board or tribunal will take appeals of decisions reached by 
the workers' compensation agency. Though all such approaches may permit appeals of the 
decisions of such bodies to be taken to court, it is common to limit such appeals solely to 
matters of law and not to disputes over facts. In some jurisdictions, access to the courts is 
strictly limited to those matters and workers' compensation disputes rarely are decided at that 
level.
Quite at odds with this approach is the model found in Victoria, and most of the other 
jurisdictions in Australia. Under WorkCover, the Authority does not adjudicate disputes over 
eligibility for, or the extent of, compensation benefits. Essentially, disputes related to these
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issues have traditionally been decided by tribunals in Victoria. Resorting to the courts to decide 
such issues can burden the parties with significant transaction costs, it will likely create 
important delays in their arriving at some resolution, and it can lead to backlog problems for 
the courts which are already coping with large caseloads from other fields.
As a way to hasten the resolution of disputes over claims, and to avoid throwing all of 
them into a court-centred process, the WorkCover legislation created the Conciliation Service. 
The purpose of the Conciliation Service, essentially, is to help the parties to resolve their 
disputes, thereby eliminating the need to take the next step, that is, to litigate the matter at 
court. It functions by involving workers, employers and insurers hi an informal and non- 
adversarial process that aims to lead to a mutually acceptable agreement. The Ministerial 
Guidelines for the Conciliation Officers identify the following goals of the Conciliation 
Officer:
assist the parties to achieve durable resolutions and agreements, where possible; 
be even handed and fair, and address matters on their merits; 
maximise flexibility and informality; 
facilitate return-to-work opportunities; 
enhance on-going worker/employer employment relationship; 
be prompt and timely in the conduct of the conciliation process and in dealings 
with the parties;
• reduce cost implications for the parties and the scheme and ensure that matters do 
not unnecessarily proceed to the courts.
Procedures
From 1 July 1994, all disputes over compensability or benefits must be referred to 
Conciliation, except those over death claims (Section 92), for maims (Section 98), and for pain 
and suffering (Section 98A). Beginning in July 1996, however, disputes over maims and pain 
and suffering also require mandatory conciliation.
Most requests for conciliation are initiated by workers who have been advised by the 
insurer of a decision that is regarded as adverse to them. However, any party to a dispute, i.e., 
the insurer, the employer, the worker, or the Authority, may refer the matter to Conciliation. 
A party has 60 days from notice by the insurer of its decision to lodge a request for
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conciliation. The Senior Conciliation Officer may allow this 60-day limit to be waived. Indeed 
this is usually done when such a request is made, for to insist that the request fall within the 60 
days may result in the applicant seeking relief from a court.
When a "Request for Conciliation" form is submitted, a referral certificate is issued 
within 7 days, putting all parties on notice. On occasion, this will be sufficient to cause the 
disputing parties to agree to settle, particularly where such cases may involve not a dispute so 
much as the need for clarification or a better explanation of a decision. After the initial 7 days 
have passed, a date is set for a conciliation conference. The worker and the employer (if it is 
the first time that the employer is to attend such a conference) are each sent a video (in four 
languages) and a brochure (available in multiple languages) describing what such a conference 
entails. This step was taken to allay any apprehension that participants might have in advance 
of the conference and to allow them to better prepare for it. Additionally, the worker is advised 
that a translator can be made available to assist the worker at the conference.
The Act requires that the parties produce any document or information that the 
Conciliation Officer considers necessary to resolve the dispute. The insurer is required to 
submit any information or medical reports to the Conciliation Service within 48 hours of 
receipt of notice that a Request for Conciliation has been lodged. The Conciliation Officer may 
attempt to have the dispute resolved even prior to the conference, if sufficient information has 
been made available and a settlement seems possible.
The Conciliation Conference will bring together the insurer, the worker, and frequently 
the employer. The worker and the employer are entitled to be accompanied by a friend or 
relative or some other person to assist them at the conference. Union representatives, for 
example, often serve as an assistant for the worker. Significantly, a worker or an employer is 
not entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor. If a party wishes to have their solicitor present, 
approval must be given by both the contending party and the Conciliation Officer. On 
occasions requests by workers to have a solicitor accompany them to a conference have been 
rejected. However, such requests can and have been granted, particularly where it seems clear 
that the opportunity to reach a settlement is greater where the worker has ready access to 
counsel.
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If a solicitor does join the worker at a Conciliation Conference his/her fee cannot be 
paid by the contending party. Since costs are not allowed as part of the conciliation process, 
either the worker must pay the solicitor, or the solicitor must offer to serve without pay. Some 
solicitors say that they charge no fee for Conciliation work where the client is a member of 
certain labour unions.
The Conciliation Conference may enable the parties to move to an agreement. In some 
cases, the agreement is shaped at the conference. In other instances, negotiations between the 
parties may occur after the conference has occurred, possibly prior to a previously scheduled 
second or subsequent conference. If the dispute involves a medical question, the Conciliation 
Officer may refer it to a Medical Panel. The opinion of the Medical Panel must be accepted by 
the parties as conclusive. However, the courts have not enforced this provision, and 
settlements are made frequently following receipt of the opinion by negotiation between the 
parties.
On some occasions, the parties are able to reach some understandings, but are unable to 
arrive at an actual agreement. In such cases, the Conciliation Officer is able to make 
recommendations regarding how the dispute may be resolved. The parties are not obligated to 
accept the recommendations; instead, the Conciliator is simply extending his/her role as a 
facilitator.
The Conciliator may be placed in the position of a decision maker. Where the dispute 
relates to weekly compensation benefits and no agreement is reached, the Conciliator may 
"direct" that payments be made or continue to be made. The Conciliator may only issue 
directions where he/she finds that no genuine dispute exists. If there is a decision that a 
genuine dispute exists, the matter of any past and future payments is left to the parties, either 
to settle or to proceed to court. Directions can be revoked by a Conciliation Officer or the 
County Court.
The Conciliation Officer may direct payment of weekly payments for the period prior to 
the direction, but that period must not exceed 10 weeks. The Conciliation Officer is authorised 
to direct that future weekly benefits be paid for a period not to exceed 12 weeks. After the 12 
weeks have passed, the Conciliation Officer may direct that up to 12 more weeks of payments
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be made, though this is not permissible where the earlier direction was revoked by the County 
Court.
Clearly, it is tricky matter for a Conciliator to fulfill the task of a facilitator while 
retaining the potential role of a decision maker. However, this represents an accommodation to 
the reality that no other decision-maker is present in the process, and the worker may be forced 
to wait for the outcome of a court proceeding before receiving any weekly compensation 
benefits. The accommodation here is tempered by the inability to direct that weekly benefits be 
paid where a genuine dispute is perceived to exist. If a direction that weekly benefits be paid 
has been issued, the worker is not required to refund those payments if the County Court 
determines that the insurer was/is not liable to pay those benefits. However, if the claim was 
wholly or partly fraudulent or made without proper justification, the Court may order that 
repayment be made.
The Conciliation Officer
Conciliation Officers are appointed by the Minister of Finance and engaged by the 
Authority. One of the Officers is appointed as the Senior Conciliation Officer, with 
responsibility for the administration of the Service. A Conciliation Officer is not subject either 
to the control or to the direction of the Authority. The Authority is not able to overrule any 
decision made by the Officer in conciliating a dispute. As of June 1996, there are 21 mil-time 
Conciliation Officers, nine sessional and part-time Officers plus three executives of the Service 
who carry small caseloads as Conciliation Officers as well. The total staff is 62 persons on a 
full-time equivalent basis.
There is no single preferred background for a Conciliation Officer as evidenced by the 
broad range found in existing Officers. Clearly, strong interpersonal skills, good judgment, an 
ability to listen carefully, a sense of fairness and the ability to appear fair, an understanding of 
the law and skills in organising one's workload, all appear to be important characteristics.
The Conciliation Officers are organised into three teams. Once a claim is successfully 
lodged with the Service, it is randomly assigned to a team. An exception to that exists where a 
team has responsibility for the country district, with that assignment rotated among the teams
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every 9 to 12 months. Once a case is assigned to a team, it is referred on a random basis to one 
of the Conciliation Officers. In 1996, some Officers had 80 to 90 cases assigned to them, and 
that is viewed as an excessive caseload.
The Experience of the Conciliation Service
The responsibilities of the Service have evolved considerably in the 4 years of its 
existence. Eligibility for weekly benefits was terminated for some persons who had been 
recipients under the WorkCare scheme for 52 weeks or more at the time that WorkCover was 
enacted. Among those persons considered not to be "seriously injured" or totally and 
permanently incapacitated, benefits were terminated after the worker had been incapacitated for 
104 weeks, including any period prior to commencement of the WorkCover Act. Additionally, 
weekly benefits for other recipients who were considered not "seriously injured*' and not 
totally and permanently incapacitated were terminated 52 weeks after the commencement of the 
Act. These cases represented a sizable portion of the Conciliation Service's caseload in its first 
year.
In addition, from 1 December 1992 to 30 June 1993 a total of 12,814 conferences were 
concluded and 9,728 cases were settled under Section 135B. However, these were handled as a 
transitional situation at the VWA, separate from the emerging Conciliation Service. A team of 
transitional conciliators was also engaged in the clearing out of cases that had been filed at the 
Accident Compensation Tribunal (eliminated by the WorkCover Act), but where the Tribunal 
either had not commenced to hear the matter or had commenced to hear the matter but had not 
completed the hearing or determined the matter. These transitional cases were to proceed to the 
County Court but only after a conciliation conference had been held on the dispute. (Section 
42) Approximately 3,600 matters were affected by this requirement, providing considerable 
activity for conciliators through much of 1993.
Mandatory conciliation, except for disputes over Section 92, Section 98, and Section 
98A, expanded the Service's responsibilities beginning in July 1994. As of July 1996, all 
disputes over maims (Section 98) and over pain and suffering (Section 98A) must be referred 
to the Service before commencing proceedings.
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One must conclude that the first several years of conciliation under WorkCover have 
witnessed highly uneven flows of cases. Such shifts can create difficulties in terms of planning 
training, and possible backlogs or excess capacity for the Conciliation Service. In fact, the 
start-up period for the Service was a difficult one, with large numbers of claims heaped onto a 
new organisation that was still taking shape. The results were large backlogs and delays. The 
Service has overcome these and now is operating with good timeliness and no large backlog. 
However, the requirement that Section 98 and Section 98A disputes must be brought to 
Conciliation before proceeding to court could have some impact on the balance that had been 
successfully achieved by mid 1996.
The data hi Table 6.6 reflect the number of applications for and disposals of cases by 
the Conciliation Service. It shows the large difference between applications and disposals that 
was created in 1992/93 but that was eliminated, largely, by the end of 1993/94 and fully 
disposed of by the end of 1994/95. By the end of June 1996, there were 2,671 cases 
outstanding, slightly below the number of new applications (2,568) plus reopened cases (182) 
for May and June 1996, i.e., a 60-day backlog.
It must be noted that the number of applications and the number of disposals are less 
than complete indicators of the Conciliation Service's activity. First, not all applications result 
in a conference. A dispute may be resolved or dropped prior to the holding of a conference, 
for example. In 1-2 percent of applications, the Conciliation Service finds that it does not have 
jurisdiction. A small percentage of cases represent reopenings of cases.
Additionally, there is a sizable number of disputes involving maims and pain and 
suffering that are being resolved in "facilitated discussions." In such disputes, a worker 
solicitor may meet with insurers and a Conciliation Officer to settle a batch of that solicitor's 
unresolved lump sum claims. The solicitor meets with each insurer separately, perhaps 
spending an entire morning seeking to settle a score or more of unresolved cases. 
Subsequently, the solicitor will contact the injured workers advising them of the offer that the 
insurer has made. In most instances, the worker will, upon the solicitor's recommendation, 
accept the offer. These facilitated discussions permit large numbers of maims cases to settle 
without the need to directly involve the courts.
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From December 1992 through June 1995, 5,799 (or 19 percent) of 30,972 applications 
to the Conciliation Service were for maims disputes. In 1995/96, 4,670 applications (or 31 
percent) involved maims disputes out of 14,968 applications for all causes. Beginning in mid 
1995, a dispute over a maims claim could be referred to conciliation by a worker concurrently 
with, or as an alternative to, a referral to a Medical Panel, or an insurer could refer a Section 
98 case to Conciliation where a worker rejected an insurer offer. (This change resulted from 
the large backlogs at the Medical Panels.) Other major sources of dispute that result in 
applications (as shown in Table 6.7) are rejections of claims by insurers, terminations of 
benefits, insurer reductions of benefit payments, and medical issues, e.g., services for which 
the insurer will not pay.
An Assessment
The workers' compensation community has provided us with mixed reviews on the 
performance of the Conciliation Service. Initially, at least, the Service appears to have been 
overwhelmed by the number of cases that it received, a particularly difficult situation for an 
agency that was entirely new. The agency had to deal with hostility from some solicitors who 
charged that the service was actually an operating arm of the Authority. Solicitors were not 
pleased with their inability to have their fees paid by costs from insurers for their work at this 
level. The changing responsibilities of the Conciliation Service over the past 4 years have 
added to the challenge that the agency has had to meet, and it is clear that the overall caseload 
that the Service has encountered has been imposing.
It seems quite remarkable that this agency now operates with virtually no backlog and 
that it can accommodate, generally, the rigorous requirement that applications be conferenced 
within 28 days of their receipt. In its first 2 years between 80 and 85 percent of its cases 
(excluding applications where conciliation did not proceed or there was no jurisdiction) were 
resolved, dropping to 65 percent in 1994-95 and 67 percent in 1995/96. This is an impressive 
performance.
The legislation requires that matters may not proceed to court (except fatality claims) 
unless first referred to Conciliation. All matters, other than maims cases, can proceed to court
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if not resolved within 28 days of being lodged with the Conciliation Service. Most solicitors 
are willing to allow matters to proceed beyond the 28 days before issuing proceedings, so long 
as they see some progress with the conciliation. However, some solicitors will delay providing 
information after the Request for Conciliation has been submitted, so that resolution cannot be 
effected within the 28-day period. As that period expires they will issue proceedings. To 
prevent such efforts to evade the process, the 1996 amendments require that the Conciliation 
Officer certify that the claimant has made a reasonable attempt to settle in disputes over mains.
It is difficult to assess the quality of a Conciliation Service on purely quantitative bases. 
Where the agency does deal expeditiously with its cases, and where a sizable proportion of 
them resolve without resort to the Courts, the agency clearly is providing an acceptable level 
of service. As to its inputs, the Service appears to have an excellent information system to 
serve its staff and executives, it has demonstrated its recognition of the importance of staff 
development, and it has been allowed to adjust the number of its Conciliators as needed. The 
agency also has demonstrated a degree of introspectiveness and a willingness to modify its 
practices when they have appeared to be in need of change.
Surveys of workers, insurers, and employers were conducted in November 1994 and 
June 1995 by an independent market research firm. It found that 86 percent of conference 
attendees were satisfied with the Service (June 1995, compared with 80 percent in November 
1994). About 80 percent were satisfied with the skills of the Conciliation Officer. These rates 
are very impressive, particularly as they emerge from participants who are engaged in 
controversy, and where zero-sum outcomes, or simply no outcomes except further litigation, 
are often the result at this level.
Some criticism about the process, but not of the Service itself, seems to surface 
regularly. First, some disputes appear to result from an insurer's reluctance to engender the 
wrath of their insureds. Thus, the insurer makes a decision that is highly likely to generate a 
dispute in order for the Conciliation Service to be identified as the source of an outcome that 
the employer resists. The insurer knows what the outcome will be, but deflects away from 
itself the anticipated employer dissatisfaction. This practice is certainly familiar from other 
jurisdictions. Its incidence is difficult to measure and, hence, to compare. Because of the
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unusual nature of the relationship between insurers and employers, the problem may be 
somewhat greater in Victoria than in most jurisdictions.
A second criticism is that the parties, and in particular the insurer, may attend 
Conciliation conferences unprepared and/or unable to commit to a settlement. These 
observations also appear to be universal in workers' compensation dispute resolution. It might 
be possible for the Conciliation Officer to report instances of this sort to the Authority, which 
in turn, could bring some greater pressure to bear on the authorised insurers. Such a role, 
however, might put the Conciliator into an evaluative role, undermining her/his primary 
responsibility to conciliate and to mediate the dispute.
The Future
Beginning in July 1996, disputes over permanent impairment must be referred to 
Conciliation. These cases may not proceed to court until a Conciliator certifies that the 
claimant has made a reasonable attempt to conciliate the matter. All medical evidence which 
any party relies upon must be exchanged either at the time the claim is made or by the 
conciliation stage. The claimant will not be able to commence court proceedings unless the 
Conciliation Officer is satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken by the claimant to 
settle the dispute. The certificate must identify copies of medical information provided by one 
party to the other, as well as any information obtained by the Conciliation Officer (including 
the opinion of a Medical Panel). It seems clear the 1996 amendments will enhance the power 
of the Conciliator. Whether it does so at the expense of the Officer's role as a mediator, or 
serves to strengthen it, remains to be seen.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Certain categories of disputes may involve the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), 
a body with a broad range of dispute resolution responsibilities that extends well beyond 
workers' compensation matters. Indeed, only one of this Tribunal's judges hears all, or nearly 
all, disputes arising out of the workers' compensation arena.
One set of disputes under workers' compensation arises from the transition to the
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Accident Compensation Act of 1985. Prior to the law's effective date, 1 September 1985, 
private insurers sold coverage to Victoria employers for workers' compensation. Subsequently 
insurance was provided by the state's Accident Compensation Commission (ACC). Not 
surprisingly, disputes arose over whether injury claims were the financial responsibility of the 
private insurers (old cases) or whether the state fund was to pay (new cases). A "Division 6" 
was created at the ACC to assure that private insurers did not succeed in shifting the burden of 
benefit payments from themselves. Disputes over this issue have largely been eliminated due to 
the passage of time, though a sizable number were adjudicated at the Tribunal in 1992 and 
1993. (Table 6.8)
A second set of disputes that have dimmed because of the passage of time are referred 
to as Section 120 cases. Though private insurance for workers' compensation was ended with 
the Accident Compensation Act of 1985, some private insurance carriers served as the 
Accident Compensation Commission's "agents" to provide a variety of claims services for 
employers. Disputes have arisen over whether or not these agents acted in the best interest of 
the employers that they were paid to service. At stake is the experience modification factor that 
an employer carries. Where an employer could demonstrate that its agent failed to serve its 
interest appropriately, the employer's costs of insurance could be adjusted downwards. Section 
120 has been repealed but a sunset provision has caused some claims to continue to be brought 
to the Tribunal for adjudication, though none were brought from 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1996.
A third set of disputes arises from employer appeals arising from their insurance rates 
and classification for rate setting purposes. The decision of the Tribunal in such disputes 
cannot be overturned in court except over matters of law. The overall number of such cases is 
small, at about 3 percent of total referrals.
The largest number of issues that have come to the AAT relate to disputes over bills 
and appropriate services provided for medical and like services and occupational rehabilitation 
services. A dispute over such an issue will not cause a review from the AAT unless the matter 
has first been referred to Conciliation. Only 28 days after it has been referred to Conciliation, 
or a certificate has been issued by a Conciliation Officer, can the matter be referred to the 
Tribunal. Where one of its decisions is appealed to the AAT, the WorkCover Authority is
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required to reconsider its decision within 28 days of its receipt of an application for review by 
the Tribunal.
Where the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, it may refer a medical question to a Medical 
Panel. If a party to the proceeding requests, the Tribunal must refer the question to a Medical 
Panel. The opinion of the Panel is binding upon the Tribunal.
Disputes over medical bills and services need not go to the AAT. In some instances, if 
both parties consent, the dispute can be taken to Magistrates' Court or County Court. 
Bifurcating disputes can result in some multi-issue disputes being adjudicated separately, both 
in a court and at the Tribunal.
In the past 2 years, the numbers of applications to the Tribunal have fallen off sharply, 
primarily due to a decline in Division 6 and Section 120 (employer aggrieved by agents) cases. 
It seems likely that the AAT's role in workers' compensation cases will be reviewed for 
purposes of determinhig the desirability of eliminating its responsibilities in this domain.
The Courts
With only a few exceptions, the Courts (Magistrates' and County) of Victoria are 
empowered to determine any matter or question under the Workers' Compensation Act 1958 or 
the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (as amended). The Magistrates' Court cannot hear cases 
arising from Section 92 (death claims) and it is limited to matters and directions concerning 
sums not to exceed $40,000 or 104 weeks of weekly benefits. These two threshold values had 
been $25,000 and 52 weeks respectively, prior to enactment of the 1996 amendments. In so 
doing, the Government sought to move more cases into the Magistrates' Court that otherwise 
would have been commenced in County Court. It also aimed at reducing the number of 
disputes, overall, that were taken to the courts. This issue is described further below.
A number of exceptions exist to the generalization that the dispute resolution process 
ends with the Courts. Matters relating to contributions and to the collection and recovery of 
levies are adjudicated at the final stage by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Similarly, the 
determination of the AAT is not subject to County Court review on disputes over Sections 99, 
99A, and 99B, that is, compensation for medical, hospital and like services, the amounts that
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the Authority or insurer may pay for occupational rehabilitation, or the rates applicable for 
occupational rehabilitation. An exception to this is found in Section 43, which enables the 
County Court to inquire into, hear and determine any matter arising out of these areas if it is 
related to another matter that is before the Court and arises from workers' compensation.
Except for claims for death benefits, proceedings must not commence in Magistrates' or 
County Courts unless the matter has been referred to Conciliation, and either 28 days have 
expired since the date of referral or a Conciliation Officer has issued a certificate indicating 
that all action in respect of Conciliation has been taken. Prior to the changes brought about the 
by the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996, disputes involving Section 98 or 98A 
claims, maims and pain and suffering, could commence proceedings without the need to go 
through Conciliation. Instead, beginning in 1995, a worker who was dissatisfied with an 
insurer's offer under either section was obligated to use either Conciliation or a Medical Panel 
before seeking a remedy at Court.
Procedures
In proceedings relating to workers' compensation, the County Court is not bound by the 
rules or practice as to evidence. Evidence given in such cases must not be used in another civil 
or criminal proceedings, except for issues of fraud, perjury or making false statement. The 
Court may refer a medical question to a Medical Panel. If a party to the proceeding so 
requests, a medical question must be referred to a Medical Panel. In either case, the Court is 
bound to adopt the Panel's opinion, except where there is evidence that the worker's condition 
has changed or new information has emerged since the opinion was rendered.
Medical reports that arise from a medical examination are admissible in evidence, and 
the author(s) may be required to attend the proceeding and be cross-examined on the report. By 
contrast, however, though a member of a Medical Panel is competent to give evidence in the 
proceeding, a Panel member may not be compelled to give any evidence.
In many workers' compensation cases disputes over medical questions and related 
matters arise. Several experienced practitioners pointed out that the Courts tend to be 
especially responsive to the opinions of the treating doctor, much more so than the medico-
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legal experts that may give evidence that points to a contrary outcome. At issue here are 
matters that are evident in many other workers' compensation jurisdictions, essentially the 
competence and integrity of the opinions of certain members of the medical/health care 
community. Specifically, where a medical person is frequently called upon by the same side in 
compensation disputes, their opinions may be discounted on the grounds that they approach 
their work with preconceived views or biases. The most curious aspect of this phenomenon is 
that they continue to be called upon by one side, though their views are given less weight by 
the determiner of facts.
A party to proceedings before the County Court may appeal a decision to the Court of 
Appeal/Supreme Court on a question of law. That party has 21 days from the date of the 
determination to serve notice of their intent to appeal. The appeal application must be lodged 
within 6 months of either the determination being appealed or the leave obtained to appeal by 
the Supreme Court. The County Courts' determination is not stayed by the filing of a notice of 
an intent to appeal or the lodging of the appeal. However, if a County Court's determination to 
pay compensation benefits, other than weekly benefits, is appealed, it will allow payment to be 
postponed, depending upon the progress of and the outcome of the appeal.
The law spells out the basis of allocating costs in proceedings. Where a party (other 
than the Authority or insurer) has brought proceedings, the Court must award costs, including 
costs directly related to conciliation, against the party who lost the judgment or decision. The 
Court may include an order to award costs to the representative of a worker who has succeeded 
in a decision.
In proceedings regarding maims (Section 98) and pain and suffering (Section 98A), 
where the judgment for payment of compensation by the Court is equal to or less that the final 
offer made by the insurer (Section 98B), the Court must order that the worker pay the insurer's 
costs, and it must not order that the insurer pay the costs of the worker. Where the insurer's 
final offer (Section 98) is less than the amount ordered by the Court, the County Court must 
order that the insurer pay the worker's costs.
The County and Magistrates' Courts and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal each 
have their own scale of costs. The scale is higher in the County Court than in the Magistrates'
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Court, in part because the latter is regarded as less formal and requiring less preparation on the 
part of solicitors. Claims are heard more quickly in the Magistrates' Court, yet the difference 
in scales provides an incentive for solicitors to prefer the County Court. Some solicitors argue 
that the County Courts tend to be more familiar with the Accident Compensation Act and to 
approach these disputes with more sophistication.
The Future
The Authority prefers that more matters that do go to proceedings be moved to 
Magistrates' Court. In so doing, disputes are resolved more promptly, costs are lower, and 
there is less incentive for workers' solicitors to go to court. As such, the law has been written 
so as to discourage substantial utilisation of the County Court. In 1993, a provision was added 
to the Act that required that costs be awarded to the worker or claimant according to the 
Magistrates' scale (lower), if the worker or claimant brought the proceeding in the County 
Court and the decision or judgment could have been made by the Magistrates' Court.
In 1996, the effort to limit the incentive to use the County Court was strengthened. 
First, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court was expanded by raising both the amount of 
money (from $25,000 to $40,000) and the number of weeks of benefits (from 52 to 104 weeks) 
it could award. Additionally, if a settlement or a compromise "is made in respect of 
proceedings in the County Court" and the outcome could have been achieved by the judgment 
or decision made in Magistrates' Court, then the agreement cannot provide for costs to be paid 
by the insurer that exceed the amount that could have been awarded by the scales of costs from 
the Magistrates' Court.
Any limits on costs awarded to the worker or claimant may be expected to reduce the 
demand for litigation, primarily at the County Court level. However, the claimant's solicitor is 
largely free to enter into an agreement with the claimant for a fee that will be greater than costs 
payable by the insurer. Thus, the disincentives to litigate at the County Court, and at any level 
could be partly mitigated as the privately set fee structure between worker and solicitor is 
modified.
An exception to this laissez-faire approach, however, emerged hi the Accident
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Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996. Its impact could be highly significant, depending upon 
how it will be applied. Specifically, this new section (Section 50A) provides that the County 
Court may order that the legal practitioner be disallowed any costs from the client, and that the 
legal practitioner pay the costs of other parties where a proceeding has commenced under the 
following circumstances: (1) it was brought without reasonable cause, (2) the matter could 
have been brought to Magistrates' Court, or (3) costs were incurred improperly or wasted due 
to undue delay, negligence, misconduct or default.
Section 50A can be considered as a continuation of the battle to reduce litigation and its 
costs by the Government. Along with the other amendments noted above, it will certainly 
cause a shift of disputes out of the County Court. It will reduce the incidence of disputes that 
are resolved "on the Court House steps," i.e., where the parties have little or no intent to 
actually engage in trial, but simply use the threat of doing so to raise the settlement value of 
cases. In large measure, the effectiveness of the Accident Compensation (Amendment) Act 1996 
will depend upon the attitude of the County Court judges. If they view the County Court as the 
appropriate venue to decide disputes hi workers' compensation disputes, even relatively minor 
disputes, the impact of the law changes could be minimised.
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Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because of rounding.
See also other tables (6.3, 6.7, 6.8)
6-36
Table 6.2 Medical Panel Referrals by Section of the Act
Section of Act
98, 98A, 104 (Maims)
111/111A

























































































































































































































Table 6.7 Conciliation Service Lodgements by Type of Case, 
1 December 1992 to 30 June 1996
Type of Case
Rejection of Claim
Terminations (104 weeks and 52 weeks)
Terminations of Weekly Benefits
Alterations of Rate of Compensation
Reductions of Rate of Compensation
Maims
























See also other tables (6.1, 6.3, 6.8)
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Table 6.8 Accident Compensation Tribunal Files, and Other Applications Referred to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 1 December 1992 to 30 June 1996
Issue
Contribution - Division 6
S.I 20 Employer Aggrieved
Levy

























See also other tables (6.1, 6.3, 6.7)
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Chapter 7 
OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION IN VICTORIA
Chapter 7 OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION IN VICTORIA
Introduction
Physical, psychological and occupational rehabilitation are all provided for within the 
legislation. In the Victorian context, "occupational rehabilitation" covers specific, defined 
services within the general rubric of rehabilitation. Practitioners in general medicine, 
occupational medicine, physiotherapy, chiropractic, naturopathy, as well as many other health 
and allied health professions are key providers of treatment services directed toward the return- 
to-work objective. However, it is the registered providers of Occupational Rehabilitation (OR) 
that deliver most of the defined occupational rehabilitation services with which this chapter is 
concerned.
The objective of "return to work" with the accident employer is the over-riding goal 
and this message is reflected in legislation, publications and policies. As a regulator rather than 
a provider of rehabilitation services, the VWA's primary mission is to set standards of service, 
monitor compliance and ensure equitable outcomes. As the manager of the central fund, the 
scheme must also pay for the services (through the insurers), maintain adequate reserves for 
current and future rehabilitation costs, and monitor utilisation and outcomes.
The current status of occupational rehabilitation services in Victoria must be read hi 
light of the evolution of WorkCover from its predecessor, the WorkCare scheme. Many of the 
features, processes and outcomes of WorkCover are a direct reaction to the perceived excesses 
of earlier systems. The current VWA system of occupational rehabilitation reflects the 
concerns of the past while attempting to realize the current legislated mandate of rehabilitation 
and return to work for all injured workers.
Thus, we will begin our review and analysis of occupational rehabilitation with a look 
backward, at the history of rehabilitation hi Victoria. In particular, we will focus on the design 
and performance of the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC) under the 
WorkCare regime from 1985 through 1992. Employer and insurer reaction to the perceived
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excesses of rehabilitation under WorkCare have been a critical determinant of current policy 
and practice in this area. Then, we will move on to describe the legislative framework for 
occupational rehabilitation, and the roles and responsibilities of various parties under the Act 
We will specifically examine the organisational and administrative structure dedicated to the 
delivery of occupational rehabilitation services and the independent agents who deliver those 
services. The chapter concludes with a review of the limited data available on occupational 
rehabilitation outcomes in Victoria, and some final thoughts.
History
Occupational rehabilitation is a relatively recent component of Australian workers' 
compensation systems. As mentioned hi Chapter 2, this largely reflected the imprint of the 
British legacy of the role of workers' compensation as simply being a circumscribed monetary 
recompense for injury. For Instance, the Seamen's Compensation Act 1911 contained no 
reference to rehabilitation whatsoever until its replacement with the Seafarers Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 1992, and the Australian Capital Territory Workers Compensation Act 
1951 similarly did not refer to rehabilitation until amending legislation in November 1994.1 It 
is also significant that, even where there was explicit statutory recognition of rehabilitation, the 
cultural ambience was such that this was little utilised in practice.
Thus, section 52 of the New South Wales Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (part of that 
legislation from the time of its enactment) authorised the then Workers Compensation 
Commission to draw from the Commission's funds such sums as may be necessary for the 
purposes of the vocational re-education and rehabilitation of disabled workers. However, no 
sum was hi fact ever drawn under this provision until 1969, and that small payment remained, 
for some time thereafter, an isolated example.2
'Alan Clayton, "The Structure and Operation of Occupational Disability Arrangements" in John Urbano 
and Alan Clayton, Review of International and Jurisdictional Best Practice in Return to Work. Canberra: Comcare 
Australia, 1996, at p. 5.
2Workers' Compensation Commission of New South Wales, Report of the Inquiry into the Feasibility of 
Establishing a System for the Rehabilitation of Injured Workers in New South Wales. " December 1970. (Judge 
A. T. Conybeare, QC) Sydney: Government Printer, at p. 1.
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Indeed one of the distinguishing features of the Victorian WorkCare scheme, which 
took effect from 1985, was the emphasis placed upon rehabilitation. The previous Victorian 
legislation, the Workers Compensation Act 1958 contained only one reference to rehabilitation; 
Section 26(2)(d)(iii), which simply provided that the reasonable costs of treatment and 
assistance with respect to a worker's industrial rehabilitation was a compensable item. By 
contrast, one entire Part of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (23 sections) was devoted to 
the operations of the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council. At least another five 
provisions in this Act related to or intersected with the area of rehabilitation. As well, it was 
clearly spelled out in the Act that the legislative intention bespoke a commitment to vocational 
and social rehabilitation.
So rehabilitation of the occupationally disabled was a relatively late development within 
the evolution of Australian workers' compensation systems, only really emerging as an issue 
following the pioneering Conybeare Report in 1970.3 By 1977, Judge Harris would note that 
submission after submission made to his Inquiry had stressed the need for a proper system of 
rehabilitation. This was not a simple matter, however, and the Harris Report alluded to the 
difficulties facing the implementation of such a programme; in particular, a lack of trained 
rehabilitation personnel, and a jurisdiction where the financing of workers' compensation was 
in the hands of 70 insurers.4
Structure of WorkCare Rehabilitation
The initiatives which did develop from the late 1970s cast their own shadows. These 
initiatives were largely undertaken by a few larger private insurers and had drawn the ire and 
suspicion of the union movement. They felt that occupational rehabilitation was simply being 
employed as a form of benefit control and raised confidentiality concerns that information 
gained from the activities of the insurer's rehabilitation arm was being fed to the claims
3This process is traced in Alan Clay ton, "Attack upon the citadel: reform of Australia's anti-rehabilitative 
statutes," Journal of Occupational Health and Safety-Australia and New Zealand, 1986, 3(4): 351-364.
4Board of Inquiry into Workers Compensation. Report, March 1977 (Judge C. W. Harris, Chairman) 
Melbourne: Government Printer, 1977; para. 24.1, p. 107-108.
7-3
department to be used to the worker's detriment. Thus, while there was strong union support 
for rehabilitation in the new scheme, these prior concerns helped dictate the structural and 
operational features of WorkCare rehabilitation.
Whereas in the Canadian provincial schemes the rehabilitation function is located within 
the Workers Compensation Board, it was decided that primary responsibility for rehabilitation 
would reside with the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council (VARC), a body largely 
independent of the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) even though that was the body 
which provided its funding. A comprehensive Government statement, issued soon after the 
announcement of the WorkCare reforms, referred to VARC as a body which would initially be 
"responsible to the Treasurer but it is expected that a fully integrated system will be developed 
hi the long run." 5
One of the consequences of this division was that the claims process and the 
rehabilitation process became largely separate systems. In particular, while VARC could 
access information on the ACC data base, there were very strong controls on reciprocal flows 
of information. These differences were reinforced by a significantly different culture within the 
two organisations. As Mark Considine observed:
The ACC was run as an insurance fund which inevitably wished to minimise 
costs. Many of its staff, including the managing director and the general 
manager responsible for the claims agents, were recruited from the insurance 
industry. VARC, in contrast, was from the start an organisation motivated by 
clearly articulated welfare values. Staff were recruited from the human service 
professions and viewed their job as being to provide every support to injured 
workers. 6
While the Government, through the Accident Compensation Act, had given a strong mandate 
for a comprehensive system of rehabilitation for occupational disability, there were immediate 
problems due to the lack of an effective vocational rehabilitation infrastructure and persons
5 Victoria - Workers' Compensation Reform: Government Statement. Economic Strategy for Victoria 
Statement No. 5. Melbourne: Government Printer (December 1984), at p. 50.
6Mark Considine, The Politics of Reform: Workers' Compensation from Woodhouse to WorkCare. Centre 
for Applied Social Research, Deakin University, 1991 (Deakin Series in Public Policy and Administration, 
No. 1), at p. 91.
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trained in the various disciplines (for instance, occupational therapy, rehabilitation counselling 
and ergonomics) associated with this field. Accordingly, one of the primary concerns for 
VARC, at least in the earlier years, was to build this system.
VARC proceeded to establish a number of public WorkCare Rehabilitation centres and 
to approve private providers in order to establish a network of services in both metropolitan 
and rural Victoria. In its first 10 months of operation it opened four WorkCare Rehabilitation 
services in major industrial areas and approved nine private rehabilitation providers. Over the 
next 6 years this network would rise to 82 service locations, involving eight WorkCare 
Rehabilitation centres and an additional five WorkCare Rehabilitation sub-offices, and 69 
locations operated by the 25 approved rehabilitation providers. The public WorkCare 
Rehabilitation service facilities came to provide about a third of the market for vocational 
rehabilitation services.
In relation to the supply and training of rehabilitation professionals, VARC, either 
individually or in conjunction with the ACC, funded a range of initiatives, such as the 
establishment of a Chair of Rehabilitation Medicine at the University of Melbourne, the 
funding of undergraduate and graduate positions in various courses at the Lincoln Institute of 
Health Sciences, and assisting the Australian Physiotherapy Association in its overseas 
recruitment campaign. Ongoing training programmes for rehabilitation professionals were an 
important part of VARC'S activities throughout its tenure.
Operation of WorkCare Rehabilitation
The Victorian WorkCare rehabilitation system grew to be one of the largest, in terms of 
workers involved, of any comparable workers' compensation system. A decision was taken by 
VARC, in mid 1987, that it would attempt to ensure that all workers off work for 12 weeks 
would be offered rehabilitation. At that time this would have captured about one-fourth of all 
time-compensated standard claims. In fact, by the end of June 1988 this had happened for 
around 28 percent of workers with time-compensated claims during 1987/88, with more than 
28,000 injured workers formerly employed by some 6,500 employers involved in 
rehabilitation. As Table 7.1 shows this high level of rehabilitation involvement was a
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distinctive feature of the WorkCare system. The total cost of rehabilitation in 1987/88 was 
$32.9 million, which represented about 3.2 per cent of total WorkCare expenditure in that 
year.
VARC was also the regulator and gatekeeper in respect of the provision of 
rehabilitation services. The issue of quality and appropriate utilisation control was an ongoing 
issue. In April 1986 VARC instituted a central referral system, ostensibly for ensuring 
effective management of the referral process and encouraging early referral and intervention. 
Under this system, approved rehabilitation providers were required to submit a rehabilitation 
plan to the VARC for approval prior to proceeding with its implementation. In preparing the 
plan, approved rehabilitation providers were able to incur up to $200 of work, either in 
assessing the client or engaging in the immediate delivery of services. However, authorisation 
for any further payments was dependent upon approval from VARC. This approval process 
became an unwieldy bureaucratic exercise and resulted in considerable delay in the provision 
of services.
Just as the ACC experimented with controls and incentives for the claims administration 
agents, so the VARC monitoring and control procedures and provider remuneration 
arrangements went through a number of refinements and configurations. One of the problems, 
particularly hi the system of mass rehabilitation which VARC was overseeing, was that the 
monitoring and control system was largely process oriented and "check box" in nature. In a 
response to this, VARC hi October 1991 implemented its Rehabilitation Case Management 
Strategy which attempted to ensure quality control and compliance with scheme goals by 
placing the approval and monitoring process in the hands of experienced rehabilitation 
professionals.
While VARC was primarily wedded to a centrally controlled case management model 
of rehabilitation, Dr. Jane Greacen, who headed its Programme Development and Training 
Unit and would for a time be the Acting CEO of VARC, had from around 1987 begun 
developing a workplace-focused Injury Management Programme. This programme was 
launched in February 1988 with the approval of two firm-based rehabilitation services (Nissan 
Motor Company and Smorgon Consolidated Industries) and a range of grants and other
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supports for companies to set up workplace-based rehabilitation arrangements. This model 
began to gain increasing acceptance and in the last year of VARC's operation the companies 
involved in this approach to rehabilitation were able to achieve almost total return-to-work 
results (compared to that of 47.7 percent success for VARC operations overall), and average 
rehabilitation costs associated with such return to work of only $417 (compared to that of 
$2,337 overall). While one could expect better performance from participants in this 
programme, being larger enterprises with better control and greater potential for the 
implementation of return-to-work measures, nevertheless, the extent of the differential clearly 
illustrated the potential of workplace-oriented programmes.
The Legacy of WorkCare Rehabilitation
While there was some discernible evolution in the approaches and practices of VARC 
over its seven-year history, nevertheless, the enduring legacy and impressions left by the 
"VARC experience" were, in a number of quarters, powerful and negative. In fact, "VARC" 
and "rehabilitation" have come to be regarded as dirty words to employers. Some of the 
reasons for this have already been alluded to, but this phenomenon, which was to influence the 
manner in which rehabilitation was approached in the WorkCover system, has a varied and 
complex aetiology.
First, there were very few strong champions of rehabilitation outside of some parts of 
the trade union movement. Whilst almost nobody expressed outright opposition to 
rehabilitation, its support, particularly from business and employer organisations, was often 
tinged or qualified with reservations about its effectiveness, and the wisdom of placing too 
much effort into a process controlled by "do-gooders" and "social workers." The structure and 
form that rehabilitation took under WorkCare was influenced very much by trade union input 
into the business/labour compact which acted as midwife to the new system, with the employer 
influence being felt hi other areas such as the halving of the premium imposed upon business, 
(see Chapter 2) As time progressed, the essentially tepid support of employer groups for 
rehabilitation would change to concern and eventually outright derision for a system of which 
they felt little sense of ownership or participation.
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Secondly, the scale of the changes to rehabilitation practice under WorkCare provided a 
set of formidable challenges. In fact, "changes" is probably too neutral a word. What was 
being attempted was a quantum leap from a situation where occupational rehabilitation hardly 
existed at all to one that would represent one of the most extensive systems of rehabilitation 
sponsored by workers' compensation anywhere in the world. In this process, especially in the 
early years, the degree of managerial oversight and attention to the dynamics of scheme 
operation which could be exercised by VARC was continually challenged and deflected by the 
exigencies of creating the necessary infrastructure and training the requisite personnel to serve 
the new system.
That is not to say that, even during this establishment phase, VARC adopted a 
laissez-faire approach to scheme operations; quite the contrary, in fact. The strong control 
approach adopted by VARC and its desire to micro-manage all aspects of the system was a 
major cause of the bad feelings that came to surround rehabilitation under WorkCare and lay 
behind much of the reaction under WorkCover.
The central referral system, which operated from April 1986, under which all approved 
rehabilitation providers had to provide detailed rehabilitation plans before any significant 
rehabilitation action could be undertaken, became a torment for most parties in the system, 
including employers and insurers as well as the providers. As anything more than minor action 
was subject to VARC approval, the system created a bureaucratic monster which 
institutionalised inflexibility and delay.
The delays induced by this approval system often ran to 12 weeks, so that both 
initiation of rehabilitation action and changes to it were hampered by a 3-month period of 
inertia during which proposals were processed. Unfortunately, the approval process was very 
much of the mechanistic box checking variety, and added little in the way of quality control or 
utilisation control to the system. In functional terms its major impact was to engender cynicism 
and resentment among a range of scheme participants.
The effects of this extreme micro-management were exacerbated by the decision, in mid 
1987, to attempt to provide rehabilitation to all workers with injury durations hi excess of 12 
weeks. As mentioned above, and illustrated in Table 7.1, the consequences were a relatively
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high participation rate in rehabilitation, with the concomitant feature of rehabilitation costs 
becoming a significant element of overall scheme costs. A further complicating factor was the 
open access to the system in terms of the source of referral to rehabilitation as illustrated in 
Table 7.2. This compounded the impression of employers and insurers that rehabilitation was a 
system that was largely out of control.
This issue of control was one that loomed large in the criticisms of VARC and the 
rehabilitation system from a number of quarters. As already mentioned, the manner in which 
VARC and the rehabilitation system was configured under WorkCare reflected trade union 
concerns that structural and operational barriers should be established to prevent rehabilitation 
being used, hi an instrumentalist sense, as a weapon of benefit control. The largely arms-length 
arrangements between the ACC and VARC resulted in an uneasy, and often acrimonious, 
relationship between these two bodies that developed strikingly different corporate cultures.
Most of the VARC staff saw themselves as the guardians of a holistic conception of 
rehabilitation encompassing the entire range of medical, vocational and social rehabilitation. 
They were very suspicious of ACC tendencies to see it as a handmaiden of the claims process, 
a way to secure closure of a claim through return to work. These philosophical differences 
existed over a number of issues. One illustration of the magnitude of such difference was the 
attempt hi the first draft of the Bill which was to become the Accident Compensation 
(Amendment) Act 1987 to banish the term "rehabilitation" totally from the Accident 
Compensation Act and replace it wherever it appeared in that statute with the term "return to 
work."
The point is that employers and insurers came to feel great antipathy toward the very 
concept of rehabilitation, and rational discourse over the appropriate level of occupational 
rehabilitation activity essentially ended. When the Victorian Liberal and National Party 
coalition came to power late hi 1992, the scene was set for the wholesale replacement of the 
VARC approach with a narrower concept of rehabilitation as, primarily, a focus on the final 
goal of return to work. The remainder of the chapter describes this current system of 
occupational rehabilitation in Victoria.
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Legislative Framework, Entitlements And Responsibilities
Mandate and Legislative Framework
The Accident Compensation Act 1985 includes the following objectives for the 
Authority "[to] . . . promote the effective occupational rehabilitation of injured workers and 
their early return to work; [and to] ... encourage the provision of suitable employment 
opportunities to workers who have been injured."7 The legislation defines occupational 
rehabilitation services in very particular terms to include only the following:




(e) advice concerning job modification;
(f) occupational rehabilitation counselling;
(g) vocational assessment;
(h) advice or assistance concerning job-seeking;
(i) vocational re-education;
(j) advice or assistance in arranging vocational re-education;
(k) preparation of a return-to-work plan;
(1) the provision of aids, appliance, apparatus or other materials likely to facilitate
	the return to work of a worker after an injury; 
(m) modification to a work station or equipment used by a worker that is likely to
	facilitate the return to work of the worker after an injury; 
(n) any other service authorised by the Authority.8
Operationally, the VWA has set in place a series of General Operating Principles to 
guide insurers, providers and employers. These principles, outlined in the Claims Manual, 
provide focus to the general legislative mandate. In particular, they assign direct 
responsibilities to each party for occupational rehabilitation and return to work.
Insurer Responsibilities
The Claims Manual lays out the specific occupational rehabilitation and return to work 
responsibilities for insurers in the General Operating Principles, numbers 10 through 13.
'Section 19(d) and (e) of the Act.
8Section 5, Accident Compensation Act 1985.
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Among these are the following, which clearly place the role of the insurer as central to the 
rehabilitation and return to work effort. 
Principle 10: Specific Objective
Insurers must have direct ownership of a specific objective ... to 
return injured workers to work as soon as possible after the injury.
• Insurers must actively support return to work by assisting and
encouraging employers to develop workplace based occupational 
rehabilitation policies, initiatives and procedures that determine how 
return to work injury management is seen, delivered and managed. 
Insurers must also encourage employers to develop re-employment or 
retraining practices highlighting the employers role in prevention and 
rehabilitation and the control of costs.
Insurers must also make every endeavour to ensure that their employers 
adhere to the legislative requirements of Occupational Rehabilitation and 
return to work.
Principle 11: Workplace Assessments
• Insurers must undertake/facilitate workplace assessments so as to ensure 
that a worker returns to work with suitable duties and, if pertinent, with 
any necessary workplace modifications made to their work environment. 
Workplace assessments will also be used to achieve a full return to work 
for partially incapacitated claimants. Insurers must liaise with all relevant 
parties during all phases of the workplace assessment process.
Principle 12: Rehabilitation/Enhancing Job Opportunities
• Insurers must be committed to the promotion of rehabilitation
programmes where they contribute to successful and effective claims 
management. Insurers must develop a comprehensive programme with 
specific case referral procedures to ensure that rehabilitation services are 
available in a timely manner that target the rehabilitation needs of 
workers. Programme emphasis must be given to the return to work of 
partially incapacitated workers, the capacity of employers to re-employ, 
vocational training, status reporting and work placement.
• Insurers must be committed to increase the willingness and ability of 
employers to support and maintain return to work objectives. The 
benefits of a successful return to work through the offer of suitable 
employment will be highlighted to employers.
Principle 13: Job-offers, Re-Employment and Re-training
Insurers must aim to return workers to their full-time pre-injury
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employment, wherever possible, by liaising with the employer to
facilitate their return to work through modifications, as required, to the
pre-injury employment work place and/or work procedures. Continuing
support and assistance will be given to workers during return to work to
maximise their income recovery potential.
Insurers must liaise with employers, workers, treating doctor/s and
rehabilitation providers to provide re-employment through a suitable job
offer where a worker regains a capacity for work.
(VWA Claims Manual, General Operating Principles, July 1994, p. 2)
Worker Entitlements and Responsibilities9
Under the legislation, workers enjoy certain entitlements with respect to the general 
themes of return to work and rehabilitation. Financial benefits for workers engaged in 
rehabilitation activities are identical to the benefits prescribed for all workers under the Act. 
The cooperation of the worker is mandated in Sections 93A(3) and (4), which require a worker 
to make every "reasonable effort" to return to work and to participate in occupational 
rehabilitation service or a return-to-work plan. If rehabilitation efforts are successful and the 
worker returns to work, financial benefits cease. There is also a provision for benefit reduction 
for partial incapacity10 taking into account "notional earnings." 11 Key to these provisions is the 
worker "making every reasonable effort to return to work" in "suitable employment."
Subsection 93D(2) defines where the worker is deemed not to be making "every 
reasonable effort" in the following instances: refused to have an assessment made of the 
worker's employment prospects, refused or failed to take the steps to obtain suitable 
employment, refused an offer of suitable employment, or failed to participate in an 
occupational rehabilitation service or return-to-work plan. Section 162 of the Act requires the 
worker to attend interviews with appropriate representatives of the Authority or insurer "for
'Effective with Royal Assent on 17 December 1996, the Accident Compensation (Further Amendment) 
Act 1996 allows the worker to choose an OR provider if the Authority, insurer, self-insurer or employer does not 
offer or provide such a service.
'°Section 93A(1) and (2) covers the first 26 weeks.
"Notional Earnings are defined in Section 5 of the Act and the method of assessing these is defined in 
93DA.
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the purpose of ascertaining whether worker's opportunities for employment can be enhanced." 
"Suitable employment" is defined in Section 5 of the Act as work for which the worker 
is suited having regard to the nature of the worker's incapacity and pre-injury employment, 
age, education, skills, work experience, place of residence, medical condition, return-to-work 
plan, and occupational rehabilitation services being provided. Note that the definition 
specifically adds "whether or not that work is available."
Even if the worker is eventually found not to be entitled to compensation, expenditures 
that have been made for occupational rehabilitation purposes are allowed and reasonable notice 
must be given before these are discontinued. Benefits continue under Section 99 for a period of 
up to 1 year, unless under 99(14) the worker has returned to work but could not continue by 
virtue of surgery, prosthesis modification, and services to stabilize the worker's health or 
lifestyle.
Survivors of workers fatally injured have no specific rehabilitation entitlements under 
the legislation. While (family) grief counselling was introduced in July 1996, the regulations 
are not yet published for its implementation. Assistance in managing the financial settlement 
with WorkCover and vocational counselling are not offered by the scheme, although anecdotal 
information from some insurers indicate that such services are sometimes informally offered.
Employer Responsibilities 12
One of the most notable aspects of the VWA system is the high level of responsibility 
that the scheme places on employers. Where the Disability Management movement 
internationally and the Total Injury Management concept defined by the Heads of Workers 
Compensation Authorities' National Consistency Programme (HWCA, 1996) encourage 
internalisation of return to work and occupational rehabilitation, the legislation and policies of 
the VWA clearly mandate these as employer responsibilities. The Claims manual specifically 
states that "The employer is responsible for injury management, including the identification
l2The Accident Compensation (Further Amendment) Act 1996 gives approval responsibility for OR 
expenditures solely to the insurer.
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and implementation of occupational rehabilitation services." 13 The insurer's role is supportive 
and facilitative to the employer's ultimate responsibility. This philosophy is also evident in the 
General Operating Principles for insurers quoted earlier.
Part VI of the legislation specifically outlines the requirements for employers with 
respect to Occupational Rehabilitation, Return-to-work Plans and Risk Management. Under 
Section 156(1) employers with payrolls of greater than $1 million must establish an 
occupational rehabilitation programme. By 30 calendar days following an injury, every 
employer must prepare a return-to-work plan and nominate a return-to-work coordinator. 
(Section 156(2)(a)) Within a 90-day period after that, an employer must establish and maintain 
an occupational rehabilitation programme. (Section 156(2)(b)(i))
The written occupational rehabilitation programme, which must be produced in 
consultation with workers, is required to include a statement of the employer's return-to-work 
policy, the name of the return-to-work coordinator and at least one provider of occupational 
rehabilitation services. (Section 158) The specific return-to-work plan for an injured worker 
must include an estimated return-to-work date, an offer of suitable employment and the steps to 
be taken to facilitate the worker's return, including any occupational rehabilitation services that 
are reasonably necessary to assist the worker in returning to and remaining at work. (Section 
160)
Reinstatement of the worker is required by Section 122. Workers are entitled to return 
to work within 12 months with the accident employer hi suitable employment. The employer, 
however, can be relieved of the responsibility if he/she can satisfy the Authority that it is "not 
possible for the employer to provide suitable employment.'' Failure to re-employ a worker may 
result in penalties of up to $25,000, although this provision has rarely been invoked.
With few exceptions, employers are required to make all initial payments for medical 
and like costs, including occupational rehabilitation costs. These expenditures count towards 
the employer's "deductible" of $416. Prior to 1 July 1996 employer expenditures for 
occupational rehabilitation services could be excluded from the calculation of the employer's
1 'Section 6.10.1 Workplace Based Occupational Rehabilitation.
7-14
excess with the "employer excess" for occupational rehabilitation separately limited to $1,200 
maximum. 14 After that date, expenditures for occupational rehabilitation are no longer 
separately tabulated, but all such costs are included in meeting the threshold for a claim to be 
paid by an insurer and still subject to approval by the employer or insurer.
Beyond their responsibilities under the Accident Compensation Act, employers are 
bound by the provisions of Health and Safety regulations, and Industrial Relations and Human 
Rights legislation. Some employers expressed concern over the apparent lack of consistency 
across these responsibilities, noting that in determining how best to deal with a particular 
situation, an employer may have to ultimately consider which piece of legislation will be least 
costly to offend.
Rehabilitation Process
Rehabilitation is far from a linear process. During the "life" of a claim, a worker may 
experience several rehabilitation-oriented services and personnel. Each of the personnel also 
have specific relationships with some aspect of the VWA and its authorised insurers. Figure 
7.1 illustrates the complexity that may be involved in any rehabilitation case.
From both the mandate and the above diagram, the central role of the RTW coordinator 
to the rehabilitation process is clearly evident. Equally important is the relationship between 
the insurer and the Occupational Rehabilitation (OR) provider. Although the employer may be 
required to name an OR provider, the main reporting relationships are to the insurer and the 
RTW coordinator. Similarly, the physician, chiropractor, or naturopath may develop a 
relationship with the worker but referrals to rehabilitation must occur through the insurer and 
in consultation with the employer.
With so many "players** in the system, the concern for confidentiality of information
14 It has been common practice for insurers to exclude employer expenditures for OR services from the 
calculation of the employer's excess. This was not the legislative intent of Section 99B but was accepted insurer 
practice. Section 99B allowed employers to incur costs of up to $1200 (indexed to $1290 at time of repeal - 
effective 1/7/96)) for approved Occupational Rehabilitation services without reference to their insurer. Amounts 
beyond this limit were to be approved by the insurer when the services are determined to be reasonable and 
necessary.
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was raised by a number of stakeholders. In order for insurers and employers to have adequate 
information on which to base a decision, there must be information sharing. Many aspects of 
medical and vocational history may be needed in the rehabilitation process. Despite strong 
admonitions against inappropriate transfers of sensitive or personal information, the potential 
exists for violations of individual privacy.
The initial rehabilitation process may be the purview of the employer and the return-to- 
work coordinator, but in the longer term, others will be involved in the rehabilitation of 
injured workers. The various services and personnel are described in later sections while the 
following section takes a more global and theoretical view of the entire rehabilitation process.
Identification and Referral for Services
The vast majority of workplace injuries will result in little or no time loss and will, 
therefore, require no rehabilitation intervention beyond medical treatment. For more prolonged 
cases, however, physical rehabilitation may be needed. Identification of this need usually 
follows medical assessment. In the typical case, the general practitioner will recommend or 
refer an individual for physiotherapy. In some cases, the worker will self-refer for physio 
therapy or chiropractic treatment.
Beyond this initial referral, the VWA model is designed with the employer's RTW 
coordinator as the central contact between the employer and the worker. The RTW coordinator 
is usually responsible for fulfilling the employer's requirement of creating a return-to-work 
plan for the injured worker. Such a plan must be prepared within 10 days following 20 
calendar days of a worker's total incapacity. Of course, such a plan does not necessarily 
include OR services. It may also fall to the RTW coordinator to be the main contact for the 
authorised insurer. Where a worker, treating medical practitioner, or the insurer believes a 
referral to occupational rehabilitation services is in order, approval will be sought from the 
employer. It will likely be the RTW coordinator who is involved hi approving a referral for 
occupational rehabilitation services.
A referral for occupational rehabilitation services is a very specific activity. Unlike 
vocational rehabilitation systems in North America that generally allow the occupational
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rehabilitation provider to determine the techniques and services likely to optimize the 
assessment, intervention or outcome, in Victoria every service must be separately authorised. 
This often involves several transactions including returned phone calls, faxes and consulta 
tions. These add to overhead and may delay actual service delivery. Of course, this also 
reflects the reaction to earlier WorkCare experience as described earlier.
Where re-training or alternate placement is involved, OR providers may well continue 
their relationship and interaction beyond the employer-employee relationship, notwithstanding 
the requirement for an employer to take a worker back within a year of injury. Figure 7.2 
demonstrates the general sequence of events. The figure indicates the general timing of the 
various treatments and interventions over the life of a workers' compensation claim. In 
Victoria, the 20-day threshold for naming a return-to-work coordinator and developing a 
return-to-work plan creates the opportunity for earlier review for potential occupational 
rehabilitation than in other systems. However, organised labour has been very critical of the 
actual results observed. It is alleged that many RTW coordinators see the plan as only a price 
of paper to be sent to the insurer, rather than as an action statement. Of course, the goal of all 
such interventions is to move the injured worker back more quickly to a higher level of overall 
health and functionality.
In rehabilitation, it is relatively easy ex post to recommend early intervention in a case 
that has gone awry. Ex. ante, however, identification of need is far more complex and 
problematic. Success at such identification comes with experience and professional judgment. 
For employers with a significant and continuous frequency of injury, it is possible for the 
RTW coordinator to develop such judgment. Where there are few injuries, however, this is not 
the case. In the critical first few weeks following an injury, it usually falls to the medical 
practitioner to identify the need for rehabilitation services.
Within the insurers, there are a variety of mechanisms in place to see that the VWA 
mandate for considering occupational rehabilitation referrals are followed. These measures 
may include review of claims by a rehabilitation professional, consultation with claims 
managers to identify cases that might benefit from an OR referral, or use of computer-matched 
profiling to flag the claims officer to consider such a referral. Interviews, however, indicate
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that profile-matching is not common in Victoria, although some insurers are developing 
proprietary software that may include this capacity.
The above model depicts the typical short-term disability case. In Victoria, there are 
also a significant and growing number of workers whose injury is very profound, resulting in 
total permanent impairment. These workers have special needs for rehabilitation, activities of 
daily living; accessibility (adaptive, mobility and similar devices, as well as other adaptations 
and modifications), and avocational counselling. Many of these cases have been inherited from 
previous incarnations of the workers' compensation system in Victoria. In many cases, the 
employer is no longer active. The direction, management, and administration of the worker's 
ongoing needs is a shared responsibility between the authorised insurer and the VWA. Either 
may contract for occupational rehabilitation or other rehabilitation services for these workers.
Claimants that have needs beyond the defined OR services may also be referred to 
community-based programmes and services. These agencies may offer support and services to 
the injured worker, his/her family and others who may be affected by the injury but who are 
beyond the scope of the Act or the direct payment by the VWA. Several such community-based 
organisations receive financial support from the VWA. Interviews indicated that these 
organisations focus on advocacy and social rehabilitation of disabled clients rather than 
occupational rehabilitation or return to work objectives. As such, they probably play a 
significant role in improving the lives of their clients, even if they do not achieve a return to 
work.
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Organisational and Administrative Structures 15
There are three distinct structural aspects to the provision of occupational rehabilitation 
services in Victoria: administration, claims management, and service delivery. The overall 
administration, scheme design and regulation take place within the VWA. Claims management 
initially falls to the employer but, once the employer excess is reached, the insurer usually 
becomes the claims manager. Services are contracted for by insurers, employers, and workers.
£
Services are delivered by registered providers. This latter group is discussed in detail in the 
section on Service Delivery Personnel.
Administration within the VWA
Within the VWA, the Scheme Regulation Department has primary responsibility for 
rehabilitation issues. The Health and Rehabilitation Branch administers most aspects of 
"medical and like" services as prescribed by Section 99 of the Act and provides registration, 
analysis, and guidance to both insurers and providers.
Table 7.3 summarizes rehabilitation services covered by the VWA. The list of services 
is quite broad and fairly typical of other workers' compensation systems. Of course, it is the 
OR services that are the focus of this chapter. Medical and like services are discussed in 
Chapter 5 of this report.
Registration
As noted in the table, only occupational rehabilitation services provided by an approved 
OR provider may be paid as a medical and like expense. The approval process requires
is ln considering these structural features of occupational rehabilitation hi Victoria, an important caveat 
must be kept in mind. The market for rehabilitation services is not limited to situations controlled by the VWA. 
There exists within the broader community both suppliers and consumers that are outside the formal relationships 
identified above. Workers injured in non-work-related events, private citizens in need of rehabilitation services, 
and individuals directed to services by non-workers' compensation insurance programmes make up a broader 
market for rehabilitation services. In addition, both workers and employers who seek services outside the scheme 
are beyond the scope of this analysis. The extent to which activity in this broader market overlaps, augments or 
provides substitutes for those services and relationships described below has not been analysed.
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potential providers to submit an application and a fee to the VWA.16 The application requires 
the provider to record information that demonstrates experience in occupational rehabilitation 
shows evidence of their capacity to deliver these services, and gives an undertaking to ensure 
these services are provided by qualified staff.
Providers able to meet these criteria may be given "unrestricted" status. "Restricted*5 
providers may not meet all of the criteria, may lack expertise in a particular area, or be 
otherwise limited due to the availability of certain services in their particular (often rural) area. 
There is also another category of provider that is employer-based and generally part of a 
self-insured employer's operation. An approved provider may consist of a full interdisciplinary 
facility or a single practitioner. Once approved, providers are expected to handle at least 20 
cases per year. Providers are also urged to attend a one-day training programme designed and 
delivered by the VWA. At this writing, there are approximately 80 registered providers with 
about 700 individuals approved to deliver services.
The registration process has been criticized by some as bestowing upon those who are 
registered a de facto form of accreditation. Unlike other provisions that rely on registration 
with (or eligibility for registration with) a professional governing body, the OR registration 
process only requires the VWA to make a minimal assessment of a provider's credentials. 
Apparently some providers use the term "approved VWA provider" as a means of promotion 
or validation of their level of practice, expertise or service. In the absence of any professional 
governing body offering accreditation, there are few alternatives open to the VWA. There may 
be an opportunity, however, for the Victorian OR providers (VCORP) to institute such a 
system at arm's length from the VWA. 17
16The application fees for OR providers effective from 1 May 1996 are $500 for approval of up to 10 
individuals and $750 for approval of more than 10 individuals.
I7The suggestion that VCORP take on the role of an accrediting body was raised in the David Gadiel and 
Lee Ridoutt paper, U A Review of the Occupational Rehabilitation Services Industry in Victoria," Health Care 
Intelligence, December 1995, p. 75 and in various interviews. The worldwide trend to quality and standard setting 
is exemplified by Australian Quality Standards, ISO 9000 movement in manufacturing and, more specifically, the 
Australian Physiotherapy Association's practice accreditation, Council for the Accreditation of Rehabilitation 
Facilities (CARF) and the Commission on Rehabilitation Counselor Certification (CRCC), which deal with 
various vocational rehabilitation providers.
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Occupational Rehabilitation Services in Victoria
For any regulator, analysis is a key function. The ACCtion system provides the main 
source of information for reports and analysis. Most reports are used in monitoring system 
performance with analysis directed to specific studies, trend analysis, or to provide model data 
for testing the effects of scheme design. The system outcomes section later in this chapter will 
comment more fully on the adequacy of the data, however, for the following discussion it is 
important to keep in mind that services provided by non-registered providers, internal 
rehabilitation professionals, and self-insured providers are not fully accounted for.
Since all payment transactions made by insurers are coded and captured by the ACCtion 
system, occupational rehabilitation "inputs" may be identified by provider, service, date or any 
combination of these or other fields within the system. Table 7.4 provides the level of 
occupational rehabilitation services for fiscal year 1995-96 at the VWA. In terms of the 
number of individuals who received services, the initial occupational rehabilitation assessment 
(code RC100) was the most frequent, with 3,254 individuals receiving such assessments during 
the past fiscal year. 18 A total of $921,325 was spent on OR assessments during 1995-96. Some 
2,418 individuals received OR counselling (code RC225), at a cost of $843,260 during the 
same period. There were 2,171 workplace assessments (code RC295) conducted at a cost to the 
VWA of $783,026 and a total of 2,023 vocational assessments (code RC315) were performed 
on injured workers at a cost of $662,578 for 1995-96.
Job search assistance (code RC125) was provided to 1,446 clients at a cost of $683,540 
and a total of 885 functional assessments (code RC113) were done at a cost of $288,146 during 
the year. In addition, 357 individuals received functional education (code RC245) at a cost of 
$110,039 and 322 individuals received advice or assistance in obtaining vocational reeducation 
(code RC119). Some 210 individuals received vocational re-education services (code RC330) 
at a current year cost of $162,873.
l8While it cannot be assumed that every individual receives an assessment upon entering the occupational 
rehabilitation system, this number of 3,254 would provide an approximation to the number of individuals who first 
qualified for OR during 1995-96. This can be contrasted with the roughly 9,000-10,000 individuals entering 
rehabilitation annually during the VARC era (see Table 7.1).
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With the return-to-work focus of occupational rehabilitation in Victoria, it is quite 
surprising that only 202 individuals received work conditioning services (code RC199) at a 
cost of $77,885 and only 136 workplace modifications (code RC300) were done during the 
1995-96 fiscal year at a cost of just $53,237.
A worker may, of course, receive more than one service in any category and services in 
more than one category may be provided to a single individual. Services to workers are also 
likely to be provided over time, so any snapshot will record services being provided for cases 
having arisen in both the current year and previous years. For the 12 months ending June 30, 
1996, a total of 7,042 individuals received services under the above codes. Table 7.5 indicates 
the year of injury for cases receiving OR during 1995-96. About 65 percent of OR claims 
involve injuries from the past 3 years.
As may be noted from the Occupational Rehabilitation Services codes hi the table, some 
common rehabilitation interventions are not well defined. Group counselling, psychometric and 
functional testing, and job search programmes-activities often performed in group sessions are 
not identified in any unique way. We heard varying opinions both internally and externally on 
how such services should be recorded. This apparent confusion may reduce the reliability of 
the data for analysis purposes.
Data Resources
The adequacy of any data system is the prime determinant of the quality and utility of 
the data generated by the system and the analysis that can be done with these data. To the 
extent that the ACCtion system accurately reports recorded data, the analysis performed within 
the VWA will be accurate and reliable. To the extent that the data are incomplete, inaccurate 
or ill-defined, the reliability of any analysis will be suspect.
For the VWA, there are competing purposes in the design and utilisation of the data 
resources. The ACCtion system is accessed by insurers and the VWA with the majority of the 
input coming from the insurer operations. For assessing the utilisation of OR services, there 
are several limitations to the system, however:
• Services provided directly by the insured employers may not be captured;
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Services performed internal to an employer's or insurer's operation are not 
recorded by the ACCtion system (although records may well exist in proprietary 
applications within the employer or insurer operation); 
Services provided by non-registered providers are not captured; 
Services provided to workers employed by self-insured employers are not 
captured on an individual or case basis;
Occupational rehabilitation "activities" (including vocational counselling ) 
provided by physicians, physiotherapists or others may not be recorded in the 
ACCtion system.
The net result of these limitations is that the ACCtion system will provide accurate 
payment information for officially "sanctioned" services, but is less likely to capture all the 
services provided. Interview information confirms that each of these limitations has some 
impact on the reliability of the data from a service measurement point of view. The nature of 
these limitations will tend to understate the rehabilitation activity that is actually provided to 
injured workers in Victoria. It is not possible to estimate to what extent this understatement 
may be occurring in individual expenditure areas nor to estimate the rehabilitative or cash 
value of these services.
Committees
Interviews revealed that various committees have been active and that the VWA does 
work with provider groups (such as VCORP and the APA) to negotiate agreements, exchange 
information and to develop specific programmes and services. For instance, the APA and the 
VWA have been working together on guidelines for the treatment of low back injuries.
With the cooperation of the AMA and the APA, the Authority has established a "peer 
review" process. Essentially, a committee of professionals from the appropriate discipline 
reviews the practices of providers identified through analysis as having patterns of service 
provision outside normal boundaries. In essence, providers identified as consistently billing for 
services beyond the normal duration or frequency are reviewed by the committee. The 
objective of the review is, in the first instance, to determine the reasons for the extensive use. 
If the service provision is determined by professional peers to be beyond the norm, the
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committee works with the provider to inform and educate the professional in ways in which to 
bring utilisation to within normally accepted levels.
Although this system is currently structured as a "utilisation" review, the understanding 
of at least some of the participants is that the process will be expanded to include both a 
general performance review through sampling and a parallel review of practices that may be 
providing sub-optimal service to injured workers. The VWA also employs some medical ; 
practitioners on a sessional basis to work on reviews and special projects. Other professionals 
serve with authority staff on specialised committees to develop educational material and 
guidelines.
The Authority also works with a stakeholder committee known as the Occupational 
Rehabilitation Advisory Forum. This group has nominations from employer associations 
(Australian Chamber of Manufacturers and Victorian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), 
labour organisations (Victorian Trades Hall Council), insurers, self-insurers, and OR providers 
(VCORP). The Forum was initially established to oversee the transition from WorkCare to 
WorkCover and has maintained a high profile by assisting the Authority to determine the 
future strategies/direction of occupational rehabilitation within the scheme. Significant input 
and assistance has been received regarding possible legislative changes, implementation and 
resolution of scheme operational and administrative issues, and the WISE programme.
Range of Rehabilitation Services and Programmes
Occupational Rehabilitation Services are primarily directed at promoting/facilitating 
maintenance at or early return to work as soon as is practicable. Returning the injured worker 
to pre-injury duties or suitable employment is preferred. Throughout our interviews, the terms 
"return to work" and "rehabilitation" were used almost interchangeably, although the latter 
was used with some reservations, apparently because of connotations from the WorkCare and 
VARC experience.
Physical, occupational, and remedial therapy may all be important in providing the 
basis for a successful return to work. Under the direction of the worker's physician or by 
worker consultation with chiropractic, naturopathic or physiotherapy practitioner, these
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services are all available within the scheme. For those requiring orthotics and prosthetics, the 
service, fitting and supply of these adaptive devices are also covered. The VWA is a sponsor 
of the paralympic programme and some of Australia's elite athletes with disabilities have 
become spokespersons for WorkCover. The depth of commitment of the organisation to this 
ideal is reflected in policies that allow for the purchase of such items as specialised prosthetics 
and wheel chairs for competition.
There is no defined "early intervention" programme within the jurisdiction, although 
several insurers report that they routinely review all employer claims either upon establishment 
of the claim or within the first 6 months to identify cases that may benefit from such a referral. 
OR providers report lengthy delays in referral after injury, often well beyond 6 months. 
Integrated, interdisciplinary treatment programmes that involve physiotherapy, vocational 
counselling, and education components are not generally supported.19 Chronic pain 
programmes, back education and evaluation services, and group work are not generally funded 
although pilot programmes and specific arrangements have been funded in some cases. 
Rehabilitation services for prescription-drug addiction, chronic pain syndrome, and post injury 
self-image or vocational identity counselling are not specifically defined as occupational 
rehabilitation services. Other services that are more "educational" and "counselling" oriented 
are similarly undefined by the legislation but are, apparently, offered to some individuals 
within the system. Physiotherapists, for example, sometimes offer "counsel" and "education" 
incidental to or in combination with "treatment."
For some workers, the iatrogenic, non-compensable and combined psycho-social impact 
of injury and other life issues form effective barriers to occupational rehabilitation and return 
to work. Whether covered by the scheme or not, the sequelae to workplace injury have played 
pivotal roles hi the course of many lives. If medical treatment, physical rehabilitation and 
occupational rehabilitation form the primary and secondary interventions, then community 
resources play an important tertiary role.
19A project is now underway to determine opportunities for more wide-spread recognition of integrated 
programmes.
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Through discretionary grant programmes, community-based "rehabilitation" 
programmes are also funded by the Authority. These programmes, often offered through social 
and community health centres, provide both specified return-to-work preparation programmes 
and, more importantly, the supportive milieu that may prevent further deterioration, 
consolidate and stabilize the worker's current situation, and encourage the re-establishment of 
a positive self-image and an appropriate disability identity that may eventually lead to 
successful vocational or avocational outcomes.
Some cases require re-education as part of rehabilitation. Educational institutions 
provide services that are paid for as "rehabilitation" expenses. These cases are not always 
easily identified in the database, but tuition, books, equipment and like expenses are provided 
under the scheme. Workers engaged hi training programmes are identified in the ACCtion 
system as "not incapable" and are not differentiated from others in receipt of benefits. It is not 
possible, without detailed file review, to determine in which specific programmes workers 
have been directed for re-training most often.
Over and above these directly funded services are services provided by other aspects of 
the social safety net. Commonwealth Rehabilitation Services (CRS), for example, provide 
rehabilitation to the broader community on a national basis. While some VWA cases are 
referred directly to CRS programmes and services, a number of cases that have a work-related 
injury (often involving a significant or protracted dispute but occasionally involving stoic or 
passive individuals) find their way to CRS for rehabilitation services. These cases and the 
services provided are not funded by the VWA.
The WISE Programme
The WorkCover Incentive Scheme for Employers (WISE) programme is aimed at 
workers who are unable to return to their accident employer. An employer receives an up-front 
grant of up to $2,000 and a wage subsidy payable at weeks 12 and 24 of a placement. The 
subsidy is equal to 50 percent of the gross weekly earnings to a maximum of $390 per week. A 
further $2000 may be sought in weeks 45 and 52 as work stability payments.
The VWA has promoted the programme in various media and has produced booklets
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encouraging potential employers to register vacancies for specific jobs. The central registry is 
housed with the Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI) and the 
programme is funded by the insurers in proportion to their market share. VECCI provides a 
coordinator, computer service and telephone support. Job opportunities are faxed daily to 
registered providers with summaries provided weekly. Providers receive a placement fee of 
$500 in week one and a durability fee of $500 in week 12 if the placement is successful. 
Additional funds for workplace modification and the fees paid to providers to assess and 
implement these may also be covered.
According to VWA, 226 registrations were made during 1995-96, with 73 of these 
resulting from job opportunities actually nominated through the Central Job Register. It is 
reported that many employers have discontinued use of the register because the system is 
unable to provide suitable candidates. Organised labour claims that the average referral to the 
WISE programme occurs some 20 months after injury. Assuming these workers are partially 
incapacitated, that means that their benefits will likely be terminated hi only 4 months. Under 
these circumstances, it is difficult to motivate insurers to invest in workplace modification, or 
other supportive services. It is cheaper to just let the benefits expire.
However, the VWA reviewed the average cost of WISE placements against estimated 
weekly benefits that would have been payable if the worker had not been placed using WISE. 
They estimated that nearly $2 million in weekly benefits had been saved. For the 32 percent of 
cases that received weekly benefits after WISE placement, i.e., another disability spell, the 
average weekly benefit amount was reduced by 70 percent.
Other Internal Services
For the long-term, seriously injured workers, there may be little attachment to an 
insurer or an employer. These cases, many totally incapacitated for one reason or another, 
have very special needs. For this population, there are also unique issues that require long- 
term monitoring and periodic intervention. Determining the appropriate level of personal care, 
assessing drug use, and maintaining these injured workers in the highest enabling environment 
are challenging issues. For these workers, there likely will be a continuing need for assessment
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and re-assessment. Unfortunately, even with a falling claims rate, the numbers of individuals 
in this category will continue to grow over time due to extremely long durations. They may 
also pose an additional moral and fiscal challenge to the VWA since it is unlikely many of 
them will be able to return to their former employment.
The Authority has one manager devoted to the task of overseeing these special cases. 
As a facilitator and coordinator of services, this manager consults and advises on the services 
provided to these cases. Services may include independence and home maintenance services 
such as vehicle modifications and housing renovations, even painting. Unlike some 
jurisdictions which provide an on-going allowance for independence and home maintenance 
issues, each case hi Victoria is decided on an individual basis as the need arises. The Authority 
also provides an information line that may be a point of contact for a despondent worker or 
family member. A sessional contract psychologist is available for consultation but, for the most 
part, cases are directed back to the authorised insurers. The most complex cases are referred to 
the internal VWA manager to address.
The Authority is currently developing pilot coordinated care programmes for the most 
complex cases in the system in an effort to provide the worker and medical practitioner with 
the appropriate means, mechanisms, and support to ensure that these cases receive quality 
effective care.
Other External Services
Authorised Insurers make a variety of resources and services available to claims 
officers, employers and others. Some insurers have in-house rehabilitation staff while others 
use contracted or wholly owned subsidiaries to provide rehabilitation services or claims 
management advice. Those that have internalised rehabilitation resources into their own 
administration provide these services as part of the claims process and not as a billed service. 
Counselling, basic assessment and, in some cases, the direct contracting of services may be 
approved and provided within an authorised insurers' operation. Since there are no separately 
billed expenditures, the quantity and nature of services actually provided cannot be determined.
Some employers and authorised self-insurers also use the services of employee
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assistance plans (EAPs) to augment the services covered by the scheme. These plans are 
generally staffed by professional counsellors who can address the full range of counselling 
services including vocational and occupational issues. Again, there is no formal recording of 
these services with respect to the VWA. Similarly, any service contracted by an employer for 
the benefit of his or her employees generally is not reported to the VWA. While the policy 
requires use of registered OR providers for VWA purposes, there are no restrictions on the use 
of non-registered personnel for services not charged against the scheme.
Rehabilitation-Oriented Research
Various research initiatives funded by VWA have taken a broader view of the system 
and the impact of current policies on rehabilitation issues. In cooperation with the Victorian 
Trades Hall Council (VTHC), the VWA sponsored a review of the barriers to effective 
rehabilitation.20 In addition, a detailed analysis of the occupational rehabilitation services 
industry in Victoria was completed by Gadiel and Ridoutt.21 This review applies standard 
market analysis to the industry and raises issues of accreditation, market concentration and data 
sufficiency. The willingness of the VWA to participate in such examinations is indicative of a 
sincerity of purpose in furthering the understanding of rehabilitation issues.
Several groups, however, complained that the research produced by the organisation 
was not readily available or widely published. Many professionals expressed the opinion that 
the VWA should be more pro-active in doing internal research and sponsoring appropriate 
academic research that would be authoritative, reproducible, and publishable. Such research, 
particularly if designed in cooperation with key professional groups, would command a greater 
degree of credibility amongst these groups. This may be of particular importance to the
^Jeanette Sdrinis, VTHC/VWA Rehabilitation and Return to Work Project Identifying the Barriers to 
Effective Rehabilitation and Return to Work of Injured Workers, Final Report and Recommendations, Melbourne, 
Victoria, May 1995.
2 'David Gadiel and Lee Ridoutt, "A Review of the Occupational Rehabilitation Services Industry in 
Victoria, Health Care Intelligence, December 1995.
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development of clinical practice guidelines for physiotherapy, chiropractic and occupational 
medicine, for example.
As pointed out earlier, much analysis is currently based on the ACCtion database. The 
utility of this data system for detailed research is currently being explored through work at the 
University of Melbourne.22 The VWA has funded nearly $500,000 in rehabilitation research 
over the past 3 years and has a continuing commitment to this programme. This interest in 
academic research, prospective studies and empirical research that contributes to the 
development of knowledge beyond any immediate business gain has the potential to be an 
important contribution to the rehabilitation professions in Australia and elsewhere.
Service Delivery Personnel
Rehabilitation services are provided by a variety of professional, semi-professional and 
designated staff. The following section parallels the rehabilitation process from the employer, 
through the authorised insurers, health care professionals and authorised providers. This is not 
intended to describe all possible individuals involved in the delivery of rehabilitation services 
but, rather, to illustrate the range of personnel involved in the process. This section also 
highlights some of the key procedures and tools employed and records some of the key issues 
and views presented by representatives of these service delivery personnel.
Return-to-work Coordinators
More than any other position, the Return-to-work Coordinator is key to the access to 
occupational rehabilitation in Victoria. The Act requires the employer to nominate a return-to- 
work coordinator. This person is not necessarily a professional in rehabilitation or related 
discipline, nor is there a requirement for such individuals to have specific training. There are, 
however, mandatory functions assigned to this individual. Section 161 of the Act prescribes the 
folio whig functions for the RTW coordinator:
22Dr. Peter Disler.
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(a) assist injured workers, where prudent and practicable, to remain at or return to 
work as soon as possible after injury;
(b) liaise with any parties involved in the occupational rehabilitation of, or 
provision of medical or hospital services to, an injured worker;
(c) monitor the progress of an injured worker's capacity to return to work;
(d) ensure that, where reasonably necessary, an injured worker is given assess to 
occupational rehabilitation services;
(e) take steps to as far as practicable prevent recurrence or aggravation of the 
relevant injury upon the worker's return to work.
Of necessity, terms such as "prudent" and "reasonably necessary" involve judgments 
based on knowledge and experience. In practice, the role of RTW Coordinator is carried out 
by a variety of personnel. In many smaller firms, the task falls to a pay clerk. In some larger 
organisations, a human resources or safety officer is delegated this responsibility. While it was 
acknowledged that most RTW Coordinators were well meaning, there were general concerns 
among those we interviewed over the confidentiality, knowledge, and skill demands placed on 
these individuals. There were also concerns that, in an effort to hasten early return to 
employment, well-meaning but uninformed personnel may adversely affect recovery in some 
cases. Similarly, the wide variability in experience, skill and knowledge could result in late 
involvement or referral to OR providers. Again, these concerns are likely more valid among 
smaller employers or those where the RTW Coordinator position is subject to rotation or 
turnover.
Since this position has been made pivotal to the occupational rehabilitation of injured 
workers hi Victoria, there is an implicit requirement for a knowledge base and an 
understanding of the requirements for confidentiality as well as appropriate support. The VWA 
produces a variety of publications that outline how the functions should be carried out but no 
formal training is required for those taking on this position.23 For employers with few injuries, 
regardless of payroll size, there may be insufficient incentive to develop effective RTW 
Coordinators. Even if the investment is made in training those assigned the task, skills may not
23The TAPE system offers a 5-day training programme for RTW Coordinators, and VECCI offers 
formally structured training programmes of shorter duration. Such training although developed with the VWA 
remains voluntary.
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be used for many months or even years, diminishing both the effectiveness and utility of the 
advanced training. For those employers with relatively frequent injuries or with well 
established disability management programmes, the appointment of an appropriate and 
knowledgeable individual is less of an issue. These firms generally will have selected an 
individual to deal with disability issues regardless of the requirement.
Tools employed by RTW Coordinators include graduated return-to-work programmes 
and alternate duty programmes. These can be particularly useful hi assisting a full return to 
work, maintaining the employer-worker relationship, and mitigating the costs of disability both 
to the worker and the employer. Many labour representatives supported the general concept of 
both programmes. They pointed out, however; that these programmes only work well with 
specific employers in specific industries, usually where the utilisation of such programmes is 
part of complete rehabilitation process and disability management plan. Employers' 
representatives, too, voiced some concerns regarding the RTW coordinator skills and the 
difficulties in providing alternate employment for injured workers. 24
General Practitioners / Family Physicians
For the majority of injured workers, the family physician will be the prune medical 
contact during recovery. The VWA has aggressively sought to inform the general public of the 
physician's role hi rehabilitation and return to work. Mass media campaigns, for example, 
have been based on the theme, "What kind of doctor sends an injured worker back to 
work? .... A doctor who cares." The VWA has backed up this message with a 
physician-developed guide booklet outlining the role of the general practitioner in WorkCover 
cases. 25
As described earlier, the physician is the person normally charged with the 
responsibility of completing medical certificates. These are critical to receiving weekly benefits
24VWA-approved training programmes are offered through TAPE and VECCI. The availability of the 
training was less of an issue than the difficulties from an employer point of view in determining who to train and 
when. The difficulties noted in the previous paragraph are not diminished by the fact that training is available.
^Dr. Ray Moore, The Role of General Practitioners in WorkCover, VWA: November 1995.
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and tend to maintain the contact with the GP. Physicians are encouraged to emphasise what the 
worker can do and to draw comparisons with sports injuries. Although encouraged to maintain 
contact with the worker and facilitate positive dialogue amongst the various players in the 
system, some physicians complained that the phone call demands of insurance adjudicators, 
RTW Coordinators, and others were an interruption to their normal practices. While some 
acknowledge that the fee structure provided by the VWA schedule offsets some of these costs, 
there was a general complaint that any fee premium was more than offset by additional cost.
Physicians are the main source of referral to other rehabilitation personnel. Referrals to 
physiotherapists and others that provide physical rehabilitation treatment are consistent with 
typical professional practice. This is not the case, however, when it comes to referral to 
occupational rehabilitation providers. The following is the advice provided to physicians 
regarding occupational rehabilitation:
GPs and employers may refer the worker to a provider but the referral has to be 
approved by the employer. Funding is often only granted for a specific amount and for 
specific services. Unreasonable refusal to attend could result in cessation of benefits for 
the worker. Employers now have nominated preferred rehabilitation providers.
You should expect to be kept informed about the rehabilitation provider's 
recommendations and an opportunity for the worker to discuss matters with you should 
be offered before rehabilitation starts. 26
One specific concern raised by physicians in the course of our interviews was the 
practice of employer or insurer substitution of provider. In some cases, a physician will 
specifically name an occupational rehabilitation provider in his/her referral. This 
named-referral may be based on the physician's previous experience, specific knowledge of the 
provider's success in dealing with certain injury types, or other reason based on professional 
judgment. At some point, however, the referral is re-directed to the employer's or insurer's 
preferred provider or other registered provider. This substitution was called "unethical" by 
some and ill-advised by others.
26Ibid., p. 15. Note also that the rehabilitation provider no longer has to be approved by the employer.
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Physiotherapists
In Victoria, continuing certification of incapacity is under the control of physio 
therapists as well as physicians. In fact, workers are free to seek treatment directly with the 
therapist of their choice without referral from a physician. However, the initial certification of 
incapacity must be provided by a physician. Physiotherapists provide manual therapy 
techniques, including mobilisation and manipulation, therapeutic exercise, physical agents and 
mechanical modalities, electro therapeutic modalities, microwave and diathermy, hydro- 
therapy, and massage. They often are involved in assisting injured workers in adjustment to 
disability. The rather arbitrary line between "treatment" and "counselling," with the latter 
being assigned to OR providers, is often crossed hi clinical practice. While this may 
compromise statistical analysis, such encroachments are likely to be a positive rather than 
negative influence on the worker's recovery.
The Australian Physiotherapy Association (APA) represents some 2000 physio 
therapists in professional practice hi Victoria. About 80 percent of registered physiotherapists 
are covered as members of this association. The high degree of membership provides a strong 
collegial and professional body which represents the interests of physiotherapists to the VWA. 
There is also a separate registration board and organisation for massage practitioners.
As a professional body, the APA has worked closely with the VWA and they 
participate in the peer review process for physiotherapists described above. The APA endorses 
a full programme of peer review rather than just directing attention to high-end utilisation. 
They also expressed concern over the development of treatment protocols for back injuries, 
recommending adherence to clinical practice guidelines produced by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council. They believe that the VWA should be more pro-active in doing 
clinical research and sponsoring appropriate academic research hi conjunction with 
professional bodies like the APA. Such research would then give a greater degree of credibility 
to such things as practice guidelines and would be more readily adopted by their membership 
as well as injured workers.
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Occupational Medicine Providers
There are relatively few physicians with occupational medicine specialty designation in 
Victoria. These specialists offer services to workers and employers and are occasionally 
aligned with a registered occupational rehabilitation provider, physiotherapy provider or 
integrated treatment programme. While they have very specific skill and knowledge, they are 
faced with similar problems to those of the general practitioners and the additional challenges 
of OR providers. Substitution of referrals, the lack of rehabilitation and occupational medicine 
knowledge amongst insurers, and a general lack of autonomy were often mentioned as 
concerns by these professionals. The "second guessing" by employers and insurers of what 
should be routine decisions to refer a case for rehabilitation services was said to be an 
unnecessary step that actually delayed interventions and could prolong patient recovery and 
return to work.
Some occupational medicine specialists also act as Independent Medical Advisers. 
These physicians perform medical examinations at the request of insurers in order to assist in 
decision-making on individual cases. The medical reports of these physicians, however, are not 
routinely shared with the treating physicians. This imbalance or asymmetry in information is 
often based on a concern for confidentiality yet, for the treating physician, these reports may 
be extremely useful in determining the appropriate rehabilitation activities that may be required 
in individual cases.
Occupational medicine has much to offer both the injured workers and other medical 
and rehabilitation personnel in the WorkCover system. VWA is currently developing a training 
cycle for physicians. This may take some time to implement but is believed to be an important 
initiative. There was a common call for greater consultation and involvement of professionals 
from occupational medicine and rehabilitation on training, education, ethics, confidentiality 
and treatment topics. The VWA Advisory Committee, if more actively utilised, was cited as an 
appropriate forum for such consultation.
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Occupational Rehabilitation Providers
The term "Occupational Rehabilitation" in Victoria describes a set of services, not a 
profession. While those engaged in delivering the services defined under the Act are 
Occupational Rehabilitation providers, the personnel are drawn from a number of disciplines: 
Physiotherapists (15 percent), Vocational and Rehabilitation Counsellors (19 percent), and 
Occupational Therapists (42 percent) to name a few. Figure 7.3 shows the distribution 
graphically. Between 700 and 800 occupational health professionals are associated with the 100 
or so approved OR providers; however, the full time equivalents are somewhat lower than 
that—around 650.27 There are several large registered occupational rehabilitation providers, 
with the top five producing about 60 percent of the aggregate billings. Three registered 
providers are owned and operated by insurance companies while the remainder are either 
private (for profit) operations or not for profit (and public) agencies.
The Victorian Council of Occupational Rehabilitation Providers (VCORP) represents 
some but not all of the providers. Some providers are active in the Australian Society of 
Rehabilitation Counsellors or other professional groups, but membership or accreditation is not 
a requirement of registration. Providers are registered by the VWA. This registration involves 
review of credentials and is tantamount to an "approval" system. Unlike some states or 
provinces in North America that require rehabilitation personnel to be certified by an 
professional association or licenced by a governing college or body, there is no analogous 
system in Victoria.
This does not mean that the professionals providing service are in any way inferior to 
their counterparts in other jurisdictions. Many are, in fact, members of such professional 
bodies and are subject to periodic accreditation and continuing education programmes to 
maintain professional standing. The Australian Society of Rehabilitation Counsellors, for 
example, has developed core competencies and a code of ethics similar in content to the 
Commission on Rehabilitation Counsellor Certification (CRCC) in North America. The
7Gadiel and Ridoutt, op. cit., p. 23.
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absence of an outside independent body with the responsibility to accredit providers, however, 
makes VWA the de facto accreditation body in the jurisdiction.
In the absence of a universally accepted accrediting body, there is no objective or 
professional assessment of the quality of services provided to VWA clients. Some providers 
have services that extend beyond occupational rehabilitation towards the closely allied areas of 
physiotherapy treatment or occupational health and safety (or both), while others augment their 
service repertoire to include geriatric assessment, pre-employment screening and rehabilitation 
of non-VWA clients.
Effective assessment is another key determinant of successful rehabilitation. Providers 
use the typical range of professional tools and methods to assist in rehabilitation. Some 
facilities are equipped with work sampling stations, psychometric testing facilities and even 
an ERGOS28 computerized assessment installation. The technical counselling ability and 
competencies in vocational assessment, training and job placement, and rehabilitation 
philosophy are well represented within the provider community.
Community-Based RTW Projects and Services
The VWA offers grants for specific projects sponsored by community-based 
organisations. These grants are targeted at workers who have or had an accepted claim and 
who have exhausted all other avenues of support under the VWA scheme. Eligible workers are 
those without an employer or current employment and 18 months without regular employment. 
Generally, other barriers to employment must also exist. The VWA lists the following 
"disadvantages": age, occupation, employer, language, literacy or geographic location, and a 
risk of long-term detachment form the labour force.29 The grants support programmes to assist 
in placement or self-placement, facilitate access to vocational training, and provide relevant 
information on worker rights. Projects are run by non-profit, community-based organisations,
28ERGOS work simulators are free-standing, computer-monitored, task sampling units used for 
standardized evaluation and assessment.
29VWA, "Community Based Return-to-work Projects: Policy Guidelines—Return-to-work Services," a 
companion document to the "Guidelines for Applicants 1995/96 Funding."
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often specialising in support and health programmes for a geographic or cultural community.
These organisations operate in centres that are close to the people they serve and are 
often less imposing than the formal clinical and office settings in which most other service 
delivery personnel operate. The range of services offered are generally more holistic and 
reflective of the community. For example, VWA clients may be in support groups with 
individuals recovering from car accidents and sports injuries. Family members are often 
included in such programmes at the community level.
While appreciative of the grants they receive, community-based resources seek a 
greater recognition of the contribution they make to mitigating the collateral consequences of 
injury. Even cases that result hi a failure from a return-to-work point of view may be 
successful in raising the potential of the individual to eventually succeed, preventing a further 
deterioration of functioning, or fostering adjustment to the permanent effects of a disability.
Authorised Insurers
The 14 authorised insurers have varying arrangements with respect to rehabilitation 
services. As authorised insurers, they are responsible for ensuring the compliance of those 
policy holders they underwrite with the requirements of the legislation, including the creation 
of rehabilitation policies. Most offer some assistance to their employers in such compliance, 
and in working with the RTW coordinators on developing rehabilitation and return-to-work 
plans. As the "claims" managers, they are responsible for the adjudication and on-going 
management of claims. This includes referral to OR providers.
One of the challenges for the insurers is the identification of cases that will benefit from 
an OR referral. In a reactive mode, those insurers can wait for the identification to be made by 
the treating medical practitioner, the employer, the union, or the worker. Physiotherapists and 
others involved in medical treatment may also suggest that such a referral may be in order. In a 
more pro-active mode, the claims agent will identify cases that would benefit from a referral. 
The mechanism for this latter process varies amongst authorised insurers.
Some insurers have dedicated rehabilitation professionals (rehabilitation counsellors, 
occupational health nurses, counselling psychologists, occupational therapists and the like) on
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staff. These are often called upon or are involved in routine file review to monitor the need for 
occupational rehabilitation services. In some cases, initial assessments are conducted by these 
personnel. In others, these in-house specialists may be empowered to make referrals directly to 
an OR provider. More commonly, however, it is the claims officer or manager who has the 
decision-making authority with respect to such referrals.
The number of these insurer in-house occupational rehabilitation resources is growing. 
Interviews reveal three main reasons for this: increased recognition of the value of earlier 
rehabilitation interventions, growing monitoring and audits by the VWA, and a greater 
understanding of the complexity of rehabilitation issues, both hi terms of long-term cost drivers 
and worker outcomes. It is important to note that the time and activities provided in-house by 
insurers are not captured by the ACCtion system. These services form part of the overhead 
costs of authorised insurers. Only external expenditures are coded by the insurer on an item, 
case and provider basis.
Several insurers have allied themselves with specific providers. Several stakeholders 
raised ethical issues around these arrangements. Unlike the "managed care" models in private 
insurance where there are complete referral networks or health management organisations that 
provide integrated care programmes as part of the policy offering, the Victorian system 
involves a higher degree of choice. The practice of employer or insurer substitution of one 
particular provider for the named referral of a physician or occupational medicine specialist 
was raised as a significant issue by a number of those interviewed.
The issue of "self-referral,*' that is, referral by an authorised insurer to its own OR 
provider, raises some ethical and principal-agent problems as well. Absent specific regulations 
to the contrary, it is possible for an insurer to direct more cases to its own subsidiary than to 
any other provider. The fear is that such referrals could be made for profitability reasons as 
much as for professional requirements. The VWA is aware of this potential problem. Although 
pattern analysis by the VWA has determined little difference hi either the referral rates or 
actual service provision, one study claimed that the main referral source for insurer-linked OR 
providers was insurers (52 percent of referrals). This is nearly four tunes the insurer-referral
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rate overall (at 13.1 percent).30 Later data from VWA indicates that the three insurers with 
organisational links to OR providers in 1995-96 accounted for between 26 and 60 percent of all 
OR services to their claimants.
Self-Insurers
Typically, self-insured employers have an administrative unit responsible for claims. In 
some organisations, this unit reports through a human resources structure, but in others the 
function is combined with risk management, occupational safety and health, or operations. The 
administrative unit may have a manager or staff familiar with rehabilitation, but it is not 
required. Many have rehabilitation policies that extend beyond the mandated measures of the 
VWA and are more reflective of the full disability management philosophy emerging 
internationally. Employee assistance programmes, graduated return-to-work plans and 
ergonomic adaptations and modifications may be applied equally as well to those injured in the 
workplace and those whose injury or disease is of non-workplace origins.
Several interviews revealed that self-insurers are relatively pleased with the autonomy 
offered by the self-insurance scheme. In particular, the ability to use all the employer's benefits 
programmes and policies to assist a disabled worker was highlighted. However, some critics 
reported that this same flexibility can be used to "buy-out" a worker in such a way as to 
relieve the employer of potential costs. Although such options would also exist among some 
non-self-insured firms, insured firms are subject to a higher degree of outside monitoring and 
reporting through their insurers and, by way of insurer audits, the VWA.
Integrated Programmes
Most workers' compensation jurisdictions have providers that offer integrated 
rehabilitation programmes. These are often associated with pain clinics, back programmes or 
general rehabilitation facilities. Victoria has several facilities in this category that offer
iel and Ridoutt, op. cit., p. 24. The analysis draws upon data from a provider self-assessment 
survey.
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consolidated services that may include programmes from post-surgical convalescence through 
pain management, occupational therapy, rehabilitation workshops, speech pathology, to 
complementary therapy programmes in stress release, physical and remedial exercise, and 
group support sessions. These facilities may also offer general counselling, functional capacity 
assessment, worksite assessments and modifications. Technology including Kin Com, B200 
and other assessment/diagnostic/treatment tools are often integrated into the programmes. In 
general, the programmes offered by these facilities are hi accord with the rehabilitation 
programmes accredited through CARF in North America.
These facilities illustrate most acutely the artificial line between "medical" and 
"occupational" rehabilitation programmes. Holistic programmes are established by the 
facilities, which are interdisciplinary by nature and not easily segmented for approval on a 
"coded line item basis," as required by the VWA. This creates barriers to admission with some 
such facilities requiring detailed approval before admission. Prior approvals, restricted 
provider status and lengthy payment procedures are seen as the major hurdles to more effective 
use of these facilities. One administrator suggested that development of "programme-based" as 
opposed to "service-based" codes could facilitate more appropriate use of these facilities.
Outcomes
For the majority of workers and employers, "outcomes" in rehabilitation mean 
successful, cost-effective and durable return to work. Measurement of these outcomes, 
however, is never easy. Each of these terms—"successful," "cost-effective" and "durable"— 
are subjective and highly dependent on the question asked, the tune-frames considered and the 
definitions used. The VWA has invested in a series of evaluations and studies that attempt to 
quantify outcomes. Many of these studies have been reflected in the preceding discussion or 
directly cited elsewhere in this report.
Occupational Rehabilitation Outcomes
The following discussion carries with it an important caveat. There is no statistic that 
will indicate whether a system is working optimally. Any measure may be disputed and any
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number discredited if the assumptions that underlie it are not accepted. The following 
discussion of outcomes, therefore, includes the perceptions of the stakeholders as well as the 
statistics and percentages associated with outcome analysis.
The "Return-to-work rate" for the VWA is reported at about 86 percent—a figure that 
compares well with other jurisdictions including South Australia (at 82 percent)? 1 and New 
South Wales32 and is a startling improvement over the 54 percent RTW rate reported under the 
WorkCare system in 1992.33 Further, the quality of these RTW rates are relatively high, with 
same employer/same duties continuity at 66 percent.34 However, there are still a significant 
number of persons who, by definition were workers at the time of injury, but have not 
succeeded in a full return to work. Therefore, it seems worth pushing beyond the numbers to 
report the perceptions of system participants.
Surveys and Interview Findings
In more than 60 interviews we conducted, stakeholders were asked the following 
question: "What has the VWA got right?" Almost without exception, employers, worker 
representatives, academics and providers stated that the VWA has correctly emphasised the 
connection between worker and employer as the fundamental relationship. Taken hi the 
historical context of workers' compensation in Victoria, this agreement constitutes a significant 
positive outcome. Current disability management theory professes this relationship as a 
fundamental tenet, (see Akabas, Gates and Galvin 1992) Through the reshaping of its 
compensation and rehabilitation programmes in 1992 and its aggressive advertising since, this 
message is clearly getting through to employers, workers, physicians, occupational 
rehabilitation providers and others.
3lCampbell Research & Consulting, "Return to Work: A Benchmark Comparison of South Australian and 
Victorian return-to-work Rates," July 1996, p. 8.
32The Boston Consulting Group, "Workers' Compensation in Victoria: Case Study of a Major 
Turnaround," February 1996, p. 12.
33Ibid.
^Campbell, op. cit., p. 13.
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Part of the message presented by the VWA is the connection between injury and costs. 
The experience rating system, 10-day employer "excess," and the required prior approval for 
occupational rehabilitation expenditures reinforce this message. Employers connect the 
expenditures and system costs with their own premium rates. The message, however, may not 
be perfectly understood. Many employers believe that a rehabilitation expenditure paid through 
the system will have a three-fold impact on total costs, because of the experience rating 
calculation. One employer representative said that, before a decision was taken regarding a 
certain occupational rehabilitation expenditure, consultants were called in to consider the dollar 
impact on the firm's rate and to weigh the rate consequences of turning down the plan.
There is also a dichotomy in outcomes when it comes to assessing the success of the 
mandated Occupational Rehabilitation programmes, RTW plans, and the RTW Coordinator 
function. Survey data indicate a high degree of compliance, "ownership" and, indeed, 
successful return to work.35 There were, however, significant criticisms of performance from 
both workers and employers. On rehabilitation outcomes, workers supported early return-to- 
work initiatives but indicated that, where alternate duties are meaningless or unavailable, the 
RTW policy can actually have a negative effect on self-esteem. Employers, too, generally 
approved of the early RTW policy but found its success to be highly dependent on the 
individual worker and his/her characteristics. They also reaffirmed the difficulty many 
employers have in finding suitable alternate employment for their injured workers.
While the VWA has been very successful in communicating the idea of early RTW, 
commissioned survey results and the interviews conducted as part of this study indicate that 
Occupational Rehabilitation Services are not highly valued by employers. Expenditures were 
seen as "costs" rather than as investments that could result in positive, cost-saving outcomes. 
On the other hand, workers who had been exposed to OR services were, according to survey
35Two "waves" of participant survey data were prepared for the VWA by Klein & Associates hi 1994 and 
1995. These showed a higher degree of compliance in larger employers. A subsequent survey (Study No. 1669, 
July 1996) by the same market research group investigated employer and worker attitudes toward return to work 
in the Melbourne small business sector. This study and another (Study No. 1608, June 1996, which focused on a 
similar population hi Ararat) found highly consistent attitudes among all stakeholders.
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results, highly complimentary and suggested that these services played a key role in both their 
rehabilitation and early return to work.
Another recurring theme among employers, physicians and OR providers was a concern 
about the lack of rehabilitation knowledge amongst insurance claims staff. Some insurers admit 
this limitation but point to their creation or expansion of internal professional rehabilitation 
resources to augment their claims management. They also have made efforts to develop greater 
claims officer knowledge to ensure that workers receive appropriate occupational rehabilitation 
services.
The VWA has made significant efforts to ensure that workers are returned to work as 
soon as practicable. The key role of the RTW Coordinator and the necessity to have an 
occupational rehabilitation plan in place as mandated by the legislation have been identified as 
strengths. It appears, however, that there is wide disparity in compliance among smaller 
employers. There is evidence that more than a third of small employers are not in compliance 
with the requirements of the Act.36 The corollary is also documented; larger firms generally do 
comply with the requirements of the legislation.
The WISE programme is the one operationally based initiative fostered by the VWA to 
address those workers who cannot return to their accident employment. While the concept is 
laudable and the investment to support the programme extensive, it has fallen far short of 
expectations and potential. There are varying explanations offered for this. Some suggest that 
competition by other agencies for scarce job opportunities coupled with relatively conservative 
incentives place VWA clients at a disadvantage. The lack of transferable skill analysis and the 
paucity of skill matching within the programme may further contribute to the low level of 
success of this programme. An examination of the design or operation of this programme may 
be in order.
The use of retraining is an appropriate rehabilitation measure. There are clear examples 
of "success stories" as a result of retraining. Little data, however, is available to indicate the
^Ibid., p. 4. A summary of the two survey "waves," ("Assessment of Employer Compliance to 
Occupational Rehabilitation Program Requirements," VWA, October 10, 1995, p. 4), notes that non-compliance 
among small work places (1-10 workers) was 35%.
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degree to which this intervention is utilised and to what success. There was a general 
perception that retraining is no longer taking place despite some media ads produced by the 
VWA that might indicate otherwise. This perception may be addressed through research.
Concluding Observations
There is general agreement in Victoria that early identification and intervention can be 
effective in reducing duration of disability and improving return-to-work outcomes. Providers 
indicate strong support for the return-to-work focus and the efforts of the VWA to maintain the 
connection between worker and employer in the workplace. These initiatives are seen as 
supportive of a general disability management philosophy and consistent with a more 
integrated model of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the value of the approach is seen as 
compromised by the length of time it typically takes for cases to be referred to occupational 
rehabilitation. Anecdotal accounts indicate that "early" referrals for occupational rehabilitation 
assistance are virtually non-existent. As is all too common in worker's compensation systems, 
time elapsed between injury and referral for an initial vocational assessment typically is in 
excess of 6 months. One retrospective study using VWA data found that the mean time 
between accident and referral was 1.42 years.37 More recent analysis by the VWA indicates 
that the median elapsed time between claim report date and first referral to OR services has 
been 152 days for the 12,169 OR referrals to date under WorkCover.
Another important technique for improving worker outcomes in rehabilitation is case 
management. This worker-focused approach provides a clear responsibility for the case 
manager and is characterised by a consistent, progressive series of interactions that lead to 
optimal case resolution. The current structure of the Victorian system prevents most providers 
from becoming "case managers." Providers are often used on strictly time-limited 
interventions with no promise of continuity. An assessment or individualized rehabilitation 
plan may be completed, but unless the insurer or the employer approves the plan, no further
37Ibid., (1994), p. 29. This figure applies to December 1994 Quarter. A footnote on the same page 
compares this to December 1994 statistics from NSW WorkCover Authority which estimated the average period 
from injury to referral to an occupational rehabilitation provider as 6.6 months.
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action can be taken. Some providers report it is typical to see a rise in activity on an earlier 
rehabilitation plan as a case nears conciliation or settlement. However, in the absence of a 
complete case management model, these activities are often not well integrated into a 
continuing, individualized rehabilitation plan.
For a few seriously injured workers, employment outcomes will be limited at best. For 
others, avocational outcomes may be the only realistic option. However, these individuals have 
little ongoing contact with an occupational rehabilitation provider. Generally, the insurer or the 
VWA itself becomes the claims manager for prolonged, permanent total or near-total disability 
claims. Services of an occupational rehabilitation provider may be engaged by either the VWA 
or the insurer, particularly for assessment or specific project management. A case management 
approach could be beneficial to workers hi this category. Various jurisdictions have initiated 
"late intervention" projects in order to meet the needs of injured workers whose claims are of 
extended duration. The goals of such projects may not be full return to work, but such 
initiatives can provide improvements in quality of care and potential for protected or 
productive employment. Some OR providers are assisting in isolated projects of this type. A 
similar approach may prove beneficial for individuals with a higher than expected frequency of 
claims.
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Source: Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council, Annual Reports 
'10 months only, from 1 September 1985
2Actual claims reported. These figures differ from those for estimated incurred claims in Table 3.1 in that the 
latter contains an estimate of incurred, but not yet reported claims (IBNRs).
3The difference between these figures and those for referrals to rehabilitation are accounted for by factors such as 
not being able to contact the worker, the worker having returned to work, the worker having declined 
rehabilitation, and the sufficiency of existing treatments.
4Plan approvals data introduced in October 1986.
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Source: VARC Annual Reports
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Table 7.3 Rehabilitation Services Covered by the VWA
Nature of Service Payment for Provided by
Medical Services attendance, examination or 
treatment of any kind; 
medicines or curative 
apparatus, appliances or 
materials; repairs, adjustments 
or replacement of crutches, 
etc.; certificates or reports 
required or authorised
medical practitioner, registered 
dentist, registered optometrist, 
registered physiotherapist, 
registered chiropractor and 
osteopath or registered 
chiropodist, registered 
pharmacist
Health Services acupuncture, dietary analysis, 




gymnasium, social work, 
speech therapy
professional eligible for 
membership with the relevant 
professional body
Hospital Services maintenance, attendance and 
treatment including medical 
attendance and treatment, 
nursing attendance, medicines, 
medically related materials, 
appliances and apparatus
any public, denominational, or 
private hospital or day 
procedure centre, psychiatric 
in-patient service including out- 
of-state hospitals approved by 
the VWA
In-Patient Charges public or private hospitals with 
special agreements
Out-Patient Charges public or private hospitals
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attendant care, counselling, 
modifications to a home or car, 
household help, transportation 
costs, aid, assistant or other 
medical service
nursing outside a hospital 
setting
any (return) transportation 
required for the purposes of 
receiving medical or hospital 
services
as set out in Section 5 of the 
Act
aids, batteries, cleaning kits
subject to an arms-length, 38 
non-vocational assessment from 
someone other than the 
proposed service provider, 
persons approved by the Health 
and Rehabilitation Branch, 
normally approved in advance. 
No payment is made to a 
spouse or family member for 
services provided. These are 
considered part of their familial 
responsibilities.
registered nurses
any public, private or other 
transportation service provided 
it is the most economical and 
practical given the worker's 
condition. Where by private 
vehicle, no parking expenses 
accepted.
approved providers who are 
either Restricted (RR) or 
Unrestricted (UR)
subject to prior approval, any 
provider.
Source: summarized from Claims Manual: Chapter 5
38The "arms-length non-vocational assessment" is usually defined as a serious injury assessment for 
certain workers. This is an administrative arrangement, not a legislative requirement. Not §Ji personal and 
household services are provided subject to such an assessment.
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Table 7.4 Summary of Occupational Rehabilitation Codes and 

























An examination of the 
current medical situation 






maintenance at or return to
suitable employment.
The objective measurement 
of the injured workers' 
physiological functioning to 
identify work capabilities. 
This code is only to be used 
for objective and verifiable
tests.
Assistance to the worker in 
obtaining appropriate 
vocational re-education
relevant to the identified 
employment goal.
Teaching job-seeking skills, 
such as job application 





























































involving the worker in
simulated or actual work
tasks and activities that are




productivity with the goal of
remaining at work or
returning to suitable
employment.




the totality of the worker's
needs.
Educating the injured
worker to maintain good
physical habits to strengthen
the body and/or mind to
avoid re-injury.
Visit to the workplace to
meet the employer, worker,
return-to-work coordinator
or supervisor to identify
suitable duties to facilitate
maintenance at or return to
work following injury. This
may also include advice
regarding workstation or
equipment modification or





















































Descriptions with Recent Volumes*
Description
Actual cost of modifying
workstation or equipment to
be used by the worker
including the cost of aide,
appliances, apparatus or
other materials to facilitate
maintenance at or return to
work following injury.





Actual cost of vocational
re-education or training
course(s) approved by the
Authority including text
books or other course needs
which are part of the course

































*For 12 months ending 30 June 1996. A worker may, of course, receive more than one service hi any category 
and services in more than one category may be provided to a single individual. Services to workers are also likely 
to be provided over time so any 1-year snapshot will record services being provided for cases having arisen hi 
both the current year and previous years. For the 12 months ending 30 June 1996, 7,042 individuals received 
services under the above codes.
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Table 7.5 Distribution of 1995-96 Occupational Rehabilitation (OR) Expenditures
















































































Medical & Like Practitioners
Health & Safety
Formal channels of report or responsibility following a workplace injury. Note the central role of the RTW Coordinator. 
Main client/ or patient/practitioner relationships.
Source: Adapted from Gadiel and Ridoutt (1995)
Figure 7.2 
Generalized Model of Injury and Recovery with Rehabilitation Process
management Medical management/Certificates
Medical and like (PT, OT, etc)
Return to Work Coordinator
Insurer manages Claim
; Occupational Rehabilitation Services
j Community-based Health and Social Services
Point A:
h r
A worker suffers a work related injury.
But for the injury, the worker's health or functioning would have remained constant over time.
With the injury, the worker's health takes a sudden drop. Medical practitioners manage the acute phase of the 
recovery and, generally, refer the worker to physical rehabilitation.
First two weeks following injury; the employer is responsible for the worker's wages and accident costs up to a 
statutory limit. Beyond this time or financial limit, an authorised insurer manages the claim. Services and liaison 
between the employer and the worker are coordinated by the RTW coordinator.
Where a worker's injury is such that the former level of health/function cannot be attained, the worker is 
permanently impaired and occupational rehabilitation services may be enlisted to assess capacity and transferable 
skills, provide counselling and direction for vocational purposes or to arrange retraining or placement.
Dotted boxes indicate discontinuous activity or involvement.
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Figure 7.3




Source: Adapted from Gadiel and Ridoutt, (1995)
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Chapter 8 THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY DIVISION
Introduction
This chapter addresses issues of importance to the delivery of occupational health and 
safety (OSH) and public safety in Victoria, Australia. Among the questions to be answered are 
the folio whig:
• What are the historical antecedents of the system?
• What is the legal basis for occupational health and safety and public safety?
• How is the system presently organised?
• How are regulations and codes of practice established and updated?
• How is compliance with regulations accomplished?
• What activities compliment the occupational health and safety and public safety 
	mandate of the Health and Safety Division (HSD)?
• What information is available to guide and monitor the effect of OSH activities?
• How are the major stakeholders involved, and what are their concerns?
We will begin with a brief history of workplace safety in Victoria. This will provide an 
understanding of the institutional framework and background for prevention activities. Then, 
we proceed to the legal authority and the structure of the Health and Safety Division (HSD) of 
the Victorian WorkCover Authority. 1 We will review the policies and strategies for promoting 
occupational health and safety, including both enforcement activities and education and 
consultation activities. Last, we will report the concerns of external stakeholders, and internal 
staff as expressed to the research team in the course of our interviews. The chapter concludes 
with some final observations.
1Throughout this chapter we will refer to the VWA Health and Safety Division (HSD), even though this 
is only the latest configuration of the administrative entity under discussion, dating to 2 July 1996. The reason for 
this will become apparent hi the first section of the chapter, "Historical Antecedents."
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Historical Antecedents
The earliest Australian initiatives in relation to workplace safety occurred in Victoria 
In large part this was due to the fact that, until very late into the nineteenth century, Victoria 
was the only colony with significant manufacturing activity; but it was also due to a radical 
tinge in Victorian politics. This latter feature was reflected in such efforts as the colony being 
the first jurisdiction in the world to achieve the eight-hour day and later the adoption of wages 
boards. 2 The very first occupational health and safety measure, the Supervision of Workrooms 
and Factories Statute 1873, was a limited enactment of six sections restricting the hours of 
work by females and enabling the use of regulations in respect of warmth, ventilation, 
cleanliness and sanitation. It was largely a response to revelations in a regional newspaper, the 
Ballarat Courier, of conditions in local clothing factories with "sewing girls" working up to 18 
hours a day in deplorable conditions for extremely low wages. 3
However, the general foundations of occupational health and safety practice in Victoria 
for most of the last hundred years stem from the Factories and Shops Act 1885. This 
enactment, which was drafted by Alfred Deakin, the Victorian Solicitor-General and later to 
become Prime Minister of Australia, resulted from a number of pressures including a 
prominent tailoresses strike and reformist agitation aided by a strong campaign by The Age 
newspaper. 4 It was a measure which was highly derivative of the English Factory and 
Workshop Act 1878, with 40 of its 61 sections being taken from that statute. Among its 
provisions were an absolute prohibition on employment of children in factories, the 
requirement that persons hi charge of boilers hold a certificate of competency, and for the 
fencing of certain machinery. Of particular importance was the appointment of inspectors to 
administer the legislation, thus effectively creating an enforcement mechanism for the first
2See Geoffrey Searle, The Rush to be Rich: A History of the Colony of Victoria 1883-1889. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press (1971), especially chapter 3.
3 See James Hagan, "Employers, Trade Unions and the First Victorian Factory Acts, " Labour History, 
7: 3-10 (1964).
4 Tasman George Parsons, "Alfred Deakin and the Victorian Factory Act of 1885: A Note," Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 14: 206-208 (1972).
8-2
time. The general structure of this legislation provided the framework for subsequent 
legislative measures and governed the approach to occupational health and safety which was to 
hold sway until the 1980s, not just in Victoria but in Australia generally.
This approach was characterised by a plethora of individual measures and by a strong 
attachment to the English tradition of factory legislation.5 The legacy of the fragmented nature 
of legislative and other regulatory initiatives in this area, and their voluminous extent, was 
highlighted by the 1995 Industry Commission report into occupational health and safety, which 
found over 150 statutes which regulate heath and safety at work in Australia and an even 
greater number of regulations and codes of practice. All together there are some 200 
Australian Standards which are referred to in the occupational health and safety legislation or 
hi the codes of practice.6 In relation to fealty to the English model of law and practice, the 
record of occupational health and safety measures was even more striking than that concerning 
workers' compensation arrangements, some of the history of which is traced in Chapter 2 of 
this report. This similarity of form and approach helps explain the relatively rapid adoption by 
the various Australian jurisdictions of the new approach to occupational health and safety 
represented by the Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (the Robens Report) 
hi the United Kingdom and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) which followed that 
Report.
What is equally significant is the almost total historical division between workers' 
compensation and workplace safety arrangements. While the legislation governing the two 
spheres of activity was often administered by the same Government department, there was 
virtually no interaction between these operations. It has only been since the 1970's that 
workers' compensation systems have included more than a slight regard for rehabilitation 
among their operational activities. Meaningful interaction between the agencies charged with
5 The classic account of this tradition is B. L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History of Factory 
Legislation. London: Frank Cass (1926); reissued 1966. Also M. W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation. 
Leigh on Sea: Thomas Bank Publishing (1948).
6 Industry Commission, Work, Health and Safety. Inquiry into Occupational Health and Safety. Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service (1995), vol. 1, p. 44.
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occupational health and safety and occupational disability compensation has been an even more 
recent phenomenon.
The Robens Approach
The traditional approach to workplace safety revolved around prescribed minimum 
standards of safety practice outlined in legislation or regulations, the breach of which 
constituted a criminal offence. The enforcement of these standards was vested in an 
independent public inspectorate with a right to enter and inspect workplaces and to initiate 
prosecutions following detection of a failure to conform to the prescribed requirements.7
Concerns about the relevance and effectiveness of this approach led the British 
Government in 1970 to set up a Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Robens. 
The Committee submitted its Report in June 1972. This report proved to be a catalyst for 
change in Britain, Australia and elsewhere in the world. In a central paragraph of the Report it 
was argued that among the problems of the then current system was "too much law of the 
wrong type" and that "there are severe practical limits on the extent to which progressively 
better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about through negative regulation 
by external agencies."8 The Committee argued that there was need for "a more effective self- 
regulating system" with "the acceptance and exercise of appropriate responsibilities at all 
levels within industry and commerce." 9
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) provided the legislative response which 
picked up the principal recommendations of the Robens Committee and provided for
a series of general duties on employers, occupiers, manufacturers, suppliers and 
employees;
7Breen Creighton and Peter Rozen, Occupational Health and Safety Law in Victoria, 2nd edition. 
Sydney: Federation Press (1997) p. 2. The following discussion of the implementation of the Robens approach in 
the United Kingdom and Australia draws heavily upon this work.
8 Committee on Health and Safety at Work, Health and Safety at Work Report of the Committee 1970-72. 
London: HMSO (1972), para. 41.
'Ibid.
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the making of regulations and codes of practice to support these broad duties; 
• safety representatives and safety committees; and
the establishment of two new statutory bodies, the Health and Safety 
Commission and a Health and Safety Executive to administer and enforce the 
new scheme.
Victoria was the third Australian jurisdiction to attempt Robens-type legislation with the 
Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Act 1981. This legislation
. . . more closely resembled the Robens model than either the original South 
Australian or Tasmanian Acts. It is true that it did not make any serious attempt to 
unify or integrate existing legislative or administrative arrangements, or to adopt more 
responsive and effective enforcement techniques: rather it reenacted, with only slight 
amendments, the principal safety provisions of the Labour and Industry Act 1958 (Vie). 
On the other hand, it did provide for the establishment of a tripartite Industrial Safety, 
Health and Welfare Advisory Council (ss 5-10); and included a series of "general duty" 
provisions (ss ll(l)-(2), 13 and 14) together with a very broad regulation-making 
power (s 33). It also provided for the preparation of health and safety policy statements 
by employers (s 11(3)), and envisaged that employees should be given the right to elect 
health and safety representatives who would, in turn, have the right to require their 
employers to set up a health and safety committee (s 12). For a variety of reasons, the 
only parts of the Act which were ever activated were those which reproduced the 1958 
provisions, and those which dealt with the so-called "general duties." These latter 
appear to have been very little used in practice. In other words, in terms of giving 
effect to the Robens philosophy, the Victorian Act appears not to have had significantly 
more practical impact than its forerunners in South Australia and Tasmania, even 
though it undoubtedly had greater potential than either of these measures. 10
As with the earlier South Australian and Tasmanian enactments, the Industrial Safety, 
Health and Welfare Act 1981 would be repealed and replaced with a more thoroughgoing 
measure, in this case the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985.
The Enactment of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
As was discussed hi Chapter 2, Victorian voters hi April 1982 elected a Labor 
Government for the first time in almost 3 decades. This Government, under the leadership of 
John Cain, was committed, particularly in its earliest years, to a vigorous reform agenda. Part
°Creighton and Rozen, op. cit. at p. 9.
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of this agenda was the overhaul of the system of workplace safety in the state. Prior to the 
assumption of Government, however, the Victorian branch of the Labor Party had, in October 
1981, endorsed a comprehensive occupational health and safety programme. This programme 
included the establishment of an Occupational Health and Safety Commission; the bringing 
together into one administrative unit of the various disparate inspectorates and allied personnel 
dealing with occupational health and safety; giving statutory recognition to worker involvement 
in workplace safety decisions at the enterprise and workplace level; increasing the powers of 
inspectors and the penalties for workplace safety breaches and providing for a comprehensive 
licencing system embracing all workplaces and work processes and all substances used in 
them.
The unveiling of this policy brought about a fiery public debate, particularly over the 
powers of health and safety representatives and the proposal for comprehensive workplace 
licencing. The then Minister for Labour and Industry, Mr. Ramsay, attacked the proposed role 
of health and safety representatives as something which "would amount to a reign of terror on 
employers by trade union organisers with almost unlimited powers in the name of industrial 
safety." 11 The debate continued into the election campaign in early 1982 and occupational 
health and safety policy was specifically included in John Cain's opening campaign speech.
The initial responsibility for occupational health and safety policy in the new Labor 
Government was with the Minister for Labour and Industry12 as was previous practice. 
However, in September 1982, in a transfer of ministerial functions, this responsibility was
HThe Sun, 30 September 1981; cited in Jennifer Doran, "Implementing the Victorian Government's 
Policy on Occupational Health and Safety - 1982-1984" in Breen Creighton & Neil Gunningham (eds) The 
Industrial Relations of Occupational Health & Safety. Sydney: Groom Helm Australia (1985) at p. 138. The 
following account of the developments concerning the original attempt to enact new occupational health and safety 
legislation between 1982 and 1984 draws heavily on this excellent insider account. Jennifer Doran was a 
ministerial adviser on occupational health and safety to the Minister for Employment and Training.
12Whereas most other Australian jurisdictions had one Department dealing with "labour" issues, Victoria, 
prior to the election of the Labor Government and for some years following had at one stage three such 
departmental bodies, namely the Department of Labour and Industry, the Ministry of Employment and Training 
and the Ministry of Industrial Affairs. As well, over time and even after a rationalising of the number of bodies, 
there was a confusing change of departmental nomenclature from the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Affairs to the Department of Labour. When the new Liberal coalition Government assumed power in October 
1992 there was a further change to the Department of Business and Employment.
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given to the Minister for Employment and Training, the portfolio held by Jim Simmonds, who 
had been closely involved in the development of the occupational health and safety policy when 
Labor was in Opposition. Almost immediately the Minister determined upon a public 
consultation policy and, in late March 1983, the Government released a public discussion 
document. This document set out in detail the Government proposals in this area and invited 
comment prior to the final development of legislation envisaged for the 1983 Spring Session of 
Parliament.
Occupational Health and Safety Bill 1983
Some 211 submissions were received including 28 from trade unions, 30 from 
employer associations and 73 from individual employers. The Minister undertook a busy 
schedule of addressing meetings and seminars on the proposals. Meetings were held in all 
major metropolitan and provincial centres. A special sub-committee of the Victorian 
Employment Committee (including representatives from the Victorian Trades Hall Council, 
Metal Trades Industry Association, Master Builders Association and the Department of Labour 
and Industry) considered the various submissions and identified the major areas of agreement 
and disagreement. Following this report, the Minister issued, in late September 1983, a 
"Response to the Submissions on the Government's Public Discussion Paper on Occupational 
Health and Safety" which included significant modification of the Government's original 
proposals.
This was followed, in early October 1983, with the circulation of a draft Occupational 
Health and Safety Bill to major stakeholders for comment which again resulted in significant 
modifications. Then, on 17 November 1983, the Occupational Health and Safety Bill was 
introduced into the Legislative Assembly and given its Second Reading, although there were 
still matters of concern unresolved with some employer groups. Debate was then adjourned 
until March 1984 to allow further consultation with the major interest groups. When 
Parliamentary debate resumed in March 1984 the Government had agreed to move amendments 
which would clarify the duties of employers under the legislation and provide further limitation 
upon the powers of health and safety representatives, together with further rights of appeal.
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The Bill passed the Legislative Assembly, where the Government had a majority, and was 
introduced into the Legislative Council, where it was in a minority, near the end of the 
Parliamentary session. Given the entrenched resistance of the Opposition parties, the 
Government decided not to proceed with the legislation in the Legislative Council. On 
9 October 1984, the Minister announced that "Without tripartite support for the Bill and faced 
with the inevitable action by the Opposition to use its numbers in the Upper House to mutilate 
the legislation, we have had no choice. This is regrettable in view of the Government's 
willingness to substantially amend the legislation in order to get that tripartite support." 13
The Industrial Route and the Legislative Window of Opportunity
It had become apparent to the trade union movement that the prospect of achieving 
substantial statutory overhaul of workplace safety arrangements was unlikely even before the 
Government surrender in October 1984. Accordingly, trade unions had prepared the way to 
secure equivalent processes to those outlined in the proposed legislation, particularly in respect 
to health and safety representatives and committees and the powers and functions of such 
persons and bodies, through negotiated health and safety agreements between individual unions 
and employers. A model for such activity was the agreement signed between unions and 
management at the Williamstown Naval Dockyard in 1982.
Significant early agreements were concluded by relevant unions with the State 
Electricity Commission of Victoria (then the state monopoly electricity utility), the Gas and 
Fuel Corporation (which occupied a similar position to the SECV in the gas industry), the 
Government Aircraft Factories and Comeng Pty Ltd (a large metal manufacturing enterprise). 
The Victorian Trades Hall Council, in May 1984, circulated a "Negotiating Exhibit on 
Occupational Health and Safety Agreements" to its affiliates and the move to industrially 
bargained agreements gained added impetus following the collapse of the 1983 Bill. By July
13 Simmonds, Jim, the Minister for Employment and Training, Press release dated 9 October 1984; cited 
by Doran, op. cit., p. 160.
8-8
1985 there were 17 health and safety agreements formalised in Victoria and many more under 
negotiation. 14
Then, as the result of a conjunction of political circumstances, the Labor Government 
achieved a majority in the Legislative Council for a brief period in mid-1985. During this 
window of opportunity the Government was able to secure passage of the Accident 
Compensation Act 7955, giving force to its workers' compensation proposals, and the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 and the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, effecting its 
workplace safety agenda. These latter two statutes were assented to on 30 July 1985 and 
entered into force on 1 October 1985.
WorkCare Responsibilities and Linkages
Prior to the enactment of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, the Government 
had administratively moved in the direction of implementing its policy of centralising the 
activities of the various inspectorates within one body. From 1 July 1984, the Ministry of 
Employment and Training assumed control of the health and safety responsibilities of the 
Department of Labour and Industry, as well as those of the Occupational Health Division of 
the Health Commission and part of those carried out in the Department of Minerals and 
Energy. In turn, these responsibilities were vested in the Department of Employment and 
Industrial Affairs from October 1985. Thus, with the coming into effect of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act, the operational aspects of workplace safety in Victoria were largely 
centred upon the Department of Employment and Industrial Affairs, which housed the 
inspectorate, while the policy-related aspects of the scheme were largely the function of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission.
As indicated in Chapter 2, the WorkCare system was intended to provide a coherent 
approach to all aspects of workplace safety and occupational disability in terms of injury and 
illness prevention, rehabilitation and compensation. While there were three agencies created to
14 Department of Employment and Industrial Affairs, Working Environment and Policy Division, Review 
of Occupational Health and Safety Agreements (July 1985).
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advance these aims and provide regulatory oversight—namely the Occupational Health and 
Safety Commission, the Victorian Accident Rehabilitation Council and the Accident 
Compensation Commission—it was intended that there would be a greater degree of scheme 
synergy than in fact occurred. However, one of the objects of the Accident Compensation Act 
was "to reduce the incidence of accidents and diseases in the workplace"15 and pursuant to this 
mandate the workers' compensation component of WorkCare became the major underwriter of 
the costs of the new workplace safety arrangements. This funding rose from $4.4 million in 
1988-89 (around 44 percent of budget) to $17.6 million in 1992-93 (about 70 percent of 
budget). The remaining funding, mainly in later years to fund dangerous goods activities, was 
derived from the Government's central consolidated revenue.
As well as sustaining the occupational health and safety organisational infrastructure, 
these funds also supported a range of workplace safety initiatives. Prominent among these was 
the provision of seed funding to the Victorian Trades Hall Council and individual trade unions, 
as well as employer associations, to establish or extend training for health and safety 
representatives and managers/supervisors, respectively, in occupational health and safety 
matters. Some ancillary workplace safety initiatives by external bodies were also funded. This 
element of funding reached $4 million in 1988-89 but declined to $2.1 million in 1990-91, a 
move which largely reflected the phasing out of the seed funding initiatives.
Personnel and Organisational Arrangements
During the period of WorkCare prevention there was a dramatic change in the size and 
composition of the inspectorate. In October 1985 there were some 55 inspectors; over the next 
5 years the number of inspectors had almost tripled to 150 in 1991. This increase continued 
into the WorkCover period with the inspectorate reaching 170 by 1994.16 As well, there was a 
conscious effort to widen the background of the inspectorate from its traditional male,
15 Accident Compensation Act 1985, Section 3(a).
16 Industry Commission, op. cit., vol. 2, Table M17.
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Anglo-Celtic, trade-based origins with the recruitment of some new inspectors among women, 
persons from non-English speaking backgrounds, and persons with tertiary qualifications. Also 
technical staff such as ergonomists, hygienists, and risk management experts were recruited in 
greater numbers.
There was also a range of other organisational and structural changes ostensibly 
designed to enable more effective delivery of services. Most prominent among these was the 
institution of a central OHS division responsible for policy development, standard setting, 
programmes and targets and a Regional Services Division charged with service delivery. Thus, 
in 1986-87, workplace inspection and advice services were decentralised to 10 regional centres 
around the state. The perceived special circumstances relating to the building and construction 
industry also determined that this area of activity should be dealt with separately, with its own 
inspectorate and policy development unit.
A more dramatic reorganisation took place hi 1991 when the occupational health and 
safety responsibilities of the Department were separated from its industrial relations and other 
functions in a separate body, the Occupational Health and Safety Authority (OHSA). In an 
effort to provide better co-ordination of WorkCover prevention activities, the Victorian 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission (VOHSC) assumed the role of board of 
management of OHS A along with its other roles. Structurally, the new body was organised 
around three major divisions. The major workplace inspection and advice services were to be 
delivered through the Workplace Management Division with a consolidation of the previous 
regionalised structure into three geographic zones. The Plant and Chemical Safety Division 
provided specialist technical services directly to external clients as well as to and through 
OHS A field staff. The Planning and Communications Division provided strategic planning, 
performance monitoring, marketing, and certification/licencing functions for the organisation.
Role of the Inspectorate
Despite these series of organisational and other changes, it appears that it took time for 
them to have an appreciable effect upon organisational performance. At least over the period 
1985-1990, there was little general change in the nature of the operations of the inspectorate.
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There was a continuation of its traditional concerns and enforcement approach which focussed 
upon breaches of particular safety regulations, especially the failure to guard dangerous 
machinery. The vast bulk of prosecution activity revolved around amputation injuries sustained 
through the use of such machinery, particularly power presses and circular saws. It was 
uncommon for prosecutions to be brought for breaches of the Act which did not result in either 
injury or death. Also, it was almost unknown for prosecutions to be launched against 
employees, managers, or manufacturers and suppliers of plant and substances. 17
From 1990 there was a noticeable change in this situation with a much greater recourse 
to the employer's "general duty" (in Section 21 of the Act) as the basis for prosecution. By 
1995 almost all prosecutions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act were founded upon 
such general duty breaches. It appears that much of this change relates to the establishment 
within the Department in 1989 of a Central Investigation Unit to co-ordinate the investigation 
of workplace fatalities and serious accidents and incidents, develop special programmes to 
ensure compliance and prevention and develop an overall prosecutions strategy. It is quite 
striking that while in Victoria around 60 to 80 prosecutions a year were instituted, in New 
South Wales, between 1990-91 and 1993-94 an average of 422 prosecutions a year were 
undertaken. 18
WorkCover Changes
The background to the WorkCover changes as they affected the workers' compensation 
aspects of WorkCare have been sketched in Chapter 2. In October 1992 the Liberal and 
National Parties came to power in Victoria. The new government amended the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act to disband VOHSC, discontinue seed funding to non-government bodies 
and vested the administration of the legislation in the new Department of Business and 
Employment (DBE). OHSA was retained as a trading name, but government OHS and
17 Creighton and Rozen, op cit., p. 118, drawing on the unpublished 1994 Ph.D. thesis of Richard 
Johnstone, The Court and the Factory: The Legal Construction of Occupational Health and Safety Offences in 
Victoria (University of Melbourne).
I8lbid., citing Industry Commission figures.
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dangerous goods services were delivered through two divisions within DBE. The Health and 
Safety Division and the Chemicals and Plant Safety Division reported to the Minister for 
Industry Services. An OHS Advisory Committee (consisting of representatives of employers, 
workers and the Minister) was established to advise the Deputy Secretary for Industry Services 
on health and safety matters.
In 1994 the Minister for Industry Services commissioned Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to 
conduct a review of OHS A and to recommend changes to its structure.19 As a consequence of 
the consultant's report, a new structure was implemented in May 1995; the trading name was 
changed to the Health and Safety Organisation, Victoria (HSO).20 The need to maintain a 
health and safety function separate from the VWA was increasingly coming under scrutiny. 
The consultant's report on OHSA suggested that in time amalgamation might be viable and 
beneficial. Similar comments had been made by the Auditor-General in his portfolio review of 
DBE in 1994.21 In November 1995 the Industry Commission's report on OHS arrangements in 
Australia recommended integration of OHS and workers' compensation policy making.22 
Following the return of the Liberal/National Coalition Government in March 1996, the health 
and safety functions of DBE were merged with the VWA on 2 July 1996. The Health and 
Safety Division of the VWA retained the structure and functions of the former HSO.
Legal Authority
The Health and Safety Division derives its authority from several pieces of legislation- 
including the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, Equipment ( Public Safety) Act 1994, 
Dangerous Goods Act 1985, and the Road Transport (Dangerous Goods) Act 1995.
"Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu: Report to the Minister for Industry Services—Review of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Authority (Melbourne, July 1994).
20 A new Equipment (Public Safety) Act was also enacted in 1994. In addition, there is a significant public 
safety aspect to the Dangerous Goods Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act imposes duties on 
employers, self-employed persons and occupiers of workplaces in relation to the health and safety of non-workers.
2l Victorian Auditor-General's Office: Report on Ministerial Portfolios (May 1994), p. 85. 
"Industry Commission Report: Work, Health and Safety (Canberra, 1995), Volume I, p. 270.
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Collectively, the principal Acts impose general duties on employers, manufacturers and 
suppliers of plant and chemicals and occupiers to achieve and maintain general health and 
safety standards. The Acts provide a broad framework for the imposition of specific regulatory 
controls.
The mining industry is within the mandate of the Department of Natural Resources and 
the Environment under the Mineral Resources Development Act 1990', certain hygiene issues 
(e.g., legionella) are the responsibility of the Public Health Department under the Health Act. 
Federal enterprises within the state are the responsibility of Comcare, and the Environmental 
Protection Authority also has some responsibilities for dangerous goods. While overlaps or 
gaps of jurisdiction are possible, agreements and understandings between the HSD and these 
other jurisdictions seem to have adequately defined the roles.
Principal Legislation 
OHS Act
As indicated earlier, the Victorian OHS Act is based in large part on the United 
Kingdom's Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The style of the Act is performance-based, 
i.e., it sets out broad duty of care provisions and requires the achievement of performance 
outcomes without specifying how these outcomes should be achieved thus establishing a 
framework which allows employers and workers to be flexible in their approach to achieving 
the standards set out in legislation. In addition, it provides the machinery to establish standards 
and enforcement. Details of issues covered by the Act are provided in Regulations and Codes 
of Practice.
General duties. The Act imposes duties on employers and workers; the self-employed; 
occupiers of workplaces; and designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers of plant, 
equipment and substances used in the workplace. This is to ensure that those with authority or 
control over particular aspects of the working environment exercise that authority hi a manner 
that is not harmful to the health and safety of any person.
Worker participation. The participation of workers in decisions concerning their health 
and safety is central to the Act's strategy for prevention. This is achieved through the election
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of health and safety representatives (HSRs) and the establishment of health and safety 
committees in individual workplaces. Through negotiation between employers and their 
workers, designated work groups (DWGs) may be established in workplaces from which health 
and safety representatives are elected by the workers.
The Act provides representatives the right to inspect any part of the workplace at which 
members of the relevant DWG work, to receive relevant information, and be consulted on 
proposed changes to the workplace that may affect health and safety. HSRs may issue a 
provisional improvement notice to the employer if s/he believes that the Act or regulations are 
being contravened. This requires the employer to rectify the breach within a specified time 
frame. The employer has the right of appeal to an HSD inspector.
The Act also provides for HSRs to be involved hi the resolution of health and safety 
issues in the workplace. It envisages employers and workers agreeing on procedures for the 
resolution of issues; if there are no agreed procedures, the OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations 
1989 provide a procedure. Where there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of any 
person, the HSR may stop the work following consultation with the employer's representative. 
Health and safety committees may be established at the request of the HSR. The composition, 
role, and function of these committees is flexible in the Act, which sets out only minimum 
requirements. It is for the parties in the workplace to agree on what is most appropriate for 
their circumstances.
Inspectors. The Act assigns a number of roles to V"WA inspectors. They have powers 
to:
enter the workplace at any reasonable time;
• make any necessary examination and inquiry in the workplace to determine 
whether the Act or regulations have been complied with;
• remove any equipment or materials or take copies of any document that may be 
required;
direct that the workplace or a part of it be left undisturbed; 
issue an Improvement Notice where he or she believes that the Act or 
regulations are being contravened—this requires the breach to be rectified within 
a stipulated tune;
issue a Prohibition Notice where he or she believes that an immediate risk exists 
in a workplace—this prohibits the relevant activity until the matters that give 
rise to the risk are remedied;
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bring a prosecution for an offence against the Act, on the authority of the 
Minister.
Penalties. The Act provides penalties for contravention of the Act or regulations. These 
penalties are currently set for most offences at a maximum of $40,000 for bodies corporate and 
$10,000 for individuals. For certain offences the maximum is set at $250,000 for bodies 
corporate and $50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 5 years for individuals. Additional 
penalties, with these same maximums for indictable offences and maximums applying to most 
summary offences, may be imposed for repeat offences. The Act also has a provision for 
infringement notices (on-the-spot fines). However, regulations to give effect to this provision 
have not been brought into effect.
Codes of Practice. The Minister may approve Codes of Practice to give practical 
guidance to parties with duties under the Act. Where a Code is relevant and has not been 
observed, a court, during a prosecution, will find the offence proved unless the alleged 
offender can demonstrate that the duties are being carried out by some other means.
Since its enactment, the OHS Act was amended in 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1996. The 
principal amendments were:
1990 - increased penalties for offences against the Act;
1993 - strengthened the requirement for workers to co-operate with their employers in 
relation to health and safety, and removed the specific role of unions hi the 
establishment of DWGs and the election of health and safety representatives;
1996 - transferred the health and safety functions of the Department of Business and 
Employment to the Victorian WorkCover Authority.
Dangerous Goods Act
A separate Act covering dangerous goods covers the special nature of risks arising from
\^
dangerous goods (e.g., explosives, flammable materials, and corrosive substances). The Act's 
maui objectives are to minimise the possibility of serious incidents involving dangerous goods, 
and to mitigate the impact of any such incidents which occur. It applies generally both to the 
workplace and non-workplace situations. The Act consolidates legislation covering dangerous 
goods and activities associated with them, viz. manufacture, storage, handling, transport, 
transfer, use and sale.
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The Act's objectives are achieved by:
imposing responsibilities on certain identified parties;
establishing legal procedures to support prosecutions (offence, penalty and
evidentiary provisions);
creating the framework for a licencing regime;
• establishing an inspectorate with comprehensive powers of inspection and 
enforcement;
providing for the power to make regulations and other orders to stipulate the 
detail of the legislative scheme.
Inspectors have powers to enter and inspect premises, make inquiries and remove 
items. Inspectors may issue Written Directions to require any action which the inspector 
believes on reasonable grounds is necessary to ensure the safety of people or property. In 
addition, inspectors may require or arrange the safe disposal of dangerous goods. The Act 
permits the delegation of certain inspector powers to officers of the State road safety agency, 
the police force, the fire authorities and local government.
Penalties for breaches of the DG Act are generally in line with those under the OHS 
Act. In addition, in relation to certain duties, there are daily penalties for continuing offences. 
There is a provision for infringement notices here also which has not been brought into effect. 
The DG Act was amended in 1987, 1989, 1990 and 1995. The principal effects of the 1995 
amendments were to provide:
an extensive definition of dangerous goods, broadly in line with the Australian
Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail;
powers to exempt specific dangerous goods from the operation of the Act or
regulations, and to declare substances or articles to be dangerous goods in
public interest situations;
inspectors with authorisation to issue an additional type of Written Direction
(similar to Improvement Notices under the OHS Act);
• power for the Minister to approve codes of practice.
Most VWA inspectors are concurrently appointed under both the OHS and DG Acts. 
The DG Act is currently under review since the rather prescriptive style of the 
legislation (i.e., specifying the actions to be taken, rather than referring to the desired 
performance outcome) makes it inconsistent with the OHS Act. There has been considerable 
effort during the last decade to change from prescriptive/restrictive legislation and regulation to
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a performance or outcome based approach. Further, the DG Act covers a number of issues 
which are now addressed by draft National Standards developed by the National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC).
Equipment (Public Safety) Act
The E(PS) Act mirrors the provisions of the OHS Act in relation to prescribed 
equipment operated in non-workplace situations. It places duties on proprietors, manufacturers, 
designers, importers, suppliers and persons in charge of prescribed equipment. Proprietors' 
duties are similar to those of employers under the OHS Act in relation to prescribed 
equipment, while the duties of persons in charge of prescribed equipment are similar to those 
of workers.
Inspectors appointed under the E(PS) Act have identical powers to those appointed 
under the OHS Act. There are provisions for regulations and codes of practice. Penalties are 
identical to those under the OHS Act. There is also a provision for infringement notices which 
has not been brought into effect.
Regulations
There is an ongoing programme to move from a prescriptive to a performance-based 
regulatory environment in Victoria. The advantages of the performance-based approach are 
seen to be that it provides
simplicity: the general duties are much less complex than the technical specifics 
required to be included in prescriptive legislation, and need to be amended much 
less often;
flexibility in meeting health and safety outcomes: the particular circumstances of 
each workplace can be taken into account;
• encouragement for the development of innovative technologies for risk 
management;
a focus on health and safety outcomes rather than on the methodology for 
achieving them; and 
encouragement for a systematic approach to the management of risk.
In 1996, the Department of State's Office of Regulation Reform issued a document 
entitled Principles of Good Regulation, in which it stated "Much of the recent reform work in
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Victoria has been directed to developing more effective and lower cost policy instruments 
compatible with economic realities. This has resulted in a move towards performance-based 
regulation in key areas such as occupational health and safety and environmental protection."
In 1995, a new set of performance-based regulations covering plant replaced three 
prescriptive Acts and 11 prescriptive principal regulations. The new regulations abolished the 
requirement for VWA inspectors to carry out regular inspections of certain types of plant, thus 
freeing resources for programmed inspections in targeted industries and reactive workplace 
visits.
While the flexibility provided by a performance-based approach is welcomed by many 
employers, some (particularly small business) express a preference for the prescriptive 
approach, where government tells them what they have to do. The VWA has sought to deal 
with the tension between the two approaches by issuing codes of practice as well as an 
extensive range of publications.
The VWA's decisions about the suitability of health and safety issues for regulation are 
primarily guided by decisions taken through the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC). In 1991 a meeting of Australian heads of government identified OHS 
as an area in which all jurisdictions should seek to work towards national uniformity. NOHSC, 
which comprises representatives of the Commonwealth, State, and Territory governments, the 
employer associations and trade unions, is the vehicle for facilitating the achievement of 
national uniformity in OHS. NOHSC develops National Standards which are then implemented 
by the various jurisdictions in the way that is most appropriate within their own legislative 
frameworks.
In 1992 NOHSC identified six priority issues for the development of National 
Standards: manual handling, noise, plant, certification of users and operators of plant, 
hazardous substances and major hazard facilities. National Standards have been declared hi all 
these areas, and Victoria has implemented four and commenced work to implement the 
remaining two. In Victoria, the objective of national consistency is supported, however, there 
is a great deal of criticism of the end product. The view is that the national standards are far 
too prescriptive and detailed. Currently, there is a lack of agreement by state governments, and
8-19
little co-ordination of the implementation process. Thus, significant differences in OHS law 
exist between jurisdictions.
Victorians would like to see some reforms to NOHSC processes. In particular, they 
have concerns that National Standards are developed as model regulations which the States and 
Territories are expected to translate directly into their own regulations. The VWA would 
prefer that National Standards be statements of understandings that the jurisdictions would 
translate into Acts, regulations and Codes of Practice within their own legislative frameworks.
The Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 stipulates that all Victorian regulations sunset 
after 10 years. At that point a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the revoked 
regulations is carried out. The VWA is currently reviewing and replacing the OHS (General 
Safety) Regulations 1986. The OHS (Manual Handling) Regulations 1988 are being evaluated 
as part of a national process. The OHS (Lead Control) Regulations will be reviewed prior to its 
sunset date in 1998. (see Table 8.1)
The Industry Commission in their Report No. 47 states that the true costs of workplace 
injury and disease are much greater than that represented by worker's compensation payments. 
The report suggests that the costs are borne in the following approximate proportions: 30 
percent by injured workers and their families; 40 percent by employers through the 
compensation system, lost productivity and overtime; and 30 percent by the community. Other 
studies have estimated the true cost at from 2 times to 11 times the compensation cost 
depending on the industry and size of the enterprise.
The Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 also requires that a Regulatory Impact Statement 
(RIS) be prepared and circulated to accompany any proposed changes in the regulations. The 
Division invests considerable resources in the development of RIS's. The goal of such an 
exercise, to calculate the costs and benefits of the proposed regulations, is important in 
justifying the need for their imposition. This practice is carried out in other health and safety 
jurisdictions around the world, such as OSHA in the United States.
It is the position of HSD that the required RIS analysis has improved the policy 
development process for occupational health and safety. For example, during the preparation 
of the OHS (Plant) Regulations 1994, the cost-benefit analysis demonstrated that inclusion of
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manually powered and hand held plant could not be justified on cost benefit grounds. Other 
non-regulatory alternatives were considered more appropriate for addressing these hazards. 
This analysis resulted in the scope of the Regulations being restricted to exclude this type of 
plant. Current examples where the RIS review has influenced policy development include the 
pending proposal for Incident Notification Regulations, and the development of proposals 
covering the scope of health surveillance requirements and employer duties under hazardous 
substances regulations.
In all regulatory impact statements prepared by the Division, assumptions are defined 
and sensitivity analysis is undertaken where information gaps are identified. As a result of 
external review processes, the Division prepares cost projections using worst-case assumptions 
and highest expected cost of compliance predictions. Because of the risk of bias when 
undertaking RIS analysis, the Division acquires information from a range of sources, including 
those who will be directly affected by the proposed regulation outcome.
The draft RIS is submitted to a rigorous public review and comment process. In 
addition to a 60- or 90-day public comment period, the Division obtains independent advice as 
to the adequacy of the RIS and of the assessment included in the RIS. There is also a 
Parliamentary Committee which scrutinises proposed Regulations and their accompanying RIS 
before implementation. This committee places significant weight on the RIS and also receives 
copies of all public comments and submissions received by the Division.
Codes of Practice
There are 17 Codes of Practice established under the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act for the purpose of providing practical guidance for compliance with the duties and 
obligations outlined in the Act, as listed in Table 8.2. The legal status of approved codes is that 
provisions in a code of practice may constitute compliance with the provision of the Act or 
regulation to which the code is addressed. However, the provisions do not give these 
instruments mandatory status. Indeed, the status of approved codes of practice enables persons 
with obligations to have flexibility regarding their method of complying with
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performance-based duties under the Act or regulations. All codes approved by the Minister 
include in the preface an explanation regarding their advisory legal status.
Where appropriate, some employers are choosing to follow associated industry codes or 
guidelines. Use of Australian Standards or other technical standards is also commonly relied 
upon to supplement or substitute for the advice contained in approved codes to achieve
compliance with the relevant obligation. Alternatively, employers can and do rely on aspects ofj
the code but vary from it to develop their own comprehensive risk assessment and control 
systems which may be more relevant to their workplace. A further possibility, allowable under 
the current legislative framework, is reliance on relevant documentation developed by NOHSC 
or other Australian jurisdictions, or perhaps an overseas OHS agency. Recent VWA cost-of 
compliance employer surveys have indicated this approach is being adopted by some firms.
Policy and Procedure
The Division invests in development and documentation of policies and procedures that 
are presented in a series of manuals. The most important HSD manuals are:
Quality Manual - This sets out management responsibilities in relation to quality, and 
standards and procedures for the operation of the quality system.
HSO Manual - This sets out standards and procedures common to all staff, such as in 
relation to policy and planning, human resource management, OHS and business 
administration.
Operations Manual - This sets out standards and procedures for field staff activities, 
such as hi relation to emergency services, operational activities, and approaches to risk 
control. During 1996 an external audit was conducted of the Division's manuals against the 
requirements of Australian Standard 3904 (ISO 9004), parts 1 and 2 (Quality management and 
quality system elements). The audit demonstrated total compliance with the requirements of 
this Standard.
The manuals are available on-line via the HSD intranet and in printed format. The 
Operations Manual is very complete and constitutes an effective mechanism to provide staff 
with timely and up-to-date advice and directives on sensitive and complex issues and priorities.
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It forms the basis of consistent service delivery. An Orientation Manual has also been 
developed to assist newly hired staff to acquaint themselves with the organisational and service 
accountabilities of the various sections within the Division. Each section within the Division 
produces an annual business plan.
The thoroughness of the documentation suggests a significant resource investment 
within each of the sections and the Division to develop and maintain these manuals. The 
substantive volume of these documents speaks to a highly process driven organisation that is 
committed to quality service delivery. This does however raise questions about the appropriate 
balance of the resources necessary to deliver the documentation and the front line staff 
deployed to carry out the plans hi accordance with the policy and procedure.
Structure of HSD
Figure 8.1 shows the organisation of HSD as at 2 July 1996. The Director, HSD has 
overall responsibility for the Division and with six reporting senior managers forms the 
Division Executive Committee. Three Operations Sections under senior managers provide 
inspection and informational services through a series of regional offices. In addition, each of 
these managers has responsibility for two or more Statewide Coordinating Units to ensure 
consistent service delivery through a matrix management process.
Strategy Group
The Strategy Group consists of the Planning and Review Unit, Standards Development 
and Co-ordination Unit, Legislation Policy Branch, Marketing Branch, the Central 
Investigations Unit, Organisational Development Unit and the Information Systems Division. 
The principal functions of the Strategy Group are to provide strategic planning services, 
implement the VWA's legislative reform programme, develop and review policy, drive the 
Division's enforcement strategy and programme, provide marketing services, represent the 
Division in external forums, and provide support services to the Division.
Key programmes for the Strategy Group in 1996-97 are
• assisting with the full implementation of the Site Assessment and Targeting 
System in the Operations Groups;
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conducting a compliance/OHS performance survey, the results of which will
guide a public information programme;
completing the regulatory package for hazardous substances;
conducting a policy review of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 and implementing
legislative changes resulting from the review of the Act;
completing the Incident Notification Regulations for implementation;
completing the Infringement Notices Regulations for implementation;
completing any associated regulatory impact statement, public comment and
code of practice products;
completing a code of practice for plant not covered by the already-approved
Code of Practice for Plant;
developing policy to give effect to the National Standard for major hazard
facilities;
providing policy advice on the Regulatory Efficiency Bill, national competition
policy and other significant legislative reform processes;
reviewing the investigations/prosecutions programme and implementing
changes;
increasing the level of prosecution with a reduction in the turnaround times of
prosecution files;
introducing simpler prosecutions options;
completing the investigations training programme;
providing authoritative advice to other Divisions on OHS legislation;
developing and overseeing the implementation strategy for the revised
Enforcement Policy;
implementing a marketing plan;
implementing a new publications production system;
undertaking the VWA Awards and Health and Safety Week programmes;
maintaining VWA and Ministerial publications, promotional and media
campaigns; coordinating the briefing of representatives on major national and
State bodies;
coordinating VWA submissions on other agencies' legislative proposals;
providing training and organisational development services;
coordinating the HSD's corporate quality programme.
Technology Group
The Technology Group consists of the Chemical Technology Unit, Ergonomics Unit, 
Hygiene Unit, Occupational Medicine Unit and Mechanical Engineering Unit. Technology 
Group's role is to provide engineering, scientific and other technical advice to assist the 
Strategy and Operations Groups of the Division to achieve their programme goals. The Group 
is staffed by chemical, mechanical and electrical engineers, chemists, occupational hygienists,
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ergonomists, and an occupational medical practitioner. The Group's expertise covers plant 
design and operational safety, all aspects of the storage, handling, transport and use of 
dangerous goods, hazardous substances, lead and asbestos, work environment hazards such as 
heat and noise, manual handling and other ergonomic issues and biological hazards. 
Key Technology Group activities are
assisting inspectors with workplace visits;
carrying out research on emerging health and safety issues;
carrying out risk assessments, e.g., in association with applications for licences
or approvals, or with plant designs notified to the VWA;
responding to telephone inquiries;
• representing the Authority on external committees, e.g., in relation to the 
development of technical standards; 
supply ing expert witnesses for prosecutions and cases in the Coroner's Court;
• providing technical input into training programmes for VWA staff;
providing technical advice on documents developed by the VWA or external 
bodies.
Operations Groups
There are three Operations Groups. Each of these groups includes a number of 
statewide co-ordination units and regional offices. The inclusion of statewide co-ordination 
units was part of the restructure of the HSD in 1995. These units co-ordinate programmes in 
their specialist areas across the three Operations Groups, and provide information to internal 
and external clients. Resources for implementation of statewide projects come from the field 
operations areas of the three Operations Groups and are secured through negotiation between 
the managers of statewide co-ordination units and the regional office managers.
Regional offices under the authority of regional managers are located in 12 locations 
across Victoria. VWA inspectors, information officers and staff to process licencing and 
certification applications are based at each regional office. The Operations Groups have 
established the following key priorities and activities for 1996-97:
programmes to assist workplaces to manage health and safety better: audits,
provision of information/advice, provision of training, marketing;
compliance programmes: inspection, prosecution, investigation, OHS legislative
dispute resolution, statutory approvals;
public safety programmes: activities to promote public safety in the areas within
the VWA's jurisdiction, emergency response;
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quality programmes: training, audit activity, performance management,
implementation of new procedures and services, focusing on clients and
obtaining feedback from them;
resource management programmes: reducing costs and working within budget
strengthening the budget components in planning;
people management programmes: communicating effectively, establishing clear
roles and accountabilities, establishing training and development opportunities.
The following information describes the structure and function of each Operations Group, 
including its statewide role.
Operations Central (Plant) Group consists of
three statewide co-ordination units (the Plant Co-ordination Unit, the Building 
and Construction Industry Co-ordination Unit and the Information Network); 
the Design Notification Unit;
regional operations at Metro Central and Preston in Melbourne, and Bendigo, 
Mildura, Shepparton, and Wangaratta in central Victoria.
Plant Co-ordination Unit. The roles of this unit are to reduce the risk to health and 
safety arising from plant and equipment through the co-ordination of statewide projects; 
develop and review guidance material for VWA operational policies, national and industry 
standards; provide specialist advice to both internal and external clients; and manage specified 
programmes. The Unit is responsible for authorising assessors of applicants for certificates of 
competency to operate specified types of plant, and for auditing assessments. It conducts about 
100 audits each year. The Unit also assists field staff in the conduct of about 2,500 inspections 
annually.
The Information Network. The work of this unit will be described later in the section on 
Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education and Technical Assistance.
The Building and Construction Industry Co-ordination Unit. This specialist unit aims to 
reduce the incidence of work-related illness, injury and death on building sites through the 
delivery of an integrated range of services. The building and construction industry is seen as 
sufficiently different from other industries to justify a specialist inspectorate resource. 
Decisions about which building and construction sites to visit are made in accordance with 
criteria set out in the Building and Construction Industry Manual. Resources allowing, most
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large commercial sites in metropolitan Melbourne are visited. The Unit carries out about 5,000 
inspections a year and responds to about 2,000 requests for information and advice.
The Design Notification Unit. This technical unit receives notifications of plant designs, 
answers inquiries relating to plant design notification, and arranges for audits of plant 
requiring design notification. About 600 plant notifications are received each year.
Operations Eastern (Work Environment Group consists of
• three statewide co-ordination units (the Work Environment Co-ordination Unit, 
the Management Systems Unit and the Licencing Unit);
• regional operations at Mulgrave in Melbourne, and Traralgon and Sale in 
eastern Victoria.
Work Environment Co-ordination Unit. This co-ordinating group brings together a 
number of scattered functions relating to hazards in the work environment. The unit is 
responsible for identifying work environment issues that need a VWA response as well as 
planning, monitoring, and reporting on all Divisional activities relating to work environment 
hazards. Some important current programmes relate to asbestos removal, manual handling, 
noise, confined spaces, hazardous substances and heat-induced illness. The Unit conducts 
about 100 audits of approved asbestos removalists and assists field staff with about 3,500 
inspections each year.
The Management Systems Unit (MSU). The MSU has evolved over time towards 
facilitating clients' capability to manage their own health and safety responsibility. A key part 
of MSU's role is the promotion of SafeyMAP, the Safety Management Achievement System. 
SafeyMAP is described in the section on Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation, 
Education and Technical Assistance. The Unit carries out approximately 300 audits of 
workplace health and safety systems, including those at self-insurers and prospective self- 
insurers, each year. The SafeyMAP audit criteria are used as the basis for carrying out these 
functions.
The Licencing Unit. The function of this group is to co-ordinate the Division's licencing 
activities, and ensure the effective administration of all licencing, registration, certification and
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approval processes. Most of the Unit's staff are centrally located, but there are also staff 
members at the major regional offices.
The principal types of licences and certificates dealt with by the Unit are
• certificates of competency for operators of cranes, hoists and forklift trucks, 
scaffolders and riggers; and operators of pressure equipment (23,093 in 1995- 
96);
registration of items of high-risk plant (28,393 in 1995-96); 
dangerous goods licences (8,410 in 1995-96); 
asbestos removalist's licences (about 40 per year).
Operations Western (Dangerous Goods^ Group consists of:
• two statewide co-ordination units (the Dangerous Goods Co-ordination Unit and 
the Enforcement and Public Safety Unit);
• regional operations in the Metro West region of Melbourne, and Geelong, 
Ballarat and Warrnanibool in western Victoria.
The Dangerous Goods Co-ordination Unit. This group identifies and co-ordinates 
appropriate VWA activities in relation to dangerous goods. The Unit aims to co-ordinate 12 
projects in 1996-97. Prominent among them are the conduct of emergency preparedness audits 
in premises not previously audited, the inspection of licenced premises which had not been 
inspected in the previous 12 months, and joint inspections with the Environment Protection 
Authority (EPA) and fire authorities of high-risk premises.
The Enforcement and Public Safety Unit. This unit provides quality assurance in 
relation to the VWA's compliance and enforcement activities and places a great focus on the 
organisation's public safety role. It is responsible for promoting, reviewing, and advising on 
the VWA's enforcement profile and activity, and for identifying public safety issues and 
developing strategies to address these issues. It establishes and audits service standards for the 
delivery of the VWA's field services.
The EPSU also co-ordinates the VWA's 24-hour emergency response service for both 
OHS and dangerous goods incidents, Including where a fatality or serious incident is involved. 
The service aims to respond to emergencies within 1 hour in the Melbourne metropolitan area 
and 2 hours in other areas.
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Development Taskforce
The role of the Development Taskforce is described in the section on Injury and 
Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance.
Other VWA Divisions with a Health and Safety Role
Apart from the Health and Safety Division, two other VWA Divisions conduct 
activities in the area of health and safety. The Corporate Affairs Division carries out high- 
profile marketing activities. These are described in the section on Injury and Disease Reduction 
through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance.
The Scheme Development Division carries out research which is used to find practical 
ways of improving workplace safety. Major recent projects conducted by the Division are
• Operation Safety - Launched as a pilot project at Ballarat in rural Victoria in
August 1995, Operation Safety was based on extensive research. Road transport 
and nursing were identified as the industries hi Ballarat with the highest claims 
costs per million dollars of remuneration. Both industries had a high proportion 
of back injuries resulting from lifting, loading and unloading. Operation Safety 
combined a number of interventions including worksite visits, telephone 
surveys, a mobile display of lifting devices, a promotional safety bus, ongoing 
publicity in the Ballarat media and an intense advertising campaign. 
Engineering, design and work practice solutions were recommended at 
individual worksites and through media publicity. The preliminary results of the 
research suggest there has been a remarkable reduction of injuries and their 
costs hi the Ballarat region during the period Operation Safety was conducted.
• TruckSafe - A Joint initiative between WorkCover and the Road Transport
Forum,TruckSafe aims to reduce injuries and improve workers' compensation 
management throughout the road transport industry. Best practice safety and 
claims management strategies in the road transport industry are identified and 
promoted through publications and videos.
Role of other Organisations in Prevention
There are a number of important roles played by organisations other than the VWA in 
prevention and analysis of workplace injuries and illnesses.
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The State Ombudsman
The State Ombudsman receives and investigates complaints from individuals when all 
other avenues of complaint have been exhausted. The Ombudsman has broad powers to obtain 
information and conduct hearings. The Ombudsman can make recommendations and request 
that the agency provide notification of its plans to implement the recommendation.
The State Coroner
The State Coroner has the responsibility to examine all reportable deaths23 and 
determine, generally at inquest, the causes and circumstances of death and the identity of any 
person found to contribute to the death. In addition the Coroner has jurisdiction to deal with 
fire. The Coroner has the power to comment and make recommendations on public health and 
safety or the administration of justice which relates to the death or fire. The Coroner's Act 
1985 gives a statutory basis for coronial findings and recommendations to be used for 
prevention of future deaths or fires. VWA investigators and inspectors are frequently called 
upon to assist the Coroner in the investigation of work-related deaths. In recent years the State 
Coroner's Office has taken an increasing interest in the prevention of work-related deaths.
Employer Associations
The major employer associations—the Victorian Employers' Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (VECCI), the Australian Chamber of Manufactures (ACM), the Metal Trades 
Industry Association (MTIA) and others—employ health and safety professionals to provide 
OHS services to their members. These services include information, advice, health and safety 
audits, training and representation in consultative forums. The information and advice services 
cover the legislative requirements, OHS management systems, and risk control. Training is 
provided for managers, supervisors, safety professionals, health and safety representatives and 
members of health and safety committees. Courses run by VECCI are approved by the VWA.
In general terms, violent and unnatural deaths.
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Trade Unions
The Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) has an OHS Services unit which provides 
training, health and safety audits, and assessments of compliance with legislation, plus 
information and advice to assist with the implementation of health and safety systems and risk 
control. These services are available to affiliated unions and to workplaces. The VTHC also 
represents unions and workers in consultative forums. The VTHC's training courses are 
tailored primarily for health and safety representatives and members of health and safety 
committees, but courses are also offered for workers and supervisors. Approximately 2,000 
people are trained annually.
Most of the larger unions also provide health and safety services to their members, 
particularly information and advice. Some have dedicated OHS officers and/or run training 
courses for health and safety representatives and workers. Courses run by the VTHC and three 
other unions are approved by the VWA.
Tertiary Education Institutions
Victoria's Technical and Further Education (TAPE) system provides relatively easy 
access to OHS diploma programmes, training for safe operation of plant and equipment 
(including training for certificates of competency to operate specified types of plant), and 
training for health and safety representatives. These functions are in addition to the TAPE 
colleges' central role of delivering training to new entrants into the trades sector. The 
competencies for trade training courses delivered by the TAPE sector are identified by industry 
training boards, and include OHS competencies specific to the individual trades. The industry 
training boards include representatives of employers, workers and the TAPE sector.
Victoria's universities run undergraduate and post-graduate courses in OHS, as well as 
professional and short courses (e.g., in ergonomics, hygiene); conduct research; and provide 
opportunities for continuing education through seminars and conferences. The Victorian 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health at the University of Ballarat is an important centre 
of training and research. A number of academics publish articles, reports, and books dealing
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with health and safety. These are based on their academic research and increase the overall 
information pool on health and safety issues in Australia.
Interest Groups
A number of groups representing particular business or community sectors run 
programmes in the area of health and safety. The Victorian Farmers' Federation (VFF) has 
taken an active role in advising fanners and motivating them to improve their health and safety 
performance. In conjunction with the VWA and its predecessors, the VFF has run three 
subsidy programmes for farmers who fit roll-over protection devices to their tractors. The VFF 
has sponsored the establishment of FarmSafe action groups in rural centres across the State to 
promote awareness of farm health and safety. The Plastics and Chemical Industry Association 
(PACIA) runs a Responsible Care programme which seeks to raise the level of health and 
safety awareness and capability of PACIA members and to assist them to improve their 
performance by providing training, information and advice. Other interest groups which have 
provided information and advocacy services for their members include the Property Council of 
Australia and the Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce. Safety Groups in various parts 
of the State bring together safety professionals and employers to discuss topics of common 
interest.
Certificate Assessors
The VWA authorises persons to assess applicants for certificates of competency to 
operate certain types of plant and equipment. The VWA issues the certificate if the applicant 
has been assessed as competent in the relevant areas. There are approximately 180 certificate 
assessors who work for TAPE colleges, large employers, and private consultants.
Consultants
Consultants provide services to the workplace parties in areas such as management 
systems, occupational hygiene, risk engineering, OHS recording and reporting systems, 
training, ergonomics, health monitoring, stress management, and organisational development.
8-32
In a performance based regulatory environment, consultants' services are critically important 
to assist persons with duties under the legislation to meet the standards required. Section 
21(4)(c) of the OHS Act requires employers to employ or engage suitably qualified persons to 
advise the employers in relation to the health and safety of his or her workers. The VWA 
maintains an electronic directory currently listing 390 consultants. However, consultants 
nominate themselves for inclusion in the directory. The VWA does not vouch for the accuracy 
of information provided by consultants.
Professional Associations
Professional societies also have an important role in the continuing development of 
OHS professionals. These societies include the Ergonomics Society of Australia, the Australian 
Institute of Occupational Hygiene, the Safety Institute of Australia, the Australian 
Physiotherapy Association, the Australian College of Occupational Medicine, and the 
Australian Occupational Nurses' Association.
Collection and Use of Data
The HSD has an extensive database for the period from 1985 which it uses to target its 
prevention activities. The principal elements of the database are as follows.
The VWA claims database described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report. This 
contains basic identity information and claims data on the approximately 
200,000 Victorian workplaces which are part of the workers' compensation 
scheme. Self-employed persons and self-insurers are not included in this 
database.
Information available from the HSD's INSPIRE database (e.g., visits to 
workplaces, reasons for visits, results of visits such as Notices and Written 
Directions issued). This includes data on all workplaces and sites visited by 
VWA field staff, including the workplaces of self-employed persons and self- 
insurers, dangerous goods sites and non-workplaces visited pursuant to the 
Equipment (Public Safety) Act.
Data on serious incidents, prosecutions, dangerous goods licences, certificates 
of competency to operate plant and equipment and registered plant and plant 
designs.
HSD field staff access the database to obtain workplace profiles prior to visiting a 
workplace. However, in practice there are difficulties in linking data in the claims database and
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other data gathered by VWA. The address or name of the establishment as described in the 
claims database does not always match with its actual location or name when the establishment 
is visited by an inspector. Inspectors can create new records of workplaces in INSPIRE and as 
such some firms have several files under different names. It is estimated that INSPIRE records 
and the WorkCover claims database cannot be matched in relation to 20 percent of workplaces. 
Work is underway to resolve this problem.
INSPIRE has been in place since 1988 and is based on outdated technology. While 
enhancements have been made to it from time to time, it is recognised that INSPIRE should be 
integrated with other parts of the VWA's overall database. A new system for tracking incidents 
reported to the VWA and investigations was implemented in 1996 as a forerunner to the 
redevelopment of INSPIRE.
A statistical section within the Planning and Review Unit (PRU) provides data to 
internal and external clients. Some 400 requests for information are dealt with annually. The 
section also produces an annual Statistical Profile analysing WorkCover claims, fatalities 
investigated by the VWA, and the VWA's compliance and enforcement activity. In 1996 this 
publication was merged with the VWA's statistical supplement to its annual report.
As in many federated nations, Australia does not have consistent national injury and 
disease statistics, and thus comparison of injury rates and the success of interventions is 
difficult within the country. The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
publishes annual estimates of national OHS statistics based largely on workers' compensation 
data. Victorian data is generally excluded from this publication as Victoria's employer excess 
coverage threshold (greater than 10 days off work) is not in accordance with the National Data 
Set (NDS). The NDS is currently being reviewed, with VWA participation, and inclusion of 
Victorian data may resume in the future.
It is unlikely that any of the reporting systems capture all of the workplace injuries or 
diseases. The HSD database contains approximately 200,000 workplaces; however, it is 
estimated that up to 100,000 additional may exist that are not captured. The WorkCover 
database does not contain statistical information on injury and disease incidence at self-insured 
employer worksites, nor for injuries that have durations below the 10-day excess. The VWA
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database has also been criticized as lacking a decision support system to facilitate valid and 
reliable causality research.
HSD uses the data to develop the top 20 injury-producing industries each year to assist 
in targeting both high-risk industries and specific high-incidence injuries within these. The 
Division recognises that this system is not easily capable of providing targeting data by 
enterprise or workplace. To correct this shortcoming, a new system called SATS (Site 
Assessment Targeting System) has been developed to record inspector assessments of a 
workplace's risk elements (hygiene, plant, manual handling, dangerous goods, location), health 
and safety management system, compliance performance, and risk control measures. The 
objective is to develop a profile or scorecard for each site and to use this as a guide to target 
future interventions.
Incident Notification Regulations are proposed as a means of capturing all of the data 
on dangerous occurrences and injuries from accidents. Approaches used in other jurisdictions 
to solve this information deficiency include the development of a menu-driven PC-based 
system that is provided to employers so that pre-coded data are transmitted electronically to the 
system. This approach avoids expending what might be a great deal of resources in data entry 
and coding. For large employers who are already capturing the data, interchange specifications 
are provided and the system can be made available on the internet.
The Licencing Co-ordination Unit has a significant database that tracks all of the 
licences, permits, approvals, certificates and registration required under the various pieces of 
legislation. This unit has responsibility for all licence and registration processes, except for 
2,500 approvals for asbestos removalists, lead and carcinogen medical surveillance 
programmes and audiometrists that are the responsibility of the Work Environment 
Coordinating Unit.
Under the Dangerous Goods Act there are 23 different licences issued, including 3 for 
transport, 12 for explosives and fireworks, and 8 for storage. Approximately 7,100 such 
licences were issued in 1995. Twenty-eight different certificates of competency are issued to 
equipment and plant operators; these are nationally accepted certificates. A common database
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for all Australia facilitates verification. Approximately 23,000 of these are issued each year, of 
which 19,300 are for forklift operators.
A registration system to track the location of plant and equipment contains five different 
registration groups and registered approximately 70,000 items when the new plant regulations 
came into effect in 1995. Current registrations run about 4,000 per month. The various 
registrations, certificates and licences are issued on a fee for service basis and the unit collects 
about $7 million annually.
Securing Compliance Through Inspection and Enforcement
In enforcing health and safety legislation, the VWA's goal is to achieve consistency, 
transparency and predictability. The enforcement policy emphasizes that
the tools used to enforce compliance should be appropriate to the circumstances 
and actions required proportionate to the risk;
there should be consistency in response—a similar approach is taken hi similar 
circumstances to achieve similar ends;
a targeted approach should be taken to ensure that the greatest attention is given 
to the highest risk situations and to those duty holders who are responsible for 
the risk and are best placed to control it;
• transparency in process should be maintained so that duty holders understand 
what is expected of them and what they should expect of the VWA—this also 
relates to clear avenues to appeal actions of the enforcing authority; 
the primary purpose of enforcement action is to prevent injury, illness and 
disease and to make non-compliers accountable to act as a deterrent to others.
Resource Utilisation
The three Operations Divisions provide a full range of services including inspection, 
investigation, information, advisory, licencing, and training. They are resourced with 304 
people, of which 170 are field inspectors and 15 are information officers. These 185 positions 
deliver the front-line service. Field activity is recorded on the INSPIRE database. During the 
two-year period July 1993 to June 1995 a total of 123,899 inspections were recorded for an 
average of 5,162 per month or 28 per inspector and information officer each month. Forty-five 
percent (2,323 per month) of the inspections involved traming/information/advice and 
observation reports. In the period March 1995 through February 1996 inspections totalled
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46,141 and consumed 64,039 inspection hours. This averages 350 hours per inspector 
assuming all of the 185 positions were field active, and 1.4 hours for each inspection.
Licencing/Certification/Registration accounted for about 20 percent of the inspections 
(1,032 per month). Inspection activity involving improvement notices, prohibition notices and 
dangerous goods directions averaging 170, 103, and 150 per month, respectively. It is 
somewhat surprising that less than 10 percent of the workplace activity results in the creation 
of an inspector's direction to improve or prohibit use. A 20 June 1996 policy directive on 
enforcement requires that inspectors issue the improvement and prohibition notices whenever 
they observe non-compliance. Apparently this is in response to the low number of enforcement 
notices cited above.
Since the September 1995 reorganisation it is reported that the deployment of regional 
inspection staff is totally consumed by responding to the targets set by the various coordinating 
units and in the investigation of serious accidents and complaints. Furthermore, the regional 
teams report they have little if any time for locally planned inspection activity.
The Inspection Process
WorkCover inspectors have the power to visit any place in Victoria covered by the 
three health and safety Acts. The legislation provides inspectors with broad and far-reaching 
legislative powers. They have the right of entry, without the need for a search warrant, to 
workplaces and to sites where there is high-risk equipment or dangerous goods. They can 
exercise this right at all reasonable times both by day and by night. It is an offence for anyone 
to refuse access to an inspector, or to obstruct, hinder or oppose an inspector. In conducting a 
visit, an inspector can be assisted by other people, including technical or scientific experts, 
interpreters or police officers.
Inspectors also have statutory powers to
conduct interviews and inquiries;
take photographs, recordings and measurements;
• seize property; 
take samples; 
examine and copy documents; and
• issue whatever directions are necessary for them to carry out their functions.
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When inspectors come to a workplace or site, wherever possible they will notify the employer 
person in charge, or site manager and any health and safety representative of their entry, and 
show their identification card before acting or proceeding under the law.
If inspectors see a dangerous situation or a potential dangerous situation, or a breach of 




Improvement Notices and Prohibition Notices may be issued under the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. An Improvement Notice is a written 
direction requiring a person or organisation to fix a breach or likely breach of the law. A time 
limit for the required improvement is included on the notice. A Prohibition Notice is a written 
direction prohibiting an activity that the inspector believes involves or will involve an 
immediate risk to the health and safety of any person. The activity cannot be started again until 
an inspector certifies that the risk has been removed. A dangerous goods Written Direction 
may be issued for a breach of the Dangerous Goods Act or its regulations, or where the 
inspector believes that action is needed to ensure the safety of people or property. The Written 
Direction may be for immediate compliance or compliance within a stipulated time as the 
inspector considers appropriate.
Inspectors may include directions in Notices and Written Directions saying how the 
breach of the law or the threat to health and safety may be fixed. These hand-written 
documents are the Inspection record—providing the detail for all of the pertinent employer and 
site location data and the inspectors' observations. The Infringement Notice—more commonly 
referred to as on-the-spot-fines—is not applicable at this time, as regulations for these have not 
been promulgated.
When the inspector returns to the office, s/he may enter the data into the INSPIRE 
database, and information to create a profile of the firm is also recorded in SATS (Site 
Assessment and Targeting System). As a general rule, however, inspectors do not enter the 
data themselves. The inspector will conduct a follow-up visit where improvement and 
prohibition notices have been issued. Inspectors appear to have a predetermined
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inspection/follow-up schedule for the day. In the case of a complaint they attend to the narrow 
issue being addressed, provide some overall guidance for the employer and move on to the 
next programmed visit. The sense is that they are pushing to obtain a quota of activities and 
this detracts from being able to do a quality, in-depth inspection of the site or adjacent sites.
The VWA Enforcement Policy sets out the circumstances in which Notices and Written 
Directions are used. This policy was reviewed in 1996, arid the review found areas where the 
existing policy was not being followed or needed clarification. In particular, inspectors were 
often using their powers to issue written requirements under general statutory powers instead 
of issuing Notices and Written Directions. Following the review a revised Enforcement Policy 
was issued which was essentially a restatement of the existing policy with more emphasis on 
ensuring that it be consistently and effectively applied in workplaces.
The revised Enforcement Policy states that Notices and Written Directions must be 
issued where a breach of the legislation or an immediate risk is identified, whether or not any 
other enforcement tool is also to be used. The exceptions to this rule are
where compliance is achieved immediately while the inspector is at the premises 
or on site, and the record of the observed non-compliance, the requirement and 
the compliance with the requirement are included in the inspection record form; 
where a Notice or Direction cannot, for a technical reason, be used to achieve 
compliance, and requirements issued under the inspector powers provision in 
the legislation are more appropriate (e.g., for taking of samples or seizure of 
property);
where WorkCover has issued a licence, approval, certificate or authorisation 
(e.g., in relation to asbestos removal, or operating a crane or forklift), an 
inspector who sees a person or organisation not complying with the law or with 
any of the conditions that are relevant to the licence, etc., may initiate action to 
suspend or cancel it.
Inspectors also respond to requests to arbitrate
disputed Provisional Improvement Notices (PINS) issued by workers' health and 
safety representatives;
• disputed work stoppages due to alleged immediate threats to health and safety; 
and
disputed Provisional Directions related to dangerous goods matters issued by 
delegated officers such as fire services officers.
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The follow-up workplace visit to a comprehensive audit is focused on specific, agreed- 
to improvements and consultation. Some inspectors advise that the new enforcement policy will 
eliminate this approach since they believe they are now required to issue notices in each case. 
On follow-up where compliance has not been achieved or recurring non-compliance exists, 
they must issue a compliance notice or proceed to prepare the file for prosecution.
Prohibition and Improvement Notices steadily increased during the late 1980s to reach 
their highest levels in 1990 to 1991. Table 8.3 shows they gradually fell off from 1991 to 
1994, approximately back to the levels of the late 1980s. This trend may reflect the movement 
through different Departments and the related reorganisation of HSD and its predecessor 
entities over this period. Changing inspection focus and reductions in the inspection resource 
may also explain the declining trend. However, the number of Improvement and Prohibition 
Notices has risen substantially in the past 2 years.
Investigations and Prosecutions
Each of the three principal health and safety Acts requires the Minister to issue general 
guidelines to inspectors about the prosecution of offences. The guidelines identify the 
following matters for consideration for prosecution, and prosecution proceedings will generally 
be instituted if investigations identify breach of legislation hi respect of them:
fatalities;
incidents resulting in serious injury or ill-health;
incidents with potential for fatality, serious injury or health effects;
repeat offenders (e.g., previous prosecution, including where Notices and
Written Directions have been issued);
obstruction or other offences in relation to inspectors;
non-complied Provisional Improvement Notices or Provisional Directions, or
inspectors' Notices or Written Directions;
Discrimination against persons in respect to OHS issues (under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act only);
where other tools such as Notices and Written Directions are not considered
appropriate for ensuring compliance or where there are repeated offences.
Prosecution proceedings may be instituted for breaches of Governor-in-Council Orders, under 
the Dangerous Goods Act and the Equipment (Public Safety) Act. Prosecution for 
manslaughter or offences under the Crimes Act 1958 is considered (in conjunction with the
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Director of Public Prosecutions) where, in the case of a work-related death or serious injury, 
there is evidence of gross negligence by a body corporate or persons in the workplace.
The trend for prosecutions follows the same general pattern as in the prohibition and 
improvement notice data as shown in Table 8.4. The number of successful prosecutions 
increased each year to a peak in the 1991/92 fiscal year and, after falling off dramatically for 2 
years, appears to be on the rise again. A recent policy directive on enforcement (issued on 20 
June 1996) requires inspectors to investigate and prepare a file for potential prosecution for 
circumstances listed in the policy. A record of the numbeir of files investigated for prosecution 
each year is not available; however an estimate of between 200 and 300 was given.
Investigations are co-ordinated by the Central Investigation Unit (CIU). They may be 
carried out by the CIU's five senior investigators, or by the ten dedicated regional 
investigators, or by inspectors. As with all field work, investigation time is logged on 
INSPIRE. The prosecution process consumes a considerable amount of the resource of the 
Division. A survey was recently conducted by an independent consultant, which resulted in the 
estimate that about 15 percent of HSD's resources went to investigation and prosecution 
activities. The same study estimated the average cost of investigation at $30,000 against an 
average fine of $10,000. A very high success rate is achieved, indicating a very thorough and 
exhaustive investigative and selection process. The average time from accident/incident to 
issue of charges is 15 months and to decision about 21 months.
All offences against the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Equipment (Public 
Safety) Act and some against the Dangerous Goods Act are indictable offences, i.e., the 
organisation or person charged with an offence has the right to a trial before a judge and jury 
in the County Court. However, with the agreement of the organisation or person charged and 
the Court, offences can be heard summarily in the Magistrates' Court. Most Dangerous Goods 
Act offences are summary offences dealt with in the Magistrates' Court. Except for 25 cases 
heard by a judge and jury in the last 10 years, all were actually heard by the Magistrates' 
Court.
Where there has been a previous conviction under the relevant Act, the Court has the 
power to impose another penalty in addition to the penalty for the second or further offence.
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The Dangerous Goods Act also has penalties on a daily basis for continuing offences. The 
VWA has increasingly sought to pursue charges of manslaughter in appropriate cases. In 1994 
a company was successfully prosecuted on a charge of manslaughter, and a director of the 
company of two charges, under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.
There are several evident weaknesses in such a large investment in prosecution. First, 
the fines are typically at a relatively low level, in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 and as such 
cannot be seen as a significant deterrent. Magistrates are not sure that such prosecutions rank 
as serious criminal offences and are therefore reluctant to levy higher fines or use good 
behaviour bonds. Second, the prosecutions are event-focused. Prosecutions are initiated when a 
serious injury or death or a "near miss" occurs and almost exclusively focus on the corporate 
employer and not the individual directors, managers or supervisors. Thirdly, the lengthy tune 
between the event and the application of the penalty serves to delink the event from the 
consequence.
The Industry Commission Report calculated the probability of a penalty being applied 
in Victoria at 2 percent and, even though the average fine is higher than other jurisdictions, 
this results in a calculated expected penalty of only $29. It is difficult to assess the argument 
that publication of the successful prosecutions will create the deterrent effect desired for other 
similar employers, but at the level of penalty currently being levied, this is a dubious 
proposition.
Appeal Process
An employer who has been issued with a Notice under the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act may appeal to the Employee Relations Commission of Victoria (ERCV).24 The 
ERCV may affirm, modify or cancel the Notice. In 1995/96, 12 Notices were appealed (fewer 
than 1 percent of Notices issued). A person who has been issued a Written Direction under the 
Dangerous Goods Act or a Notice under the Equipment (Public Safety) Act may appeal to the
24At the beginning of 1997 this jurisdiction was transferred to the Industrial Division of the Magistrates' 
Court.
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Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Such appeals are very rare. There have only been two 
appeals under the Dangerous Goods Act in the last 3 years.
Employers who have been issued with a Provisional Improvement Notice (PIN) by a 
health and safety representative under the OSH Act may appeal to an inspector. In 1995/96 
there were 94 such appeals.25 In 58 of these cases the PIN was cancelled by the inspector. A 
person who has been issued a Provisional Direction by a delegated officer under the Dangerous 
Goods Act may appeal to an inspector. No such appeals have been recorded. The VWA is 
preparing to release a booklet on the powers of inspectors and the appeal rights of employers 
and others. This booklet aims to encourage a more open process to the benefit both of the 
parties who come in contact with inspectors and the agency itself.
Injury and Disease Reduction through Consultation, Education, and Technical Assistance
The VWA supplements its inspection and enforcement programme with a number of 
other activities designed to provide workers, unions, employers, equipment manufacturers, and 
others with the knowledge and information they need to maintain safe, healthy working 
conditions. This section of the report will give a brief description of these efforts.
Information Network Unit (INU)
The INU was established in 1989 to augment field resources by providing information 
officers whose sole task is to provide information and advice to workplaces. Information 
officers do not have the statutory enforcement powers of inspectors. The Information 
Network's services are directed to the key parties who can influence decision-making in the 
workplace: employers, managers, health and safety representatives, safety officers, and 
supervisors. The Information Network undertakes targeted prevention projects (e.g., assisting 
with the application of manual handling legislation); conducts industry briefings; provides 
assistance hi workplaces; conducts seminars, displays and rural field days; distributes VWA
"Neither health and safety representatives nor employers are required to advise the VWA when a PIN 
has been used.
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publications; responds to telephone and over-the-counter inquiries; maintains a central library 
and regional resource centres; and carries out media activity.
The INU has a head office component and teams of regionally based information 
officers whose activities are overseen by a zone co-ordinator. The co-ordinator liaises with 
area managers to ensure consistency. INU responds to about 35,000 inquiries and conducts 
about 700 industry briefings each year. Since 1992 the Unit has run a shopfront at the HSDs 
headquarters building which responds to visitor and telephone inquiries and sends out written 
information.
The INU is also responsible for approving courses in health and safety which are 
conducted by external providers. The OSH Act permits health and safety representatives to 
take time off work with pay to attend approved courses. The following categories of courses 
are approved at present:
• five-day basic courses for health and safety representatives and
managers/supervisors/others. Eighteen providers have been approved, 
a one-day post-introductory course (Everyone's Business) for managers/ 
supervisors and health and safety representatives/committee members. Three 
providers have been approved.
• a training package (SafePlant) which provides an overview of the Plant and 
Certification Regulations and the responsibilities of all the parties. Five 
providers have been approved.
The SHARE Programme collects solutions for dealing with health and safety hazards 
and makes them more widely available to workplaces via a loose-leaf manual. Solutions are 
usually identified by inspectors and information officers, though workplaces are encouraged to 
nominate their own solutions for incorporation in the programme. The SHARE manual costs 
$75, and there are about 900 subscribers.
The Bilingual Information Programme (BIP) was established in 1985 within the 
Department of Labour. In 1991 the BIP was integrated into INU. The objective was to make it 
part of the mainstream programme while maintaining its special services to workplaces. BIPs 
current activities include providing information to workplaces on the Codes of Practice and the 
provision of OHS information in languages other than English, providing information to 
various communities via ethnic radio broadcasts and networks, assisting inspectors in
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investigating incidents involving persons of non-English speaking background, conducting 
sessions on cross-cultural communication in external courses for health and safety 
representatives, and distributing publications in languages other than English. In recent years 
activity in this area has fallen off, due mainly to difficulties in coordinating the BIP's work 
through regional offices as well as a focus on other projects.
Development Taskforce
The Division set up the Taskforce in October 1995 with a defined 18-month life. Its 
objectives are to develop sustainable partnerships focused on achieving improved health and 
safety performance, provide an enhanced advisory infrastructure and drive increased 
community awareness of OHS issues. Seven projects are currently underway and a long list of 
potential additional projects has been identified. The Development Taskforce's current 
activities include the following projects.
Community relations: do-it-yourself/home safety, off-the-job (24-hour) safety, 
promotion of community safety, safety at school;
Farm safety: training days, promotion of farm safety action groups, tractor roll 
over protection rebate scheme, increasing farmers' OHS skills and awareness;
Local government: improved CEO/senior management accountability, safety 
management systems, development and expansion of OHS professional networks, 
contractor safety;
Small business: collaboration with trade and professional associations to produce 
appropriate OHS tools, use of a panel of accountants, solicitors and financial advisers 
to increase small business commitment;
Partnering: establishment of one-on-one partnering sets between companies to 
promote best practice in OHS (pilots are underway in the plastics and chemicals 
industry and in some regional centres);
Healthshare: establishment of a SHARE-style programme within the 
health/hospital industry;
Building Construction: co-operation with industry associations to improve work 
practices; and
Mechanical integrity: transfer of best practice in predictive and preventive 
industrial maintenance to a wider range of workplaces.
The Taskforce strives to create opportunities that will mobilize and leverage local 
resources in partnerships for specific project initiatives. For example, a community relations 
project will promote off-the-job safety and health through the school system to enhance student
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hazard awareness and enlist worker ambassadors to promote health and safety. The Taskforce 
presents an opportunity to develop greatly enhanced hazard awareness for workers and their 
families and in the long term cause a culture shift where the belief is that all workplace injury 
and disease is preventable.
SafetyMap
Safety Map is an audit tool developed by HSD and launched in 1993. The audit was 
specifically designed to evaluate safety management systems at enterprises. The tool does not 
audit compliance for site specific health and safety issues. The product has been marketed 
extremely well and has enjoyed a good reception. Staff estimate that 2,000 copies have been 
sold throughout Australia and to other countries. Accreditation under SafetyMap is a 
requirement for all self-insured employers under WorkCover. Many large employers also are 
now requiring that the contractors they hire be accredited under SafetyMap as a form of due 
diligence.
While the number of units that have been marketed is high, there are less than 200 
firms that are actually accredited under SafetyMap. The coordinating unit expects to increase 
the number of accredited firms significantly. The tool is aligned with quality assurance 
principles and therefore the expectation is that most medium and large firms will be able to 
achieve at least the entry level certification. The coordinating unit is somewhat apprehensive 
about their marketing success, since they feel they may not have sufficient auditors available to 
meet the demand.
Marketing Unit
HSD has a Marketing Unit that provides a communication function. The focus of the 
material is driven by emerging technical issues and legislative amendments. These are in the 
form of brochures and pamphlets that are given away. The rights to distribute the Acts, 
Regulations and Codes of Practice are owned by other agencies and are marketed by them. 
This unit produces a publication called WorkWords and distributes 24,000 copies each quarter.
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This publication keeps the readers informed on upcoming amendments to regulation, emerging 
issues in health and safety, and general news about HSD.
The planning and co-ordination of Health and Safety Week is also a responsibility of 
this unit. The programme for 1996 consisted of a wide range of events organised across 
Victoria by the VWA and individual workplaces and unions. These events included debates, 
workshops, seminars, displays, roadside tea breaks for truck drivers, a forklift derby, a moot 
court and an art display.
The annual Health and Safety Awards programme that has been operating for 8 years is 
also co-ordinated by this unit. The awards are given for achieving innovation or excellence in 
health and safety. Approximately 150 applicants are judged each year in seven categories of 
industry. The unit also carries out some media programmes when there are new regulations or 
standards and seeks regional media assistance to publicize successful prosecutions to achieve a 
deterrent effect.
The VWA's Corporate Affairs Division has become increasingly active in marketing 
health and safety in recent years. It has run a series of high-profile advertising campaigns 
aimed at promoting a pervasive culture of safety within Victorian workplaces. The campaigns 
are grounded hi comprehensive research and market testing. Their effectiveness is tested by 
market awareness surveys and changes hi recorded claims numbers. Market awareness recently 
was found to be 80 percent, and a continued decrease in claims reported is attributed partly to 
this marketing effort.
Campaigns include television and radio commercials, posters, displays, and outdoor 
advertising. Recent campaigns are
WorkCover's working to stop injuries - promoted better communication between
management and workers, improved workplace environments, job rotation,
training, workers' exercise programmes and safety responsibility at the supervisor
level;
Quiet Tragedy - highlighted the number of deaths and severe injuries in Victorian
workplaces;
Safety: think it, talk it, work it - targeted the "black spots" of workplace injuries:
working at heights, mixed pedestrian and vehicle traffic, manual handling, and
insufficient management commitment.
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Major safety promotion displays are held at shows, exhibitions and field days throughout 
Victoria, including the Royal Melbourne Show and the "Victoria on Show" exhibition. Safety 
videos are produced, and there has also been a range of activities to promote safety in the 
farming community.
Stakeholder Feedback
In this section of the report, feedback from employers and labour on the VWA health 
and safety efforts is provided. Since we talked to a significant number of such stakeholders in 
the course of carrying out this study, it seems appropriate to record their reactions to the 
system as they experience it. Of necessity, these comments are more subjective, and are also 
subject to less cross-referencing than other material in the report. Nevertheless, they are an 
important part of our review and analysis. Ultimately, the stakeholders will get the system they 
want, and their perceptions are an important part of an evaluation of the performance of the 
VWA.
Employer Comment
Employers complain that the Division has an excessively intense interest hi prosecution. 
They believe the preoccupation with putting the legal case together hinders the true preventive 
value of the accident investigation. Small- to medium-sized enterprises express concern that 
fines resulting from prosecution may in fact reduce their financial capacity to improve health 
and safety standards at the workplace. They argue for a system that would require the penalty 
to be invested in improvements to standards at the workplace.
Employers believe that the targeting system and the lack of field inspector capacity 
results in an uneven playing field. They argue that sporadic and arbitrary enforcement fuels a 
low expectation of detection of non-compliance and subsequent action. They believe this could 
result in good operators being driven out of business, especially in the building and 
construction industry where competition is stiff in the tendering process. Employers are 
reluctant to seek advice and assistance from the inspectorate. In spite of the establishment of an
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Information and Advisory Network to deliver service in a non-threatening way, many 
employers still perceive a threat because the officers are part of the enforcement organisation.
Self-insured employers believe SafetyMap is an effective tool that will result in the 
development of a higher level of hazard awareness and drive behavioural change at the 
workplace. There is support for the Management System Coordinating Unit's belief that there 
is room for improvement to the audit process.
Some employer representatives were very critical of the knowledge and skills of the 
inspectorate. Low pay levels and lack of recognition for those with ability were blamed for 
many of the good inspectors leaving the Division. In addition, the cyclical variations caused by 
changes in government was seen to reward those who were politically astute as opposed to 
those with good skills in health and safety issues.
One employer association was extremely critical of the process they had been through 
to get approval of a course developed to train health and safety representatives. After 7 months 
of process, during which the goal posts were constantly moved, the impression was that the 
HSD did not wish to approve any courses, even though the legislation requires it. This 
frustration led to the comment that everything HSD did seemed to be very bureaucratic, 
convoluted and designed with the specific purpose of maintaining or increasing staffing levels.
One association stated the SATS system was another useless paper exercise hi that it 
was too subjective and lacks consistency. They recommended the energy be applied to assisting 
small businesses who do not have access to health and safety professional assistance and also to 
providing these enterprises with best practices information.
In common with complaints from labour, employers found a lack of opportunity to 
communicate with HSD and believed some form of consultative process was needed. One 
regional office was said to be a problem because the staff were rude, not interested in being 
helpful and the inspectors were also found to be threatening to employers. Employers found 
inspectors often reluctant to provide advice, and that they would only point to the regulations 
or codes to indicate what was expected. Employers sensed that the problem might be systemic 
since they believe HSD really does not understand what employers need.
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The Division provides a lot of information developed by specialists, however employers 
complain that they have difficulty getting a yes or no answer to a question. It appears to the 
employer as a fear of being held accountable for the advice given. The Division is not viewed 
as proactive or responsive to emerging health and safety issues. In a recent discussion paper, 
an employer association has called for major reform to the OHS legislation and further
regulatory changes. They strongly recommend greater involvement by employers in OHS
j 
regulation and code of practice development.
Of course, this sentiment is echoed by the labour representatives and would mean 
reconstructing a tripartite committee that was only recently disbanded. Involvement of the 
community as advisors is critical to the regulation making process. However, recent experience 
in another jurisdiction in North America (British Columbia) where a consensus approach was 
tried led to a process that has taken many years, cost millions, and produced purposely vague 
regulatory language that had to be bargained over at every step. Each workplace party 
interprets the requirements differently and policy had to be developed to establish the intent. 
Achieving a balanced approach that has meaningful consultation and yet achieves timely and 
clear regulatory amendment must be the goal.
Employer associations complain that there is a lack of consistency in service delivery 
by inspectors. It should be noted this is a common concern of employers world-wide in dealing 
with OHS regulators. On the other hand, employers often point out that each workplace is 
unique and inspectors should be more flexible in determining the level of non-compliance. 
Regulators can ensure consistency through training and strong policy direction; however, the 
natural result is no exceptions in following policy and thus no flexibility.
The reorganisation of the Division was touted to provide a one-stop service to 
employers. Some employer's view is that the strategy is not working, since they find 
interaction with different parts of the Division still produces inconsistent advice and direction. 
The performance-based regulations are an area of concern because of the manner of application 
by the inspectors. Compliance with them is reduced to the individual inspector's view of what 
is required. To overcome many of the issues a suggestion was the formation of regular forums 
with employer representatives to discuss emerging issues.
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Consultant Comments
Independent health and safety consultants believe that the Division is suffering from a 
long history of political influence, and there is a carryover of policy and behaviour from that 
history. They expressed concern that the integration with VWA might drive inappropriate 
prevention strategies that were exclusively founded on the costly claims. They believe the 
Division's efforts are hampered by a poor database, in that all workplaces are not captured and 
only the excess claims are reported. Further, they have a grave concern that the information on 
workplace hygiene issues is either non-existent or very poor.
The consultants also did not give high marks to the VWA prevention media campaigns. 
They acknowledge the effort achieved high audience awareness, however, the feeling is that 
they are not targeting the real hazards in the workplace. Another concern consultants have is 
that employers do not understand the new performance-based approach and still view HSD as 
an agency that provides the historic inspection and enforcement service. In addition, they are 
highly critical of industry associations. They are sceptical that these organisations have much 
interest in a proactive agenda for health and safety issues, unless the effort is funded by grants 
or awards. On a positive note, these consultants believe improved targeting of the inspection 
resource could make a significant difference to the reduction of injury and disease.
SafetyMap is a leading edge approach to fostering the development of safety 
management systems that drive employer and worker responsibility for workplace safety. At 
the same time the approach ensures the regulator is monitoring the effectiveness of this strategy 
at each firm that is accredited. Victoria is years ahead of other jurisdictions around the world 
that are developing similar approaches. However, at the moment Australian critics seem to be 
sceptical about the long-term effectiveness of the safety management strategy in reducing 
injury and disease, even at large, well-resourced enterprises.
Consultants view HSD as being over-organised, highly inefficient, and very politicized. 
The strong emphasis on prosecutions is viewed as an ineffective use of resources. Critics 
believe that corporations approach a prosecution with a heavy emphasis on making the good 
corporate citizen argument and also shifting the blame and responsibility. Furthermore, they 
believe enforcement by HSD must move more rapidly to a decision to penalize in order to
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achieve corrective behaviour. The concern is that too much time and energy are expended in 
coaxing an enterprise into compliance.
Labour Comments
Worker representatives express a great deal of concern that they cannot get a speedy 
response from HSD inspectors when they have complaints at the workplace. They believe that 
there are too few unannounced inspections conducted. This observation was actually supported 
by HSD staff and managers. When an inspector does arrive at the workplace, they frequently 
do not invite participation of the health and safety representative hi the inspection or seek out 
their views on workplace issues. When combined with a reduction in labour's influence with 
employers, this means that workers are losing their opportunity for meaningful participation.
They also point out that inspectors continue to be focused on their area of specialization 
and often walk right past other hazards and serious safety issues during an inspection. They 
observe that inspectors arrive promptly to the scene of an accident where there is loss of life or 
limb but may take up to 6 weeks to investigate injuries such as crushing, falls or broken bones.
Labour views the advisory, training and information role of inspectors as something 
that reduces their core function of inspection and enforcement. They assert that less than 30 
percent of available inspector time is spent actually undertaking workplace visits. This leads to 
their conclusion that most employers in Victoria have no expectation that they will ever be 
visited by an inspector. Thus the minimal risk of violations being detected has for all practical 
purposes left Victorian industry to self-regulate.
The high level of inspection resource invested in the prosecution of employers is not 
supported by labour. They argue that the monetary fine levels are so low and the elapsed tune 
so lengthy that there is little deterrent effect. They would support a speedy, less resource 
consuming process, provided the freed-up inspection time was deployed on increased 
inspections. Labour also questions the value of the resources invested in tracking the 
movement and installation of plant and equipment compared to the prevention of injury and 
disease. Labour is concerned that the Infringement Notice proposal (on-the-spot fines) will not
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have fines that are high enough to reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. Furthermore, they 
do not want any fines applied to workers.
The tripartite structure that gave the labour community the opportunity to provide 
advice and exert influence on HSD has been abandoned and lack of access is of great concern. 
However, labour concedes that the previous Health and Safety Commission was too 
consultative and that change was required. Reduced access and a perceived fortress mentality 
on the part of HSD results in their observation that opportunity for participation has virtually 
disappeared.
Labour points out that the budget of the Division is only 25 to 50 percent of that in 
other states of Australia. Plus, the resources are deployed in a reactive strategy of accident and 
incident investigation as opposed to a proactive random compliance strategy. They point out 
that Victoria has the highest number of workplaces per inspector of any of the states and even 
at one inspection per workplace the re-inspection cycle would take 8 to 10 years. They believe 
that compliance is only driven by the probability of being inspected and an expectation that 
severe punishment will follow. This is based on the understanding that employers face difficult 
competitive pressures and this drives the reluctance to invest in health and safety.
Those unions representing workers in federally regulated industries, as well as those 
representing workers in the education system, complain that the arrangement for HSD to 
provide services is not working. There is no inspection or enforcement activity. The primary 
concern is that education system employers are not taking responsibility for OHS. Under 
reporting of injuries, coercion of workers not to report, and a lack of expertise about violence 
in the workplace and environmental issues are key areas where improvement is needed. In 
addition, the reorganisation of the Division has resulted in the ergonomists and the hygienists 
no longer being available to assist them in identification and assessment of risks.
High marks are given to a noise measurement programme called Operation Decibel and 
the manual handling training programme carried out by the Division. Labour would like to see 
more preventive programmes of this nature. However, labour perceives a withdrawal of HSD 
inspections in this sector and believes this to be a significant contributing factor.
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Unions recommend that training for safety and health representatives be prescribed in 
regulation and, further, that the value of worker participation in workplace OHS be the focus 
of media campaigns. They point out that at present, training falls mostly to trade unions and 
that those who have been trained require upgrading as regulations are amended. They feel 
strongly that the qualifications for inspectors needs upgrading such that the minimum 
requirement would include the 3-year OSH diploma programme.
The publications prepared by HSD are important to labour; however, they criticize 
them as being too glossy and difficult to decipher. They would trade the high production 
quality for a greater numbers of documents that are more available and user friendly. Many of 
the documents they need to meaningfully participate, they find too expensive and believe they 
should be provided free or at a subsidized price.
They point to the fact that the fatal injury toll at workplaces has not been reduced and 
recommend the focus should be on hazard reduction and awareness campaigns. More emphasis 
on research into working environment issues is also recommended.
Finally, labour is concerned that the merger of HSD with VWA might mean an 
emphasis on privatisation of the health and safety function and point to the VWA privatisation 
of the compensation scheme as evidence for their position.
Health and Safety Division Concerns
Senior staff in HSD expressed significant concern at the criticism they receive both 
from the employer and worker communities. They are at a loss to explain this. In addition, a 
concern exists that the Division and its mandate are one that no department of government 
wants. Over the years this has resulted in constant movement from Ministry to Ministry, to a 
stand-alone agency and now to WorkCover. This all leads to a pervasive morale and identity 
problem. Those who have been around awhile point to 15 changes of title for the organisation 
over 20 years! The impression left is that "this too will pass" and not much will change. Since 
HSD also has the responsibility for both public safety aspects and occupational health and 
safety, this Division should be viewed as the champion of health and safety and should be 
highly respected for their knowledge and professional and technical expertise.
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The Technology Section is too reactive in its service to the Division. Some units, such 
as the chemical engineers, are fully utilised in support of the licencing and approval process for 
dangerous goods. The engineers are not able to undertake proactive prevention initiatives to 
achieve improvements in occupational health and safety. There is also a concern that they are 
"out gunned" in the licencing and approval process by the client's experts, largely because the 
Division has not promoted technical currency through attendance at international symposia, 
etc. The manager has been proactive in arranging secondment exchanges with the chemical 
industry to offset these concerns; however, this is not viewed as sufficient.
The occupational medicine unit has only one physician position. That is currently 
vacant, and there is some doubt whether this position will be staffed in future. The hygienists 
and ergonomists act as in-house consultants to the field inspectors. As part of the unit's 
business plan under the reorganised structure, these professionals spend time at the field offices 
on a rotational basis. This strategy is expected to make the inspectors more aware of their 
expertise and result in increased utilisation of their skills. However, these professionals do not 
make their own field visits to enterprises. When they are called upon by the inspector, their 
advice or findings are relayed through the inspector to the workplace. The individual 
professionals are concerned that the inspector may decide not to utilise the information, or may 
have difficulty hi its application or explanation. Moreover, the expert is screened from the 
client.
Hygienists expressed a keen interest hi secondment exchanges with other OHS agencies 
to maintain currency and experience other approaches. These professionals also no longer see 
themselves as part of the strategic planning process. They see their unit as a group still 
struggling with the reorganisation and trying to sort out how they fit, and how best to utilise 
their specialty skills. This is a common theme also expressed by some regional office staff. 
Hygienists are particularly concerned that the government laboratory will be closed and they 
will be left without one that has the credentials to do the analyses they require to carry out 
monitoring. One possibility suggested was the establishment of this analytical capability at the 
University of Melbourne. Moreover, the staff believe such a lab may require financial 
assistance and see this as an opportunity for consideration by VWA.
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The current matrix organisational structure was initiated on 25 September 1995 upon 
the recommendation of management consultants Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. Senior 
management's view is that the state-wide co-ordination in the areas of Plant, Dangerous 
Goods, Working Environment, Enforcement and Public Safety, Building and Construction, 
Information Programme, Standards Development, Management Systems, and Licencing and 
Certification is working well. However, regional managers and their staff say that they are 
being asked to provide the resources to meet targets for service that are not reasonable. The 
total inspector time needed for the targets in a region have been estimated at between 110 
percent and 200 percent of the available resource. Regional managers believe they will be held 
responsible when the targets set by the statewide co-ordinators are not met. The planning 
sessions held to sort out the difficulties were viewed as a failure and, in the end, the state co 
ordinators prescribed the targets. Adding to this dilemma for regional managers is the time 
required for their staff to attend training sessions mandated by the co-ordinators that are often 
scheduled on short notice. All of this leaves them with reduced control over the resources they 
manage.
Both inside and outside HSD the sense is that inspection of workplaces has the lowest 
priority. The minimum worksite time available per inspector has been set at 500 hours per year 
(about 25 percent) as a guide in allocating scarce field inspector resources. Investigation and 
preparation for prosecutions are estimated by some managers to consume 60 percent of some 
inspectors' time, and the balance is scheduled to projects assigned by the co-ordinators. Senior 
management indicate this is a gross exaggeration. However, it is agreed that workplace 
complaints have the lowest priority. The result is they may not be followed up for weeks or 
until there is sufficient heat generated to cause the complaint to rise to the top as a Ministerial 
Directive.
Staff are generally concerned about the high level of resources invested in the licencing 
of the manufacture, transport, storage and use of dangerous goods. It is widely believed that 
very little of this activity leads to prevention of injury and disease, or any added value to health 
and safety. The dangerous goods coordinating unit has six inspectors, currently being increased 
to 11 to deal with the transfer of the added responsibility for the Port of Victoria. The chemical
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technical group estimates 70 percent of the 12 chemical engineers and chemist's time is 
devoted to this process. The manager of the co-ordination unit is concerned that the number of 
inspectors with dangerous goods skills has diminished, and as a result only 40 percent of the 
targets set by this unit are being met by the regions. Everyone agrees that the revision of the 
regulations in this area to a performance-based approach will alleviate some of the problems.
Dangerous goods are seen as an area of apparent political interest and sensitivity. 
Service delivery has been criticized by the Auditor General, since, in spite of the activity, there 
is no understanding of the level of compliance with the existing legislation. Other agencies 
(Infrastructure and Planning and Environmental Protection) also have responsibilities for 
licencing and approval of dangerous goods, however, there is a lack of co-ordinated service 
delivery by the agencies. There is significant animosity within the organisation directed at the 
dangerous goods coordinating unit. The unit is viewed as a clearing house that orchestrates the 
hand-off of tasks to other areas and adds little value.
It appears that the reorganisation has not been well communicated throughout the 
organisation. The coordinating units are misunderstood and barriers have been erected between 
the regional front-line staff and the coordinating and technical units. The difficulty is described 
by some as a failure to define and document the roles of the various managers. Others attribute 
the problems to either poorly skilled resources in the field or their inability to adapt to changed 
responsibilities. The multiplicity of tasks and demands from the coordinating units is seen by 
many as inhibiting quality service delivery. The reorganisation has created an unhealthy 
competition by the coordinating units and technical unit staff for inspector's time, either to 
carry out projects or to participate with them in workplace interventions.
The coordinating units apparently have higher staff pay levels. This concerns regional 
managers from an equity perspective, and also because vacancies in the units are sought after 
by skilled inspection staff from the regions. This results in a drain of resource from the field. 
The lowest paid positions in the coordinating units are at the same level as regional managers, 
who believe they have a greater workload and responsibility without appropriate compensation. 
Regional managers assert that if a position contains policy or co-ordination functions it pays far 
better and that this drives the proliferation of policy development functions in many units. Both
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internal and external critics of the recent reorganisation believe the coordinating units are 
unnecessary.
Insufficient vehicles provided for field inspection is a significant complaint heard from 
all levels within the organisation. In the worst case there are three vehicles allocated for five 
inspectors. The result is a rotation where each inspector can only spend 3 days per week on 
field activity. This also means that the inspectors carry a minimum of supplies with them since
i
they must carry the materials fairly long distances to and from the vehicles, especially in the 
central office. Inspector time is significantly under-utilised because of this serious under 
complement of vehicles.
While in the office, inspectors answer phones, input data into the database, and no 
doubt have some non-productive time. Failure to provide a dedicated vehicle for each inspector 
also means that they have to fight traffic travelling to the office in their own vehicle, park their 
vehicle, attend at the office to gather materials, fight traffic travelling to the first inspection, 
and repeat this in reverse after the last inspection. This seems to be a very inefficient 
application of scarce inspector time.
HSD also has a remarkable "starship" arrangement of one computer to four desks, i.e., 
one computer shared by four inspectors. Inspectors complain that this arrangement leads to 
great inefficiency since they often find there are more inspectors in the office than available 
computer terminals.
Some inspectors are also having a great deal of difficulty adapting to change. They are 
not comfortable with their revised roles as a result of the performance-based legislation. Many 
are accustomed to being "the expert" and providing the detailed inspection and audit functions 
associated with prescriptive regulation. Employers also have not fully realized or adapted to 
their new responsibilities under the revised regulations. This results in an expectation on their 
part for the old style of service from inspectors.
Many inspectors are not at all comfortable with the new (June 1996) get-tough 
enforcement policy. Senior management claims that this was merely a restatement of the 
existing guidelines, with more emphasis on ensuring that they are consistently and effectively 
applied in the workplace. In spite of this, some inspectors see this as a significant culture
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change for them. They interpret the policy as giving them no flexibility in dealing with the 
employers. They must write improvement and/or prohibition notices whenever they observe 
non-compliance. When inspectors determine there has been a failure to comply or observe 
repeated non-compliance, they must proceed to recommend prosecution. They see this as 
detrimental to the maintenance of good employer relationships and the significant degree of co 
operation achieved in the past. But when one observes that there are approximately 50,000 
inspections each year and only a small fraction of these have generated improvement or 
prohibition notices, it is understandable that the executive has had to resort to this tough policy 
direction.
There is a great deal of energy expended in paperwork and entering data to track 
activity. Both inspector and technical staff raise significant concerns about the value of this 
exercise. The Job Tracker system is similar to that which would be used by a consulting firm 
to track billable hours. It apparently is not flexible enough to allow full tracking of 
multitasking. One professional complained that a 12-hour day had been worked and the system 
would only credit 8 hours of activity. The INSPIRE system is designed to track inspector 
activity by workplace, however there is skepticism that the data reflect what is actually 
happening in a region. Criticism is particularly levelled at Inspire's inability to flag exceptions. 
A new system to track incident/accident investigation was criticized for not being user friendly.
In addition to Job Tracker and INSPIRE the technical staff also use Microsoft Scheduler 
and a correspondence tracking system. The output from Job Tracker is seen by some simply as 
great stacks of paper listing the tasks performed, and of little real value. Inspectors find they 
spend a great deal of time handwriting the paper work that is left after an inspection. If they 
were to observe 100 infractions they would produce 100 improvement notices and spend 
perhaps a day to complete the paperwork. This onerous burden may drive a practice of only 
recording the very serious infractions or even reducing the scope of the inspection so as not to 
observe too many infractions.
Inspectors and regional managers maintain that the inspector positions are underpaid by 
up to 25 percent when compared to equivalent private sector positions. Several have seen peers 
leave the organisation to set up shop as assessors or consultants. Outside inspection service is
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in great demand by employers as they begin to understand their new responsibilities under the 
performance based regulations. Regional managers report an inability to attract appropriately 
experienced and trained replacements as a result of low pay levels. Given the difficulty some 
inspectors are experiencing in adapting to their revised roles under the new regulations, it may 
be that their skills need upgrading coincident with the development of a revised job 
classification and re-evaluation of compensation levels.
Most managers were sceptical that safety and health interventions could be linked to 
outcomes. One manager cited a conference where safety and heath professionals presented 
papers to show how their programmes had led to measurable outcomes. However, all of the 
professionals were claiming responsibility for the same outcomes. The lack of a research 
capability or the funds to support a significant Grants and Awards scheme to foster 
fundamental research by the academic community into emerging health and safety issues was 
also seen as a significant concern.
Regional staff expressed concern that the organisation does not have sufficient data to 
provide an effective targeting system. The top-20 worst industry list is not seen as a 
particularly useful tool. Head office provides the list of industries and the regions are left to 
figure out which workplaces within the region to inspect. Some inspectors said this strategy 
resulted in them often inspecting the same workplaces over and over and preaching to the 
converted.
Some staff raised what they termed the workplace culture and industrial relations 
issues. They believe that these issues are detrimental to improvement of health and safety hi 
some industries. In such instances they view strict enforcement of compliance with the 
regulations and codes as the only effective approach. These views when compared to earlier 
stated views of some inspectors that the enforcement policy is inflexible points to the 
inconsistency of approaches by individual inspectors. This is not uncommon and is found in 
most inspecting agencies.
Staff expressed concern that VWA and HSD were sending mixed or conflicting 
messages to the community about prevention of workplace death, injury and disease and the
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responsibilities of employers and workers. Discussions held to co-ordinate strategies and 
integrate messages in the past apparently did not alleviate the problems.
A significant opportunity is seen by most staff to develop synergy between HSD and 
VWA to drive prevention initiatives. However, a concern was expressed that HSD was 
internally process-driven and that difficulties had arisen in previous collaborative attempts to 
develop and deliver important strategies in a timely manner. On the other hand it was 
recognised that HSD's process strengths and activity focus would compliment what is seen as a 
lack of process strength in WorkCover.
There is a general feeling of apprehension at the integration of VWA and HSD. There 
is a common belief that VWA does not understand or appreciate the importance of the mandate 
and responsibility flowing from the legislation, nor HSD's function as a service delivery 
organisation. In addition, the staff have a specific fear of further integration, even where they 
see the positive opportunities of consolidation. Staff point to an earlier amalgamation of some 
HSD/VWA departments as an example of their concern. They indicate this reorganisation was 
not handled very well and that most of the HSD staff were declared redundant.
Conclusions
Over the last decade, the Health and Safety Division (HSD) of the VWA has 
experienced constant change. In the past 15 years, the Division has been a part of six different 
Ministries or Authorities. In 1982 it reported to the Minister of Labour and Industry and this 
seems to be where most in the general public still identify the prevention field staff, referring 
to them as DLI inspectors. However, in 1982, the new Labor Government moved the agency 
to the Minister for Employment and Training. With the passage of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 1985, the agency moved to the Department of Employment and Industrial 
Affairs. In 1991 an administratively autonomous Occupational Health and Safety Authority 
(OHSA) was set up to oversee and consolidate the delivery of health and safety in Victoria. 
With the change in government hi 1992, the functions were delivered by two divisions within 
the Department of Business and Employment. In May 1995, the organisation was renamed the 
Health and Safety Organisation (HSO), and on 2 July 1996 the responsibility was once again
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moved to become the Health and Safety Division of the Victorian WorkCover Authority. The 
Division actually may be suffering an identity crisis resulting from the numerous name 
changes.
In addition to the movement through various Departments and Authorities, the 
organisational structure has been constantly evolving. This current study is among several the 
organisation has been subjected to over the last 5 years. All of this change is reflected in a high 
level of frustration and cynicism among the staff of the Division. There is a feeling that the 
mandate for health and safety is difficult and politically charged, and for these reasons the 
responsibility is constantly shifted. Each new reorganisation is seen as "the flavour of the 
month," and the staff have developed a fortress mentality that to some degree deflects or 
resists the change. Lack of "buy in" is partly a result of the constant change, but also because 
it is driven from the top, providing little opportunity for involvement of those who are required 
to implement change.
Since the Division is still in the process of adjusting to the reorganisation as a result of 
the Deloitte Touch Tohmatsu report in 1994, any further reorganisation must be carried out 
carefully and skilfully. It should be inclusive of staff representatives from most levels in the 
division during the planning and transition process. The importance of the mandate for health 
and safety dictates the critical need for a period of stability for the division. Since "Prevention 
of Injury" is the primary challenge stated in the mission of the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority, there is now a golden opportunity to achieve a strong identity and stable service 
delivery performance.
The HSD has a very broad mandate that includes occupational health and safety at 
almost all places of work in Victoria. In addition, HSD's responsibility extends to public health 
and safety with respect to dangerous goods and plant and equipment. Given this significant 
scope, HSD needs to utilise resources in a way that maximizes their effect. The efforts of the 
Information Network Unit, the Development Taskforce, SafetyMap, SHARE, and the 
Marketing Unit are being successfully deployed to leverage resources in the community. These 
are successful and valuable strategies, however more effective co-ordination and service 
delivery efficiencies could be obtained.
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The inspection resource is probably sufficient in numbers, but the staff are severely 
constrained in maximising their effectiveness by such things as the lack of vehicles, excessive 
paper and data entry work, the heavy focus on prosecutions, insufficient computer resources, 
and ineffective software. HSD strategies should ensure inspectors are field active for most of 
their day and almost every day of the month.
In addition, improved targeting strategies need to be developed. The SATS programme 
will assist in targeting; however, a significant improvement in the collection of causality and 
source data, other than that needed to adjudicate an injury claim, would assist targeting 
strategies. The knowledge, skills and ability of the inspection resource needs to be refined to 
match the performance based regulatory focus. This should be followed with an evaluation of 
the existing resource base and means developed to upgrade and replace as necessary. 
Remuneration levels should also be evaluated, so as to attract and maintain appropriately 
skilled staff.
HSD's management structure has many layers and as such is seen to be very top heavy. 
The plethora of coordinating units sets up an internal competition for resources, and will likely 
result in blame shifting as aggressively planned objectives are not achieved. The skills of 
technical specialists, especially the hygienists and ergonomists, could be deployed more 
effectively to achieve preventive measures. At the moment they are not empowered or 
stimulated to aggressively utilise their skills to drive results-oriented approaches.
The significant investment in investigation with a view to prosecution is not supported 
by any of the stakeholders. This is primarily due to the belief that the deterrent effect of the 
existing strategy is minimal. This does not mean that the enforcement effort should be 
abandoned. However, a new strategy is needed that does not focus solely on events that have 
serious injury attached; rather one that has significantly greater fines for the occasions when 
prosecution is attempted and supplemented by a process linked to the premium system. The 
existing prosecution focus is reactive to an injury event as opposed to proactive/preventive 
where a serious risk or imminent hazard is observed.
Some services provided by HSD could be as effectively carried out by the private sector 
and some need further refinement. Legislative amendment may be required to achieve the
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desired result in some instances. The community suggested there were mechanisms that should 
be either enhanced or established, included funding research into emerging occupational health 
and safety issues and the development of a meaningful consultative mechanism. Both employer 
and labour communities agree the previous tripartite mechanism was not working, however 
they now feel isolated from participation with HSD.
HSD has many cutting edge-strategies, and for the most part, a highly educated and 
skilled staff that knows its mandate and is dedicated to reducing workplace injury and disease. 
All of this positions the Division, in partnership with employers and workers, to achieve order 
of magnitude improvements to safety and health in Victoria.
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Table 8.1 Regulations under the Principal Health and Safety Acts
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985
OHS (Asbestos) Regulations 1992 Provide for control of risks of asbestos- 
related disease among workers working in 
process which use asbestos and among 
workers likely to be exposed to airborne 
asbestos
OHS (Certification of Plant Users 
and Operators) Regulations 1994
Establish minimum standards of competency 
for people working with cranes, forklift 
trucks, hoists and other mechanical 
loadshifttng equipment, pressure equipment 
and scaffolding, and implement a certifi 
cation system to ensure that those standards 
are observed, hi order to minimise the 
incidence and severity of serious incidents 
involving these types of plant________
OHS (General Safety) Regulations 1986 (to be 
replaced with the OHS [Incident Notification] 
Regulations 1997)
Prescribe criteria for the notification of
accidents;
Prescribe criteria for the keeping of accident
records;
Prescribe age prohibition for the
employment of young persons________
OHS (Issue Resolution) Regulations 1989 Prescribe a procedure for the effective 
resolution at workplaces of health and safety 
issues as they arise, where there is no 
agreed process for resolution________
OHS (Lead Control) Regulations 1988 Provide measures to protect people at work 
against risks to health or safety arising from 
exposure to lead _____
OHS (Manual Handling) Regulations 1988
Provide measures to reduce the number and 
severity of injuries resulting from manual 
handling tasks in workplaces; 
Require employers to assess and control 
risks arising from manual handling activities 
in workplaces_________________
OHS (Noise) Regulations 1992 Provide measures to protect people at work 
against risks to health or safety arising from 
noise ___
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OHS (Plant) Regulations 1995
———————————————————————i 
Provide measures to protect people at work 
against risks to health or safety arising from 
plant and systems of work associated with 
plant___________________
Dangerous Goods Act 1985
DG (Explosives) Regulations 1988 Provide for safety in the manufacture, 
transport, storage, sale, import and use of 
explosives;
Provide for safety in the making of 
explosives mixtures other than at a factory; 
Provide for safety in the filling of safety 
cartridges other than at a factory; 
Provide for the safe location of ships 
containing explosives while in port; 
Prescribe matters for the purposes of the Act
DG (Liquefied Gases Transfer) Regulations 
1987
Specify various matters relating to liquefied 
gas containers and cylinders; 
Set requirements for maintenance, 
alteration, and repair at liquefied gas storage 
installations
DG (Storage and Handling) Regulations 1989 Provide measures to promote the health and
safety of people and the safety of property in
relation to the storage, handling, transfer,
use, manufacture and sale of dangerous
goods at premises;
Prescribe matters for the purposes of the
DGAct
DG (Transport) Regulations) 1987
Provide for the licencing of vehicles used to
transport dangerous goods hi bulk;
Provide for the registration of persons who
drive vehicles used to transport dangerous
goods in bulk;
Adopt the Transport Code;
Specify requirements that must be observed
to enhance safety in the transport of
dangerous goods_______________
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Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994
E(PS) (General) Regulations 1995 Declare certain equipment to be prescribed 
equipment for the purposes of these 
Regulations and the E(PS) Act 
Provide for the health and safety of people 
in relation to prescribed equipment
Source: VWA
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Temporary Electrical Installations on Building 
and Construction Sites
Manual Handling
Safety Precautions in Trenching Operations
Safe Work on Roofs (excluding villa 
construction)
Safe Use of Cranes in the Building and 
Construction Industry
Safety in Forest Operations
Building and Construction Workplaces
Demolition
Manual Handling (Occupational Overuse 
Syndrome)
Provision of Occupational Health and Safety 
Information in Languages other than English
Noise
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Chapter 9 ATTENTION POINTS
As in other comparable studies of workers' compensation systems in North America, 
we have taken the liberty to record in this chapter our summary observations about the 
workers' compensation system of Victoria in the form of "attention points." These attention 
points are identified as such because they represent special strengths of the system or because 
they warrant, at least in our opinion, additional attention by those who seek to improve the 
system.
We have depended very heavily on the available data, and on what people intimately 
familiar with the VWA have told us. It would not be possible to perform such system reviews 
without the wholehearted support of these people. Our reactions to what we have heard and the 
judgments that result are, of course, solely our responsibility. We hope that the issues we 
identify for attention here will resonate with decision makers in Victoria. However, we 
purposely do not prescribe cures for problems identified; we believe this is the responsibility of 
the stakeholders in the system. We simply offer what we hope is a well informed outside 
perspective on the workers' compensation system hi Victoria.
It is also important to emphasize that we were unable to stay current with very recent 
policy developments hi Victoria. It was necessary to keep our focus on the "official" 
observation date of July 1996. While this means that some of our attention points may already 
have been addressed with amending legislation, it was simply not possible for us to keep up 
with the latest alterations in an environment as dynamic as that in Victoria.
For purposes of exposition, we have grouped our observations into the broad categories 
of (1) general issues; (2) insurer regulation issues; (3) compensation issues; (4) rehabilitation 
issues; and (5) prevention issues. Within each of these categories, our attention points are 
numbered for convenient reference. However, the points are not presented in priority order.
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General (G)
We begin with a set of observations that relate to the general approach and the 
accomplishments of the VWA over the period from late 1992 to the present.
G-l. Amazing Transformation
In just a few short years, the VWA has transformed a workers' compensation system 
characterised by a "compo" philosophy, uncontrolled claims incidence, excessive durations of 
disability, and runaway costs. The picture that emerges from our review is of a system that is 
aiming to attain equilibrium and stability at a level of performance that would have been 
unimaginable 5 years ago. Claims are down more than 50 percent, durations have been 
significantly reduced, the incidence of long-term claims has been cut by nearly 40 percent, and 
system costs are at the lowest level in Australia at 1.8 percent of payroll. The system is fully 
funded (actually with a small surplus) compared to a 42 percent unfunded liability under the 
last full year of WorkCare. The leadership of the VWA and the Ministry deserve much of the 
credit for this turnaround. Their vision and consistency of purpose have been remarkable. 
While the system has its critics, no one disagrees that this has been an amazing transformation.
G-2. Historical Opportunity
While much has been accomplished, this is not the time for the VWA to rest on its 
laurels. After 5 years, it is apparent that the time is now ripe to rebalance the system and 
carefully adjust the various facets so that they reinforce each other to accomplish both strategic 
and tactical objectives. The merger of the former Health and Safety Organisation and the VWA 
in 1996 creates a historical opportunity for a thorough and careful rethinking of system 
parameters. Bringing the mission and operations of HSD into the VWA will prove challenging, 
but if it can be done with the kind of creative thinking that has characterised the past 5 years, it 
can move the entire organisation to new heights of achievement.
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G-3. Cultural Change through Media
We are not aware of any other workers' compensation system in the world that has used 
media more aggressively or more effectively than has the VWA. Their fundamental faith in the 
power of the media to effect a change in the "compo" culture that characterised Victoria's 
workers' compensation system previously has paid off in a major way. From injured workers 
and their employers to the doctors and other medical practitioners that treat them, the VWA 
has changed the expectations that participants have about the system. The media strategy of the 
VWA has been a leading element of this change. The merger with HSD creates the opportunity 
to carry the media message into new areas. This promises additional returns in the fight to 
prevent workplace injury and disease and to minimise its disabling consequences.
G-4. Stakeholder Input
Our interviews revealed that labour and management, as well as other stakeholders, 
have perceived a problem over consultation with the VWA and policy makers. The complaint 
has been that the "consultation" resembles a "briefing" on what the VWA or the government 
has already decided to do. We believe the system in Victoria has matured sufficiently that 
further improvements will depend upon participation and ownership by stakeholders. Thus, it 
seems that it is time to move to a more open, consultative policy development process. This 
does not mean that VWA management abdicates its decision making responsibility, but rather 
that they recognise the legitimate self-interest of stakeholders and allow for the input of those 
viewpoints before critically important decisions are made. While it may take a little longer, 
this will lead to more durable decisions and sounder policy judgments in the long run.
Insurer Regulation (I)
There are a number of issues which emerged from our review of the insurer regulation 
procedures at the VWA. It is difficult to forecast how future policy changes may impact the 
role of the VWA, given the uncertainties about possible changes in regulatory policies and 
mechanisms and further privatisation of the provision of insurance services. We have tried to 
formulate attention points that address these uncertainties, as well as the eventual operational
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issues that will emerge from the political decisions about the relative roles of the insurers and 
the VWA.
1-1. Improvements in Scheme Performance
The regulatory scheme appears to have been successful in managing the transition from 
the limited insurer functions under WorkCare to the insurers' expanded role under 
WorkCover. This has been a learning process for both regulators and insurers, and the success 
of the WorkCover scheme is at least partly attributable to more sophisticated regulatory 
mechanisms, as well as the development of insurers' capabilities. Improvements in reserve 
analysis, pricing, and detailed scheme information are among the most notable 
accomplishments of this system. The VWA has continued to refine its regulatory mechanisms 
as problems are identified and insurers' capabilities have evolved. Because of these efforts, we 
believe insurers will be in a better position to assume expanded functions and exercise greater 
authority if measures are implemented to effect such changes.
At the same time, these improvements have not occurred without significant 
government interference with insurers' activities and tension between regulators and authorised 
insurers. Victoria may be approaching the limits of what can be achieved from the current 
principle-agent framework. In looking towards the future, policy makers will need to assess the 
potential further gains from this type of arrangement against those offered by alternative 
models, including those that return greater responsibility and choice to the private sector.
1-2. Role and Expectations for Authorised Insurers
VWA staff expressed concerns that insurers are not being sufficiently proactive in 
helping employers identify and address problems. VWA staff also are critical of insurers' 
performance in managing long-term claims and returning these injured workers to productive 
employment. Of course, VWA's view of the role of insurers and what their objectives should 
be may be very different than insurers' views.
VWA documents, such as the licensing agreement, are intended to inform insurers as to 
what they are expected to do, but these documents cannot be specific enough in this regard. It
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is not feasible for regulatory documents to prescribe every aspect of insurers' functions nor 
address every contingency that may arise. There are likely to be expectations on the part of the 
VWA that are not fully articulated in the documents.
A certain degree of ambiguity is inherent in a system where the government and 
insurers share responsibility for providing workers' compensation insurance. However, this 
ambiguity has been exacerbated by communication problems, political uncertainty about the 
future role of insurers, and economic incentives that are sometimes inconsistent with the 
expressed goals of the system.
Within the last 2 decades in Victoria, insurers' levels of responsibility and discretion 
have varied considerably. Further, when WorkCover was implemented in 1992, it was 
expected that the system would ultimately move to full privatisation. However, today it is 
uncertain how far Victoria will go in increasing insurers' responsibilities. In fact, our 
interviews suggest that insurers themselves have very different preferences and expectations 
regarding "privatisation" which are affecting their current behaviour. This uncertainty about 
further changes to the system complicates insurers' planning efforts and may cause them to 
defer investments that would improve their current efficiency and performance. It would be 
very helpful if these uncertainties could be resolved and all insurers understood the shape of 
the future hi Victoria's workers' compensation market.
1-3. Relations Between the VWA and Insurers
The VWA and insurers are partners in providing workers' compensation insurance, but 
they do not always behave strictly like partners. The VWA acts towards insurers as both a 
regulator and a partner, and insurers respond accordingly., The VWA obviously cannot 
abrogate its regulatory role, but the way it performs this role may contribute to confusion on 
the part of insurers.
Some insurers believe that they are unfairly treated by the VWA, and that VWA actions 
towards them are unnecessarily heavy handed and arbitrary. Insurers generally believe that the 
VWA is not sufficiently open with them and does not consider their views when addressing 
mutual concerns and proposed remedies. On the other hand, many VWA staff believe that
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insurers have not demonstrated behaviour that would warrant easing regulatory pressure. Also 
VWA staff do not acknowledge the communication problems that insurers experience. Clearly, 
there is a certain lack of mutual trust and respect.
We believe the relationship between the VWA and insurers is more adversarial than 
appropriate for their shared responsibilities. The development of institutional mechanics that 
would facilitate better communication and joint problem resolution could improve VWA- 
insurer relations and contribute significantly to improved scheme performance. However, this 
will have to wait until the privatisation issue is settled one way or the other, since this policy 
decision will fundamentally determine the nature of the future relationships.
1-4. Economic Incentives
Structuring economic incentives to promote scheme goals is complicated by the sharing 
of responsibilities between the VWA and insurers. One senior VWA executive asserts that they 
have brought economic incentives to "an art form." The combination of experience rating and 
competition among insurers for employers' business is intended to encourage insurers to 
provide high-quality service, and to work with employers to contain costs.
However, service is only one parameter on which insurers compete and the use of 
"kickbacks," in the form of special services or allowances, is alleged to be rampant in the 
industry. This implies that some insurers find it more economical to acquire business through 
in-kind price discounts (e.g., computer equipment) rather than through better service outcomes 
(e.g., loss prevention and claims management services). The audit programme and best 
practice incentives are intended to contribute to proper economic incentives but insurers 
complain that these programmes are not structured properly and the best practice incentives are 
insufficient to compensate for the deficiencies of the remuneration scheme.
Also, it is not clear that the incentives contained in VWA's pricing, remuneration, and 
regulatory schemes encourage the return-to-work goal which the VWA espouses. The VWA is 
contemplating new initiatives which may help to enhance proper economic incentives 
generally, but the management of long-term claims and severely injured workers will continue 
to be a problem without incentives specifically focused to address these objectives.
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1-5. Insurer Quality of Service and Performance
VWA statistics indicate significant variation among insurers in several important 
service measures, including timeliness, case reserve accuracy, dispute rates, and medical panel 
delays. Some of the variation might be explained by differences in insurers' risk and claim 
portfolios, but sub-par performance by some insurers also could contribute to this variation. 
Multivariate analysis of available data should help to untangle these influences.
These issues, combined with the VWA's concern about loss prevention and long-term 
case management, require continued attention. New initiatives to improve economic incentives 
and employer information, as well as the new audit programme, are likely to improve the 
performance of below average insurers. If not, further measures will need to be considered. 
However, we would urge the adoption of a continuous improvement model for all insurers, in 
addition to the implicit bench marking and relatively crude financial incentives currently 
underlying the regulatory regime.
If better service performance (considering an insurer's specific risk and claim portfolio) 
can be adequately compensated, then insurers would have a greater incentive to pursue the 
performance goals of the system. With this strategy, regulatory pressure can be more 
effectively targeted, and the performance of the entire scheme can be improved.
1-6. Insurer Audits
The VWA's audit programme has been a major concern to insurers, and the VWA has 
recognised the need for its improvement. Although some insurers are not fully satisfied with 
the design of the new audit programme, it may be prudent: to defer judgment until its 
performance can be evaluated. However, fully engaging insurers in a continuing collective 
evaluation of the programme could help to ease their concerns and further support partnering 
with VWA. One critical element which the VWA can influence in the implementation of the 
new programme is the experience and training of the auditors, which has been a matter of 
concern for insurers. Of course, the VWA and insurers need to be willing to pay to recruit and 
retain better qualified auditors, and to commit to longer-term contracts which would support 
additional capacity development by vendors of auditing services.
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1-7. Pricing and System Costs
The government has placed a high priority on maintaining a low overall workers' 
compensation insurance rate, which is considered to be a critical benchmark of scheme 
performance as well as an important policy objective. It is also a legislatively expressed system 
objective that the scheme be fully funded. It is critical to the perceived fairness of the system 
that scheme parameters are not manipulated to maintain the price objective if system costs 
begin to rise. While the goal of maintaining a low premium rate is laudable, it needs to be 
balanced against other scheme goals and the costs which may be externalised to employers, 
workers, or others in the community.
We fear that the promotion of a low rate increases the pressure on the government to 
sacrifice other objectives to maintain that rate. For example, the significant investments 
required to return severely injured workers to employment may not be compatible with 
minimising costs in the short run. However, they may represent the best long-term strategy for 
minimising the social costs of work-related injury and illness and maximising injured workers' 
continued participation in an active lifestyle. Also, efforts to keep rates low should not be 
allowed to mask trends with respect to system costs or other emerging problems, which might 
delay recognition and implementation of remedial measures. It would be beneficial to direct 
public attention to other measures of scheme performance in addition to the premium rate.
1-8. Scheme Information
Insurers' ability to compete and provide high-quality service is heavily dependent on 
their access to information. However, many insurers complain that VWA information systems 
are not designed to allow them to easily extract and analyse data. Thus, insurers are forced to 
expend considerable resources to extract information from the VWA database or even develop 
their own systems. Smaller insurers are at a greater disadvantage than large insurers hi this 
regard, which tends to increase market concentration and lessen competition. Strains on the 
ACCtion system have also prompted the VWA to pressure insurers to decrease their usage. On 
the whole, this tends to discourage the kind of analysis that insurers should be performing (and 
presenting to employers) to enhance loss prevention and effective claims management. Further,
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insurers' ability to calculate accurate reserves, one of the VWA's concerns, is clearly affected 
by their ability to access and analyse claims information.
If privatisation were to delegate greater responsibility to insurers for pricing, reserving, 
and bearing risk, a summarised industry database might prove to be inadequate to meet 
insurers' needs. Generally, insurers' data on their own claims experience is not sufficiently 
credible for accurate pricing. This is recognised in "competitive rating" states in North 
America that maintain a pooled database with access by all insurers. It is not clear to us that a 
summarized database would provide sufficient detail to enable insurers to supplement their own 
data to develop a proper rate structure, nor allow the VWA sufficient insight into insurer 
performance to support their regulatory functions.
The opportunities for "database synergy" with HSD should also not be overlooked. The 
potential contribution of analysing claims information jointly with occupational health and 
safety information would seem to argue for retaining an establishment level database under 
VWA control. Thus, we urge the VWA to carefully consider the strategic and tactical 
implications of the regulatory database proposals.
1-9. Consumer Information
Good consumer information (i.e., to employers who purchase workers' compensation 
insurance) is important hi promoting effective competition and efficient market performance. 
Buyers need reliable, user-friendly information on the performance dimensions within which 
insurers compete. Lack of access to this information in the past has probably contributed to the 
inertia in employers' movement to better performing insurers. The VWA's plan to publicize 
insurer performance data should help to address this deficiency and, thereby, enhance 
competition and scheme performance.
Some insurers are understandably nervous about this development and the potential for 
misleading performance indicators. However, the VWA should not shrink from this initiative 
and efforts should be directed toward refining the accuracy of the information that is provided 
to employers as experience is acquired, rather than suppressing this information. Good 
consumer information will become even more important if insurers are encouraged to increase
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their competition through service differentiation. Using data to enable employers to evaluate 
their own claims experience relative to industry averages, and to feed their potential interest in 
cost reductions are other areas which the VWA may wish to evaluate if it wants to encourage 
more effective use of these mechanisms.
I-10. Self-Insurance and Self-Administration
It is reasonable to consider ways to enhance employers' incentives to contain costs by 
allowing them to bear greater risk and/or be more actively involved in managing their claims. 
There are an array of options to consider: expanding access to individual self-insurance and 
self-administration; extending group self-insurance; permitting retrospective rating; increasing 
retention limits; or introducing large deductible policies. Enabling such options could help 
medium and smaller employers as well by increasing insurer competition for their business. 
There must be safeguards to ensure that only economically-viable employers are allowed to 
self-insure and avoid unfunded obligations to the scheme. Other systems around the world have 
developed self-insured security funds to prevent transferring any cost burden to the general 
population of insured employers. This experience should be reviewed by the VWA before 
offering significantly wider access to self-insurance.
Greater use of self-insurance will also inevitably result hi some "adverse selection" 
(i.e., low-risk employers should find this option more attractive than high-risk employers). 
This could increase the average premium rate for the scheme even though, if it improves cost 
containment among self-insureds, it could lower overall social costs of occupational injury and 
illness. The expansion of self-insurance will also exacerbate the "missing data" problem. Self- 
insured employer's experiences should be part of the system database for analytical and 
comparative purposes. In addition, as the VWA recognises, it will need to rnuiimise cross 
subsidies to avoid unnecessary erosion of the pool of employers insured by the scheme. Thus, 
expanding access to self-insurance will highlight any existing flaws in the premium pricing 
system.
Group self-insurance will undoubtedly become more of an issue following the initial 
extension of this concept to the municipal sector. Certain group self-insurance arrangements
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can offer legitimate economic efficiencies. However, this is a philosophical issue for the VWA 
and policy makers to resolve, because it raises numerous regulatory issues as well. The VWA 
would benefit by informing itself regarding other jurisdictions' experience with group self- 
insurance before venturing into these relatively uncharted waters.
1-11. Coordination of Federal and State Regulatory Responsibilities 
Victoria's authorised insurers appear to fall into a gray area with respect to financial 
regulation. The VWA relies on the federal regulator's oversight of the solvency of authorised 
insurers. However, the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC) gives diminished 
attention to these insurers because they are formed solely to service WorkCover policies and 
cede all of their risk to the VWA. This is not a problem under the current framework, since 
these insurers do not bear any underwriting risk and generally have parent companies that 
could infuse capital, if necessary, to keep their subsidiaries solvent. However, if changes are 
made that would permit authorised insurers to bear more risk, the VWA and the ISC would 
need to reconcile their respective oversight functions to ensure that solvency issues would not 
slip between jurisdictions and place the VWA or policy holders at risk.
1-12. Other Issues With Respect to Privatisation
The prospects for privatisation initiatives are uncertain, but the VWA will likely 
implement several measures to improve economic incentives and increase insurers' 
responsibilities even if full privatisation is not achieved. Uncertainty about the future may be 
the most significant challenge facing insurers. Resolving this issue and developing a shared 
vision of the future structure of the scheme among all the stakeholders would facilitate better 
planning, investment, and other changes necessary to achieve scheme goals.
If there is a move to transfer greater risk and responsibility to insurers, then a host of 
questions will arise as to the appropriate regulatory structure, as well as the transition strategy 
to support this move. Entry barriers, market concentration, price regulation, information 
needs, and solvency concerns would become much more significant issues under a privatised
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scheme. Developing an appropriate balance between regulation and private choice would be 
critical to the success of such an effort.
Compensation Issues (C)
We take the basic structure of compensation as a "given"; that is, we assume that the 
political leaders in Victoria have structured the benefits to accord with current Australian 
realities. Of course, a careful study of the equity of the benefit structure has not yet been 
undertaken. However, there are still a multitude of issues which arise, and we have a number 
of observations in the area of compensation.
C-l. WorkCover Goals Have Been Met
Many workers' compensation schemes are vague about the goals of their public agency. 
Certainly, the same cannot be said about the Victorian WorkCover Authority and its architects. 
The legislation that created this new scheme sought to remedy certain perceived problems. 
Among the objectives were to reduce the number of claims for compensation, to reduce the 
average period of time for which a worker would collect weekly benefits and especially to pare 
back the number of long-term beneficiaries. The WorkCover system has accomplished each of 
these goals.
Many compensation agencies worldwide have sought to restrain various excesses that 
resulted in the growth of costs in their programmes. Some have not succeeded in doing so at 
all, and some have done so only by making their laws overly harsh. Critics of the government 
and/or the Authority argue that their goals were accomplished at the expense of injured 
workers. That controversy certainly cannot be resolved here. However, we did not find that 
the Authority or the underlying law sought to accomplish system goals by disregarding or 
trammelling the needs of injured workers.
C-2. The Erosion of the "Serious Injury" Threshold
The concept of "serious injury" was a central feature in two main areas of the 
WorkCover reform legislation. First, it was introduced as an additional benefit category,
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alongside "total incapacity" and "partial incapacity" with respect to statutory benefits. Second, 
it served as a screening device to limit access to the common law remedy to those instances 
where a work injury or illness had left the worker with a level of impairment equal to at least 
30 percent, as measured by the AMA Guides, 2nd edition. However, parallel to the Transport 
Accident Act, a narrative threshold of serious injury was also permitted, so that the 30 percent 
threshold was not an absolute precondition to access the common law remedy.
In fact, a number of gaps have emerged that substantially open up access to the courts, 
One source of this has been the ability of claimants to achieve or surpass the 30-percent 
threshold through the aoverlay" of a psychiatric impairment on a physiological one. Clearly, 
psychiatric conditions and the associated impairment ratings tend to be more subjective than 
those for physical injuries. 1
A second source of widening access to actions at law has been interpretation by the 
courts. A critical decision, Petkovski v. Galetti. essentially would permit damages to be sought 
where a claimant has suffered a "serious consequence" of an injury, without regard to the 30- 
percent threshold. Similar issues have arisen under the Transport Accident Act, and the law is 
not yet settled here. This potential expansion of the concept of serious injury is a considerable 
threat to the current cost levels of the system. Leaving this decision in the hands of the court 
system also may not be the most effective way of dealing with the social equity and efficiency 
issues involved.
C-3. Consistency and Comprehensiveness of the Table of Maims 
In several respects, some attention to the Table of Maims may be warranted. At least 
three anomalies in the table are apparent. First, the basis for rating most maims are different 
from those applicable to the back, neck, and pelvis. Thus, the very formula for setting a rating 
is substantially different for these different classes of injury. (It should be noted that Victoria is 
hardly unique in this regard.) A consistent approach has the virtue, at least, of being
! We offer no judgment on the adequacy or equity of the December 1996 amendments seeking to end this 
practice.
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understandable to persons with little familiarity with workers' compensation benefits, e.g., an 
injured worker.
A second difference occurs because uniform standards have been imposed in the rating 
of impairments of the back, neck, and pelvis through the requirement that the AMA Guides be 
utilised. No such uniformity is imposed where a worker suffers, for example, the partial loss 
of use of an arm. Third, the Table of Maims does not include impairments to most internal 
organs. For example, respiratory impairments are not found in the Table and, therefore, 
benefits for permanent impairment are less likely to be provided. Combined with an update to 
a later edition of the AMA Guides, it would be appropriate to reexamine the equity aspects of 
the current benefit structure for maims.
C-4. Terminating Weekly Benefits
The process of terminating weekly benefits is frequently problematic for a workers' 
compensation agency. If it is simple for an insurer to unilaterally terminate benefits, it can do 
serious harm to an injured worker, and places the worker in a very vulnerable position relative 
to the insurer. By contrast, if terminating benefits is a slow and contentious process for the 
insurer, it can increase system costs and induce some workers to delay their return to work. 
Both are common in North American workers' compensation systems.
A key to finding a fair balance is to assure both sides that the system can respond 
promptly. Thus far, it appears that the Conciliation Service has managed to arrange and 
conduct conferences very promptly, thereby minimising the difficulties that either side might 
have to endure from the termination process. The significance of maintaining this access 
should not be minimised. Most jurisdictions cannot approach the Conciliation Service's record 
of scheduling and conducting its conferences. While not all disputes are actually resolved, the 
contribution made to dispute resolution overall is very valuable.
C-5. The Injured Workers' Wage Level May Need Consideration 
Weekly benefits under workers' compensation programmes aim to replace a large 
proportion of the lost earnings of an injured employee. The weekly benefit is based on the
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employee's pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). A feature of Victoria's law is that 
the calculation of the PIAWE takes no account of an employee's pay for overtime, shift 
differential, hazard duty allowance or dirt money. For some workers that are accustomed to 
earning such payments, their true wage replacement rate when they are injured is lower than 
that of a fellow employee who does not regularly receive such earnings.
This situation is mitigated, however, by the existence of industrial awards in many 
occupations and industries which provide for the operation of "make-up" pay to the actual pre- 
injury level inclusive of allowances. However, these provisions (particularly in relation to their 
duration) vary considerably between industries, and they do not operate at all in some sectors 
of the economy. In addition, with the deregulation of the labour market, many awards are 
being superseded by enterprise bargained agreements. Consequently, it is impossible to tell 
how significant this issue may be. However, it seems difficult to justify this disparate 
treatment, even though it might lead to some administrative savings through simplifying the 
weekly benefit determination process.
C-6. Payments for Maims Have Been Growing
Though many elements of the WorkCover system have been successful and have curbed 
the growth in costs of workers' compensation, there are certain areas that warrant scrutiny. 
Payments for maims have been growing under the new system. A variety of explanations can 
be given for this. The effort to limit lump sum payments may be the major driver behind this 
development. The role of solicitors is obviously important here as well. The maim benefit, 
including any benefit for pain and suffering (Section 98A), is flexible enough to be used as the 
basis for resolving other disputes between the parties. The pain and suffering benefit is 
especially subjective in character. Further, a larger maim benefit can be used to reduce the 
incentive to seek common law damages, subject to the potential offset of the lump sum.
The WorkCover law has been able to limit the availability of lump sum payments. 
However, it has not been able entirely to eliminate lump sum settlements. Other jurisdictions 
have found that where the practice of lump sum settlements has existed, it becomes a familiar 
and convenient tool for the parties to use, and is extremely difficult to eradicate. Clearly these
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issues need to be reexamined in the current, successful workers' compensation environment.
C-7. Problems in the Setting of Reasonable Medical and Like Fees 
A variety of issues exist in the setting of reasonable fees for medical and like services. 
While some providers believe that the fee schedule that applies to them is too low, the VWA 
believes that fees have been overly generous in recent years. The Authority also contends that 
complaints by health care providers about delays in making payments are overblown and no 
longer justified. Negotiations over fee schedules have been contentious. The process of 
rationalizing and negotiating these fees needs examination.
Managed care has not yet arrived in Victoria, but its spread elsewhere has raised the 
interest of those seeking to curb health care cost growth in workers' compensation.2 All told, 
the current period appears to be one of transition; that is, where important system changes are 
imminent, but their exact configuration is not clear. All parties will benefit if these changes 
were to materialize as part of a carefully considered package of change, with extensive public 
consultation, rather than emerging on a piecemeal basis.
C-8. The Medical Panels Have Been Overburdened
The medical panel scheme has been well designed and could be a highly useful source 
of dispute management. However, the extraordinary bulge in the workload of panels because 
of their use in maims disputes has exacted a price. Delays and backlogs have resulted, both in 
arriving at determinations by panels and in resolving disputes. It remains to be seen how these 
maims disputes will be resolved in the future, with or without the use of medical panels. What 
seems clear at this point is that the panels, as now constructed, cannot be counted on to deliver 
decisions in thousands of disputes yearly. That level of need inevitably raises questions about 
the costs and the quality of decisions, and the impact that delays have on other programme 
elements. It would seem more appropriate to confine the Medical Panels to areas where their 
expertise could really make a difference.
2The December 1996 reforms include authorisation of a managed care scheme by the VWA.
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Rehabilitation Issues (R)
Occupational rehabilitation in Victoria has a narrower arid more constrained focus than 
in some other jurisdictions. This results in large part from the perceived excesses under the 
WorkCare regime from 1985-92. Accepting this reality, we find there are also a number of 
issues in the occupational rehabilitation area that need scrutiny.
R-l. Focus on Return to Work
Since WorkCover took over responsibility from WorkCare, some of the greatest 
changes to the scheme have occurred within the rehabilitation area. The VWA's success in 
changing expectations of both workers and employers towards early return to work is 
remarkable. As well, physicians and occupational rehabilitation providers now appreciate the 
importance of a timely return to work. The VWA has been remarkably effective in getting this 
key message across in its policies, its media campaigns, and in its dealings with stakeholders. 
They have achieved a return-to-work focus second to none.
R-2. Rehabilitation as an Employer Responsibility
More than any other factor, the commitment between the employer and the worker will 
determine the success of rehabilitation. Employers in Victoria generally accept that they are 
responsible for returning workers to their employment. Many medium- and large-sized 
employers have very effective early intervention, case management, and return to work 
programmes. Insurers, large and small, are developing rehabilitation expertise to advise and 
consult on rehabilitation matters. In many ways, the policies of the VWA have operationalised 
the ideals of the disability management movement.
The effectiveness of such policies, however, are constrained hi certain circumstances. 
Small enterprises, hi particular, have struggled with rehabilitation issues and mandatory 
reinstatement laws. The size of an enterprise will inherently limit its flexibility to accommodate 
workers with disabilities. The relative infrequency of injury and disease for smaller employers 
(simply because of their size) also limits the opportunity of smaller enterprises to become 
familiar with occupational rehabilitation concepts and their use hi coordinating an effective and
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in Victoria. The measurement of expenditures, when reduced to some form of contact hours 
between client and occupational rehabilitation provider, also reflects lower than expected 
levels.
In addition, there is little in the way of analysis of the factors that might signal an 
earlier intervention. For example, the fact that a worker has had several previous back claims 
may be an important factor in determining the type of rehabilitation intervention necessary. Yet 
there is no formal mechanism to flag such a case for early intervention, nor to bring forward 
information regarding medical or rehabilitation interventions on previous cases that might be 
indicative of either successful approaches or blind alleys.
The record of the VWA in funding research on rehabilitation demonstrates a long-term 
commitment to improving measurement and outcomes. The VWA is uniquely placed to 
provide a rich source of data that can contribute to both prevention and rehabilitation goals. 
The design and integrity of the database and data-capture systems are critical investments that 
can assist in answering fundamental questions for Victoria.
R-7. Rehabilitation Provider Issues
The VWA plays a pivotal role in the rehabilitation professions in Victoria. The 
standards it sets for services will have an impact on the community at large. The existing 
dedicated internal rehabilitation administrative staff, the advisory and peer review committees, 
and the meetings with provider groups could form the institutional structure for a continuous 
improvement model. The VWA has a vested interest hi fostering the professional development 
of the medical and rehabilitation community.
The hybrid public-private system that exists in Victoria poses particular policy and 
monitoring problems in medical and occupational rehabilitation. While occupational medicine 
has recently gained acceptance as a medical specialty, the expertise of occupational medicine 
and occupational providers is still treated more like a commodity than a professional service. 
The practice of service-provider substitution (where the referral of a physician to a particular 
treatment programme or occupational rehabilitation provider is diverted to another provider by 
the insurer) was widely reported. It is not documented that this practice has been detrimental to
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any individual worker, but the practice is an affront to professional values. The vertical 
integration of some insurance carriers with wholly-owned rehabilitation subsidiaries and the 
ownership of rehabilitation facilities by medical practitioners may exacerbate the problem. This 
raises an important policy question for the VWA; what guidelines or restrictions, if any, 
should exist for the referral of VWA cases to enterprises or facilities where the referral agent 
has a pecuniary interest in the referral?
Prevention (P)
The mandate of the VWA to prevent workplace injury and disease and in some cases 
provide for the safety of the general public is a daunting one, even if the resources to deliver 
such services were fully sufficient. Many of these attention points are targeted towards 
improving the utilisation of Health and Safety Division (HSD) resources, dealing particularly 
with the efficiency and effectiveness of providing field services. The logic is that the 
organisation must be able to demonstrate maximum effect from the existing resource and 
strategies before it can be determined whether the resource level is appropriate.
P-l. Potential Synergies
We commend the HSD on its programmes, several of which represent cutting-edge 
strategies hi this field. The management of the division is visionary, energetic, highly 
educated, and experienced in occupational safety and health (OSH) matters, and firmly 
committed to the challenge of reducing workplace injury and disease in Victoria. The merger 
of HSD with VWA provides a historical opportunity for the division to develop new synergies 
within the organisation and leverage the resource potential. As experienced OSH professionals, 
the division management exhibit a strong belief that the workplace sources of personal pain and 
suffering experienced by workers are preventable.
VWA is to be further commended on its investment in extremely aggressive and 
successful outreach programmes based on sound research; highlighted by initiatives such as the 
"Operation Safety" pilot in the Ballarat Region, the TruckSafe programme, the dissemination 
of best practices and practical solutions through the SHARE programme and the SafePlant
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training package. Both employers and labour expressed support of these initiatives and 
provided suggestions for future efforts.
P-2. Management Structure
The Divisional management count is over 40, or about 10 percent of the total staff. 
Within the sub-sections and area offices there also exist further management levels with titles 
of manager, assistant manager, supervisor, senior consultant, technical consultant, and team 
leader; although it is true that many of these maintain an active field role. Any future 
reorganisation should seek to reduce the number of managers and re-deploy resources at the 
field inspection or service delivery level.
P-3. Human Resource Skill Adjustments
The adjustment of the Division's human resources to the 1985 change from a standards 
enforcement approach to a performance-based approach is not yet complete. We heard this 
story from employers, from inspectors and their managers, and from informed outsiders. The 
division needs to evaluate whether each individual inspector's skills match a performance- 
based regulatory approach that promotes the use of best practices and a systems approach to 
managing safety. Retraining or replacement may be necessary to effect a change in service 
delivery that matches the requirements of the legislation. There is far more tertiary-level 
education available in health and safety matters than there was a decade ago in Victoria, so 
HSD has the potential to retrofit the human resource skills needed. However, compensation 
levels may need to be re-evaluated in light of the specific skill sets required.
P-4. Resource Allocation
The Division might benefit from reevaluating the need for the significant resources 
invested in the development of the various procedure manuals. The volume and detail of these 
appear excessive and incompatible with a performance-based regulatory approach. This may 
also be true of the time reporting system used by inspectors. When field resources are spread 
so thinly, any such allocation of valuable inspector time seems wasteful.
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P-5. Community Collaboration
The Development Taskforce has an opportunity to drive significant and durable 
improvement in the prevention of injury and disease in both the workplace and communities. 
Serious consideration should be given to continuing this effort, with a rigorous impact 
evaluation plan set for a date certain. Consideration might also be given to assist with 
provision of basic OHS information, training, auditing, and inspection services by external 
organisations. Victoria is developing a wealth of private and public resources that can be 
enlisted to help with the prevention mission on a cost-effective basis.
VWA and HSD also might build more collaborative relationships with the State 
Coroner's Office which possesses a wealth of information on occupational disease and injury 
causality that may help drive the development of targeted interventions and research efforts.
P-6. Service Quality Assurance
Service quality needs to be monitored regularly through surveys of employer and 
worker communities. It is particularly important in a regulatory environment that customers 
feel free to give their unfettered opinion. Thus, a random, anonymous survey conducted by an 
independent entity is the most reliable way of gathering information on service quality.
P-7. Specialist Skill Deployment
Given the proliferation of new chemicals introduced into the workplace each year and 
the unknown long-term effects of exposures to combinations of them, the HSD requires an 
active worksite presence of trained industrial hygienists. HSD should consider the field 
deployment of hygienists as inspectors, and as vacancies arise in the field increase the number 
of hygienists.
Manual handling injuries represent more than 50 percent of work related injuries in 
most countries. This staggering number suggests a far greater proactive role for ergonomic 
expertise to assist at the workplace in identification and assessment of hazards. HSD should 
consider ways to enhance and deploy these resources as well, so that they can be more 
effective in delivery of monitoring and assessment services in the field.
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P-8. Inspector Support
Each inspector needs a dedicated vehicle. This would maximise field inspection time 
and promote prompt, quality service to workplaces. The ability to begin their workday from 
home and return directly home at the end of the day, as well as being field active for 9 of 10 
working days (rather than 6 of 10 at present), could provide a 64 percent increase in field 
active tune over current practice (add 1 hour per day =14 percent, move from 6 to 9 days in 
every 10 = 50 percent). This is equivalent to adding 109 inspectors to the current stated 
complement of 170.
An added bonus will be the ability of inspectors to carry brochures, pamphlets, posters, 
and other information they now advise employers to obtain by calling the information officers. 
At present, it is unlikely that the employer remembers what to ask for if they find the time to 
call, and on receipt of the information they are less likely to find and fully understand the 
relevant sections that simply could be highlighted by the inspector while he or she has the 
employer's attention.
Each inspector might also be provided with a laptop computer and portable printer. 
Appropriate software could be developed to provide for data entry right at the worksite to 
produce professional-looking, readable, and consistently-worded documents. Added benefits 
would include the ability to upload information to HSD's database, as well as refer to 
standards, regulations, policies, and procedures on disk or via telecommunication. When 
combined with a dedicated vehicle and cellular phone, the inspector essentially has a fully 
mobile office. Some jurisdictions in North America have successfully utilised this concept to 
make the inspector contact with workplaces more effective and to significantly extend the 
inspector resource hi the field.
P-9. Other Resource Allocation Issues
A significant effort is involved with the monitoring and inspection requirements of the 
prescriptive Dangerous Goods Regulations. The national uniformity process seems stalled hi 
delivering a new model, although far enough along that the outcome may be approximated. 
VWA may want to consider moving ahead with policy revisions to achieve performance-based
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regulation on its own, with a view to regularise with the national model when it becomes 
available.
VWA should also review the significant resource deployed in prosecutions, particularly 
in light of the generally held view that the deterrent effect is minimal. For example, 
prosecutions might be scaled back to cover only wilful and blatant violations where workers 
are injured or killed. A swifter and financially more punitive approach likely could be 
developed in the form of an administrative penalty system.
P-10. Information Sources
A toll free OHS information call centre could be developed which would provide timely 
advice and answers to questions from the public. A few well-trained staff with access to 
computer information sources such as chemical safety data sheets, regulations, codes of 
practice, standards, etc., should be able to handle up to 80 percent of the calls. Those requiring 
special expertise or a field inspector could be routed to the appropriate person, perhaps via 
electronic mail. In addition to supporting the performance-based regulatory approach, such a 
facility creates good public relations for the agency when it is done effectively.
The division could also develop a series of industry specific, user-friendly guides to the 
regulations and codes that are written hi plain language arid offer practical solutions. These 
should be targeted to small business. For example, a guide to health and safety for an office 
employer or a small retail or wholesale trade employer would sift out the key hazard 
prevention sections from the stack of regulatory documents and provide practical examples of 
how to deliver a safe and healthy workplace.
Conclusion
The VWA with its new responsibilities for occupational safety and health has 
outstanding potential to exploit the synergies between prevention, compensation, and 
rehabilitation. Further, the well-established VWA communication resource has the 
demonstrated capability to bring this vital message to the general public. The start that has 
been made in funding applied research also will generate new understanding of the integrated
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mission of the VWA. As champion of both prevention and rehabilitation, the VWA now 
directs the two programmes with the largest potential to leverage financial and human cost 
savings in workers' disability. We look forward to seeing how the VWA responds to this 
challenge over the next several years.
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Appendix
Table A-l VWA Statistics, 1985-1996
_____________________1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996
Average Employment ('000 persons) 1 1,856 1,903 1,934 2,023 2,139 2,018 1,953 1,945 1,966 2,019 2,079
Unemployment Rate 1 6.4% 6.3% 9.6% 4.9% 4.9% 8.9% 11.0% 11.9% 11.5% 9.4% 8.4%
Total Wages excluding N/A $ 28,717 $ 32,727 $ 36,395 $ 40,256 $ 40,460 $ 39,197 $ 40,070 $ 39,042 N/A N/A 
Commonwealth 1
Consumer Price Index 1 4.3% 9.8% 7.1% 7.6% 7.8% 6.9% 1.5% 0.3% 1.9% 2.5% 5.1% 
Average Weekly Earnings' $ 374.80 $ 394.20 $ 414.90 $ 442.20 $ 476.20 $ 485.90 $ 504.40 $ 519.80 $ 534.50 $ 558.50 $ 557.00
Statutory Maximum Weekly Benefits2 $ 400.00 $ 430.00 $ 457.00 $ 481.00 $ 506.00 $ 550.00 $ 575.00 $ 603.00 $ 603.00 $ 621.00 $ 650.00 
Average Weekly Benefits' $ 257.00 $ 270.00 $ 287.00 $ 297.00 $ 305.00 $ 311.00 $ 318.00 $ 318.00 $ 326.00 $ 354.00 $ 374.00
Claimants in receipt of weekly benefits 31,244 80,778 88,784 93,823 88,388 81,836 71,817 61,773 38,703 35,767 33,524 
during year
Statutory Maximum Table of Maim $61,750.00 $66,440.00 $70,620.00 $74,260.00 $78,100.00 $84,840.00 $88,750.00 $93,080.00 $93,080.00 $95,810.00 $100,300.00 
Payment2
> Average Table Payment3 $ 6,089.00 $ 4,626.00 $ 5,856.00 $ 7,128.00 $ 7,268.00 $ 7,857.00 $ 8,523.00 $ 7,324.00 $ 7,110.00 $10,774.00 $ 15,467.00
"* Claimants in receipt of Table of Maims 56 1,119 2,724 3,474 4,779 6,012 7,169 10,924 11,004 8,391 7,540 
payment
Statutory Maximum WorkCover N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $671,760.00 $671,960.00 $691,650.00 $724,070.00 
Common Law-Pecuniary Loss2-4
Statutory Maximum Common Law- N/A N/A $140,000.00 $147,210.00 $154,810.00 $168,390.00 $176,150.00 $298,640.00 $298,640.00 $311,770.00 $326,380.00 
Non-Pecuniary Loss 2
Average Common Law Settlement- N/A $7,796.00 $11,706.00 $13,738.00 $14,913.00 $15,935.00 $22,216.00 $22,832.00 $21,216.00 $26,484.00 $47,751.00 
Total Loss3
Number of Common Law Settlements- N/A 46 295 714 1,770 3,471 4,941 10,529 5,270 4,444 1,720 
Total Loss
Statutory Maximum Settlement for $100,000.00 $108,640.00 $113,640.00 $119,180.00 $122,670.00 $128,420.00 $131,190.00 
Death2
Average Settlement for Death 3 $62,079 $55,374.00 $47,506.00 $52,204.00 $57,859.00 $62,366.00 $72,417.00 $73,006.00 $87,755.00 $97,509.00 $93,669.00 
Number of Settlements for Death 10 97 147 248 246 222 227 144 90 72 95
'Source - Australian Bureau of Statistics - Employment Surveys
2Maximum payment available as compensation for heads of damages as specified and indexed annually in the Accident Compensation Act 
3Total payments for head of compensation divided by number of claimants in receipt of compensation during whole or part of period 
'Pecuniary loss entitlement existed only after 1/12/92
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996
Claims
Claims Reported (all claims lodged in 
period)
Weekly Benefit Claims (Claims lodged 




Journey Claims and Claims<10 days
Fatal Claims
Standard Claims Reported
Claims Incurred (latest estimate by 
Actuaries 31 December 1996)
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WorkCover Administration Costs 
(SM)
15.1 17.5 35.0 55.4 60.3 63.8 55.2 70.4 73.0 67.1 73.7
1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 
1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996
Total Scheme Administration Costs 
(SM) Include Agent & Authorised 
insurer fees, certified payments & self- 
insurer settlements
Total Payments
Permanent Commission Staff (includ 
ing maternity, leave without pay)
WorkCare Compensation Services Staff
Total Staff





Fund (Total Assets) ($M)
Rate of Return on Assets
Net Investment Income ($M)
Gross Outstanding Liabilities ($M)
Outcome for Year (Net profit/loss)($M)
Funding Position (Net assets)
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Doug Campbell, Acting Manager, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
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Brian Cook, Director, Scheme Development
Steve Cummins, Manager, Self-Insurance Regulation
Richard Fuller, Executive Officer
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Ursula Hauser, Bus mess Analysis, Scheme Development
David Hopkins, Telephone Operator
Lorraine Johnson, Director, Information Services
Joe Maher, Corporate Planning, Scheme Development
Sue Masters, Manager, Provider Services
Eileen McMahon, Director, Corporate Affairs
Gerard Moylan, Manager, Regulation, Monitoring and Planning, Scheme Development
Tom Mullins, Manager, Actuarial and Statistical Services
Jay Peries, Acting Director, Finance and Corporate Services
Ray Perks, Medical Panels
Jane Renshaw, Manager, Serious Injury
Bronwyn Richardson, Manager, Research and Development
Marilla Rootsey, Manager, Occupational Rehabilitation, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
Marjorie Taylor, Manager, Training and Information
Teresa Testarotta, Health and Rehabilitation Branch
Peter Tibbits, Manager, Medical Panel
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Greg Tweedly, Director, Scheme Regulation
Max Vickery, Acting Director, Scheme Development
Con Vidinopoulos, Manager, Insurance
Kerri Whitehead, Manager, Licence Management and Insurance Regulation
Dick Wright, Manager, Investigations and Compliance
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Health and Safety Division
Kaye Owen, Director
Halil Ahmet, Occupational Hygienist, Technology Division
Heather Baker-Goldsmith, Manager, Country West
Cliff Ball, Acting Manager, Mechanical Engineering Unit
Greg Bird, Inspector, Preston
Bryan Bottomley, Manager, Strategy
Rod Bray, Inspector, Metro West
Phil Court, Manager, Enforcement and Public Safety Unit
George Crick, Area Manager, Traralgon
Margaret Donnan, Manager, Operations East
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David Ellis, Area Manager, Metro West
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Clare Gallagher, Manager, Information Network Unit
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Jim Giddings, Administration Manager, Western Zone
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Heather Hall, Inspector, Mulgrave
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Dennis Noonan, Inspector, Ballarat
Barbara Palmer, Manager, Systems Unit
Carry Radley, Manager, Standards Development and Coordination Unit
Peter Rankin, Manager, Management Systems Unit
Geoff Rivert, Inspector, Geelong
Glenn Sargent, Director, Technology Branch
Harold Scanlon, Manager, Work Environment Coordination Unit
Adrian Simonetta, Manager, Technology Unit
Irena Taylor, Assistant Manager, Licensing
Peter Vacouski, Information and Systems Management Group, Preston
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Sreeni Vasan, Mechanical Engineer, Technology Division 
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Sue Ward-McGurty, Manager, Occupational Hygiene Unit 
Neil Whitington, Manager, Development Taskforce 
David Wong, Manager, Plant Coordination Unit 
Colleen Young, Manager, Marketing
Insurers
Craig Bakker, Underwriting Manager, HIH
Bernie Bartels, Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Phil Bawden, Claims Manager, Workers' Compensation, MMI
Rodney Bond, Sales Manager, Workers' Compensation, MMI
Bruce Bowlby, General Manager, HIH
Trever Collette, Key Account Manager, GIO
Rayphe Collins, Manager, Risk and Rehabilitation, GIO
Peter Daly, Chief Executive, Insurance Council of Australia
Paul Eastman, Operations Officer, Mercantile Mutual
David Eggar, Chief Manager, QBE Workers' Compensation Ltd.
Barry Ellis, Managing Director, HIH
Donna Evans, Medical Case Coordinator, HIH
Linda Evans, Injury Management Team, FAI Workers' Compensation Victoria
Stephen Grant, General Manager, GIO
Ivan Handasyde, National Workers' Compensation Manager, NZI Insurance
Michael Heagerty, Operations Manager, GIO
Leonie Higginbotham, Rehabilitation Advisor, GIO
Hilary Kerrison, Client Services Manager, GIO
Paul Kitch, VACC
Greg Lackman, Marketing Manager, HIH
Barry Lindgren, Manager, Victorian WorkCover, MMI
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Peter McDonald, GIO
John McGuinness, Marketing Development Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Gary McMullen, Claims Supervisor, HIH
Tony Newlands, General Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Shane O'Dea, Manager of Work Safety, VACC
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Mike Papuga, Administration, Premium, Credit Manager, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance
Steve Regester, Conciliation Manager, GIO
John Schultz, Rehabilitation Manager, NZI Insurance
Lorraine Stabey, Rehabilitation, NZI Insurance
A-6
Cathy Thornee, Manager, Small Business Division, QBE
Dennis Trafford, National Manager, Workers' Compensation, Insurance Council of Australia
Alan Whitehead, Business Development Manager, VACC
Susan Wiegel, Senior Claims Officer, HIH
Bruce Willey, Manager, Key Clients Division, QBE
Susan Wischer, Manager, VACC
Employers and Representatives
Trevor Armstrong, Manager, Corporate Services, Manufacturing, Engineering, and
Construction Industry Association 
Nan Austin, Safety Manager, University of Melbourne 
Val Barry, Human Resources Officer, DuPont Fibres Bays water 
Rosemary Bavaresco, Manager, WorkCover, Amcor, Ltd.
John Bridge, Manager, Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare, Phillip Morris Ltd. 
Malcolm Brown, Manager, Health, Safety and Environment, Shell Australia 
Vanessa Castle, Senior Consultant, Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers'
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI) 
Illona Charles, Safety Manager, Australia National Bank 
Joanne Clancy, Group Manager, Qantus Airways Limited 
Sandra Cowell, Australian Chamber of Manufactures
David Edwards, CEO, Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI) 
Sue Forsyth, Occupational Health and Safety Coordinator, Holeproof 
Tony Graham, Unilever Corporation 
Peter Greer, Director, Greer Industries Propriety Ltd. 
Sandy Hamilton, DuPont Fibres Bayswater
Prue Hardiman, Health and Safety Coordinator, Royal Children's Hospital 
Brian Hope, Manager, National Workers' Compensation and Risk Management Services,
Coles-My er Ltd.
Joe Jurisic, Manager, Human Resources, Nippondenso 
Warwick Koochew, Manager, Workers' Compensation, Mayne Nickless, Ltd. 
Sid Levett, Group Insurance and Risk Manager, Amcor, Ltd 
Elizabeth McFail, Manager, Health and Safety, Royal Children's Hospital 
Colin McLean, Senior Consultant on Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI)
Larry Meager, Manager, Safety, Employee and Environment, Transfield Tunnelling 
Liz Menwood, Chairperson of Southeast WorkCover User Group, Southcorp 
Richard Russell, Division Manager, Safety, Health and Environment, ICI Australia 
Laura Sillitto, Manager, Claims Management, Coles-Myer Ltd. 
Jim Smith, Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association, 
John Smith, Senior Counsellor, Australian Chamber of Manufactures 
Graeme Suckling, Risk Manager, University of Melbourne 
lan Swann, Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association,
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Seyram Tawia, Manager, Safety, Health and Environment, Victorian Employers Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (VECCI) 
Anne Taylor, Metal Trades Industry Association 
Geoff Thomas, Manager, Human Resources, Thiess Contractors, P/L 
David Trenerry, Director, Employee Relations, Shell Australia
Karen Wild, National Manager, Occupational Health and Safety, Australia National Bank 
Ivan Wilson, Kemcor 
Graeme Wishart, Manager, Occupational Health and Safety Projects, Coles-Myer Ltd.
Conciliation Service
Peter Jackson, Director, Conciliation Service
David Bryson, Conciliation Service
Richard Green, Senior Conciliation Officer, Conciliation Service
Fay Yule, Conciliation Officer
Unions
Mick Avent, Australian Education Union
Dr. Yossi Berger, Director, National Occupational Health and Safety, Australia Workers'
Union
Graham Burgess, Transport Workers Union 
Gayle Burmeister, National Union of Workers 
Thea Calzoni, Victorian Trades Hall Council 
Gary Cameron, Trainer, Victorian Trades Hall Council, Occupational Health & Safety
Training Unit 
Helen Casey, Divisional Branch Secretary, Australian Liquor, Hospitality, and Miscellaneous
Workers Union
Judith Edwards, Australian Nursing Federation Injured, Nurses Support Group 
Gwynnyth Evans, WorkCover Project Officer, Victorian Trades Hall Council 
Sue Fuller, Australia Manufacturing Workers' Union 
Leigh Hubbard, Secretary, Victorian Trades Hall Council
Peter Kelly, President and Occupational Health and Safety Officer, National Union of Workers 
Elina Koletsis-Dalziel, Finance Sector Union of Australia 
Elizabeth Langford, Australian Nursing Federation, Victorian Branch 
Geoff Lewin, State Public Services Federation/Community and Public Sector Union 
Peter Livy, Plumbing Division, Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information,
Postal, Plumbing, & Allied Services Union of Australia 
Claire McMurtry, Australian Liquor, Hospitality, and Hospitality Union 
Mark Nelson, Industrial Officer, Finance Sector Union of Australia 
Pat Preston, Construction, Forestry, Mining, Energy Union 
Jeanette Sdrinis, Health Services Union of Australia 
Kath Spence, Victorian Independent Education Union
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Mark Towler, Occupational Health and Safety Officer, Victorian Trades Hall Council,
Occupational Health & Safety Training Unit 
Robyn Vale, Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union
Deborah Vallance, Health and Safety Officer, Australia Manufacturing Workers' Union 
Tim Wall, Australian Education Union
Teresa Weiss, Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
Margaret Williamson, Telecommunications & Services Branch, Communications, Electrical,
Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing, and Allied Services Union of
Australia
Other Government Agencies
Mike Bampfield, WorkCover Support Unit, Department of Treasury and Finance
Len Boehmn, Transport Accident Commission
Faye Burton, Director of WorkCover Support Unit, Department of Treasury and Finance
Eric Chalmers, Assistant Commissioner, General Insurance, Insurance and Superannuation
Commission
Jim Cox, Manager, Field Operations, WorkCover - New South Wales 
Andrew Fronsko, Transport Accident Commission 
Graeme Johnstone, State Coroner, Victoria 
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Helen L'Orange, Acting CEO, WorkSafe Australia, Sydney 
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Judge Brian McCarthy, Administrative Appeals Tribune 
Lew Owens, CEO, WorkCover South Australia 
Jeffrey Rae, Presiding Commissioner, Industry Commission
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John Catto-Smith, Community Skill Share 
Jim Davidson, Deakin University 
Martin Fry, Trowbridge Consulting 
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Chris Knight, OSH Consultant, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
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lan Phillips, Management Consultant, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
Andrew Remenie, Director, Rehabilitation Studies, LaTrobe University 
Stanley Rodski, Chairman, Rodski and Falls
Peter Rozen, Associate, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of 
Melbourne
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Doctors and Representatives
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Dr. Peter Disler, Rehabilitation Medicine, University of Melbourne
Dr. Robyn Horsley, Occupational Physician and Specialist in Occupational Medicine
Dr. Bruce Kinloch, Medical Director, Bethesda Hospital
Dr. Edwin Knight, Occupational Physician
Dr. Peter Lothian, Director, Medical Service and Spokesperson, Australian Medical
Association (AMA) 
Dr. Ray Moore, General Practitioner 
Paul Ryan, Australian Medical Association 
Dr. Kevin Sleigh, Medical Director, Caterpillar
Dr. Mary Wyatt, General Practitioner, WorkCover Advisory Committee 
Dr. David Kotzman, Medical Advisor, Medical Panels 
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